4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com
commit 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 upstream.
pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index zatm_dev->pool_info
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- drivers/atm/zatm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/atm/zatm.c +++ b/drivers/atm/zatm.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <asm/io.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "uPD98401.h" #include "uPD98402.h" @@ -1458,6 +1459,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *de return -EFAULT; if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL) return -EINVAL; + pool = array_index_nospec(pool, + ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1); spin_lock_irqsave(&zatm_dev->lock, flags); info = zatm_dev->pool_info[pool]; if (cmd == ZATM_GETPOOLZ) {