6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com
commit 51081a3f25c742da5a659d7fc6fd77ebfdd555be upstream.
When processing calls to certain helpers, verifier invalidates all packet pointers in a current state. For example, consider the following program:
__attribute__((__noinline__)) long skb_pull_data(struct __sk_buff *sk, __u32 len) { return bpf_skb_pull_data(sk, len); }
SEC("tc") int test_invalidate_checks(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; if ((void *)(p + 1) > (void *)(long)sk->data_end) return TCX_DROP; skb_pull_data(sk, 0); *p = 42; return TCX_PASS; }
After a call to bpf_skb_pull_data() the pointer 'p' can't be used safely. See function filter.c:bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() for a list of such helpers.
At the moment verifier invalidates packet pointers when processing helper function calls, and does not traverse global sub-programs when processing calls to global sub-programs. This means that calls to helpers done from global sub-programs do not invalidate pointers in the caller state. E.g. the program above is unsafe, but is not rejected by verifier.
This commit fixes the omission by computing field bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data for each sub-program before main verification pass. changes_pkt_data should be set if: - subprogram calls helper for which bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data returns true; - subprogram calls a global function, for which bpf_subprog_info->changes_pkt_data should be set.
The verifier.c:check_cfg() pass is modified to compute this information. The commit relies on depth first instruction traversal done by check_cfg() and absence of recursive function calls: - check_cfg() would eventually visit every call to subprogram S in a state when S is fully explored; - when S is fully explored: - every direct helper call within S is explored (and thus changes_pkt_data is set if needed); - every call to subprogram S1 called by S was visited with S1 fully explored (and thus S inherits changes_pkt_data from S1).
The downside of such approach is that dead code elimination is not taken into account: if a helper call inside global function is dead because of current configuration, verifier would conservatively assume that the call occurs for the purpose of the changes_pkt_data computation.
Reported-by: Nick Zavaritsky mejedi@gmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0498CA22-5779-4767-9C0C-A9515CEA711F@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210041100.1898468-4-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [shung-hsi.yu: do not use bitfield in "struct bpf_subprog_info" because commit 406a6fa44bfb ("bpf: use bitfields for simple per-subprog bool flags") is not present and minor context difference in check_func_call() because commit 491dd8edecbc ("bpf: Emit global subprog name in verifier logs") is not present. ] Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu shung-hsi.yu@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -573,6 +573,7 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info { bool tail_call_reachable; bool has_ld_abs; bool is_async_cb; + bool changes_pkt_data; };
struct bpf_verifier_env; --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -9364,6 +9364,8 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_ve
if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) verbose(env, "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", subprog); + if (env->subprog_info[subprog].changes_pkt_data) + clear_all_pkt_pointers(env); clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
/* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ @@ -15114,6 +15116,29 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_ return 0; }
+static void mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off) +{ + struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog; + + subprog = find_containing_subprog(env, off); + subprog->changes_pkt_data = true; +} + +/* 't' is an index of a call-site. + * 'w' is a callee entry point. + * Eventually this function would be called when env->cfg.insn_state[w] == EXPLORED. + * Rely on DFS traversal order and absence of recursive calls to guarantee that + * callee's change_pkt_data marks would be correct at that moment. + */ +static void merge_callee_effects(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int t, int w) +{ + struct bpf_subprog_info *caller, *callee; + + caller = find_containing_subprog(env, t); + callee = find_containing_subprog(env, w); + caller->changes_pkt_data |= callee->changes_pkt_data; +} + /* non-recursive DFS pseudo code * 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v): * 2 label v as discovered @@ -15247,6 +15272,7 @@ static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, s bool visit_callee) { int ret, insn_sz; + int w;
insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1; ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env); @@ -15258,8 +15284,10 @@ static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, s mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz);
if (visit_callee) { + w = t + insns[t].imm + 1; mark_prune_point(env, t); - ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env); + merge_callee_effects(env, t, w); + ret = push_insn(t, w, BRANCH, env); } return ret; } @@ -15311,6 +15339,8 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_ mark_prune_point(env, t); mark_jmp_point(env, t); } + if (bpf_helper_call(insn) && bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(insn->imm)) + mark_subprog_changes_pkt_data(env, t); if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;