5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Carlos Fernandez carlos.fernandez@technica-engineering.de
[ Upstream commit d9816ec74e6d6aa29219d010bba3f780ba1d9d75 ]
According to 802.1AE standard, when ES and SC flags in TCI are zero, used SCI should be the current active SC_RX. Current code uses the header MAC address. Without this patch, when ES flag is 0 (using a bridge or switch), header MAC will not fit the SCI and MACSec frames will be discarted.
In order to test this issue, MACsec link should be stablished between two interfaces, setting SC and ES flags to zero and a port identifier different than one. For example, using ip macsec tools:
ip link add link $ETH0 macsec0 type macsec port 11 send_sci off end_station off ip macsec add macsec0 tx sa 0 pn 2 on key 01 $ETH1_KEY ip macsec add macsec0 rx port 11 address $ETH1_MAC ip macsec add macsec0 rx port 11 address $ETH1_MAC sa 0 pn 2 on key 02 ip link set dev macsec0 up
ip link add link $ETH1 macsec1 type macsec port 11 send_sci off end_station off ip macsec add macsec1 tx sa 0 pn 2 on key 01 $ETH0_KEY ip macsec add macsec1 rx port 11 address $ETH0_MAC ip macsec add macsec1 rx port 11 address $ETH0_MAC sa 0 pn 2 on key 02 ip link set dev macsec1 up
Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver") Co-developed-by: Andreu Montiel Andreu.Montiel@technica-engineering.de Signed-off-by: Andreu Montiel Andreu.Montiel@technica-engineering.de Signed-off-by: Carlos Fernandez carlos.fernandez@technica-engineering.de Reviewed-by: Subbaraya Sundeep sbhatta@marvell.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/macsec.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c index 5e30fd017b3ac..e6a013da6680c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c @@ -260,15 +260,39 @@ static sci_t make_sci(u8 *addr, __be16 port) return sci; }
-static sci_t macsec_frame_sci(struct macsec_eth_header *hdr, bool sci_present) +static sci_t macsec_active_sci(struct macsec_secy *secy) { - sci_t sci; + struct macsec_rx_sc *rx_sc = rcu_dereference_bh(secy->rx_sc); + + /* Case single RX SC */ + if (rx_sc && !rcu_dereference_bh(rx_sc->next)) + return (rx_sc->active) ? rx_sc->sci : 0; + /* Case no RX SC or multiple */ + else + return 0; +} + +static sci_t macsec_frame_sci(struct macsec_eth_header *hdr, bool sci_present, + struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd) +{ + struct macsec_dev *macsec; + sci_t sci = 0;
- if (sci_present) + /* SC = 1 */ + if (sci_present) { memcpy(&sci, hdr->secure_channel_id, sizeof(hdr->secure_channel_id)); - else + /* SC = 0; ES = 0 */ + } else if ((!(hdr->tci_an & (MACSEC_TCI_ES | MACSEC_TCI_SC))) && + (list_is_singular(&rxd->secys))) { + /* Only one SECY should exist on this scenario */ + macsec = list_first_or_null_rcu(&rxd->secys, struct macsec_dev, + secys); + if (macsec) + return macsec_active_sci(&macsec->secy); + } else { sci = make_sci(hdr->eth.h_source, MACSEC_PORT_ES); + }
return sci; } @@ -1096,7 +1120,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd; struct macsec_dev *macsec; unsigned int len; - sci_t sci; + sci_t sci = 0; u32 hdr_pn; bool cbit; struct pcpu_rx_sc_stats *rxsc_stats; @@ -1143,11 +1167,14 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
macsec_skb_cb(skb)->has_sci = !!(hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_SC); macsec_skb_cb(skb)->assoc_num = hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_AN_MASK; - sci = macsec_frame_sci(hdr, macsec_skb_cb(skb)->has_sci);
rcu_read_lock(); rxd = macsec_data_rcu(skb->dev);
+ sci = macsec_frame_sci(hdr, macsec_skb_cb(skb)->has_sci, rxd); + if (!sci) + goto drop_nosc; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(macsec, &rxd->secys, secys) { struct macsec_rx_sc *sc = find_rx_sc(&macsec->secy, sci);
@@ -1270,6 +1297,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa); drop_nosa: macsec_rxsc_put(rx_sc); +drop_nosc: rcu_read_unlock(); drop_direct: kfree_skb(skb);