Hi Suraj,
On Wed, Oct 05, 2022 at 03:02:27PM -0700, Suraj Jitindar Singh wrote:
tl;dr: The existing mitigation for eIBRS PBRSB predictions uses an INT3 to ensure a call instruction retires before a following unbalanced RET. Replace this with a WRMSR serialising instruction which has a lower performance penalty.
== Background ==
eIBRS (enhanced indirect branch restricted speculation) is used to prevent predictor addresses from one privilege domain from being used for prediction in a higher privilege domain.
== Problem ==
On processors with eIBRS protections there can be a case where upon VM exit a guest address may be used as an RSB prediction for an unbalanced RET if a CALL instruction hasn't yet been retired. This is termed PBRSB (Post-Barrier Return Stack Buffer).
A mitigation for this was introduced in: (2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections)
This mitigation [1] has a ~1% performance impact on VM exit compared to without it [2].
== Solution ==
The WRMSR instruction can be used as a speculation barrier and a serialising instruction. Use this on the VM exit path instead to ensure that a CALL instruction (in this case the call to vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host) has retired before the prediction of a following unbalanced RET.
This mitigation [3] has a negligible performance impact.
== Testing ==
Run the outl_to_kernel kvm-unit-tests test 200 times per configuration which counts the cycles for an exit to kernel mode.
[1] With existing mitigation: Average: 2026 cycles [2] With no mitigation: Average: 2008 cycles
During these tests was the value of MSR SPEC_CTRL for host and guest different?
[3] With proposed mitigation: Average: 2008 cycles