On Wed, Aug 01, 2018 at 09:41:04AM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
On 08/01/2018 09:37 AM, Greg KH wrote:
On Tue, Jul 31, 2018 at 03:02:13PM -0700, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
CVE-2018-9363
The buffer length is unsigned at all layers, but gets cast to int and checked in hidp_process_report and can lead to a buffer overflow. Switch len parameter to unsigned int to resolve issue.
This affects 3.18 and newer kernels.
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn salyzyn@android.com Fixes: a4b1b5877b514b276f0f31efe02388a9c2836728 ("HID: Bluetooth: hidp: make sure input buffers are big enough") Cc: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Cc: Johan Hedberg johan.hedberg@gmail.com Cc: "David S. Miller" davem@davemloft.net Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Benjamin Tissoires benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Nit, you only need to bother security@ if you do not have a fix and need to figure out one.
Thanks, I thought anything with a CVE was to go there according to netdev FAQ (dropped security from response list).
Also, you forgot to cc: stable@vger.kernel.org to be included in older kernel releases :(
netdev FAQ said to _not_ copy stable, I am so confused ;-{ (added stable to response list b/c patch is now taken into bluetooth-next)
Ah, well, bluetooth is a bit not normal here, usually stuff that ends up in a subsystem tree before netdev needs to have a cc: stable on it for me to catch it. Hopefully the bluetooth maintainers are on it :)
thanks,
greg k-h