From: Wenwen Wang wang6495@umn.edu
[ Upstream commit 8af03d1ae2e154a8be3631e8694b87007e1bdbc2 ]
In btf_parse_hdr(), the length of the btf data header is firstly copied from the user space to 'hdr_len' and checked to see whether it is larger than 'btf_data_size'. If yes, an error code EINVAL is returned. Otherwise, the whole header is copied again from the user space to 'btf->hdr'. However, after the second copy, there is no check between 'btf->hdr->hdr_len' and 'hdr_len' to confirm that the two copies get the same value. Given that the btf data is in the user space, a malicious user can race to change the data between the two copies. By doing so, the user can provide malicious data to the kernel and cause undefined behavior.
This patch adds a necessary check after the second copy, to make sure 'btf->hdr->hdr_len' has the same value as 'hdr_len'. Otherwise, an error code EINVAL will be returned.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang wang6495@umn.edu Acked-by: Song Liu songliubraving@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 138f0302692ec..378cef70341c4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -2114,6 +2114,9 @@ static int btf_parse_hdr(struct btf_verifier_env *env, void __user *btf_data,
hdr = &btf->hdr;
+ if (hdr->hdr_len != hdr_len) + return -EINVAL; + btf_verifier_log_hdr(env, btf_data_size);
if (hdr->magic != BTF_MAGIC) {