From: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Sent: Tuesday, December 22, 2020 6:22 PM
From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" parri.andrea@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 206ad34d52a2f1205c84d08c12fc116aad0eb407 ]
Lack of validation could lead to out-of-bound reads and information leaks (cf. usage of nvdev->chan_table[]). Check that the number of allocated sub-channels fits into the expected range.
Suggested-by: Saruhan Karademir skarade@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) parri.andrea@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang haiyangz@microsoft.com Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Cc: "David S. Miller" davem@davemloft.net Cc: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/20201118153310.112404-1-parri.andrea@gm... Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org
drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Sasha -- This patch is one of an ongoing group of patches where a Linux guest running on Hyper-V will start assuming that hypervisor behavior might be malicious, and guards against such behavior. Because this is a new assumption, these patches are more properly treated as new functionality rather than as bug fixes. So I would propose that we *not* bring such patches back to stable branches.
Michael