From: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com
commit c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf upstream.
This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're accidently passing -1 or similar.
Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine") Cc: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c +++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c @@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s __le64 lens[2]; } b __aligned(16);
+ if (WARN_ON(src_len > INT_MAX)) + return false; + chacha_load_key(b.k, key);
b.iv[0] = 0;