When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip.
Fix this issue by introducting trusted_tpm_load() and trusted_tpm_new(), which wrap these operations.
Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com Cc: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org Cc: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 - include/linux/tpm.h | 10 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 79 +++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 947d1db0a5cc..4338573a8d48 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -194,8 +194,6 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec) int tpm_chip_start(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_chip_stop(struct tpm_chip *chip); struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev, const struct tpm_class_ops *ops); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 8f4ff39f51e7..0fe1cb5517ea 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -397,6 +397,8 @@ static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, @@ -410,7 +412,13 @@ static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) { return -ENODEV; } - +static inline int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ +} static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest) { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 0f2e893c6b5f..5d6358bea4ad 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -950,6 +950,51 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) return p; }
+static int trusted_tpm_load(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_tpm_new(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int ret; + + ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, payload->key_len); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ret != payload->key_len) + return -EIO; + + if (tpm_is_tpm2(chip)) { + ret = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); + if (!ret) { + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + tpm_put_ops(chip); + } + } else { + ret = key_seal(payload, options); + } + + return ret; +} + /* * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key * @@ -968,12 +1013,6 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, char *datablob; int ret = 0; int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; - int tpm2; - - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); - if (tpm2 < 0) - return tpm2;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -1011,33 +1050,21 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + ret = trusted_tpm_load(chip, payload, options); + dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); + if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: load failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret < 0) { - ret = -EIO; - goto out; - } + ret = trusted_tpm_new(chip, payload, options);
- if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); - goto out; - } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("%s: new failed (%d)\n", __func__, ret); + break; default: ret = -EINVAL;