3.16.60-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" gustavo@embeddedor.com
commit 23d6aef74da86a33fa6bb75f79565e0a16ee97c2 upstream.
`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap) kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index current->signal->rlim
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Cc: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Drop changes to compat implementation, which is a wrapper for the regular implementation here - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings ben@decadent.org.uk --- --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/unistd.h>
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */ +#include <linux/nospec.h> + #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) #endif @@ -1294,6 +1297,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) return -EINVAL;
+ resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); task_lock(current->group_leader); x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; task_unlock(current->group_leader);