5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Archie Pusaka apusaka@chromium.org
[ Upstream commit fad646e16d3cafd67d3cfff8e66f77401190957e ]
This patch replaces some non-inclusive terms based on the appropriate language mapping table compiled by the Bluetooth SIG: https://specificationrefs.bluetooth.com/language-mapping/Appropriate_Languag...
Specifically, these terms are replaced: master -> initiator slave -> responder
Signed-off-by: Archie Pusaka apusaka@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Stable-dep-of: 59b047bc9808 ("Bluetooth: MGMT/SMP: Fix address type when using SMP over BREDR/LE") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 10 +++--- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- net/bluetooth/smp.h | 6 ++-- 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h b/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h index 6b55155e05e97..faaba22e0d386 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ struct mgmt_cp_load_link_keys { struct mgmt_ltk_info { struct mgmt_addr_info addr; __u8 type; - __u8 master; + __u8 initiator; __u8 enc_size; __le16 ediv; __le64 rand; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 878bf73822449..c62ea4c954645 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -5939,7 +5939,7 @@ static int load_irks(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *cp_data,
static bool ltk_is_valid(struct mgmt_ltk_info *key) { - if (key->master != 0x00 && key->master != 0x01) + if (key->initiator != 0x00 && key->initiator != 0x01) return false;
switch (key->addr.type) { @@ -6017,11 +6017,11 @@ static int load_long_term_keys(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, switch (key->type) { case MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED: authenticated = 0x00; - type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE; + type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER; break; case MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED: authenticated = 0x01; - type = key->master ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_SLAVE; + type = key->initiator ? SMP_LTK : SMP_LTK_RESPONDER; break; case MGMT_LTK_P256_UNAUTH: authenticated = 0x00; @@ -8055,7 +8055,7 @@ static u8 mgmt_ltk_type(struct smp_ltk *ltk) { switch (ltk->type) { case SMP_LTK: - case SMP_LTK_SLAVE: + case SMP_LTK_RESPONDER: if (ltk->authenticated) return MGMT_LTK_AUTHENTICATED; return MGMT_LTK_UNAUTHENTICATED; @@ -8101,7 +8101,7 @@ void mgmt_new_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct smp_ltk *key, bool persistent) ev.key.rand = key->rand;
if (key->type == SMP_LTK) - ev.key.master = 1; + ev.key.initiator = 1;
/* Make sure we copy only the significant bytes based on the * encryption key size, and set the rest of the value to zeroes. diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 1c1dc2d2b7d59..af6cc2e8c0284 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -112,9 +112,9 @@ struct smp_chan { u8 id_addr_type; u8 irk[16]; struct smp_csrk *csrk; - struct smp_csrk *slave_csrk; + struct smp_csrk *responder_csrk; struct smp_ltk *ltk; - struct smp_ltk *slave_ltk; + struct smp_ltk *responder_ltk; struct smp_irk *remote_irk; u8 *link_key; unsigned long flags; @@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk); - kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk); + kfree_sensitive(smp->responder_csrk); kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac); @@ -777,9 +777,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu); }
- if (smp->slave_ltk) { - list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list); - kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu); + if (smp->responder_ltk) { + list_del_rcu(&smp->responder_ltk->list); + kfree_rcu(smp->responder_ltk, rcu); }
if (smp->remote_irk) { @@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) int ret;
bt_dev_dbg(conn->hcon->hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, - conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + conn->hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, @@ -1022,8 +1022,8 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp) else auth = 0;
- /* Even though there's no _SLAVE suffix this is the - * slave STK we're adding for later lookup (the master + /* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the + * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator * STK never needs to be stored). */ hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, @@ -1078,10 +1078,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); }
- if (smp->slave_csrk) { - smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); + if (smp->responder_csrk) { + smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->responder_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->responder_csrk, persistent); }
if (smp->ltk) { @@ -1090,10 +1090,10 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); }
- if (smp->slave_ltk) { - smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; - bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); + if (smp->responder_ltk) { + smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->responder_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->responder_ltk, persistent); }
if (smp->link_key) { @@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; - struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; + struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident ident; struct smp_ltk *ltk; u8 authenticated; __le16 ediv; @@ -1294,14 +1294,15 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, - SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, + SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, authenticated, enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); - smp->slave_ltk = ltk; + smp->responder_ltk = ltk;
ident.ediv = ediv; ident.rand = rand;
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT, sizeof(ident), + &ident);
*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; } @@ -1344,7 +1345,7 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp) csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED; memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); } - smp->slave_csrk = csrk; + smp->responder_csrk = csrk;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
@@ -2049,7 +2050,7 @@ static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp) struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; u8 auth;
- /* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */ + /* The issue is only observed when we're in responder role */ if (hcon->out) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -2085,7 +2086,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, hcon->out ? "master" : "slave"); + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p %s", conn, + hcon->out ? "initiator" : "responder");
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf)) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; @@ -2252,7 +2254,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level) hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val, key->enc_size); hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
- /* We never store STKs for master role, so clear this flag */ + /* We never store STKs for initiator role, so clear this flag */ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags);
return true; @@ -2468,7 +2470,7 @@ int smp_cancel_and_remove_pairing(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, /* Set keys to NULL to make sure smp_failure() does not try to * remove and free already invalidated rcu list entries. */ smp->ltk = NULL; - smp->slave_ltk = NULL; + smp->responder_ltk = NULL; smp->remote_irk = NULL;
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags)) @@ -2504,7 +2506,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS; }
- SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT); + SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@@ -2513,9 +2515,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; }
-static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +static int smp_cmd_initiator_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data; + struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident *rp = (void *)skb->data; struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp; struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data; struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; @@ -2914,7 +2916,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; }
- /* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */ + /* Responder sends DHKey check as response to initiator */ sc_dhkey_check(smp); }
@@ -3001,8 +3003,8 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb); break;
- case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT: - reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb); + case SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT: + reason = smp_cmd_initiator_ident(conn, skb); break;
case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO: diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h index 121edadd5f8da..5fe68e255cb29 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h @@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info { __u8 ltk[16]; } __packed;
-#define SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT 0x07 -struct smp_cmd_master_ident { +#define SMP_CMD_INITIATOR_IDENT 0x07 +struct smp_cmd_initiator_ident { __le16 ediv; __le64 rand; } __packed; @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify { enum { SMP_STK, SMP_LTK, - SMP_LTK_SLAVE, + SMP_LTK_RESPONDER, SMP_LTK_P256, SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG, };