From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
This patch has been added to the 4.1 stable tree. If you have any objections, please let us know.
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[ Upstream commit 7c68d1a6b4db9012790af7ac0f0fdc0d2083422a ]
Without proper validation of DODGY packets, we might very well feed qdisc_pkt_len_init() with invalid GSO packets.
tcp_hdrlen() might access out-of-bound data, so let's use skb_header_pointer() and proper checks.
Whole story is described in commit d0c081b49137 ("flow_dissector: properly cap thoff field")
We have the goal of validating DODGY packets earlier in the stack, so we might very well revert this fix in the future.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Cc: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com Cc: Jason Wang jasowang@redhat.com Reported-by: syzbot+9da69ebac7dddd804552@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Jason Wang jasowang@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin alexander.levin@microsoft.com --- net/core/dev.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 4d4213b6f7f6..196476c8b7d5 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -2803,10 +2803,21 @@ static void qdisc_pkt_len_init(struct sk_buff *skb) hdr_len = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb);
/* + transport layer */ - if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))) - hdr_len += tcp_hdrlen(skb); - else - hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr); + if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))) { + const struct tcphdr *th; + struct tcphdr _tcphdr; + + th = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb), + sizeof(_tcphdr), &_tcphdr); + if (likely(th)) + hdr_len += __tcp_hdrlen(th); + } else { + struct udphdr _udphdr; + + if (skb_header_pointer(skb, skb_transport_offset(skb), + sizeof(_udphdr), &_udphdr)) + hdr_len += sizeof(struct udphdr); + }
if (shinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY) gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len,