6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Xin Li (Intel) xin@zytor.com
commit dc81e556f2a017d681251ace21bf06c126d5a192 upstream.
An indirect branch instruction sets the CPU indirect branch tracker (IBT) into WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH (WFE) state and WFE stays asserted across the instruction boundary. When the decoder finds an inappropriate instruction while WFE is set ENDBR, the CPU raises a #CP fault.
For the "kernel IBT no ENDBR" selftest where #CPs are deliberately triggered, the WFE state of the interrupted context needs to be cleared to let execution continue. Otherwise when the CPU resumes from the instruction that just caused the previous #CP, another missing-ENDBRANCH #CP is raised and the CPU enters a dead loop.
This is not a problem with IDT because it doesn't preserve WFE and IRET doesn't set WFE. But FRED provides space on the entry stack (in an expanded CS area) to save and restore the WFE state, thus the WFE state is no longer clobbered, so software must clear it.
Clear WFE to avoid dead looping in ibt_clear_fred_wfe() and the !ibt_fatal code path when execution is allowed to continue.
Clobbering WFE in any other circumstance is a security-relevant bug.
[ dhansen: changelog rewording ]
Fixes: a5f6c2ace997 ("x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler") Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) xin@zytor.com Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Acked-by: Dave Hansen dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241113175934.3897541-1-xin%40zytor.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c @@ -81,6 +81,34 @@ static void do_user_cp_fault(struct pt_r
static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
+/* + * By definition, all missing-ENDBRANCH #CPs are a result of WFE && !ENDBR. + * + * For the kernel IBT no ENDBR selftest where #CPs are deliberately triggered, + * the WFE state of the interrupted context needs to be cleared to let execution + * continue. Otherwise when the CPU resumes from the instruction that just + * caused the previous #CP, another missing-ENDBRANCH #CP is raised and the CPU + * enters a dead loop. + * + * This is not a problem with IDT because it doesn't preserve WFE and IRET doesn't + * set WFE. But FRED provides space on the entry stack (in an expanded CS area) + * to save and restore the WFE state, thus the WFE state is no longer clobbered, + * so software must clear it. + */ +static void ibt_clear_fred_wfe(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* + * No need to do any FRED checks. + * + * For IDT event delivery, the high-order 48 bits of CS are pushed + * as 0s into the stack, and later IRET ignores these bits. + * + * For FRED, a test to check if fred_cs.wfe is set would be dropped + * by compilers. + */ + regs->fred_cs.wfe = 0; +} + static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) { if ((error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR) { @@ -90,6 +118,7 @@ static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt
if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_noendbr)) { regs->ax = 0; + ibt_clear_fred_wfe(regs); return; }
@@ -97,6 +126,7 @@ static void do_kernel_cp_fault(struct pt if (!ibt_fatal) { printk(KERN_DEFAULT CUT_HERE); __warn(__FILE__, __LINE__, (void *)regs->ip, TAINT_WARN, regs, NULL); + ibt_clear_fred_wfe(regs); return; } BUG();