6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org
commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream.
'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode' but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob into with a cleanup helper.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 *blob_handle) { + u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; struct tpm_buf buf; unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; @@ -400,6 +401,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip /* old form */ blob = payload->blob; payload->old_format = 1; + } else { + /* Bind for cleanup: */ + blob_ref = blob; }
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ @@ -464,8 +468,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out: - if (blob != payload->blob) - kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)