6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit 27ce8299bc1ec6df8306073785ff82b30b3cc5ee ]
User->user Spectre v2 attacks (including RSB) across context switches are already mitigated by IBPB in cond_mitigation(), if enabled globally or if either the prev or the next task has opted in to protection. RSB filling without IBPB serves no purpose for protecting user space, as indirect branches are still vulnerable.
User->kernel RSB attacks are mitigated by eIBRS. In which case the RSB filling on context switch isn't needed, so remove it.
Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Amit Shah amit.shah@amd.com Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov nik.borisov@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/98cdefe42180358efebf78e3b80752850c7a3e1b.174414825... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index a8fce2ab0f250..78545f7e9cc6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) rrsba_disabled = true; }
-static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { /* * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks @@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ */ switch (mode) { case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: - return; + break;
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: @@ -1607,18 +1607,21 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n"); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE); } - return; + break;
case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: - pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n"); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB: Filling RSB on context switch and VMEXIT\n"); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); - return; - } + break;
- pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit"); - dump_stack(); + default: + pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation\n"); + dump_stack(); + break; + } }
/* @@ -1844,10 +1847,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) * * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD? */ - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); - pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); - - spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode); + spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(mode);
/* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index df1794a5e38a5..4872bb082b193 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -392,9 +392,9 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next) prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);
/* - * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor - * when switching between processes. This stops one process from - * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * Avoid user->user BTB/RSB poisoning by flushing them when switching + * between processes. This stops one process from doing Spectre-v2 + * attacks on another. * * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the