From: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 898f706695682b9954f280d95e49fa86ffa55d08 ]
Syzbot found a crash : UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG. The underlying bug is the missing check of bmp->db_agl2size. The field can be greater than 64 and trigger the shift-out-of-bounds.
Fix this bug by adding a check of bmp->db_agl2size in dbMount since this field is used in many following functions. The upper bound for this field is L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG, thanks for the help of Dave Kleikamp. Note that, for maintenance, I reorganized error handling code of dbMount.
Reported-by: syzbot+15342c1aa6a00fb7a438@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu mudongliangabcd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp dave.kleikamp@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index a07fbb60ac3c..a46fa0f3db57 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) struct bmap *bmp; struct dbmap_disk *dbmp_le; struct metapage *mp; - int i; + int i, err;
/* * allocate/initialize the in-memory bmap descriptor @@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) BMAPBLKNO << JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->l2nbperpage, PSIZE, 0); if (mp == NULL) { - kfree(bmp); - return -EIO; + err = -EIO; + goto err_kfree_bmp; }
/* copy the on-disk bmap descriptor to its in-memory version. */ @@ -194,9 +194,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) bmp->db_l2nbperpage = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_l2nbperpage); bmp->db_numag = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_numag); if (!bmp->db_numag) { - release_metapage(mp); - kfree(bmp); - return -EINVAL; + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_release_metapage; }
bmp->db_maxlevel = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_maxlevel); @@ -207,6 +206,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) bmp->db_agwidth = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agwidth); bmp->db_agstart = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agstart); bmp->db_agl2size = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agl2size); + if (bmp->db_agl2size > L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_release_metapage; + } + for (i = 0; i < MAXAG; i++) bmp->db_agfree[i] = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]); bmp->db_agsize = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agsize); @@ -227,6 +231,12 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) BMAP_LOCK_INIT(bmp);
return (0); + +err_release_metapage: + release_metapage(mp); +err_kfree_bmp: + kfree(bmp); + return err; }
From: Shigeru Yoshida syoshida@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit c791730f2554a9ebb8f18df9368dc27d4ebc38c2 ]
syzbot reported a warning like below [1]:
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 7301 at fs/buffer.c:1145 __brelse+0x67/0xa0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> invalidate_bh_lru+0x99/0x150 smp_call_function_many_cond+0xe2a/0x10c0 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0 ? __mutex_lock+0x21c/0x12d0 ? smp_call_on_cpu+0x250/0x250 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 ? lock_release+0x587/0x810 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50 on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x3c/0x80 blkdev_flush_mapping+0x13a/0x2f0 blkdev_put_whole+0xd3/0xf0 blkdev_put+0x222/0x760 deactivate_locked_super+0x96/0x160 deactivate_super+0xda/0x100 cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0 task_work_run+0x149/0x240 ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30 do_exit+0xb29/0x2a40 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12a/0x2b0 ? mm_update_next_owner+0x7c0/0x7c0 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 ? zap_other_threads+0x234/0x2d0 do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2a0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The cause of the issue is that brelse() is called on both ofibh.sbh and ofibh.ebh by udf_find_entry() when it returns NULL. However, brelse() is called by udf_rename(), too. So, b_count on buffer_head becomes unbalanced.
This patch fixes the issue by not calling brelse() by udf_rename() when udf_find_entry() returns NULL.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=8297f45698159c6bca8a1f87dc983667c1a1c85... [1] Reported-by: syzbot+7902cd7684bc35306224@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221023095741.271430-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/udf/namei.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/udf/namei.c b/fs/udf/namei.c index da6bd03d51fe..72957b1acb1a 100644 --- a/fs/udf/namei.c +++ b/fs/udf/namei.c @@ -1112,8 +1112,9 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, return -EINVAL;
ofi = udf_find_entry(old_dir, &old_dentry->d_name, &ofibh, &ocfi); - if (IS_ERR(ofi)) { - retval = PTR_ERR(ofi); + if (!ofi || IS_ERR(ofi)) { + if (IS_ERR(ofi)) + retval = PTR_ERR(ofi); goto end_rename; }
@@ -1122,8 +1123,7 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
brelse(ofibh.sbh); tloc = lelb_to_cpu(ocfi.icb.extLocation); - if (!ofi || udf_get_lb_pblock(old_dir->i_sb, &tloc, 0) - != old_inode->i_ino) + if (udf_get_lb_pblock(old_dir->i_sb, &tloc, 0) != old_inode->i_ino) goto end_rename;
nfi = udf_find_entry(new_dir, &new_dentry->d_name, &nfibh, &ncfi);
From: Hoi Pok Wu wuhoipok@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 25e70c6162f207828dd405b432d8f2a98dbf7082 ]
This should be applied to most URSAN bugs found recently by syzbot, by guarding the dbMount. As syzbot feeding rubbish into the bmap descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Hoi Pok Wu wuhoipok@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp dave.kleikamp@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index a46fa0f3db57..0ca1ad2610df 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -211,6 +211,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) goto err_release_metapage; }
+ if (((bmp->db_mapsize - 1) >> bmp->db_agl2size) > MAXAG) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_release_metapage; + } + for (i = 0; i < MAXAG; i++) bmp->db_agfree[i] = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]); bmp->db_agsize = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com
[ Upstream commit 404ec60438add1afadaffaed34bb5fe4ddcadd40 ]
A use-after-free in acpi_ps_parse_aml() after a failing invocaion of acpi_ds_call_control_method() is reported by KASAN [1] and code inspection reveals that next_walk_state pushed to the thread by acpi_ds_create_walk_state() is freed on errors, but it is not popped from the thread beforehand. Thus acpi_ds_get_current_walk_state() called by acpi_ps_parse_aml() subsequently returns it as the new walk state which is incorrect.
To address this, make acpi_ds_call_control_method() call acpi_ds_pop_walk_state() to pop next_walk_state from the thread before returning an error.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-acpi/20221019073443.248215-1-chenzhongjin@huaw... # [1] Reported-by: Chen Zhongjin chenzhongjin@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Reviewed-by: Chen Zhongjin chenzhongjin@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c index d7fc36917c67..88e729e24314 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c @@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread, info = ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED(sizeof(struct acpi_evaluate_info)); if (!info) { status = AE_NO_MEMORY; - goto cleanup; + goto pop_walk_state; }
info->parameters = &this_walk_state->operands[0]; @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
ACPI_FREE(info); if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) { - goto cleanup; + goto pop_walk_state; }
/* @@ -595,6 +595,12 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
+pop_walk_state: + + /* On error, pop the walk state to be deleted from thread */ + + acpi_ds_pop_walk_state(thread); + cleanup:
/* On error, we must terminate the method properly */
From: Jianglei Nie niejianglei2021@163.com
[ Upstream commit 12b9d301ff73122aebd78548fa4c04ca69ed78fe ]
Patch series "Some minor cleanup patches resent".
The first three patches trivial clean up patches.
And for the patch "kexec: replace crash_mem_range with range", I got a ibm-p9wr ppc64le system to test, it works well.
This patch (of 4):
elfcorehdr_alloc() allocates a memory chunk for elfcorehdr_addr with kzalloc(). If is_vmcore_usable() returns false, elfcorehdr_addr is a predefined value. If parse_crash_elf_headers() gets some error and returns a negetive value, the elfcorehdr_addr should be released with elfcorehdr_free().
Fix it by calling elfcorehdr_free() when parse_crash_elf_headers() fails.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220929042936.22012-1-bhe@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220929042936.22012-2-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie niejianglei2021@163.com Signed-off-by: Baoquan He bhe@redhat.com Acked-by: Baoquan He bhe@redhat.com Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: Chen Lifu chenlifu@huawei.com Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: Li Chen lchen@ambarella.com Cc: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: Paul Mackerras paulus@samba.org Cc: Petr Mladek pmladek@suse.com Cc: Russell King linux@armlinux.org.uk Cc: ye xingchen ye.xingchen@zte.com.cn Cc: Zeal Robot zealci@zte.com.cn Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/proc/vmcore.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/vmcore.c b/fs/proc/vmcore.c index 0bfd71bec7f2..2ed309191d91 100644 --- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c +++ b/fs/proc/vmcore.c @@ -1177,6 +1177,7 @@ static int __init vmcore_init(void) return rc; rc = parse_crash_elf_headers(); if (rc) { + elfcorehdr_free(elfcorehdr_addr); pr_warn("Kdump: vmcore not initialized\n"); return rc; }
From: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 610a2a3d7d8be3537458a378ec69396a76c385b6 ]
Patch series "nilfs2: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warnings on mount time".
The first patch fixes a bug reported by syzbot, and the second one fixes the remaining bug of the same kind. Although they are triggered by the same super block data anomaly, I divided it into the above two because the details of the issues and how to fix it are different.
Both are required to eliminate the shift-out-of-bounds issues at mount time.
This patch (of 2):
If the block size exponent information written in an on-disk superblock is corrupted, nilfs_sb2_bad_offset helper function can trigger shift-out-of-bounds warning followed by a kernel panic (if panic_on_warn is set):
shift exponent 38983 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long long' Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x33d/0x3b0 lib/ubsan.c:322 nilfs_sb2_bad_offset fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:449 [inline] nilfs_load_super_block+0xdf5/0xe00 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:523 init_nilfs+0xb7/0x7d0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:577 nilfs_fill_super+0xb1/0x5d0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1047 nilfs_mount+0x613/0x9b0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1317 ...
In addition, since nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() performs multiplication without considering the upper bound, the computation may overflow if the disk layout parameters are not normal.
This fixes these issues by inserting preliminary sanity checks for those parameters and by converting the comparison from one involving multiplication and left bit-shifting to one using division and right bit-shifting.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221027044306.42774-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221027044306.42774-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+e91619dd4c11c4960706@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c b/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c index 9bbdd152c296..3e143c2da06d 100644 --- a/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/crc32.h> #include "nilfs.h" #include "segment.h" @@ -457,11 +458,33 @@ static int nilfs_valid_sb(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp) return crc == le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_sum); }
-static int nilfs_sb2_bad_offset(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, u64 offset) +/** + * nilfs_sb2_bad_offset - check the location of the second superblock + * @sbp: superblock raw data buffer + * @offset: byte offset of second superblock calculated from device size + * + * nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() checks if the position on the second + * superblock is valid or not based on the filesystem parameters + * stored in @sbp. If @offset points to a location within the segment + * area, or if the parameters themselves are not normal, it is + * determined to be invalid. + * + * Return Value: true if invalid, false if valid. + */ +static bool nilfs_sb2_bad_offset(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, u64 offset) { - return offset < ((le64_to_cpu(sbp->s_nsegments) * - le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_blocks_per_segment)) << - (le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size) + 10)); + unsigned int shift_bits = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size); + u32 blocks_per_segment = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_blocks_per_segment); + u64 nsegments = le64_to_cpu(sbp->s_nsegments); + u64 index; + + if (blocks_per_segment < NILFS_SEG_MIN_BLOCKS || + shift_bits > ilog2(NILFS_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) - BLOCK_SIZE_BITS) + return true; + + index = offset >> (shift_bits + BLOCK_SIZE_BITS); + do_div(index, blocks_per_segment); + return index < nsegments; }
static void nilfs_release_super_block(struct the_nilfs *nilfs)
From: Zheng Yejian zhengyejian1@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit c5f31c655bcc01b6da53b836ac951c1556245305 ]
The integer overflow is descripted with following codes:
317 static comp_t encode_comp_t(u64 value) 318 { 319 int exp, rnd;
......
341 exp <<= MANTSIZE; 342 exp += value; 343 return exp; 344 }
Currently comp_t is defined as type of '__u16', but the variable 'exp' is type of 'int', so overflow would happen when variable 'exp' in line 343 is greater than 65535.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210515140631.369106-3-zhengyejian1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian zhengyejian1@huawei.com Cc: Hanjun Guo guohanjun@huawei.com Cc: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org Cc: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Cc: Zhang Jinhao zhangjinhao2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/acct.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c index 354578d253d5..bec90c267ac6 100644 --- a/kernel/acct.c +++ b/kernel/acct.c @@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static comp_t encode_comp_t(unsigned long value) exp++; }
+ if (exp > (((comp_t) ~0U) >> MANTSIZE)) + return (comp_t) ~0U; /* * Clean it up and polish it off. */
From: ZhangPeng zhangpeng362@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 8d824e69d9f3fa3121b2dda25053bae71e2460d2 ]
Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11 CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495 hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84 __hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75 hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138 hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]
If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect: struct inode struct hfs_inode_info struct hfs_cat_key struct hfs_name u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the maximum length of an HFS filename
OOB read occurred: hfs_write_inode() hfs_brec_find() __hfs_brec_find() hfs_cat_keycmp() hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large
Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling hfs_brec_find().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221130065959.2168236-1-zhangpeng362@huawei.com Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng zhangpeng362@huawei.com Reported-by: syzbot+e836ff7133ac02be825f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Damien Le Moal damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com Cc: Ira Weiny ira.weiny@intel.com Cc: Jeff Layton jlayton@kernel.org Cc: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Cc: Matthew Wilcox willy@infradead.org Cc: Nanyong Sun sunnanyong@huawei.com Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko slava@dubeyko.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/hfs/inode.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/hfs/inode.c b/fs/hfs/inode.c index 350afd67bd69..4e795c8d697d 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/hfs/inode.c @@ -453,6 +453,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc) /* panic? */ return -EIO;
+ if (HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key.CName.len > HFS_NAMELEN) + return -EIO; fd.search_key->cat = HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key; if (hfs_brec_find(&fd)) /* panic? */
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Sasha Levin