4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julian Anastasov ja@ssi.bg

commit 5c64576a77894a50be80be0024bed27171b55989 upstream.

syzkaller reports for wrong rtnl_lock usage in sync code [1] and [2]

We have 2 problems in start_sync_thread if error path is taken, eg. on memory allocation error or failure to configure sockets for mcast group or addr/port binding:

1. recursive locking: holding rtnl_lock while calling sock_release which in turn calls again rtnl_lock in ip_mc_drop_socket to leave the mcast group, as noticed by Florian Westphal. Additionally, sock_release can not be called while holding sync_mutex (ABBA deadlock).

2. task hung: holding rtnl_lock while calling kthread_stop to stop the running kthreads. As the kthreads do the same to leave the mcast group (sock_release -> ip_mc_drop_socket -> rtnl_lock) they hang.

Fix the problems by calling rtnl_unlock early in the error path, now sock_release is called after unlocking both mutexes.

Problem 3 (task hung reported by syzkaller [2]) is variant of problem 2: use _trylock to prevent one user to call rtnl_lock and then while waiting for sync_mutex to block kthreads that execute sock_release when they are stopped by stop_sync_thread.

[1] IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4500 ... WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syzkaller688027/4497 is trying to acquire lock: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

but task is already holding lock: IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 4495 ... (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario:

CPU0 ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(rtnl_mutex);

*** DEADLOCK ***

May be due to missing lock nesting notation

2 locks held by syzkaller688027/4497: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000bb14d7fb>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000703f78e3>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388

stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 4497 Comm: syzkaller688027 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1761 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1805 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2401 [inline] __lock_acquire+0xe8f/0x3e00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3431 lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 ip_mc_drop_socket+0x88/0x230 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2643 inet_release+0x4e/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:413 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:595 start_sync_thread+0x2213/0x2b70 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1924 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x1139/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2389 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1261 udp_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv4/udp.c:2406 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2975 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1849 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1828 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x446a69 RSP: 002b:00007fa1c3a64da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000446a69 RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006e29fc R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e29f8 R13: 00676e697279656b R14: 00007fa1c3a659c0 R15: 00000000006e2b60

[2] IPVS: sync thread started: state = BACKUP, mcast_ifn = syz_tun, syncid = 4, id = 0 IPVS: stopping backup sync thread 25415 ... INFO: task syz-executor7:25421 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.16.0-rc6+ #284 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. syz-executor7 D23688 25421 4408 0x00000004 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2862 [inline] __schedule+0x8fb/0x1ec0 kernel/sched/core.c:3440 schedule+0xf5/0x430 kernel/sched/core.c:3499 schedule_timeout+0x1a3/0x230 kernel/time/timer.c:1777 do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:86 [inline] __wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:107 [inline] wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:118 [inline] wait_for_completion+0x415/0x770 kernel/sched/completion.c:139 kthread_stop+0x14a/0x7a0 kernel/kthread.c:530 stop_sync_thread+0x3d9/0x740 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:1996 do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x2b1/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2394 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0x97/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253 sctp_setsockopt+0x2ca/0x63e0 net/sctp/socket.c:4154 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:3039 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x454889 RSP: 002b:00007fc927626c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc9276276d4 RCX: 0000000000454889 RDX: 000000000000048c RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000017 RBP: 000000000072bf58 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000051c R14: 00000000006f9b40 R15: 0000000000000001

Showing all locks held in the system: 2 locks held by khungtaskd/868: #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:175 [inline] #0: (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: [<00000000a1a8f002>] watchdog+0x1c5/0xd60 kernel/hung_task.c:249 #1: (tasklist_lock){.+.+}, at: [<0000000037c2f8f9>] debug_show_all_locks+0xd3/0x3d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4470 1 lock held by rsyslogd/4247: #0: (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}, at: [<000000000d8d6983>] __fdget_pos+0x12b/0x190 fs/file.c:765 2 locks held by getty/4338: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4339: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4340: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4341: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4342: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4343: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 2 locks held by getty/4344: #0: (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bee98654>] ldsem_down_read+0x37/0x40 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:365 #1: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c1d180aa>] n_tty_read+0x2ef/0x1a40 drivers/tty/n_tty.c:2131 3 locks held by kworker/0:5/6494: #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] work_static include/linux/workqueue.h:198 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:619 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:646 [inline] #0: ((wq_completion)"%s"("ipv6_addrconf")){+.+.}, at: [<00000000a062b18e>] process_one_work+0xb12/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2084 #1: ((addr_chk_work).work){+.+.}, at: [<00000000278427d5>] process_one_work+0xb89/0x1bb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2088 #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25421: #0: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000d414a689>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x277/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2393 2 locks held by syz-executor7/25427: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 #1: (ipvs->sync_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000e6d48489>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x10f8/0x1cc0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 1 lock held by syz-executor7/25435: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74 1 lock held by ipvs-b:2:0/25415: #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000066e35ac>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:74

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a46d6abf9d56b1365a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5fe074c01b2032ce9618@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: e0b26cc997d5 ("ipvs: call rtnl_lock early") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov ja@ssi.bg Signed-off-by: Simon Horman horms@verge.net.au Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Cc: Zubin Mithra zsm@chromium.org Cc: Guenter Roeck groeck@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 8 -- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)

--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -2384,11 +2384,7 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cm strlcpy(cfg.mcast_ifn, dm->mcast_ifn, sizeof(cfg.mcast_ifn)); cfg.syncid = dm->syncid; - rtnl_lock(); - mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); ret = start_sync_thread(ipvs, &cfg, dm->state); - mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); - rtnl_unlock(); } else { mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); ret = stop_sync_thread(ipvs, dm->state); @@ -3481,12 +3477,8 @@ static int ip_vs_genl_new_daemon(struct if (ipvs->mixed_address_family_dests > 0) return -EINVAL;

- rtnl_lock(); - mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); ret = start_sync_thread(ipvs, &c, nla_get_u32(attrs[IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_STATE])); - mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); - rtnl_unlock(); return ret; }

--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>

#include <asm/unaligned.h> /* Used for ntoh_seq and hton_seq */

@@ -1360,15 +1361,9 @@ static void set_mcast_pmtudisc(struct so /* * Specifiy default interface for outgoing multicasts */ -static int set_mcast_if(struct sock *sk, char *ifname) +static int set_mcast_if(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev) { - struct net_device *dev; struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); - - dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV;

if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev->ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if) return -EINVAL; @@ -1396,19 +1391,14 @@ static int set_mcast_if(struct sock *sk, * in the in_addr structure passed in as a parameter. */ static int -join_mcast_group(struct sock *sk, struct in_addr *addr, char *ifname) +join_mcast_group(struct sock *sk, struct in_addr *addr, struct net_device *dev) { - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); struct ip_mreqn mreq; - struct net_device *dev; int ret;

memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq)); memcpy(&mreq.imr_multiaddr, addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));

- dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev->ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if) return -EINVAL;

@@ -1423,15 +1413,10 @@ join_mcast_group(struct sock *sk, struct

#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 static int join_mcast_group6(struct sock *sk, struct in6_addr *addr, - char *ifname) + struct net_device *dev) { - struct net *net = sock_net(sk); - struct net_device *dev; int ret;

- dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && dev->ifindex != sk->sk_bound_dev_if) return -EINVAL;

@@ -1443,24 +1428,18 @@ static int join_mcast_group6(struct sock } #endif

-static int bind_mcastif_addr(struct socket *sock, char *ifname) +static int bind_mcastif_addr(struct socket *sock, struct net_device *dev) { - struct net *net = sock_net(sock->sk); - struct net_device *dev; __be32 addr; struct sockaddr_in sin;

- dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifname); - if (!dev) - return -ENODEV; - addr = inet_select_addr(dev, 0, RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE); if (!addr) pr_err("You probably need to specify IP address on " "multicast interface.\n");

IP_VS_DBG(7, "binding socket with (%s) %pI4\n", - ifname, &addr); + dev->name, &addr);

/* Now bind the socket with the address of multicast interface */ sin.sin_family = AF_INET; @@ -1493,7 +1472,8 @@ static void get_mcast_sockaddr(union ipv /* * Set up sending multicast socket over UDP */ -static struct socket *make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id) +static int make_send_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, + struct net_device *dev, struct socket **sock_ret) { /* multicast addr */ union ipvs_sockaddr mcast_addr; @@ -1505,9 +1485,10 @@ static struct socket *make_send_sock(str IPPROTO_UDP, &sock); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error during creation of socket; terminating\n"); - return ERR_PTR(result); + goto error; } - result = set_mcast_if(sock->sk, ipvs->mcfg.mcast_ifn); + *sock_ret = sock; + result = set_mcast_if(sock->sk, dev); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error setting outbound mcast interface\n"); goto error; @@ -1522,7 +1503,7 @@ static struct socket *make_send_sock(str set_sock_size(sock->sk, 1, result);

if (AF_INET == ipvs->mcfg.mcast_af) - result = bind_mcastif_addr(sock, ipvs->mcfg.mcast_ifn); + result = bind_mcastif_addr(sock, dev); else result = 0; if (result < 0) { @@ -1538,19 +1519,18 @@ static struct socket *make_send_sock(str goto error; }

- return sock; + return 0;

error: - sock_release(sock); - return ERR_PTR(result); + return result; }

/* * Set up receiving multicast socket over UDP */ -static struct socket *make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, - int ifindex) +static int make_receive_sock(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int id, + struct net_device *dev, struct socket **sock_ret) { /* multicast addr */ union ipvs_sockaddr mcast_addr; @@ -1562,8 +1542,9 @@ static struct socket *make_receive_sock( IPPROTO_UDP, &sock); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error during creation of socket; terminating\n"); - return ERR_PTR(result); + goto error; } + *sock_ret = sock; /* it is equivalent to the REUSEADDR option in user-space */ sock->sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE; result = sysctl_sync_sock_size(ipvs); @@ -1571,7 +1552,7 @@ static struct socket *make_receive_sock( set_sock_size(sock->sk, 0, result);

get_mcast_sockaddr(&mcast_addr, &salen, &ipvs->bcfg, id); - sock->sk->sk_bound_dev_if = ifindex; + sock->sk->sk_bound_dev_if = dev->ifindex; result = sock->ops->bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&mcast_addr, salen); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error binding to the multicast addr\n"); @@ -1582,21 +1563,20 @@ static struct socket *make_receive_sock( #ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6 if (ipvs->bcfg.mcast_af == AF_INET6) result = join_mcast_group6(sock->sk, &mcast_addr.in6.sin6_addr, - ipvs->bcfg.mcast_ifn); + dev); else #endif result = join_mcast_group(sock->sk, &mcast_addr.in.sin_addr, - ipvs->bcfg.mcast_ifn); + dev); if (result < 0) { pr_err("Error joining to the multicast group\n"); goto error; }

- return sock; + return 0;

error: - sock_release(sock); - return ERR_PTR(result); + return result; }

@@ -1778,13 +1758,12 @@ static int sync_thread_backup(void *data int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ipvs_sync_daemon_cfg *c, int state) { - struct ip_vs_sync_thread_data *tinfo; + struct ip_vs_sync_thread_data *tinfo = NULL; struct task_struct **array = NULL, *task; - struct socket *sock; struct net_device *dev; char *name; int (*threadfn)(void *data); - int id, count, hlen; + int id = 0, count, hlen; int result = -ENOMEM; u16 mtu, min_mtu;

@@ -1792,6 +1771,18 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs IP_VS_DBG(7, "Each ip_vs_sync_conn entry needs %zd bytes\n", sizeof(struct ip_vs_sync_conn_v0));

+ /* Do not hold one mutex and then to block on another */ + for (;;) { + rtnl_lock(); + if (mutex_trylock(&ipvs->sync_mutex)) + break; + rtnl_unlock(); + mutex_lock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + if (rtnl_trylock()) + break; + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + } + if (!ipvs->sync_state) { count = clamp(sysctl_sync_ports(ipvs), 1, IPVS_SYNC_PORTS_MAX); ipvs->threads_mask = count - 1; @@ -1810,7 +1801,8 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs dev = __dev_get_by_name(ipvs->net, c->mcast_ifn); if (!dev) { pr_err("Unknown mcast interface: %s\n", c->mcast_ifn); - return -ENODEV; + result = -ENODEV; + goto out_early; } hlen = (AF_INET6 == c->mcast_af) ? sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + sizeof(struct udphdr) : @@ -1827,26 +1819,30 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs c->sync_maxlen = mtu - hlen;

if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) { + result = -EEXIST; if (ipvs->ms) - return -EEXIST; + goto out_early;

ipvs->mcfg = *c; name = "ipvs-m:%d:%d"; threadfn = sync_thread_master; } else if (state == IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) { + result = -EEXIST; if (ipvs->backup_threads) - return -EEXIST; + goto out_early;

ipvs->bcfg = *c; name = "ipvs-b:%d:%d"; threadfn = sync_thread_backup; } else { - return -EINVAL; + result = -EINVAL; + goto out_early; }

if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) { struct ipvs_master_sync_state *ms;

+ result = -ENOMEM; ipvs->ms = kcalloc(count, sizeof(ipvs->ms[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ipvs->ms) goto out; @@ -1862,39 +1858,38 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs } else { array = kcalloc(count, sizeof(struct task_struct *), GFP_KERNEL); + result = -ENOMEM; if (!array) goto out; }

- tinfo = NULL; for (id = 0; id < count; id++) { - if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) - sock = make_send_sock(ipvs, id); - else - sock = make_receive_sock(ipvs, id, dev->ifindex); - if (IS_ERR(sock)) { - result = PTR_ERR(sock); - goto outtinfo; - } + result = -ENOMEM; tinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*tinfo), GFP_KERNEL); if (!tinfo) - goto outsocket; + goto out; tinfo->ipvs = ipvs; - tinfo->sock = sock; + tinfo->sock = NULL; if (state == IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) { tinfo->buf = kmalloc(ipvs->bcfg.sync_maxlen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!tinfo->buf) - goto outtinfo; + goto out; } else { tinfo->buf = NULL; } tinfo->id = id; + if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) + result = make_send_sock(ipvs, id, dev, &tinfo->sock); + else + result = make_receive_sock(ipvs, id, dev, &tinfo->sock); + if (result < 0) + goto out;

task = kthread_run(threadfn, tinfo, name, ipvs->gen, id); if (IS_ERR(task)) { result = PTR_ERR(task); - goto outtinfo; + goto out; } tinfo = NULL; if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) @@ -1911,20 +1906,20 @@ int start_sync_thread(struct netns_ipvs ipvs->sync_state |= state; spin_unlock_bh(&ipvs->sync_buff_lock);

+ mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + rtnl_unlock(); + /* increase the module use count */ ip_vs_use_count_inc();

return 0;

-outsocket: - sock_release(sock); - -outtinfo: - if (tinfo) { - sock_release(tinfo->sock); - kfree(tinfo->buf); - kfree(tinfo); - } +out: + /* We do not need RTNL lock anymore, release it here so that + * sock_release below and in the kthreads can use rtnl_lock + * to leave the mcast group. + */ + rtnl_unlock(); count = id; while (count-- > 0) { if (state == IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) @@ -1932,13 +1927,23 @@ outtinfo: else kthread_stop(array[count]); } - kfree(array); - -out: if (!(ipvs->sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_MASTER)) { kfree(ipvs->ms); ipvs->ms = NULL; } + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + if (tinfo) { + if (tinfo->sock) + sock_release(tinfo->sock); + kfree(tinfo->buf); + kfree(tinfo); + } + kfree(array); + return result; + +out_early: + mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex); + rtnl_unlock(); return result; }

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tero Kristo t-kristo@ti.com

commit 269bd202bc0fd04e841cb123867fd3f49e04ace9 upstream.

The introduction of support for CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT flag for clkctrl clocks used a generic clock flag, which causes a conflict with the rest of the clkctrl flags, namely the NO_IDLEST flag. This can cause boot failures on certain platforms where this flag is introduced, by omitting the wait for the clockctrl module to be fully enabled before proceeding with rest of the code.

Fix this by moving all the clkctrl specific flags to their own bit-range.

Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo t-kristo@ti.com Fixes: 49159a9dc3da ("clk: ti: add support for CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT flag") Reported-by: Christophe Lyon christophe.lyon@linaro.org Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd sboyd@kernel.org Cc: Sam Protsenko semen.protsenko@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/clk/ti/clock.h | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/clk/ti/clock.h +++ b/drivers/clk/ti/clock.h @@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ enum { #define CLKF_CORE (1 << 9) #define CLKF_J_TYPE (1 << 10)

+/* CLKCTRL flags */ +#define CLKF_SW_SUP BIT(5) +#define CLKF_HW_SUP BIT(6) +#define CLKF_NO_IDLEST BIT(7) + #define CLK(dev, con, ck) \ { \ .lk = { \ @@ -183,10 +188,6 @@ extern const struct omap_clkctrl_data am extern const struct omap_clkctrl_data dm814_clkctrl_data[]; extern const struct omap_clkctrl_data dm816_clkctrl_data[];

-#define CLKF_SW_SUP BIT(0) -#define CLKF_HW_SUP BIT(1) -#define CLKF_NO_IDLEST BIT(2) - typedef void (*ti_of_clk_init_cb_t)(void *, struct device_node *);

struct clk *ti_clk_register(struct device *dev, struct clk_hw *hw,

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sowmini Varadhan sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com

commit 53d0e83f9329aa51dcc205b514dbee05cb4df309 upstream.

rds_tcp_connection allocation/free management has the potential to be called from __rds_conn_create after IRQs have been disabled, so spin_[un]lock_bh cannot be used with rds_tcp_conn_lock.

Bottom-halves that need to synchronize for critical sections protected by rds_tcp_conn_lock should instead use rds_destroy_pending() correctly.

Reported-by: syzbot+c68e51bb5e699d3f8d91@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: ebeeb1ad9b8a ("rds: tcp: use rds_destroy_pending() to synchronize netns/module teardown and rds connection/workq management") Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/rds/tcp.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/net/rds/tcp.c +++ b/net/rds/tcp.c @@ -275,13 +275,14 @@ static int rds_tcp_laddr_check(struct ne static void rds_tcp_conn_free(void *arg) { struct rds_tcp_connection *tc = arg; + unsigned long flags;

rdsdebug("freeing tc %p\n", tc);

- spin_lock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_lock_irqsave(&rds_tcp_conn_lock, flags); if (!tc->t_tcp_node_detached) list_del(&tc->t_tcp_node); - spin_unlock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rds_tcp_conn_lock, flags);

kmem_cache_free(rds_tcp_conn_slab, tc); } @@ -311,13 +312,13 @@ static int rds_tcp_conn_alloc(struct rds rdsdebug("rds_conn_path [%d] tc %p\n", i, conn->c_path[i].cp_transport_data); } - spin_lock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_lock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); for (i = 0; i < RDS_MPATH_WORKERS; i++) { tc = conn->c_path[i].cp_transport_data; tc->t_tcp_node_detached = false; list_add_tail(&tc->t_tcp_node, &rds_tcp_conn_list); } - spin_unlock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); fail: if (ret) { for (j = 0; j < i; j++) @@ -529,7 +530,7 @@ static void rds_tcp_kill_sock(struct net

rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock = NULL; rds_tcp_listen_stop(lsock, &rtn->rds_tcp_accept_w); - spin_lock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_lock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(tc, _tc, &rds_tcp_conn_list, t_tcp_node) { struct net *c_net = read_pnet(&tc->t_cpath->cp_conn->c_net);

@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static void rds_tcp_kill_sock(struct net tc->t_tcp_node_detached = true; } } - spin_unlock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(tc, _tc, &tmp_list, t_tcp_node) rds_conn_destroy(tc->t_cpath->cp_conn); } @@ -590,7 +591,7 @@ static void rds_tcp_sysctl_reset(struct { struct rds_tcp_connection *tc, *_tc;

- spin_lock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_lock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(tc, _tc, &rds_tcp_conn_list, t_tcp_node) { struct net *c_net = read_pnet(&tc->t_cpath->cp_conn->c_net);

@@ -600,7 +601,7 @@ static void rds_tcp_sysctl_reset(struct /* reconnect with new parameters */ rds_conn_path_drop(tc->t_cpath, false); } - spin_unlock_bh(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&rds_tcp_conn_lock); }

static int rds_tcp_skbuf_handler(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit 6091f09c2f79730d895149bcfe3d66140288cd0e upstream.

syzbot reported :

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ffs arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:432 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in netlink_sendmsg+0xb26/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1851

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -1845,6 +1845,8 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket

if (msg->msg_namelen) { err = -EINVAL; + if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl)) + goto out; if (addr->nl_family != AF_NETLINK) goto out; dst_portid = addr->nl_pid;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit b13dda9f9aa7caceeee61c080c2e544d5f5d85e5 upstream.

syzbot reported __skb_try_recv_from_queue() was using skb->peeked while it was potentially unitialized.

We need to clear it in __skb_clone()

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/core/skbuff.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -857,6 +857,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *__skb_clone(struc n->hdr_len = skb->nohdr ? skb_headroom(skb) : skb->hdr_len; n->cloned = 1; n->nohdr = 0; + n->peeked = 0; n->destructor = NULL; C(tail); C(end);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit b855ff827476adbdc2259e9895681d82b7b26065 upstream.

syzbot reported an uninit-value read of skb->mark in iptable_mangle_hook()

Thanks to the nice report, I tracked the problem to dccp not caring of ireq->ir_mark for passive sessions.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipt_mangle_out net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c:66 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in iptable_mangle_hook+0x5e5/0x720 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c:84 CPU: 0 PID: 5300 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #81 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 ipt_mangle_out net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c:66 [inline] iptable_mangle_hook+0x5e5/0x720 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c:84 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0x158/0x3d0 net/netfilter/core.c:483 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:243 [inline] __ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:113 [inline] ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:122 [inline] ip_queue_xmit+0x1d21/0x21c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:504 dccp_transmit_skb+0x15eb/0x1900 net/dccp/output.c:142 dccp_xmit_packet+0x814/0x9e0 net/dccp/output.c:281 dccp_write_xmit+0x20f/0x480 net/dccp/output.c:363 dccp_sendmsg+0x12ca/0x12d0 net/dccp/proto.c:818 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091 SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x455259 RSP: 002b:00007f1a4473dc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1a4473e6d4 RCX: 0000000000455259 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020b76fc8 RDI: 0000000000000015 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004f0 R14: 00000000006fa720 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was stored to memory at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:293 [inline] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:684 __msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:521 ip_queue_xmit+0x1e35/0x21c0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:502 dccp_transmit_skb+0x15eb/0x1900 net/dccp/output.c:142 dccp_xmit_packet+0x814/0x9e0 net/dccp/output.c:281 dccp_write_xmit+0x20f/0x480 net/dccp/output.c:363 dccp_sendmsg+0x12ca/0x12d0 net/dccp/proto.c:818 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline] SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091 SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Uninit was stored to memory at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:293 [inline] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:684 __msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:521 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x503/0x580 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:797 dccp_create_openreq_child+0x7f/0x890 net/dccp/minisocks.c:92 dccp_v4_request_recv_sock+0x22c/0xe90 net/dccp/ipv4.c:408 dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x290/0x2000 net/dccp/ipv6.c:414 dccp_check_req+0x7b9/0x8f0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:197 dccp_v4_rcv+0x12e4/0x2630 net/dccp/ipv4.c:840 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x6ed/0xd40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x43c/0x4e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:449 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x1253/0x16d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:397 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline] ip_rcv+0x119d/0x16f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:493 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x47cf/0x4a80 net/core/dev.c:4562 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4627 [inline] process_backlog+0x62d/0xe20 net/core/dev.c:5307 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5705 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7c1/0x1a70 net/core/dev.c:5771 __do_softirq+0x56d/0x93d kernel/softirq.c:285 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmem_cache_alloc+0xaab/0xb90 mm/slub.c:2756 reqsk_alloc include/net/request_sock.h:88 [inline] inet_reqsk_alloc+0xc4/0x7f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6145 dccp_v4_conn_request+0x5cc/0x1770 net/dccp/ipv4.c:600 dccp_v6_conn_request+0x299/0x1880 net/dccp/ipv6.c:317 dccp_rcv_state_process+0x2ea/0x2410 net/dccp/input.c:612 dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x229/0x340 net/dccp/ipv4.c:682 dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x16d/0x1220 net/dccp/ipv6.c:578 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __sk_receive_skb+0x60e/0xf20 net/core/sock.c:513 dccp_v4_rcv+0x24d4/0x2630 net/dccp/ipv4.c:874 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x6ed/0xd40 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:216 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x43c/0x4e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:257 dst_input include/net/dst.h:449 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x1253/0x16d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:397 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline] ip_rcv+0x119d/0x16f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:493 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x47cf/0x4a80 net/core/dev.c:4562 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4627 [inline] process_backlog+0x62d/0xe20 net/core/dev.c:5307 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5705 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7c1/0x1a70 net/core/dev.c:5771 __do_softirq+0x56d/0x93d kernel/softirq.c:285

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/dccp/ipv4.c | 1 + net/dccp/ipv6.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c @@ -614,6 +614,7 @@ int dccp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk ireq = inet_rsk(req); sk_rcv_saddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->daddr); sk_daddr_set(req_to_sk(req), ip_hdr(skb)->saddr); + ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb); ireq->ireq_family = AF_INET; ireq->ir_iif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;

--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct s ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr; ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr; ireq->ireq_family = AF_INET6; + ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb);

if (ipv6_opt_accepted(sk, skb, IP6CB(skb)) || np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo || np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo ||

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit 3099a52918937ab86ec47038ad80d377ba16c531 upstream.

syzbot reported an uninit-value in inet_csk_bind_conflict() [1]

It turns out we never propagated sk->sk_reuseport into timewait socket.

[1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in inet_csk_bind_conflict+0x5f9/0x990 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:151 CPU: 1 PID: 3589 Comm: syzkaller008242 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 inet_csk_bind_conflict+0x5f9/0x990 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:151 inet_csk_get_port+0x1d28/0x1e40 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:320 inet6_bind+0x121c/0x1820 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:399 SYSC_bind+0x3f2/0x4b0 net/socket.c:1474 SyS_bind+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:1460 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x4416e9 RSP: 002b:00007ffce6d15c88 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0100000000000000 RCX: 00000000004416e9 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020402000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000e6d15e08 R09: 00000000e6d15e08 R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000009478 R13: 00000000006cd448 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was stored to memory at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:293 [inline] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:684 __msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:521 tcp_time_wait+0xf17/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:283 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xebe/0x6490 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6003 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x11dd/0x1d90 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1331 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_close+0x277/0x18f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2269 inet_release+0x240/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427 inet6_release+0xaf/0x100 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:435 sock_release net/socket.c:595 [inline] sock_close+0xe0/0x300 net/socket.c:1149 __fput+0x49e/0xa10 fs/file_table.c:209 ____fput+0x37/0x40 fs/file_table.c:243 task_work_run+0x243/0x2c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x10e1/0x38d0 kernel/exit.c:867 do_group_exit+0x1a0/0x360 kernel/exit.c:970 SYSC_exit_group+0x21/0x30 kernel/exit.c:981 SyS_exit_group+0x25/0x30 kernel/exit.c:979 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Uninit was stored to memory at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:293 [inline] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:684 __msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:521 inet_twsk_alloc+0xaef/0xc00 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:182 tcp_time_wait+0xd9/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:258 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xebe/0x6490 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6003 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x11dd/0x1d90 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1331 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_close+0x277/0x18f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2269 inet_release+0x240/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427 inet6_release+0xaf/0x100 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:435 sock_release net/socket.c:595 [inline] sock_close+0xe0/0x300 net/socket.c:1149 __fput+0x49e/0xa10 fs/file_table.c:209 ____fput+0x37/0x40 fs/file_table.c:243 task_work_run+0x243/0x2c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x10e1/0x38d0 kernel/exit.c:867 do_group_exit+0x1a0/0x360 kernel/exit.c:970 SYSC_exit_group+0x21/0x30 kernel/exit.c:981 SyS_exit_group+0x25/0x30 kernel/exit.c:979 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmem_cache_alloc+0xaab/0xb90 mm/slub.c:2756 inet_twsk_alloc+0x13b/0xc00 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:163 tcp_time_wait+0xd9/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:258 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xebe/0x6490 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6003 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x11dd/0x1d90 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1331 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_close+0x277/0x18f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2269 inet_release+0x240/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427 inet6_release+0xaf/0x100 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:435 sock_release net/socket.c:595 [inline] sock_close+0xe0/0x300 net/socket.c:1149 __fput+0x49e/0xa10 fs/file_table.c:209 ____fput+0x37/0x40 fs/file_table.c:243 task_work_run+0x243/0x2c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline] do_exit+0x10e1/0x38d0 kernel/exit.c:867 do_group_exit+0x1a0/0x360 kernel/exit.c:970 SYSC_exit_group+0x21/0x30 kernel/exit.c:981 SyS_exit_group+0x25/0x30 kernel/exit.c:979 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Fixes: da5e36308d9f ("soreuseport: TCP/IPv4 implementation") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/net/inet_timewait_sock.h | 1 + net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/include/net/inet_timewait_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_timewait_sock.h @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ struct inet_timewait_sock { #define tw_family __tw_common.skc_family #define tw_state __tw_common.skc_state #define tw_reuse __tw_common.skc_reuse +#define tw_reuseport __tw_common.skc_reuseport #define tw_ipv6only __tw_common.skc_ipv6only #define tw_bound_dev_if __tw_common.skc_bound_dev_if #define tw_node __tw_common.skc_nulls_node --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ struct inet_timewait_sock *inet_twsk_all tw->tw_dport = inet->inet_dport; tw->tw_family = sk->sk_family; tw->tw_reuse = sk->sk_reuse; + tw->tw_reuseport = sk->sk_reuseport; tw->tw_hash = sk->sk_hash; tw->tw_ipv6only = 0; tw->tw_transparent = inet->transparent;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yonghong Song yhs@fb.com

commit 3a38bb98d9abdc3856f26b5ed4332803065cd7cf upstream.

syzbot reported a possible deadlock in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog. The error details: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.16.0-rc7+ #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor7/24531 is trying to acquire lock: (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000008a849b07>] perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854

but task is already holding lock: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<0000000038768f87>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x198/0x280 mm/util.c:353

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: __might_fault+0x13a/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4571 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] bpf_prog_array_copy_info+0xf2/0x1c0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1694 perf_event_query_prog_array+0x1c7/0x2c0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:891 _perf_ioctl kernel/events/core.c:4750 [inline] perf_ioctl+0x3e1/0x1480 kernel/events/core.c:4770 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1b1/0x1520 fs/ioctl.c:686 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:701 [inline] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:692 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

-> #0 (bpf_event_mutex){+.+.}: lock_acquire+0x1d5/0x580 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:756 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x16f/0x1a80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908 perf_event_detach_bpf_prog+0x92/0x3d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:854 perf_event_free_bpf_prog kernel/events/core.c:8147 [inline] _free_event+0xbdb/0x10f0 kernel/events/core.c:4116 put_event+0x24/0x30 kernel/events/core.c:4204 perf_mmap_close+0x60d/0x1010 kernel/events/core.c:5172 remove_vma+0xb4/0x1b0 mm/mmap.c:172 remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2490 [inline] do_munmap+0x82a/0xdf0 mm/mmap.c:2731 mmap_region+0x59e/0x15a0 mm/mmap.c:1646 do_mmap+0x6c0/0xe00 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2223 [inline] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1de/0x280 mm/util.c:355 SYSC_mmap_pgoff mm/mmap.c:1533 [inline] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x462/0x5f0 mm/mmap.c:1491 SYSC_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:100 [inline] SyS_mmap+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:91 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

other info that might help us debug this:

Possible unsafe locking scenario:

CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex); lock(&mm->mmap_sem); lock(bpf_event_mutex);

*** DEADLOCK *** ======================================================

The bug is introduced by Commit f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") where copy_to_user, which requires mm->mmap_sem, is called inside bpf_event_mutex lock. At the same time, during perf_event file descriptor close, mm->mmap_sem is held first and then subsequent perf_event_detach_bpf_prog needs bpf_event_mutex lock. Such a senario caused a deadlock.

As suggested by Daniel, moving copy_to_user out of the bpf_event_mutex lock should fix the problem.

Fixes: f371b304f12e ("bpf/tracing: allow user space to query prog array on the same tp") Reported-by: syzbot+dc5ca0e4c9bfafaf2bae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/linux/bpf.h | 4 ++-- kernel/bpf/core.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -335,8 +335,8 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct b void bpf_prog_array_delete_safe(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs, struct bpf_prog *old_prog); int bpf_prog_array_copy_info(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *array, - __u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt, - __u32 __user *prog_cnt); + u32 *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt, + u32 *prog_cnt); int bpf_prog_array_copy(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *old_array, struct bpf_prog *exclude_prog, struct bpf_prog *include_prog, --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -1572,13 +1572,32 @@ int bpf_prog_array_length(struct bpf_pro return cnt; }

+static bool bpf_prog_array_copy_core(struct bpf_prog **prog, + u32 *prog_ids, + u32 request_cnt) +{ + int i = 0; + + for (; *prog; prog++) { + if (*prog == &dummy_bpf_prog.prog) + continue; + prog_ids[i] = (*prog)->aux->id; + if (++i == request_cnt) { + prog++; + break; + } + } + + return !!(*prog); +} + int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs, __u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 cnt) { struct bpf_prog **prog; unsigned long err = 0; - u32 i = 0, *ids; bool nospc; + u32 *ids;

/* users of this function are doing: * cnt = bpf_prog_array_length(); @@ -1595,16 +1614,7 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct b return -ENOMEM; rcu_read_lock(); prog = rcu_dereference(progs)->progs; - for (; *prog; prog++) { - if (*prog == &dummy_bpf_prog.prog) - continue; - ids[i] = (*prog)->aux->id; - if (++i == cnt) { - prog++; - break; - } - } - nospc = !!(*prog); + nospc = bpf_prog_array_copy_core(prog, ids, cnt); rcu_read_unlock(); err = copy_to_user(prog_ids, ids, cnt * sizeof(u32)); kfree(ids); @@ -1683,22 +1693,25 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy(struct bpf_prog_ }

int bpf_prog_array_copy_info(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *array, - __u32 __user *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt, - __u32 __user *prog_cnt) + u32 *prog_ids, u32 request_cnt, + u32 *prog_cnt) { + struct bpf_prog **prog; u32 cnt = 0;

if (array) cnt = bpf_prog_array_length(array);

- if (copy_to_user(prog_cnt, &cnt, sizeof(cnt))) - return -EFAULT; + *prog_cnt = cnt;

/* return early if user requested only program count or nothing to copy */ if (!request_cnt || !cnt) return 0;

- return bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(array, prog_ids, request_cnt); + /* this function is called under trace/bpf_trace.c: bpf_event_mutex */ + prog = rcu_dereference_check(array, 1)->progs; + return bpf_prog_array_copy_core(prog, prog_ids, request_cnt) ? -ENOSPC + : 0; }

static void bpf_prog_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work) --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -876,6 +876,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct p { struct perf_event_query_bpf __user *uquery = info; struct perf_event_query_bpf query = {}; + u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; int ret;

if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -884,15 +885,31 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct p return -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&query, uquery, sizeof(query))) return -EFAULT; - if (query.ids_len > BPF_TRACE_MAX_PROGS) + + ids_len = query.ids_len; + if (ids_len > BPF_TRACE_MAX_PROGS) return -E2BIG; + ids = kcalloc(ids_len, sizeof(u32), GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN); + if (!ids) + return -ENOMEM; + /* + * The above kcalloc returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR when ids_len = 0, which + * is required when user only wants to check for uquery->prog_cnt. + * There is no need to check for it since the case is handled + * gracefully in bpf_prog_array_copy_info. + */

mutex_lock(&bpf_event_mutex); ret = bpf_prog_array_copy_info(event->tp_event->prog_array, - uquery->ids, - query.ids_len, - &uquery->prog_cnt); + ids, + ids_len, + &prog_cnt); mutex_unlock(&bpf_event_mutex);

+ if (copy_to_user(&uquery->prog_cnt, &prog_cnt, sizeof(prog_cnt)) || + copy_to_user(uquery->ids, ids, ids_len * sizeof(u32))) + ret = -EFAULT; + + kfree(ids); return ret; }

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Olsa jolsa@kernel.org

commit bfb3d7b8b906b66551424d7636182126e1d134c8 upstream.

If the get_callchain_buffers fails to allocate the buffer it will decrease the nr_callchain_events right away.

There's no point of checking the allocation error for nr_callchain_events > 1. Removing that check.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa jolsa@kernel.org Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Cc: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: Andi Kleen andi@firstfloor.org Cc: H. Peter Anvin hpa@zytor.com Cc: Namhyung Kim namhyung@kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415092352.12403-3-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/events/callchain.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/events/callchain.c +++ b/kernel/events/callchain.c @@ -131,14 +131,8 @@ int get_callchain_buffers(int event_max_ goto exit; }

- if (count > 1) { - /* If the allocation failed, give up */ - if (!callchain_cpus_entries) - err = -ENOMEM; - goto exit; - } - - err = alloc_callchain_buffers(); + if (count == 1) + err = alloc_callchain_buffers(); exit: if (err) atomic_dec(&nr_callchain_events);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp

commit 8236b0ae31c837d2b3a2565c5f8d77f637e824cc upstream.

syzbot is reporting hung tasks at wait_on_bit(WB_shutting_down) in wb_shutdown() [1]. This seems to be because commit 5318ce7d46866e1d ("bdi: Shutdown writeback on all cgwbs in cgwb_bdi_destroy()") forgot to call wake_up_bit(WB_shutting_down) after clear_bit(WB_shutting_down).

Introduce a helper function clear_and_wake_up_bit() and use it, in order to avoid similar errors in future.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=b297474817af98d5796bc544e1bb806fc3da0e5...

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+c0cf869505e03bdf1a24@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 5318ce7d46866e1d ("bdi: Shutdown writeback on all cgwbs in cgwb_bdi_destroy()") Cc: Tejun Heo tj@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/linux/wait_bit.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ mm/backing-dev.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/wait_bit.h +++ b/include/linux/wait_bit.h @@ -262,4 +262,21 @@ int wait_on_atomic_t(atomic_t *val, wait return out_of_line_wait_on_atomic_t(val, action, mode); }

+/** + * clear_and_wake_up_bit - clear a bit and wake up anyone waiting on that bit + * + * @bit: the bit of the word being waited on + * @word: the word being waited on, a kernel virtual address + * + * You can use this helper if bitflags are manipulated atomically rather than + * non-atomically under a lock. + */ +static inline void clear_and_wake_up_bit(int bit, void *word) +{ + clear_bit_unlock(bit, word); + /* See wake_up_bit() for which memory barrier you need to use. */ + smp_mb__after_atomic(); + wake_up_bit(word, bit); +} + #endif /* _LINUX_WAIT_BIT_H */ --- a/mm/backing-dev.c +++ b/mm/backing-dev.c @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ static void wb_shutdown(struct bdi_write * the barrier provided by test_and_clear_bit() above. */ smp_wmb(); - clear_bit(WB_shutting_down, &wb->state); + clear_and_wake_up_bit(WB_shutting_down, &wb->state); }

static void wb_exit(struct bdi_writeback *wb)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz

commit b8b784958eccbf8f51ebeee65282ca3fd59ea391 upstream.

Syzbot has reported that it can hit a NULL pointer dereference in wb_workfn() due to wb->bdi->dev being NULL. This indicates that wb_workfn() was called for an already unregistered bdi which should not happen as wb_shutdown() called from bdi_unregister() should make sure all pending writeback works are completed before bdi is unregistered. Except that wb_workfn() itself can requeue the work with:

mod_delayed_work(bdi_wq, &wb->dwork, 0);

and if this happens while wb_shutdown() is waiting in:

flush_delayed_work(&wb->dwork);

the dwork can get executed after wb_shutdown() has finished and bdi_unregister() has cleared wb->bdi->dev.

Make wb_workfn() use wakeup_wb() for requeueing the work which takes all the necessary precautions against racing with bdi unregistration.

CC: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp CC: Tejun Heo tj@kernel.org Fixes: 839a8e8660b6777e7fe4e80af1a048aebe2b5977 Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+9873874c735f2892e7e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner dchinner@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/fs-writeback.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/fs-writeback.c +++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c @@ -1961,7 +1961,7 @@ void wb_workfn(struct work_struct *work) }

if (!list_empty(&wb->work_list)) - mod_delayed_work(bdi_wq, &wb->dwork, 0); + wb_wakeup(wb); else if (wb_has_dirty_io(wb) && dirty_writeback_interval) wb_wakeup_delayed(wb);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Timur Tabi timur@codeaurora.org

commit ab3dbcf78f60f46d6a0ad63b1f4b690b7a427140 upstream.

If the main loop in linehandle_create() encounters an error, it unwinds completely by freeing all previously requested GPIO descriptors. However, if the error occurs in the beginning of the loop before that GPIO is requested, then the exit code attempts to free a null descriptor. If extrachecks is enabled, gpiod_free() triggers a WARN_ON.

Instead, keep a separate count of legitimate GPIOs so that only those are freed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d7c51b47ac11 ("gpio: userspace ABI for reading/writing GPIO lines") Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Timur Tabi timur@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static int linehandle_create(struct gpio struct gpiohandle_request handlereq; struct linehandle_state *lh; struct file *file; - int fd, i, ret; + int fd, i, count = 0, ret; u32 lflags;

if (copy_from_user(&handlereq, ip, sizeof(handlereq))) @@ -507,6 +507,7 @@ static int linehandle_create(struct gpio if (ret) goto out_free_descs; lh->descs[i] = desc; + count = i;

if (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_ACTIVE_LOW) set_bit(FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW, &desc->flags); @@ -577,7 +578,7 @@ static int linehandle_create(struct gpio out_put_unused_fd: put_unused_fd(fd); out_free_descs: - for (; i >= 0; i--) + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) gpiod_free(lh->descs[i]); kfree(lh->label); out_free_lh:

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org

commit 4bf01ca21e2e0e4561d1a03c48c3d740418702db upstream.

Make sure to free the rfkill device in case registration fails during probe.

Fixes: 5e7ca3937fbe ("net: rfkill: gpio: convert to resource managed allocation") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13 Cc: Heikki Krogerus heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c +++ b/net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c @@ -137,13 +137,18 @@ static int rfkill_gpio_probe(struct plat

ret = rfkill_register(rfkill->rfkill_dev); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto err_destroy;

platform_set_drvdata(pdev, rfkill);

dev_info(&pdev->dev, "%s device registered.\n", rfkill->name);

return 0; + +err_destroy: + rfkill_destroy(rfkill->rfkill_dev); + + return ret; }

static int rfkill_gpio_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com

commit fc8cec113904a47396bf0a1afc62920d66319d36 upstream.

Use kvfree instead of kfree because the array is allocated with kvmalloc.

Fixes: 7eada909bfd7a ("dm: add integrity target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c @@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ static void dm_integrity_free_journal_sc unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < ic->journal_sections; i++) kvfree(sl[i]); - kfree(sl); + kvfree(sl); }

static struct scatterlist **dm_integrity_alloc_journal_scatterlist(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, struct page_list *pl)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vitaly Wool vitalywool@gmail.com

commit 6098d7e136692f9c6e23ae362c62ec822343e4d5 upstream.

Do not try to optimize in-page object layout while the page is under reclaim. This fixes lock-ups on reclaim and improves reclaim performance at the same time.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180430125800.444cae9706489f412ad12621@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vitaly Wool vitaly.vul@sony.com Reported-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Tested-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Cc: Oleksiy.Avramchenko@sony.com Cc: Matthew Wilcox mawilcox@microsoft.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- mm/z3fold.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/z3fold.c +++ b/mm/z3fold.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ enum z3fold_page_flags { PAGE_HEADLESS = 0, MIDDLE_CHUNK_MAPPED, NEEDS_COMPACTING, - PAGE_STALE + PAGE_STALE, + UNDER_RECLAIM };

/***************** @@ -173,6 +174,7 @@ static struct z3fold_header *init_z3fold clear_bit(MIDDLE_CHUNK_MAPPED, &page->private); clear_bit(NEEDS_COMPACTING, &page->private); clear_bit(PAGE_STALE, &page->private); + clear_bit(UNDER_RECLAIM, &page->private);

spin_lock_init(&zhdr->page_lock); kref_init(&zhdr->refcount); @@ -748,6 +750,10 @@ static void z3fold_free(struct z3fold_po atomic64_dec(&pool->pages_nr); return; } + if (test_bit(UNDER_RECLAIM, &page->private)) { + z3fold_page_unlock(zhdr); + return; + } if (test_and_set_bit(NEEDS_COMPACTING, &page->private)) { z3fold_page_unlock(zhdr); return; @@ -832,6 +838,8 @@ static int z3fold_reclaim_page(struct z3 kref_get(&zhdr->refcount); list_del_init(&zhdr->buddy); zhdr->cpu = -1; + set_bit(UNDER_RECLAIM, &page->private); + break; }

list_del_init(&page->lru); @@ -879,25 +887,35 @@ static int z3fold_reclaim_page(struct z3 goto next; } next: - spin_lock(&pool->lock); if (test_bit(PAGE_HEADLESS, &page->private)) { if (ret == 0) { - spin_unlock(&pool->lock); free_z3fold_page(page); return 0; } - } else if (kref_put(&zhdr->refcount, release_z3fold_page)) { - atomic64_dec(&pool->pages_nr); + spin_lock(&pool->lock); + list_add(&page->lru, &pool->lru); + spin_unlock(&pool->lock); + } else { + z3fold_page_lock(zhdr); + clear_bit(UNDER_RECLAIM, &page->private); + if (kref_put(&zhdr->refcount, + release_z3fold_page_locked)) { + atomic64_dec(&pool->pages_nr); + return 0; + } + /* + * if we are here, the page is still not completely + * free. Take the global pool lock then to be able + * to add it back to the lru list + */ + spin_lock(&pool->lock); + list_add(&page->lru, &pool->lru); spin_unlock(&pool->lock); - return 0; + z3fold_page_unlock(zhdr); }

- /* - * Add to the beginning of LRU. - * Pool lock has to be kept here to ensure the page has - * not already been released - */ - list_add(&page->lru, &pool->lru); + /* We started off locked to we need to lock the pool back */ + spin_lock(&pool->lock); } spin_unlock(&pool->lock); return -EAGAIN;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Rientjes rientjes@google.com

commit 27ae357fa82be5ab73b2ef8d39dcb8ca2563483a upstream.

Since exit_mmap() is done without the protection of mm->mmap_sem, it is possible for the oom reaper to concurrently operate on an mm until MMF_OOM_SKIP is set.

This allows munlock_vma_pages_all() to concurrently run while the oom reaper is operating on a vma. Since munlock_vma_pages_range() depends on clearing VM_LOCKED from vm_flags before actually doing the munlock to determine if any other vmas are locking the same memory, the check for VM_LOCKED in the oom reaper is racy.

This is especially noticeable on architectures such as powerpc where clearing a huge pmd requires serialize_against_pte_lookup(). If the pmd is zapped by the oom reaper during follow_page_mask() after the check for pmd_none() is bypassed, this ends up deferencing a NULL ptl or a kernel oops.

Fix this by manually freeing all possible memory from the mm before doing the munlock and then setting MMF_OOM_SKIP. The oom reaper can not run on the mm anymore so the munlock is safe to do in exit_mmap(). It also matches the logic that the oom reaper currently uses for determining when to set MMF_OOM_SKIP itself, so there's no new risk of excessive oom killing.

This issue fixes CVE-2018-1000200.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1804241526320.238665@chino.kir.corp... Fixes: 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently") Signed-off-by: David Rientjes rientjes@google.com Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Acked-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli aarcange@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [4.14+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/linux/oom.h | 2 + mm/mmap.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++------------ mm/oom_kill.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/oom.h +++ b/include/linux/oom.h @@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ static inline int check_stable_address_s return 0; }

+void __oom_reap_task_mm(struct mm_struct *mm); + extern unsigned long oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *memcg, const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages); --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -2997,6 +2997,32 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) /* mm's last user has gone, and its about to be pulled down */ mmu_notifier_release(mm);

+ if (unlikely(mm_is_oom_victim(mm))) { + /* + * Manually reap the mm to free as much memory as possible. + * Then, as the oom reaper does, set MMF_OOM_SKIP to disregard + * this mm from further consideration. Taking mm->mmap_sem for + * write after setting MMF_OOM_SKIP will guarantee that the oom + * reaper will not run on this mm again after mmap_sem is + * dropped. + * + * Nothing can be holding mm->mmap_sem here and the above call + * to mmu_notifier_release(mm) ensures mmu notifier callbacks in + * __oom_reap_task_mm() will not block. + * + * This needs to be done before calling munlock_vma_pages_all(), + * which clears VM_LOCKED, otherwise the oom reaper cannot + * reliably test it. + */ + mutex_lock(&oom_lock); + __oom_reap_task_mm(mm); + mutex_unlock(&oom_lock); + + set_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags); + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + } + if (mm->locked_vm) { vma = mm->mmap; while (vma) { @@ -3018,24 +3044,6 @@ void exit_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) /* update_hiwater_rss(mm) here? but nobody should be looking */ /* Use -1 here to ensure all VMAs in the mm are unmapped */ unmap_vmas(&tlb, vma, 0, -1); - - if (unlikely(mm_is_oom_victim(mm))) { - /* - * Wait for oom_reap_task() to stop working on this - * mm. Because MMF_OOM_SKIP is already set before - * calling down_read(), oom_reap_task() will not run - * on this "mm" post up_write(). - * - * mm_is_oom_victim() cannot be set from under us - * either because victim->mm is already set to NULL - * under task_lock before calling mmput and oom_mm is - * set not NULL by the OOM killer only if victim->mm - * is found not NULL while holding the task_lock. - */ - set_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags); - down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); - } free_pgtables(&tlb, vma, FIRST_USER_ADDRESS, USER_PGTABLES_CEILING); tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, 0, -1);

--- a/mm/oom_kill.c +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c @@ -474,7 +474,6 @@ bool process_shares_mm(struct task_struc return false; }

- #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /* * OOM Reaper kernel thread which tries to reap the memory used by the OOM @@ -485,16 +484,54 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(oom_reape static struct task_struct *oom_reaper_list; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(oom_reaper_lock);

-static bool __oom_reap_task_mm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm) +void __oom_reap_task_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) { - struct mmu_gather tlb; struct vm_area_struct *vma; + + /* + * Tell all users of get_user/copy_from_user etc... that the content + * is no longer stable. No barriers really needed because unmapping + * should imply barriers already and the reader would hit a page fault + * if it stumbled over a reaped memory. + */ + set_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &mm->flags); + + for (vma = mm->mmap ; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { + if (!can_madv_dontneed_vma(vma)) + continue; + + /* + * Only anonymous pages have a good chance to be dropped + * without additional steps which we cannot afford as we + * are OOM already. + * + * We do not even care about fs backed pages because all + * which are reclaimable have already been reclaimed and + * we do not want to block exit_mmap by keeping mm ref + * count elevated without a good reason. + */ + if (vma_is_anonymous(vma) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { + const unsigned long start = vma->vm_start; + const unsigned long end = vma->vm_end; + struct mmu_gather tlb; + + tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end); + mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, start, end); + unmap_page_range(&tlb, vma, start, end, NULL); + mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, start, end); + tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end); + } + } +} + +static bool oom_reap_task_mm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ bool ret = true;

/* * We have to make sure to not race with the victim exit path * and cause premature new oom victim selection: - * __oom_reap_task_mm exit_mm + * oom_reap_task_mm exit_mm * mmget_not_zero * mmput * atomic_dec_and_test @@ -539,39 +576,8 @@ static bool __oom_reap_task_mm(struct ta

trace_start_task_reaping(tsk->pid);

- /* - * Tell all users of get_user/copy_from_user etc... that the content - * is no longer stable. No barriers really needed because unmapping - * should imply barriers already and the reader would hit a page fault - * if it stumbled over a reaped memory. - */ - set_bit(MMF_UNSTABLE, &mm->flags); - - for (vma = mm->mmap ; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { - if (!can_madv_dontneed_vma(vma)) - continue; + __oom_reap_task_mm(mm);

- /* - * Only anonymous pages have a good chance to be dropped - * without additional steps which we cannot afford as we - * are OOM already. - * - * We do not even care about fs backed pages because all - * which are reclaimable have already been reclaimed and - * we do not want to block exit_mmap by keeping mm ref - * count elevated without a good reason. - */ - if (vma_is_anonymous(vma) || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { - const unsigned long start = vma->vm_start; - const unsigned long end = vma->vm_end; - - tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end); - mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, start, end); - unmap_page_range(&tlb, vma, start, end, NULL); - mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, start, end); - tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end); - } - } pr_info("oom_reaper: reaped process %d (%s), now anon-rss:%lukB, file-rss:%lukB, shmem-rss:%lukB\n", task_pid_nr(tsk), tsk->comm, K(get_mm_counter(mm, MM_ANONPAGES)), @@ -592,13 +598,12 @@ static void oom_reap_task(struct task_st struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->signal->oom_mm;

/* Retry the down_read_trylock(mmap_sem) a few times */ - while (attempts++ < MAX_OOM_REAP_RETRIES && !__oom_reap_task_mm(tsk, mm)) + while (attempts++ < MAX_OOM_REAP_RETRIES && !oom_reap_task_mm(tsk, mm)) schedule_timeout_idle(HZ/10);

if (attempts <= MAX_OOM_REAP_RETRIES) goto done;

- pr_info("oom_reaper: unable to reap pid:%d (%s)\n", task_pid_nr(tsk), tsk->comm); debug_show_all_locks();

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jimmy Assarsson extja@kvaser.com

commit 6ee00865ffe4e8c8ba4a68d26db53c7ec09bbb89 upstream.

Increase rx_dropped, if alloc_can_skb() fails, not tx_dropped.

Signed-off-by: Jimmy Assarsson extja@kvaser.com Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/kvaser_usb.c @@ -1179,7 +1179,7 @@ static void kvaser_usb_rx_can_msg(const

skb = alloc_can_skb(priv->netdev, &cf); if (!skb) { - stats->tx_dropped++; + stats->rx_dropped++; return; }

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Wunner lukas@wunner.de

commit 32bee8f48fa048a3198109de50e51c092507ff52 upstream.

When sending packets as fast as possible using "cangen -g 0 -i -x", the HI-3110 occasionally latches the interrupt pin high on completion of a packet, but doesn't set the TXCPLT bit in the INTF register. The INTF register contains 0x00 as if no interrupt has occurred. Even waiting for a few milliseconds after the interrupt doesn't help.

Work around this apparent erratum by instead checking the TXMTY bit in the STATF register ("TX FIFO empty"). We know that we've queued up a packet for transmission if priv->tx_len is nonzero. If the TX FIFO is empty, transmission of that packet must have completed.

Note that this is congruent with our handling of received packets, which likewise gleans from the STATF register whether a packet is waiting in the RX FIFO, instead of looking at the INTF register.

Cc: Mathias Duckeck m.duckeck@kunbus.de Cc: Akshay Bhat akshay.bhat@timesys.com Cc: Casey Fitzpatrick casey.fitzpatrick@timesys.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner lukas@wunner.de Acked-by: Akshay Bhat akshay.bhat@timesys.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ #define HI3110_STAT_BUSOFF BIT(2) #define HI3110_STAT_ERRP BIT(3) #define HI3110_STAT_ERRW BIT(4) +#define HI3110_STAT_TXMTY BIT(7)

#define HI3110_BTR0_SJW_SHIFT 6 #define HI3110_BTR0_BRP_SHIFT 0 @@ -737,10 +738,7 @@ static irqreturn_t hi3110_can_ist(int ir } }

- if (intf == 0) - break; - - if (intf & HI3110_INT_TXCPLT) { + if (priv->tx_len && statf & HI3110_STAT_TXMTY) { net->stats.tx_packets++; net->stats.tx_bytes += priv->tx_len - 1; can_led_event(net, CAN_LED_EVENT_TX); @@ -750,6 +748,9 @@ static irqreturn_t hi3110_can_ist(int ir } netif_wake_queue(net); } + + if (intf == 0) + break; } mutex_unlock(&priv->hi3110_lock); return IRQ_HANDLED;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com

commit a2ee41fd953e7c3ff6c55a3038c80354d191a318 upstream.

One layout supported by the Marvell NAND controller supports NAND pages of 2048 bytes, all handled in one single chunk when using BCH with a strength of 4-bit per 512 bytes. In this case, instead of the generic XTYPE_WRITE_DISPATCH/XTYPE_LAST_NAKED_RW couple, the controller expects to receive XTYPE_MONOLITHIC_RW.

This fixes problems at boot like:

[ 1.315475] Scanning device for bad blocks [ 3.203108] marvell-nfc f10d0000.flash: Timeout waiting for RB signal [ 3.209564] nand_bbt: error while writing BBT block -110 [ 4.243106] marvell-nfc f10d0000.flash: Timeout waiting for RB signal [ 5.283106] marvell-nfc f10d0000.flash: Timeout waiting for RB signal [ 5.289562] nand_bbt: error -110 while marking block 2047 bad [ 6.323106] marvell-nfc f10d0000.flash: Timeout waiting for RB signal [ 6.329559] nand_bbt: error while writing BBT block -110 [ 7.363106] marvell-nfc f10d0000.flash: Timeout waiting for RB signal [ 8.403105] marvell-nfc f10d0000.flash: Timeout waiting for RB signal [ 8.409559] nand_bbt: error -110 while marking block 2046 bad ...

Fixes: 02f26ecf8c772 ("mtd: nand: add reworked Marvell NAND controller driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Tested-by: Chris Packham chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon boris.brezillon@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/mtd/nand/marvell_nand.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mtd/nand/marvell_nand.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/marvell_nand.c @@ -1404,6 +1404,7 @@ marvell_nfc_hw_ecc_bch_write_chunk(struc struct marvell_nand_chip *marvell_nand = to_marvell_nand(chip); struct marvell_nfc *nfc = to_marvell_nfc(chip->controller); const struct marvell_hw_ecc_layout *lt = to_marvell_nand(chip)->layout; + u32 xtype; int ret; struct marvell_nfc_op nfc_op = { .ndcb[0] = NDCB0_CMD_TYPE(TYPE_WRITE) | NDCB0_LEN_OVRD, @@ -1419,7 +1420,12 @@ marvell_nfc_hw_ecc_bch_write_chunk(struc * last naked write. */ if (chunk == 0) { - nfc_op.ndcb[0] |= NDCB0_CMD_XTYPE(XTYPE_WRITE_DISPATCH) | + if (lt->nchunks == 1) + xtype = XTYPE_MONOLITHIC_RW; + else + xtype = XTYPE_WRITE_DISPATCH; + + nfc_op.ndcb[0] |= NDCB0_CMD_XTYPE(xtype) | NDCB0_ADDR_CYC(marvell_nand->addr_cyc) | NDCB0_CMD1(NAND_CMD_SEQIN); nfc_op.ndcb[1] |= NDCB1_ADDRS_PAGE(page);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boris Brezillon boris.brezillon@bootlin.com

commit 9a0e9802217291e54c4dd1fc5462f189a4be14ec upstream.

When using uni-planar formats (like RGB), the scaling parameters are stored in plane 0, not plane 1.

Fixes: fc04023fafec ("drm/vc4: Add support for YUV planes.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon boris.brezillon@bootlin.com Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt eric@anholt.net Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180507121303.5610-1-boris.br... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static int vc4_plane_mode_set(struct drm * the scl fields here. */ if (num_planes == 1) { - scl0 = vc4_get_scl_field(state, 1); + scl0 = vc4_get_scl_field(state, 0); scl1 = scl0; } else { scl0 = vc4_get_scl_field(state, 1);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Skeggs bskeggs@redhat.com

commit 0d5a03c3d9254813ca76d7886ff9ed76a0aea545 upstream.

Potentially responsible for some random OOPSes.

Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs bskeggs@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [v4.15+] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.c | 1 - drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.h | 2 -- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_ttm.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.c @@ -214,7 +214,6 @@ nouveau_bo_new(struct nouveau_cli *cli, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nvbo->entry); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nvbo->vma_list); nvbo->bo.bdev = &drm->ttm.bdev; - nvbo->cli = cli;

/* This is confusing, and doesn't actually mean we want an uncached * mapping, but is what NOUVEAU_GEM_DOMAIN_COHERENT gets translated --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_bo.h @@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ struct nouveau_bo {

struct list_head vma_list;

- struct nouveau_cli *cli; - unsigned contig:1; unsigned page:5; unsigned kind:8; --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_ttm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_ttm.c @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ nouveau_vram_manager_new(struct ttm_mem_ struct ttm_mem_reg *reg) { struct nouveau_bo *nvbo = nouveau_bo(bo); - struct nouveau_drm *drm = nvbo->cli->drm; + struct nouveau_drm *drm = nouveau_bdev(bo->bdev); struct nouveau_mem *mem; int ret;

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ nouveau_gart_manager_new(struct ttm_mem_ struct ttm_mem_reg *reg) { struct nouveau_bo *nvbo = nouveau_bo(bo); - struct nouveau_drm *drm = nvbo->cli->drm; + struct nouveau_drm *drm = nouveau_bdev(bo->bdev); struct nouveau_mem *mem; int ret;

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ nv04_gart_manager_new(struct ttm_mem_typ struct ttm_mem_reg *reg) { struct nouveau_bo *nvbo = nouveau_bo(bo); - struct nouveau_drm *drm = nvbo->cli->drm; + struct nouveau_drm *drm = nouveau_bdev(bo->bdev); struct nouveau_mem *mem; int ret;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com

commit 2be147f7459db5bbf292e0a6f135037b55e20b39 upstream.

pool can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/atm/zatm.c:1462 zatm_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'zatm_dev->pool_info' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing pool before using it to index zatm_dev->pool_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavo@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/atm/zatm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/atm/zatm.c +++ b/drivers/atm/zatm.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <asm/io.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h>

#include "uPD98401.h" #include "uPD98402.h" @@ -1458,6 +1459,8 @@ static int zatm_ioctl(struct atm_dev *de return -EFAULT; if (pool < 0 || pool > ZATM_LAST_POOL) return -EINVAL; + pool = array_index_nospec(pool, + ZATM_LAST_POOL + 1); spin_lock_irqsave(&zatm_dev->lock, flags); info = zatm_dev->pool_info[pool]; if (cmd == ZATM_GETPOOLZ) {

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com

commit cfcadfaad7251d8b640713724b388164d75465b2 upstream.

Commit 0847684cfc5f0 (PCI / PM: Simplify device wakeup settings code) went too far and dropped the device_may_wakeup() check from pci_enable_wake() which causes wakeup to be enabled during system suspend, hibernation or shutdown for some PCI devices that are not allowed by user space to wake up the system from sleep (or power off).

As a result of this, excessive power is drawn by some of the affected systems while in sleep states or off.

Restore the device_may_wakeup() check in pci_enable_wake(), but make sure that the PCI bus type's runtime suspend callback will not call device_may_wakeup() which is about system wakeup from sleep and not about device wakeup from runtime suspend.

Fixes: 0847684cfc5f0 (PCI / PM: Simplify device wakeup settings code) Reported-by: Joseph Salisbury joseph.salisbury@canonical.com Cc: 4.13+ stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.13+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas bhelgaas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/pci/pci.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -1897,7 +1897,7 @@ void pci_pme_active(struct pci_dev *dev, EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_pme_active);

/** - * pci_enable_wake - enable PCI device as wakeup event source + * __pci_enable_wake - enable PCI device as wakeup event source * @dev: PCI device affected * @state: PCI state from which device will issue wakeup events * @enable: True to enable event generation; false to disable @@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_pme_active); * Error code depending on the platform is returned if both the platform and * the native mechanism fail to enable the generation of wake-up events */ -int pci_enable_wake(struct pci_dev *dev, pci_power_t state, bool enable) +static int __pci_enable_wake(struct pci_dev *dev, pci_power_t state, bool enable) { int ret = 0;

@@ -1956,6 +1956,23 @@ int pci_enable_wake(struct pci_dev *dev,

return ret; } + +/** + * pci_enable_wake - change wakeup settings for a PCI device + * @pci_dev: Target device + * @state: PCI state from which device will issue wakeup events + * @enable: Whether or not to enable event generation + * + * If @enable is set, check device_may_wakeup() for the device before calling + * __pci_enable_wake() for it. + */ +int pci_enable_wake(struct pci_dev *pci_dev, pci_power_t state, bool enable) +{ + if (enable && !device_may_wakeup(&pci_dev->dev)) + return -EINVAL; + + return __pci_enable_wake(pci_dev, state, enable); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_enable_wake);

/** @@ -1968,9 +1985,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(pci_enable_wake); * should not be called twice in a row to enable wake-up due to PCI PM vs ACPI * ordering constraints. * - * This function only returns error code if the device is not capable of - * generating PME# from both D3_hot and D3_cold, and the platform is unable to - * enable wake-up power for it. + * This function only returns error code if the device is not allowed to wake + * up the system from sleep or it is not capable of generating PME# from both + * D3_hot and D3_cold and the platform is unable to enable wake-up power for it. */ int pci_wake_from_d3(struct pci_dev *dev, bool enable) { @@ -2101,7 +2118,7 @@ int pci_finish_runtime_suspend(struct pc

dev->runtime_d3cold = target_state == PCI_D3cold;

- pci_enable_wake(dev, target_state, pci_dev_run_wake(dev)); + __pci_enable_wake(dev, target_state, pci_dev_run_wake(dev));

error = pci_set_power_state(dev, target_state);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com

commit 544a591668813583021474fa5c7ff4942244d654 upstream.

Commit f44cb4b19ed4 ("Bluetooth: btusb: Fix quirk for Atheros 1525/QCA6174") is causing bluetooth to no longer work for several people, see: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1568911

So lets revert it for now and try to find another solution for devices which need the modified quirk.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blackl { USB_DEVICE(0x0930, 0x0227), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x0036), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3004), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3008), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311d), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311e), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 }, @@ -263,7 +264,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blackl { USB_DEVICE(0x0489, 0xe03c), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },

/* QCA ROME chipset */ - { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3004), .driver_info = BTUSB_QCA_ROME }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0xe007), .driver_info = BTUSB_QCA_ROME }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0xe009), .driver_info = BTUSB_QCA_ROME }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0xe010), .driver_info = BTUSB_QCA_ROME },

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com

commit fc54910280eb38bde923cdf0898e74687d8e6989 upstream.

Jeremy Cline correctly points out in rhbz#1514836 that a device where the QCA rome chipset needs the USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME quirk, may also ship with a different wifi/bt chipset in some configurations.

If that is the case then we are needlessly penalizing those other chipsets with a reset-resume quirk, typically causing 0.4W extra power use because this disables runtime-pm.

This commit moves the DMI table check to a btusb_check_needs_reset_resume() helper (so that we can easily also call it for other chipsets) and calls this new helper only for QCA_ROME chipsets for now.

BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1514836 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jeremy Cline jcline@redhat.com Suggested-by: Jeremy Cline jcline@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -2846,6 +2846,12 @@ static int btusb_config_oob_wake(struct } #endif

+static void btusb_check_needs_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) +{ + if (dmi_check_system(btusb_needs_reset_resume_table)) + interface_to_usbdev(intf)->quirks |= USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME; +} + static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id) { @@ -2968,9 +2974,6 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interf hdev->send = btusb_send_frame; hdev->notify = btusb_notify;

- if (dmi_check_system(btusb_needs_reset_resume_table)) - interface_to_usbdev(intf)->quirks |= USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME; - #ifdef CONFIG_PM err = btusb_config_oob_wake(hdev); if (err) @@ -3109,6 +3112,7 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interf hdev->setup = btusb_setup_csr;

set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_SIMULTANEOUS_DISCOVERY, &hdev->quirks); + btusb_check_needs_reset_resume(intf); }

if (id->driver_info & BTUSB_SNIFFER) {

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marek Szyprowski m.szyprowski@samsung.com

commit c8da6cdef57b459ac0fd5d9d348f8460a575ae90 upstream.

tmu_read() in case of Exynos4210 might return error for out of bound values. Current code ignores such value, what leads to reporting critical temperature value. Add proper error code propagation to exynos_get_temp() function.

Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski m.szyprowski@samsung.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz b.zolnierkie@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Eduardo Valentin edubezval@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/thermal/samsung/exynos_tmu.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/thermal/samsung/exynos_tmu.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/samsung/exynos_tmu.c @@ -892,6 +892,7 @@ static void exynos7_tmu_control(struct p static int exynos_get_temp(void *p, int *temp) { struct exynos_tmu_data *data = p; + int value, ret = 0;

if (!data || !data->tmu_read || !data->enabled) return -EINVAL; @@ -899,12 +900,16 @@ static int exynos_get_temp(void *p, int mutex_lock(&data->lock); clk_enable(data->clk);

- *temp = code_to_temp(data, data->tmu_read(data)) * MCELSIUS; + value = data->tmu_read(data); + if (value < 0) + ret = value; + else + *temp = code_to_temp(data, value) * MCELSIUS;

clk_disable(data->clk); mutex_unlock(&data->lock);

- return 0; + return ret; }

#ifdef CONFIG_THERMAL_EMULATION

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Charles Machalow charles.machalow@intel.com

commit 4e50d9ebaeaa3c6761d2b513ef7039510c8cf213 upstream.

If a controller reset is requested while the device has no namespaces, we were incorrectly returning ENETRESET. This patch adds the check for ADMIN_ONLY controller state to indicate a successful reset.

Fixes: 8000d1fdb0 ("nvme-rdma: fix sysfs invoked reset_ctrl error flow ") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Charles Machalow charles.machalow@intel.com [changelog] Signed-off-by: Keith Busch keith.busch@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ int nvme_reset_ctrl_sync(struct nvme_ctr ret = nvme_reset_ctrl(ctrl); if (!ret) { flush_work(&ctrl->reset_work); - if (ctrl->state != NVME_CTRL_LIVE) + if (ctrl->state != NVME_CTRL_LIVE && + ctrl->state != NVME_CTRL_ADMIN_ONLY) ret = -ENETRESET; }

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

commit 7281c8dec8a87685cb54d503d8cceef5a0fc2fdd upstream.

kernel/sched/core.c:6921 cpu_weight_nice_write_s64() warn: potential spectre issue 'sched_prio_to_weight'

Userspace controls @nice, so sanitize the value before using it to index an array.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Mike Galbraith efault@gmx.de Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/mmu_context.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/nmi.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/prefetch.h> #include <linux/profile.h> #include <linux/security.h> @@ -6873,11 +6874,15 @@ static int cpu_weight_nice_write_s64(str struct cftype *cft, s64 nice) { unsigned long weight; + int idx;

if (nice < MIN_NICE || nice > MAX_NICE) return -ERANGE;

- weight = sched_prio_to_weight[NICE_TO_PRIO(nice) - MAX_RT_PRIO]; + idx = NICE_TO_PRIO(nice) - MAX_RT_PRIO; + idx = array_index_nospec(idx, 40); + weight = sched_prio_to_weight[idx]; + return sched_group_set_shares(css_tg(css), scale_load(weight)); } #endif

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

commit ef9ee4ad38445a30909c48998624861716f2a994 upstream.

arch/x86/events/core.c:319 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_event_ids[cache_type]' (local cap) arch/x86/events/core.c:319 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_event_ids' (local cap) arch/x86/events/core.c:328 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_extra_regs[cache_type]' (local cap) arch/x86/events/core.c:328 set_ext_hw_attr() warn: potential spectre issue 'hw_cache_extra_regs' (local cap)

Userspace controls @config which contains 3 (byte) fields used for a 3 dimensional array deref.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Cc: Jiri Olsa jolsa@redhat.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Stephane Eranian eranian@google.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Vince Weaver vincent.weaver@maine.edu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/events/core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c @@ -304,17 +304,20 @@ set_ext_hw_attr(struct hw_perf_event *hw

config = attr->config;

- cache_type = (config >> 0) & 0xff; + cache_type = (config >> 0) & 0xff; if (cache_type >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cache_type = array_index_nospec(cache_type, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX);

cache_op = (config >> 8) & 0xff; if (cache_op >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cache_op = array_index_nospec(cache_op, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX);

cache_result = (config >> 16) & 0xff; if (cache_result >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cache_result = array_index_nospec(cache_result, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX);

val = hw_cache_event_ids[cache_type][cache_op][cache_result];

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

commit 06ce6e9b6d6c09d4129c6e24a1314a395d816c10 upstream.

arch/x86/events/msr.c:178 msr_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'msr' (local cap)

Userspace controls @attr, sanitize cfg (attr->config) before using it to index an array.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Cc: Jiri Olsa jolsa@redhat.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Stephane Eranian eranian@google.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Vince Weaver vincent.weaver@maine.edu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/events/msr.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/events/msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/msr.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h>

enum perf_msr_id { @@ -158,9 +159,6 @@ static int msr_event_init(struct perf_ev if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type) return -ENOENT;

- if (cfg >= PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX) - return -EINVAL; - /* unsupported modes and filters */ if (event->attr.exclude_user || event->attr.exclude_kernel || @@ -171,6 +169,11 @@ static int msr_event_init(struct perf_ev event->attr.sample_period) /* no sampling */ return -EINVAL;

+ if (cfg >= PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + cfg = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)cfg, PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX); + if (!msr[cfg].attr) return -EINVAL;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

commit 46b1b577229a091b137831becaa0fae8690ee15a upstream.

arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c:307 cstate_pmu_event_init() warn: potential spectre issue 'pkg_msr' (local cap) arch/x86/events/intel/core.c:337 intel_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'intel_perfmon_event_map' arch/x86/events/intel/knc.c:122 knc_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'knc_perfmon_event_map' arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c:722 p4_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'p4_general_events' arch/x86/events/intel/p6.c:116 p6_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'p6_perfmon_event_map' arch/x86/events/amd/core.c:132 amd_pmu_event_map() warn: potential spectre issue 'amd_perfmon_event_map'

Userspace controls @attr, sanitize @attr->config before passing it on to x86_pmu::event_map().

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Cc: Jiri Olsa jolsa@redhat.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Stephane Eranian eranian@google.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Vince Weaver vincent.weaver@maine.edu Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/events/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h>

#include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> @@ -424,6 +425,8 @@ int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event if (attr->config >= x86_pmu.max_events) return -EINVAL;

+ attr->config = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)attr->config, x86_pmu.max_events); + /* * The generic map: */