From: Gwangun Jung exsociety@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 3037933448f60f9acb705997eae62013ecb81e0d ]

If the TCA_QFQ_LMAX value is not offered through nlattr, lmax is determined by the MTU value of the network device. The MTU of the loopback device can be set up to 2^31-1. As a result, it is possible to have an lmax value that exceeds QFQ_MIN_LMAX.

Due to the invalid lmax value, an index is generated that exceeds the QFQ_MAX_INDEX(=24) value, causing out-of-bounds read/write errors.

The following reports a oob access:

[ 84.582666] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in qfq_activate_agg.constprop.0 (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1027 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1060 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1313) [ 84.583267] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810f676948 by task ping/301 [ 84.583686] [ 84.583797] CPU: 3 PID: 301 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.3.0-rc5 #1 [ 84.584164] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 84.584644] Call Trace: [ 84.584787] <TASK> [ 84.584906] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) [ 84.585108] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:320 mm/kasan/report.c:430) [ 84.585570] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:538) [ 84.585988] qfq_activate_agg.constprop.0 (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1027 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1060 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1313) [ 84.586599] qfq_enqueue (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1255) [ 84.587607] dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:3776) [ 84.587749] __dev_queue_xmit (./include/net/sch_generic.h:186 net/core/dev.c:3865 net/core/dev.c:4212) [ 84.588763] ip_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:546 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228) [ 84.589460] ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:430) [ 84.590132] ip_push_pending_frames (./include/net/dst.h:444 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:126 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1586 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1606) [ 84.590285] raw_sendmsg (net/ipv4/raw.c:649) [ 84.591960] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) [ 84.592084] __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2142) [ 84.593306] __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2150) [ 84.593779] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [ 84.593902] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [ 84.594070] RIP: 0033:0x7fe568032066 [ 84.594192] Code: 0e 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c09[ 84.594796] RSP: 002b:00007ffce388b4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c

Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== [ 84.595047] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffce388cc70 RCX: 00007fe568032066 [ 84.595281] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00005605fdad6d10 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 84.595515] RBP: 00005605fdad6d10 R08: 00007ffce388eeec R09: 0000000000000010 [ 84.595749] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 84.595984] R13: 00007ffce388cc30 R14: 00007ffce388b4f0 R15: 0000001d00000001 [ 84.596218] </TASK> [ 84.596295] [ 84.596351] Allocated by task 291: [ 84.596467] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:46) [ 84.596597] kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52) [ 84.596725] __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:384) [ 84.596852] __kmalloc_node (./include/linux/kasan.h:196 mm/slab_common.c:967 mm/slab_common.c:974) [ 84.596979] qdisc_alloc (./include/linux/slab.h:610 ./include/linux/slab.h:731 net/sched/sch_generic.c:938) [ 84.597100] qdisc_create (net/sched/sch_api.c:1244) [ 84.597222] tc_modify_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1680) [ 84.597357] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6174) [ 84.597495] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2574) [ 84.597627] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365) [ 84.597759] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1942) [ 84.597891] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:724 net/socket.c:747) [ 84.598016] ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2501) [ 84.598147] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2557) [ 84.598275] __sys_sendmsg (./include/linux/file.h:31 net/socket.c:2586) [ 84.598399] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [ 84.598520] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) [ 84.598688] [ 84.598744] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810f674000 [ 84.598744] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 [ 84.599135] The buggy address is located 2664 bytes to the right of [ 84.599135] allocated 7904-byte region [ffff88810f674000, ffff88810f675ee0) [ 84.599544] [ 84.599598] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 84.599777] page:00000000e638567f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10f670 [ 84.600074] head:00000000e638567f order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 84.600330] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) [ 84.600517] raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100043180 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 84.600764] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080020002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 84.601009] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 84.601187] [ 84.601241] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 84.601396] ffff88810f676800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.601620] ffff88810f676880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.601845] >ffff88810f676900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.602069] ^ [ 84.602243] ffff88810f676980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.602468] ffff88810f676a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 84.602693] ================================================================== [ 84.602924] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Fixes: 3015f3d2a3cd ("pkt_sched: enable QFQ to support TSO/GSO") Reported-by: Gwangun Jung exsociety@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Gwangun Jung exsociety@gmail.com Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salimjhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index 4701019768955..2832e16b6c2e1 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -432,15 +432,16 @@ static int qfq_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, } else weight = 1;

- if (tb[TCA_QFQ_LMAX]) { + if (tb[TCA_QFQ_LMAX]) lmax = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_QFQ_LMAX]); - if (lmax < QFQ_MIN_LMAX || lmax > (1UL << QFQ_MTU_SHIFT)) { - pr_notice("qfq: invalid max length %u\n", lmax); - return -EINVAL; - } - } else + else lmax = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch));

+ if (lmax < QFQ_MIN_LMAX || lmax > (1UL << QFQ_MTU_SHIFT)) { + pr_notice("qfq: invalid max length %u\n", lmax); + return -EINVAL; + } + inv_w = ONE_FP / weight; weight = ONE_FP / inv_w;

From: Aleksandr Loktionov aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 8485d093b076e59baff424552e8aecfc5bd2d261 ]

Fix accessing vsi->active_filters without holding the mac_filter_hash_lock. Move vsi->active_filters = 0 inside critical section and move clear_bit(__I40E_VSI_OVERFLOW_PROMISC, vsi->state) after the critical section to ensure the new filters from other threads can be added only after filters cleaning in the critical section is finished.

Fixes: 278e7d0b9d68 ("i40e: store MAC/VLAN filters in a hash with the MAC Address as key") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c index de8a713db078f..929e85b2eb21d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c @@ -10078,15 +10078,15 @@ static int i40e_add_vsi(struct i40e_vsi *vsi) vsi->id = ctxt.vsi_number; }

- vsi->active_filters = 0; - clear_bit(__I40E_VSI_OVERFLOW_PROMISC, vsi->state); spin_lock_bh(&vsi->mac_filter_hash_lock); + vsi->active_filters = 0; /* If macvlan filters already exist, force them to get loaded */ hash_for_each_safe(vsi->mac_filter_hash, bkt, h, f, hlist) { f->state = I40E_FILTER_NEW; f_count++; } spin_unlock_bh(&vsi->mac_filter_hash_lock); + clear_bit(__I40E_VSI_OVERFLOW_PROMISC, vsi->state);

if (f_count) { vsi->flags |= I40E_VSI_FLAG_FILTER_CHANGED;

From: Nikita Zhandarovich n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru

[ Upstream commit c0e73276f0fcbbd3d4736ba975d7dc7a48791b0c ]

Function mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi_get() returns NULL if 'tlv' in question does not pass checks in mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_payload_get(). This behaviour may lead to NULL pointer dereference in 'multi->total_len'. Fix this issue by testing mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi_get()'s return value against NULL.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with static analysis tool SVACE.

Fixes: 410ed13cae39 ("Add the mlxfw module for Mellanox firmware flash process") Co-developed-by: Natalia Petrova n.petrova@fintech.ru Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel idosch@nvidia.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230417120718.52325-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c index 0094b92a233ba..31c0d6ee81b16 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxfw/mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi.c @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_next(const struct mlxfw_mfa2_file *mfa2_file,

if (tlv->type == MLXFW_MFA2_TLV_MULTI_PART) { multi = mlxfw_mfa2_tlv_multi_get(mfa2_file, tlv); + if (!multi) + return NULL; tlv_len = NLA_ALIGN(tlv_len + be16_to_cpu(multi->total_len)); }

From: Douglas Raillard douglas.raillard@arm.com

[ Upstream commit 0b04d4c0542e8573a837b1d81b94209e48723b25 ]

Fix the nid_t field so that its size is correctly reported in the text format embedded in trace.dat files. As it stands, it is reported as being of size 4:

field:nid_t nid[3]; offset:24; size:4; signed:0;

Instead of 12:

field:nid_t nid[3]; offset:24; size:12; signed:0;

This also fixes the reported offset of subsequent fields so that they match with the actual struct layout.

Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard douglas.raillard@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha quic_mojha@quicinc.com Reviewed-by: Chao Yu chao@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/trace/events/f2fs.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/trace/events/f2fs.h b/include/trace/events/f2fs.h index 7ab40491485bc..8ecfc8e68507d 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/f2fs.h +++ b/include/trace/events/f2fs.h @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(f2fs_truncate_partial_nodes, TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(dev_t, dev) __field(ino_t, ino) - __field(nid_t, nid[3]) + __array(nid_t, nid, 3) __field(int, depth) __field(int, err) ),

From: Tomas Henzl thenzl@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 0808ed6ebbc292222ca069d339744870f6d801da ]

If crash_dump_buf is not allocated then crash dump can't be available. Replace logical 'and' with 'or'.

Signed-off-by: Tomas Henzl thenzl@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230324135249.9733-1-thenzl@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c index 42d876034741c..bdd06b26e2de1 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c @@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ megasas_fw_crash_buffer_show(struct device *cdev,

spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags); buff_offset = instance->fw_crash_buffer_offset; - if (!instance->crash_dump_buf && + if (!instance->crash_dump_buf || !((instance->fw_crash_state == AVAILABLE) || (instance->fw_crash_state == COPYING))) { dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,

From: Álvaro Fernández Rojas noltari@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 45977e58ce65ed0459edc9a0466d9dfea09463f5 ]

Implement phy_read16() and phy_write16() ops for B53 MMAP to avoid accessing B53_PORT_MII_PAGE registers which hangs the device. This access should be done through the MDIO Mux bus controller.

Signed-off-by: Álvaro Fernández Rojas noltari@gmail.com Acked-by: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c b/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c index ef63d24fef814..985eb0bbf7dbd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_mmap.c @@ -207,6 +207,18 @@ static int b53_mmap_write64(struct b53_device *dev, u8 page, u8 reg, return 0; }

+static int b53_mmap_phy_read16(struct b53_device *dev, int addr, int reg, + u16 *value) +{ + return -EIO; +} + +static int b53_mmap_phy_write16(struct b53_device *dev, int addr, int reg, + u16 value) +{ + return -EIO; +} + static const struct b53_io_ops b53_mmap_ops = { .read8 = b53_mmap_read8, .read16 = b53_mmap_read16, @@ -218,6 +230,8 @@ static const struct b53_io_ops b53_mmap_ops = { .write32 = b53_mmap_write32, .write48 = b53_mmap_write48, .write64 = b53_mmap_write64, + .phy_read16 = b53_mmap_phy_read16, + .phy_write16 = b53_mmap_phy_write16, };

static int b53_mmap_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)

From: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com

[ Upstream commit 2eca98e5b24d01c02b46c67be05a5f98cc9789b1 ]

Issue the same error message in case an illegal page boundary crossing has been detected in both cases where this is tested.

Suggested-by: Jan Beulich jbeulich@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich jbeulich@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230329080259.14823-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 252414a9293db..a141db3f0dc7c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -991,10 +991,8 @@ static void xenvif_tx_build_gops(struct xenvif_queue *queue,

/* No crossing a page as the payload mustn't fragment. */ if (unlikely((txreq.offset + txreq.size) > XEN_PAGE_SIZE)) { - netdev_err(queue->vif->dev, - "txreq.offset: %u, size: %u, end: %lu\n", - txreq.offset, txreq.size, - (unsigned long)(txreq.offset&~XEN_PAGE_MASK) + txreq.size); + netdev_err(queue->vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txreq.offset: %u, size: %u\n", + txreq.offset, txreq.size); xenvif_fatal_tx_err(queue->vif); break; }

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

commit 4b6d621c9d859ff89e68cebf6178652592676013 upstream.

When calling dev_set_name() memory is allocated for the name for the struct device. Once that structure device is registered, or attempted to be registerd, with the driver core, the driver core will handle cleaning up that memory when the device is removed from the system.

Unfortunatly for the memstick code, there is an error path that causes the struct device to never be registered, and so the memory allocated in dev_set_name will be leaked. Fix that leak by manually freeing it right before the memory for the device is freed.

Cc: Maxim Levitsky maximlevitsky@gmail.com Cc: Alex Dubov oakad@yahoo.com Cc: Ulf Hansson ulf.hansson@linaro.org Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" rafael@kernel.org Cc: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Cc: Kay Sievers kay.sievers@vrfy.org Cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0252c3b4f018 ("memstick: struct device - replace bus_id with dev_name(), dev_set_name()") Cc: stable stable@kernel.org Co-developed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Co-developed-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr Signed-off-by: Mirsad Goran Todorovac mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230401200327.16800-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson ulf.hansson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c +++ b/drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c @@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ static struct memstick_dev *memstick_all return card; err_out: host->card = old_card; + kfree_const(card->dev.kobj.name); kfree(card); return NULL; } @@ -471,8 +472,10 @@ static void memstick_check(struct work_s put_device(&card->dev); host->card = NULL; } - } else + } else { + kfree_const(card->dev.kobj.name); kfree(card); + } }

out_power_off:

From: Tudor Ambarus tudor.ambarus@linaro.org

This reverts commit bb8592efcf8ef2f62947745d3182ea05b5256a15 which is commit 67d7d8ad99beccd9fe92d585b87f1760dc9018e3 upstream.

The order in which patches are queued to stable matters. This patch has a logical dependency on commit 310c097c2bdbea253d6ee4e064f3e65580ef93ac upstream, and failing to queue the latter results in a null-ptr-deref reported at the Link below.

In order to avoid conflicts on stable, revert the commit just so that we can queue its prerequisite patch first and then queue the same after.

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d5ebf56f3b1268136afd Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus tudor.ambarus@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -2200,9 +2200,8 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode * struct ext4_inode *raw_inode; int error;

- if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode)) + if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) return 0; - raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc); header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode); is->s.base = is->s.first = IFIRST(header); @@ -2230,9 +2229,8 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t struct ext4_xattr_search *s = &is->s; int error;

- if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode)) + if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) return -ENOSPC; - error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, handle, inode, false /* is_block */); if (error) return error;

From: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com

[ Upstream commit 67d7d8ad99beccd9fe92d585b87f1760dc9018e3 ]

Hulk Robot reported a issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092

CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17 Call Trace: [...] memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline] __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline] __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x459fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9 RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140 RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80 [...] ==================================================================

Above issue may happen as follows: ------------------------------------- ext4_xattr_set ext4_xattr_set_handle ext4_xattr_ibody_find >> s->end < s->base >> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR >> xattr_check_inode is not executed ext4_xattr_ibody_set ext4_xattr_set_entry >> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base >> UAF in memcpy

we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands: mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt touch /mnt/file setfattr -n user.cat -v `seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]'` /mnt/file

In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic: header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode) = raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize is->s.base = IFIRST(header) = header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size

In ext4_xattr_set_entry min_offs = s->end - s->base = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) last = s->first free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32) = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize - sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32)

In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8. The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when memcpy is executed.

Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue.

Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) ritesh.list@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220616021358.2504451-3-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus tudor.ambarus@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -2200,8 +2200,9 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode * struct ext4_inode *raw_inode; int error;

- if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) + if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode)) return 0; + raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc); header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode); is->s.base = is->s.first = IFIRST(header); @@ -2229,8 +2230,9 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_set(handle_t *handl struct ext4_xattr_search *s = &is->s; int error;

- if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0) + if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode)) return -ENOSPC; + error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, handle, inode, false /* is_block */); if (error) return error;

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com

commit d38afeec26ed4739c640bf286c270559aab2ba5f upstream.

Originally, inet6_sk(sk)->XXX were changed under lock_sock(), so we were able to clean them up by calling inet6_destroy_sock() during the IPv6 -> IPv4 conversion by IPV6_ADDRFORM. However, commit 03485f2adcde ("udpv6: Add lockless sendmsg() support") added a lockless memory allocation path, which could cause a memory leak:

setsockopt(IPV6_ADDRFORM) sendmsg() +-----------------------+ +-------+ - do_ipv6_setsockopt(sk, ...) - udpv6_sendmsg(sk, ...) - sockopt_lock_sock(sk) ^._ called via udpv6_prot - lock_sock(sk) before WRITE_ONCE() - WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_prot, &tcp_prot) - inet6_destroy_sock() - if (!corkreq) - sockopt_release_sock(sk) - ip6_make_skb(sk, ...) - release_sock(sk) ^._ lockless fast path for the non-corking case

- __ip6_append_data(sk, ...) - ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, ...) - xchg(&np->rxpmtu, skb) ^._ rxpmtu is never freed.

- goto out_no_dst;

- lock_sock(sk)

For now, rxpmtu is only the case, but not to miss the future change and a similar bug fixed in commit e27326009a3d ("net: ping6: Fix memleak in ipv6_renew_options()."), let's set a new function to IPv6 sk->sk_destruct() and call inet6_cleanup_sock() there. Since the conversion does not change sk->sk_destruct(), we can guarantee that we can clean up IPv6 resources finally.

We can now remove all inet6_destroy_sock() calls from IPv6 protocol specific ->destroy() functions, but such changes are invasive to backport. So they can be posted as a follow-up later for net-next.

Fixes: 03485f2adcde ("udpv6: Add lockless sendmsg() support") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/net/ipv6.h | 1 + include/net/udp.h | 2 +- include/net/udplite.h | 8 -------- net/ipv4/udp.c | 9 ++++++--- net/ipv4/udplite.c | 8 ++++++++ net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 8 +++++++- net/ipv6/udp.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- net/ipv6/udp_impl.h | 1 + net/ipv6/udplite.c | 9 ++++++++- 9 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ void ipv6_local_error(struct sock *sk, i void ipv6_local_rxpmtu(struct sock *sk, struct flowi6 *fl6, u32 mtu);

void inet6_cleanup_sock(struct sock *sk); +void inet6_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk); int inet6_release(struct socket *sock); int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len); int inet6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int *uaddr_len, --- a/include/net/udp.h +++ b/include/net/udp.h @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static inline int udp_rqueue_get(struct }

/* net/ipv4/udp.c */ -void udp_destruct_sock(struct sock *sk); +void udp_destruct_common(struct sock *sk); void skb_consume_udp(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int len); int __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); void udp_skb_destructor(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); --- a/include/net/udplite.h +++ b/include/net/udplite.h @@ -24,14 +24,6 @@ static __inline__ int udplite_getfrag(vo return copy_from_iter_full(to, len, &msg->msg_iter) ? 0 : -EFAULT; }

-/* Designate sk as UDP-Lite socket */ -static inline int udplite_sk_init(struct sock *sk) -{ - udp_init_sock(sk); - udp_sk(sk)->pcflag = UDPLITE_BIT; - return 0; -} - /* * Checksumming routines */ --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ drop: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb);

-void udp_destruct_sock(struct sock *sk) +void udp_destruct_common(struct sock *sk) { /* reclaim completely the forward allocated memory */ struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk); @@ -1393,10 +1393,14 @@ void udp_destruct_sock(struct sock *sk) kfree_skb(skb); } udp_rmem_release(sk, total, 0, true); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(udp_destruct_common);

+static void udp_destruct_sock(struct sock *sk) +{ + udp_destruct_common(sk); inet_sock_destruct(sk); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(udp_destruct_sock);

int udp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) { @@ -1404,7 +1408,6 @@ int udp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) sk->sk_destruct = udp_destruct_sock; return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(udp_init_sock);

void skb_consume_udp(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int len) { --- a/net/ipv4/udplite.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udplite.c @@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ struct udp_table udplite_table __read_mostly; EXPORT_SYMBOL(udplite_table);

+/* Designate sk as UDP-Lite socket */ +static int udplite_sk_init(struct sock *sk) +{ + udp_init_sock(sk); + udp_sk(sk)->pcflag = UDPLITE_BIT; + return 0; +} + static int udplite_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) { return __udp4_lib_rcv(skb, &udplite_table, IPPROTO_UDPLITE); --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -107,6 +107,12 @@ static __inline__ struct ipv6_pinfo *ine return (struct ipv6_pinfo *)(((u8 *)sk) + offset); }

+void inet6_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) +{ + inet6_cleanup_sock(sk); + inet_sock_destruct(sk); +} + static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int kern) { @@ -199,7 +205,7 @@ lookup_protocol: inet->hdrincl = 1; }

- sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct; + sk->sk_destruct = inet6_sock_destruct; sk->sk_family = PF_INET6; sk->sk_protocol = protocol;

--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -66,6 +66,19 @@ static bool udp6_lib_exact_dif_match(str return false; }

+static void udpv6_destruct_sock(struct sock *sk) +{ + udp_destruct_common(sk); + inet6_sock_destruct(sk); +} + +int udpv6_init_sock(struct sock *sk) +{ + skb_queue_head_init(&udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue); + sk->sk_destruct = udpv6_destruct_sock; + return 0; +} + static u32 udp6_ehashfn(const struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *laddr, const u16 lport, @@ -1552,7 +1565,7 @@ struct proto udpv6_prot = { .connect = ip6_datagram_connect, .disconnect = udp_disconnect, .ioctl = udp_ioctl, - .init = udp_init_sock, + .init = udpv6_init_sock, .destroy = udpv6_destroy_sock, .setsockopt = udpv6_setsockopt, .getsockopt = udpv6_getsockopt, --- a/net/ipv6/udp_impl.h +++ b/net/ipv6/udp_impl.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *, str void __udp6_lib_err(struct sk_buff *, struct inet6_skb_parm *, u8, u8, int, __be32, struct udp_table *);

+int udpv6_init_sock(struct sock *sk); int udp_v6_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum);

int udpv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, --- a/net/ipv6/udplite.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udplite.c @@ -14,6 +14,13 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include "udp_impl.h"

+static int udplitev6_sk_init(struct sock *sk) +{ + udpv6_init_sock(sk); + udp_sk(sk)->pcflag = UDPLITE_BIT; + return 0; +} + static int udplitev6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) { return __udp6_lib_rcv(skb, &udplite_table, IPPROTO_UDPLITE); @@ -39,7 +46,7 @@ struct proto udplitev6_prot = { .connect = ip6_datagram_connect, .disconnect = udp_disconnect, .ioctl = udp_ioctl, - .init = udplite_sk_init, + .init = udplitev6_sk_init, .destroy = udpv6_destroy_sock, .setsockopt = udpv6_setsockopt, .getsockopt = udpv6_getsockopt,

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com

commit 1651951ebea54970e0bda60c638fc2eee7a6218f upstream.

After commit d38afeec26ed ("tcp/udp: Call inet6_destroy_sock() in IPv6 sk->sk_destruct()."), we call inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_destruct() by setting inet6_sock_destruct() to it to make sure we do not leak inet6-specific resources.

DCCP sets its own sk->sk_destruct() in the dccp_init_sock(), and DCCPv6 socket shares it by calling the same init function via dccp_v6_init_sock().

To call inet6_sock_destruct() from DCCPv6 sk->sk_destruct(), we export it and set dccp_v6_sk_destruct() in the init function.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/dccp/dccp.h | 1 + net/dccp/ipv6.c | 15 ++++++++------- net/dccp/proto.c | 8 +++++++- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/net/dccp/dccp.h +++ b/net/dccp/dccp.h @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ int dccp_rcv_state_process(struct sock * int dccp_rcv_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct dccp_hdr *dh, const unsigned int len);

+void dccp_destruct_common(struct sock *sk); int dccp_init_sock(struct sock *sk, const __u8 ctl_sock_initialized); void dccp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk);

--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -1000,6 +1000,12 @@ static const struct inet_connection_sock #endif };

+static void dccp_v6_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk) +{ + dccp_destruct_common(sk); + inet6_sock_destruct(sk); +} + /* NOTE: A lot of things set to zero explicitly by call to * sk_alloc() so need not be done here. */ @@ -1012,17 +1018,12 @@ static int dccp_v6_init_sock(struct sock if (unlikely(!dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized)) dccp_v6_ctl_sock_initialized = 1; inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_af_ops; + sk->sk_destruct = dccp_v6_sk_destruct; }

return err; }

-static void dccp_v6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk) -{ - dccp_destroy_sock(sk); - inet6_destroy_sock(sk); -} - static struct timewait_sock_ops dccp6_timewait_sock_ops = { .twsk_obj_size = sizeof(struct dccp6_timewait_sock), }; @@ -1045,7 +1046,7 @@ static struct proto dccp_v6_prot = { .accept = inet_csk_accept, .get_port = inet_csk_get_port, .shutdown = dccp_shutdown, - .destroy = dccp_v6_destroy_sock, + .destroy = dccp_destroy_sock, .orphan_count = &dccp_orphan_count, .max_header = MAX_DCCP_HEADER, .obj_size = sizeof(struct dccp6_sock), --- a/net/dccp/proto.c +++ b/net/dccp/proto.c @@ -171,12 +171,18 @@ const char *dccp_packet_name(const int t

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dccp_packet_name);

-static void dccp_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk) +void dccp_destruct_common(struct sock *sk) { struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);

ccid_hc_tx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid, sk); dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid = NULL; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dccp_destruct_common); + +static void dccp_sk_destruct(struct sock *sk) +{ + dccp_destruct_common(sk); inet_sock_destruct(sk); }

--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ void inet6_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk inet6_cleanup_sock(sk); inet_sock_destruct(sk); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_sock_destruct);

static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int kern)

From: William Breathitt Gray william.gray@linaro.org

commit 4aa3b75c74603c3374877d5fd18ad9cc3a9a62ed upstream.

The Counter (CNTR) register is 24 bits wide, but we can have an effective 25-bit count value by setting bit 24 to the XOR of the Borrow flag and Carry flag. The flags can be read from the FLAG register, but a race condition exists: the Borrow flag and Carry flag are instantaneous and could change by the time the count value is read from the CNTR register.

Since the race condition could result in an incorrect 25-bit count value, remove support for 25-bit count values from this driver; hard-coded maximum count values are replaced by a LS7267_CNTR_MAX define for consistency and clarity.

Fixes: 28e5d3bb0325 ("iio: 104-quad-8: Add IIO support for the ACCES 104-QUAD-8") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1.x Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.2.x Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230312231554.134858-1-william.gray@linaro.org/ Signed-off-by: William Breathitt Gray william.gray@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/iio/counter/104-quad-8.c | 10 +--------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/iio/counter/104-quad-8.c +++ b/drivers/iio/counter/104-quad-8.c @@ -64,9 +64,6 @@ static int quad8_read_raw(struct iio_dev { struct quad8_iio *const priv = iio_priv(indio_dev); const int base_offset = priv->base + 2 * chan->channel; - unsigned int flags; - unsigned int borrow; - unsigned int carry; int i;

switch (mask) { @@ -76,12 +73,7 @@ static int quad8_read_raw(struct iio_dev return IIO_VAL_INT; }

- flags = inb(base_offset + 1); - borrow = flags & BIT(0); - carry = !!(flags & BIT(1)); - - /* Borrow XOR Carry effectively doubles count range */ - *val = (borrow ^ carry) << 24; + *val = 0;

/* Reset Byte Pointer; transfer Counter to Output Latch */ outb(0x11, base_offset + 1);

From: Ekaterina Orlova vorobushek.ok@gmail.com

commit 5a43001c01691dcbd396541e6faa2c0077378f48 upstream.

It seems there is a misprint in the check of strdup() return code that can lead to NULL pointer dereference.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: 4520c6a49af8 ("X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler") Signed-off-by: Ekaterina Orlova vorobushek.ok@gmail.com Cc: David Woodhouse dwmw2@infradead.org Cc: James Bottomley jejb@linux.ibm.com Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230315172130.140-1-vorobushek.ok@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c +++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) p = strrchr(argv[1], '/'); p = p ? p + 1 : argv[1]; grammar_name = strdup(p); - if (!p) { + if (!grammar_name) { perror(NULL); exit(1); }