From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit 669474e772b952b14f4de4845a1558fd4c0414a4 upstream.

For CPUs capable of data value prediction, CSDB waits for any outstanding predictions to architecturally resolve before allowing speculative execution to continue. Provide macros to expose it to the arch code.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 7 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index f68abb17aa4b..683c2875278f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ dmb \opt .endm

+/* + * Value prediction barrier + */ + .macro csdb + hint #20 + .endm + #define USER(l, x...) \ 9999: x; \ .section __ex_table,"a"; \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h index f2d2c0bbe21b..574486634c62 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ #define dmb(opt) asm volatile("dmb " #opt : : : "memory") #define dsb(opt) asm volatile("dsb " #opt : : : "memory")

+#define csdb() asm volatile("hint #20" : : : "memory") + #define mb() dsb(sy) #define rmb() dsb(ld) #define wmb() dsb(st)

From: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com

commit 022620eed3d0bc4bf2027326f599f5ad71c2ea3f upstream.

Provide an optimised, assembly implementation of array_index_mask_nospec() for arm64 so that the compiler is not in a position to transform the code in ways which affect its ability to inhibit speculation (e.g. by introducing conditional branches).

This is similar to the sequence used by x86, modulo architectural differences in the carry/borrow flags.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h index 574486634c62..7c25e3e11b6d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -37,6 +37,27 @@ #define dma_rmb() dmb(oshld) #define dma_wmb() dmb(oshst)

+/* + * Generate a mask for array_index__nospec() that is ~0UL when 0 <= idx < sz + * and 0 otherwise. + */ +#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec +static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx, + unsigned long sz) +{ + unsigned long mask; + + asm volatile( + " cmp %1, %2\n" + " sbc %0, xzr, xzr\n" + : "=r" (mask) + : "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz) + : "cc"); + + csdb(); + return mask; +} + #define smp_mb() dmb(ish) #define smp_rmb() dmb(ishld) #define smp_wmb() dmb(ishst)

From: Yury Norov ynorov@caviumnetworks.com

commit eef94a3d09aab437c8c254de942d8b1aa76455e2 upstream.

ILP32 series [1] introduces the dependency on <asm/is_compat.h> for TASK_SIZE macro. Which in turn requires <asm/thread_info.h>, and <asm/thread_info.h> include <asm/memory.h>, giving a circular dependency, because TASK_SIZE is currently located in <asm/memory.h>.

In other architectures, TASK_SIZE is defined in <asm/processor.h>, and moving TASK_SIZE there fixes the problem.

Discussion: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9929107/

[1] https://github.com/norov/linux/tree/ilp32-next

CC: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com CC: Laura Abbott labbott@redhat.com Cc: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Cc: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Suggested-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Yury Norov ynorov@caviumnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 15 --------------- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 +- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h index b42b930cc19a..959a1e9188fe 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ * (VA_BITS - 1)) * VA_BITS - the maximum number of bits for virtual addresses. * VA_START - the first kernel virtual address. - * TASK_SIZE - the maximum size of a user space task. - * TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE - the lower boundary of the mmap VM area. * The module space lives between the addresses given by TASK_SIZE * and PAGE_OFFSET - it must be within 128MB of the kernel text. */ @@ -58,19 +56,6 @@ #define PCI_IO_END (MODULES_VADDR - SZ_2M) #define PCI_IO_START (PCI_IO_END - PCI_IO_SIZE) #define FIXADDR_TOP (PCI_IO_START - SZ_2M) -#define TASK_SIZE_64 (UL(1) << VA_BITS) - -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -#define TASK_SIZE_32 UL(0x100000000) -#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \ - TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64) -#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk) (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_32BIT) ? \ - TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64) -#else -#define TASK_SIZE TASK_SIZE_64 -#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ - -#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 4))

/* * Physical vs virtual RAM address space conversion. These are diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index d08559528927..75d9ef6c457c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ #ifndef __ASM_PROCESSOR_H #define __ASM_PROCESSOR_H

+#define TASK_SIZE_64 (UL(1) << VA_BITS) + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + /* * Default implementation of macro that returns current * instruction pointer ("program counter"). @@ -36,6 +40,22 @@ #include <asm/types.h>

#ifdef __KERNEL__ +/* + * TASK_SIZE - the maximum size of a user space task. + * TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE - the lower boundary of the mmap VM area. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define TASK_SIZE_32 UL(0x100000000) +#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \ + TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64) +#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk) (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_32BIT) ? \ + TASK_SIZE_32 : TASK_SIZE_64) +#else +#define TASK_SIZE TASK_SIZE_64 +#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ + +#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 4)) + #define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_64 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT #define AARCH32_VECTORS_BASE 0xffff0000 @@ -188,4 +208,5 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)

int cpu_enable_pan(void *__unused);

+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASM_PROCESSOR_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 586326981769..c849be9231bb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/esr.h> -#include <asm/memory.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h> #include <asm/asm-uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h>

From: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com

commit 51369e398d0d33e8f524314e672b07e8cf870e79 upstream.

Currently, USER_DS represents an exclusive limit while KERNEL_DS is inclusive. In order to do some clever trickery for speculation-safe masking, we need them both to behave equivalently - there aren't enough bits to make KERNEL_DS exclusive, so we have precisely one option. This also happens to correct a longstanding false negative for a range ending on the very top byte of kernel memory.

Mark Rutland points out that we've actually got the semantics of addresses vs. segments muddled up in most of the places we need to amend, so shuffle the {USER,KERNEL}_DS definitions around such that we can correct those properly instead of just pasting "-1"s everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ 4.4: Dropped changes from fault.c and fixed minor rebase conflict ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++------------- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 +-- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 75d9ef6c457c..ff1449c25bf4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@

#define TASK_SIZE_64 (UL(1) << VA_BITS)

+#define KERNEL_DS UL(-1) +#define USER_DS (TASK_SIZE_64 - 1) + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

/* diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 829fa6d3e561..c625cc5531fc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -56,10 +56,7 @@ struct exception_table_entry

extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs);

-#define KERNEL_DS (-1UL) #define get_ds() (KERNEL_DS) - -#define USER_DS TASK_SIZE_64 #define get_fs() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)

static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) @@ -87,22 +84,32 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise. * * This is equivalent to the following test: - * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= current->addr_limit - * - * This needs 65-bit arithmetic. + * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)current->addr_limit + 1 */ -#define __range_ok(addr, size) \ -({ \ - unsigned long __addr = (unsigned long __force)(addr); \ - unsigned long flag, roksum; \ - __chk_user_ptr(addr); \ - asm("adds %1, %1, %3; ccmp %1, %4, #2, cc; cset %0, ls" \ - : "=&r" (flag), "=&r" (roksum) \ - : "1" (__addr), "Ir" (size), \ - "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) \ - : "cc"); \ - flag; \ -}) +static inline unsigned long __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) +{ + unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit; + + __chk_user_ptr(addr); + asm volatile( + // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps: + // 1: X = A + B; X' = X % 2^64 + " adds %0, %0, %2\n" + // 2: Set C = 0 if X > 2^64, to guarantee X' > C in step 4 + " csel %1, xzr, %1, hi\n" + // 3: Set X' = ~0 if X >= 2^64. For X == 2^64, this decrements X' + // to compensate for the carry flag being set in step 4. For + // X > 2^64, X' merely has to remain nonzero, which it does. + " csinv %0, %0, xzr, cc\n" + // 4: For X < 2^64, this gives us X' - C - 1 <= 0, where the -1 + // comes from the carry in being clear. Otherwise, we are + // testing X' - C == 0, subject to the previous adjustments. + " sbcs xzr, %0, %1\n" + " cset %0, ls\n" + : "+r" (addr), "+r" (limit) : "Ir" (size) : "cc"); + + return addr; +}

/* * When dealing with data aborts, watchpoints, or instruction traps we may end @@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) */ #define untagged_addr(addr) sign_extend64(addr, 55)

-#define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size) +#define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs

/* diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index c849be9231bb..4c5013b09dcb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -96,10 +96,10 @@ .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE get_thread_info tsk - /* Save the task's original addr_limit and set USER_DS (TASK_SIZE_64) */ + /* Save the task's original addr_limit and set USER_DS */ ldr x20, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] str x20, [sp, #S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT] - mov x20, #TASK_SIZE_64 + mov x20, #USER_DS str x20, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT] .endif /* \el == 0 */ mrs x22, elr_el1

From: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com

commit 4d8efc2d5ee4c9ccfeb29ee8afd47a8660d0c0ce upstream.

Similarly to x86, mitigate speculation past an access_ok() check by masking the pointer against the address limit before use.

Even if we don't expect speculative writes per se, it is plausible that a CPU may still speculate at least as far as fetching a cache line for writing, hence we also harden put_user() and clear_user() for peace of mind.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index c625cc5531fc..75363d723262 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -121,6 +121,26 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size) #define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok((unsigned long)(addr), size) #define user_addr_max get_fs

+/* + * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the + * current addr_limit. + */ +#define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) +static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr) +{ + void __user *safe_ptr; + + asm volatile( + " bics xzr, %1, %2\n" + " csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n" + : "=&r" (safe_ptr) + : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit) + : "cc"); + + csdb(); + return safe_ptr; +} + /* * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address * space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()" @@ -193,7 +213,7 @@ do { \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ might_fault(); \ access_ok(VERIFY_READ, __p, sizeof(*__p)) ? \ - __get_user((x), __p) : \ + __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p), __get_user((x), __p) : \ ((x) = 0, -EFAULT); \ })

@@ -259,7 +279,7 @@ do { \ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ might_fault(); \ access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, __p, sizeof(*__p)) ? \ - __put_user((x), __p) : \ + __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p), __put_user((x), __p) : \ -EFAULT; \ })

@@ -297,7 +317,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_in_user(void __user *to, const voi static inline unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) { if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) - n = __clear_user(to, n); + n = __clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n); return n; }

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit 6314d90e64936c584f300a52ef173603fb2461b5 upstream.

In a similar manner to array_index_mask_nospec, this patch introduces an assembly macro (mask_nospec64) which can be used to bound a value under speculation. This macro is then used to ensure that the indirect branch through the syscall table is bounded under speculation, with out-of-range addresses speculating as calls to sys_io_setup (0).

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: use existing scno & sc_nr definitions ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 11 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 1 + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index 683c2875278f..2b30363a3a89 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ hint #20 .endm

+/* + * Sanitise a 64-bit bounded index wrt speculation, returning zero if out + * of bounds. + */ + .macro mask_nospec64, idx, limit, tmp + sub \tmp, \idx, \limit + bic \tmp, \tmp, \idx + and \idx, \idx, \tmp, asr #63 + csdb + .endm + #define USER(l, x...) \ 9999: x; \ .section __ex_table,"a"; \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 4c5013b09dcb..e6aec982dea9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -697,6 +697,7 @@ el0_svc_naked: // compat entry point b.ne __sys_trace cmp scno, sc_nr // check upper syscall limit b.hs ni_sys + mask_nospec64 scno, sc_nr, x19 // enforce bounds for syscall number ldr x16, [stbl, scno, lsl #3] // address in the syscall table blr x16 // call sys_* routine b ret_fast_syscall

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit c2f0ad4fc089cff81cef6a13d04b399980ecbfcc upstream.

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 75363d723262..fc11c50af558 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs); static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) { current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs; + + /* + * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding + * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation. + */ + dsb(nsh); + isb(); }

#define segment_eq(a, b) ((a) == (b))

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit 84624087dd7e3b482b7b11c170ebc1f329b3a218 upstream.

access_ok isn't an expensive operation once the addr_limit for the current thread has been loaded into the cache. Given that the initial access_ok check preceding a sequence of __{get,put}_user operations will take the brunt of the miss, we can make the __* variants identical to the full-fat versions, which brings with it the benefits of address masking.

The likely cost in these sequences will be from toggling PAN/UAO, which we can address later by implementing the *_unsafe versions.

Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Fixed conflicts around {__get_user|__put_user}_unaligned macros ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 62 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index fc11c50af558..a34324436ce1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -200,30 +200,35 @@ do { \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \ } while (0)

-#define __get_user(x, ptr) \ +#define __get_user_check(x, ptr, err) \ ({ \ - int __gu_err = 0; \ - __get_user_err((x), (ptr), __gu_err); \ - __gu_err; \ + __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ + might_fault(); \ + if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, __p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ + __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \ + __get_user_err((x), __p, (err)); \ + } else { \ + (x) = 0; (err) = -EFAULT; \ + } \ })

#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ ({ \ - __get_user_err((x), (ptr), (err)); \ + __get_user_check((x), (ptr), (err)); \ (void)0; \ })

-#define __get_user_unaligned __get_user - -#define get_user(x, ptr) \ +#define __get_user(x, ptr) \ ({ \ - __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ - might_fault(); \ - access_ok(VERIFY_READ, __p, sizeof(*__p)) ? \ - __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p), __get_user((x), __p) : \ - ((x) = 0, -EFAULT); \ + int __gu_err = 0; \ + __get_user_check((x), (ptr), __gu_err); \ + __gu_err; \ })

+#define __get_user_unaligned __get_user + +#define get_user __get_user + #define __put_user_asm(instr, reg, x, addr, err) \ asm volatile( \ "1: " instr " " reg "1, [%2]\n" \ @@ -266,30 +271,35 @@ do { \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \ } while (0)

-#define __put_user(x, ptr) \ +#define __put_user_check(x, ptr, err) \ ({ \ - int __pu_err = 0; \ - __put_user_err((x), (ptr), __pu_err); \ - __pu_err; \ + __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ + might_fault(); \ + if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, __p, sizeof(*__p))) { \ + __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \ + __put_user_err((x), __p, (err)); \ + } else { \ + (err) = -EFAULT; \ + } \ })

#define __put_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ ({ \ - __put_user_err((x), (ptr), (err)); \ + __put_user_check((x), (ptr), (err)); \ (void)0; \ })

-#define __put_user_unaligned __put_user - -#define put_user(x, ptr) \ +#define __put_user(x, ptr) \ ({ \ - __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \ - might_fault(); \ - access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, __p, sizeof(*__p)) ? \ - __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p), __put_user((x), __p) : \ - -EFAULT; \ + int __pu_err = 0; \ + __put_user_check((x), (ptr), __pu_err); \ + __pu_err; \ })

+#define __put_user_unaligned __put_user + +#define put_user __put_user + extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);

From: Andrey Ryabinin aryabinin@virtuozzo.com

commit 64f8ebaf115bcddc4aaa902f981c57ba6506bc42 upstream.

Memory access coded in an assembly won't be seen by KASAN as a compiler can instrument only C code. Add kasan_check_[read,write]() API which is going to be used to check a certain memory range.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462538722-1574-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozz... Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko glider@google.com Cc: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Cc: Ingo Molnar mingo@elte.hu Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" hpa@zytor.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org [ v4.4: Fixed MAINTAINERS conflict and added whole kasan entry. Drop 4th argument to check_memory_region(). ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- MAINTAINERS | 14 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 12 ++++++++++++ mm/kasan/kasan.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/kasan-checks.h

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index f4d4a5544dc1..2a8826732967 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5982,6 +5982,20 @@ S: Maintained F: Documentation/hwmon/k8temp F: drivers/hwmon/k8temp.c

+KASAN +M: Andrey Ryabinin aryabinin@virtuozzo.com +R: Alexander Potapenko glider@google.com +R: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com +L: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com +S: Maintained +F: arch/*/include/asm/kasan.h +F: arch/*/mm/kasan_init* +F: Documentation/kasan.txt +F: include/linux/kasan*.h +F: lib/test_kasan.c +F: mm/kasan/ +F: scripts/Makefile.kasan + KCONFIG M: "Yann E. MORIN" yann.morin.1998@free.fr L: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b7f8aced7870 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +#ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_CHECKS_H +#define _LINUX_KASAN_CHECKS_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +void kasan_check_read(const void *p, unsigned int size); +void kasan_check_write(const void *p, unsigned int size); +#else +static inline void kasan_check_read(const void *p, unsigned int size) { } +static inline void kasan_check_write(const void *p, unsigned int size) { } +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c index b7397b459960..1cdcab0c976a 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c @@ -274,6 +274,18 @@ static __always_inline void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, void __asan_loadN(unsigned long addr, size_t size); void __asan_storeN(unsigned long addr, size_t size);

+void kasan_check_read(const void *p, unsigned int size) +{ + check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_read); + +void kasan_check_write(const void *p, unsigned int size) +{ + check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_write); + #undef memset void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) {

From: Yang Shi yang.shi@linaro.org

commit bffe1baff5d57521b0c41b6997c41ff1993e9818 upstream.

The upstream commit 1771c6e1a567ea0ba2cccc0a4ffe68a1419fd8ef ("x86/kasan: instrument user memory access API") added KASAN instrument to x86 user memory access API, so added such instrument to ARM64 too.

Define __copy_to/from_user in C in order to add kasan_check_read/write call, rename assembly implementation to __arch_copy_to/from_user.

Tested by test_kasan module.

Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Tested-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi yang.shi@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index a34324436ce1..693a0d784534 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ * User space memory access functions */ #include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/kasan-checks.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h>

@@ -300,15 +301,29 @@ do { \

#define put_user __put_user

-extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); -extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long n);

+static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + kasan_check_write(to, n); + return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n); +} + +static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + kasan_check_read(from, n); + return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n); +} + static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { + kasan_check_write(to, n); + if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)) - n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n); + n = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n); else /* security hole - plug it */ memset(to, 0, n); return n; @@ -316,8 +331,10 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u

static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { + kasan_check_read(from, n); + if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) - n = __copy_to_user(to, from, n); + n = __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n); return n; }

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c index 3b6d8cc9dfe0..c654df05b7d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(copy_page); EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page);

/* user mem (segment) */ -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_to_user); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_in_user);

diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index 4699cd74f87e..281e75db899a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ .endm

end .req x5 -ENTRY(__copy_from_user) +ENTRY(__arch_copy_from_user) ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) add end, x0, x2 @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy ret -ENDPROC(__copy_from_user) +ENDPROC(__arch_copy_from_user)

.section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 7512bbbc07ac..db4d187de61f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ .endm

end .req x5 -ENTRY(__copy_to_user) +ENTRY(__arch_copy_to_user) ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) add end, x0, x2 @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) mov x0, #0 ret -ENDPROC(__copy_to_user) +ENDPROC(__arch_copy_to_user)

.section .fixup,"ax" .align 2

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit f71c2ffcb20dd8626880747557014bb9a61eb90e upstream.

Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user operations.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: fixup for v4.4 style uaccess primitives ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 ++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 693a0d784534..f2f5a152f372 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -303,19 +303,18 @@ do { \

extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); -extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); -extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long n); +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);

static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { kasan_check_write(to, n); - return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n); + return __arch_copy_from_user(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); }

static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) { kasan_check_read(from, n); - return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n); + return __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n); }

static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) @@ -338,22 +337,25 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi return n; }

-static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n) && access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) - n = __copy_in_user(to, from, n); + n = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); return n; } +#define copy_in_user __copy_in_user

#define __copy_to_user_inatomic __copy_to_user #define __copy_from_user_inatomic __copy_from_user

-static inline unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n); +static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n) { if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) - n = __clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n); + n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n); return n; } +#define clear_user __clear_user

extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c index c654df05b7d7..abe4e0984dbb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page); /* user mem (segment) */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_in_user); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user);

/* physical memory */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(memstart_addr); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S index a9723c71c52b..fc6bb0f83511 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@

.text

-/* Prototype: int __clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz) +/* Prototype: int __arch_clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz) * Purpose : clear some user memory * Params : addr - user memory address to clear * : sz - number of bytes to clear @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ * * Alignment fixed up by hardware. */ -ENTRY(__clear_user) +ENTRY(__arch_clear_user) ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) mov x2, x1 // save the size for fixup return @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ USER(9f, strb wzr, [x0] ) ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) ret -ENDPROC(__clear_user) +ENDPROC(__arch_clear_user)

.section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S index 81c8fc93c100..0219aa85b3cc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ .endm

end .req x5 -ENTRY(__copy_in_user) +ENTRY(__arch_copy_in_user) ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) add end, x0, x2 @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN) mov x0, #0 ret -ENDPROC(__copy_in_user) +ENDPROC(__arch_copy_in_user)

.section .fixup,"ax" .align 2

From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com

commit 644c2ae198412c956700e55a2acf80b2541f6aa5 upstream.

CPU feature code uses the desc field as a test to find the end of the list, this means every entry must have a description. This generates noise for entries in the list that aren't really features, but combinations of them. e.g.

CPU features: detected feature: Privileged Access Never CPU features: detected feature: PAN and not UAO

These combination features are needed for corner cases with alternatives, where cpu features interact.

Change all walkers of the arm64_features[] and arm64_hwcaps[] lists to test 'matches' not 'desc', and only print 'desc' if it is non-NULL.

Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by : Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index c1eddc07d996..bdb4cd9ffccf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static void setup_cpu_hwcaps(void) int i; const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *hwcaps = arm64_hwcaps;

- for (i = 0; hwcaps[i].desc; i++) + for (i = 0; hwcaps[i].matches; i++) if (hwcaps[i].matches(&hwcaps[i])) cap_set_hwcap(&hwcaps[i]); } @@ -754,11 +754,11 @@ void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, { int i;

- for (i = 0; caps[i].desc; i++) { + for (i = 0; caps[i].matches; i++) { if (!caps[i].matches(&caps[i])) continue;

- if (!cpus_have_cap(caps[i].capability)) + if (!cpus_have_cap(caps[i].capability) && caps[i].desc) pr_info("%s %s\n", info, caps[i].desc); cpus_set_cap(caps[i].capability); } @@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ static void enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) { int i;

- for (i = 0; caps[i].desc; i++) + for (i = 0; caps[i].matches; i++) if (caps[i].enable && cpus_have_cap(caps[i].capability)) /* * Use stop_machine() as it schedules the work allowing @@ -884,7 +884,7 @@ void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) return;

caps = arm64_features; - for (i = 0; caps[i].desc; i++) { + for (i = 0; caps[i].matches; i++) { if (!cpus_have_cap(caps[i].capability) || !caps[i].sys_reg) continue; /* @@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) caps[i].enable(NULL); }

- for (i = 0, caps = arm64_hwcaps; caps[i].desc; i++) { + for (i = 0, caps = arm64_hwcaps; caps[i].matches; i++) { if (!cpus_have_hwcap(&caps[i])) continue; if (!feature_matches(__raw_read_system_reg(caps[i].sys_reg), &caps[i]))

From: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com

commit 92406f0cc9e3d5cc77bf3de6d68c9c2373dcd701 upstream.

Add scope parameter to the arm64_cpu_capabilities::matches(), so that this can be reused for checking the capability on a given CPU vs the system wide. The system uses the default scope associated with the capability for initialising the CPU_HWCAPs and ELF_HWCAPs.

Cc: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Cc: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Cc: Andre Przywara andre.przywara@arm.com Cc: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com [ v4.4: Changes made according to 4.4 codebase ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 9 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 105 +++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index ad83c245781c..4c31e14c0f0e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -74,10 +74,17 @@ struct arm64_ftr_reg { struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftr_bits; };

+/* scope of capability check */ +enum { + SCOPE_SYSTEM, + SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, +}; + struct arm64_cpu_capabilities { const char *desc; u16 capability; - bool (*matches)(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *); + int def_scope; /* default scope */ + bool (*matches)(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, int scope); int (*enable)(void *); /* Called on all active CPUs */ union { struct { /* To be used for erratum handling only */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index a3e846a28b05..0971d80d3623 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -29,10 +29,12 @@ MIDR_ARCHITECTURE_MASK)

static bool __maybe_unused -is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) +is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();

+ WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); + if ((midr & CPU_MODEL_MASK) != entry->midr_model) return false;

@@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) }

#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ + .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ .midr_model = model, \ .midr_range_min = min, \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index bdb4cd9ffccf..d0c82bc02de4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -589,6 +589,48 @@ u64 read_system_reg(u32 id) return regp->sys_val; }

+/* + * __raw_read_system_reg() - Used by a STARTING cpu before cpuinfo is populated. + * Read the system register on the current CPU + */ +static u64 __raw_read_system_reg(u32 sys_id) +{ + switch (sys_id) { + case SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_PFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_PFR1_EL1); + case SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_DFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR1_EL1); + case SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR2_EL1); + case SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR3_EL1); + case SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR1_EL1); + case SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR2_EL1); + case SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR3_EL1); + case SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR4_EL1); + case SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR4_EL1); + case SYS_MVFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(MVFR0_EL1); + case SYS_MVFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(MVFR1_EL1); + case SYS_MVFR2_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(MVFR2_EL1); + + case SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); + case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); + + case SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0: return (u64)read_cpuid(CNTFRQ_EL0); + case SYS_CTR_EL0: return (u64)read_cpuid(CTR_EL0); + case SYS_DCZID_EL0: return (u64)read_cpuid(DCZID_EL0); + default: + BUG(); + return 0; + } +} + #include <linux/irqchip/arm-gic-v3.h>

static bool @@ -600,19 +642,24 @@ feature_matches(u64 reg, const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) }

static bool -has_cpuid_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) +has_cpuid_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { u64 val;

- val = read_system_reg(entry->sys_reg); + WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU && preemptible()); + if (scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM) + val = read_system_reg(entry->sys_reg); + else + val = __raw_read_system_reg(entry->sys_reg); + return feature_matches(val, entry); }

-static bool has_useable_gicv3_cpuif(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) +static bool has_useable_gicv3_cpuif(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { bool has_sre;

- if (!has_cpuid_feature(entry)) + if (!has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope)) return false;

has_sre = gic_enable_sre(); @@ -627,6 +674,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "GIC system register CPU interface", .capability = ARM64_HAS_SYSREG_GIC_CPUIF, + .def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM, .matches = has_useable_gicv3_cpuif, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, @@ -636,6 +684,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "Privileged Access Never", .capability = ARM64_HAS_PAN, + .def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, .field_pos = ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT, @@ -647,6 +696,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "LSE atomic instructions", .capability = ARM64_HAS_LSE_ATOMICS, + .def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, .field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR0_ATOMICS_SHIFT, @@ -656,6 +706,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "32-bit EL0 Support", .capability = ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0, + .def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM, .matches = has_cpuid_feature, .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT, @@ -667,6 +718,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { #define HWCAP_CAP(reg, field, min_value, type, cap) \ { \ .desc = #cap, \ + .def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM, \ .matches = has_cpuid_feature, \ .sys_reg = reg, \ .field_pos = field, \ @@ -745,7 +797,7 @@ static void setup_cpu_hwcaps(void) const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *hwcaps = arm64_hwcaps;

for (i = 0; hwcaps[i].matches; i++) - if (hwcaps[i].matches(&hwcaps[i])) + if (hwcaps[i].matches(&hwcaps[i], hwcaps[i].def_scope)) cap_set_hwcap(&hwcaps[i]); }

@@ -755,7 +807,7 @@ void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, int i;

for (i = 0; caps[i].matches; i++) { - if (!caps[i].matches(&caps[i])) + if (!caps[i].matches(&caps[i], caps[i].def_scope)) continue;

if (!cpus_have_cap(caps[i].capability) && caps[i].desc) @@ -800,47 +852,6 @@ static inline void set_sys_caps_initialised(void) sys_caps_initialised = true; }

-/* - * __raw_read_system_reg() - Used by a STARTING cpu before cpuinfo is populated. - */ -static u64 __raw_read_system_reg(u32 sys_id) -{ - switch (sys_id) { - case SYS_ID_PFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_PFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_PFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_PFR1_EL1); - case SYS_ID_DFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_DFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_MMFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_MMFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR1_EL1); - case SYS_ID_MMFR2_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR2_EL1); - case SYS_ID_MMFR3_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_MMFR3_EL1); - case SYS_ID_ISAR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_ISAR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR1_EL1); - case SYS_ID_ISAR2_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR2_EL1); - case SYS_ID_ISAR3_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR3_EL1); - case SYS_ID_ISAR4_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR4_EL1); - case SYS_ID_ISAR5_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_ISAR4_EL1); - case SYS_MVFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(MVFR0_EL1); - case SYS_MVFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(MVFR1_EL1); - case SYS_MVFR2_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(MVFR2_EL1); - - case SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); - case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1: return (u64)read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); - - case SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0: return (u64)read_cpuid(CNTFRQ_EL0); - case SYS_CTR_EL0: return (u64)read_cpuid(CTR_EL0); - case SYS_DCZID_EL0: return (u64)read_cpuid(DCZID_EL0); - default: - BUG(); - return 0; - } -} - /* * Park the CPU which doesn't have the capability as advertised * by the system.

From: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com

Commit c4bc34d20273db698c51951a1951dba0a722e162 upstream.

Adds a routine which can be used to park CPUs (spinning in kernel) when they can't be killed.

Cc: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 5 +---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h index d9c3d6a6100a..53b53a9b3e5a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/smp.h @@ -69,4 +69,12 @@ extern int __cpu_disable(void); extern void __cpu_die(unsigned int cpu); extern void cpu_die(void);

+static inline void cpu_park_loop(void) +{ + for (;;) { + wfe(); + wfi(); + } +} + #endif /* ifndef __ASM_SMP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index b7f01bf47988..4adf18307568 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -868,10 +868,7 @@ void cpu_die_early(void) /* Check if we can park ourselves */ if (cpu_ops[cpu] && cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_die) cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_die(cpu); - asm( - "1: wfe\n" - " wfi\n" - " b 1b"); + cpu_park_loop(); }

/*

From: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com

commit 6a6efbb45b7d95c84840010095367eb06a64f342 upstream.

CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied to the kernel code at boot time and the data is then freed up. If a new hotplugged CPU requires a work around which was not applied at boot time, there is nothing we can do but simply fail the booting.

Cc: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Cc: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: Andre Przywara andre.przywara@arm.com Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com [ Viresh: Resolved rebase conflict ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 4c31e14c0f0e..dd1aab8e52aa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ void update_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps, const char *info); void check_local_cpu_errata(void);

+void verify_local_cpu_errata(void); + #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void); #else diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 0971d80d3623..a3567881c01b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -116,6 +116,26 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { } };

+/* + * The CPU Errata work arounds are detected and applied at boot time + * and the related information is freed soon after. If the new CPU requires + * an errata not detected at boot, fail this CPU. + */ +void verify_local_cpu_errata(void) +{ + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps = arm64_errata; + + for (; caps->matches; caps++) + if (!cpus_have_cap(caps->capability) && + caps->matches(caps, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) { + pr_crit("CPU%d: Requires work around for %s, not detected" + " at boot time\n", + smp_processor_id(), + caps->desc ? : "an erratum"); + cpu_die_early(); + } +} + void check_local_cpu_errata(void) { update_cpu_capabilities(arm64_errata, "enabling workaround for"); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index a0273cd8be51..9a4b638b1c18 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -872,6 +872,8 @@ void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) if (!sys_caps_initialised) return;

+ verify_local_cpu_errata(); + caps = arm64_features; for (i = 0; caps[i].matches; i++) { if (!cpus_have_cap(caps[i].capability) || !caps[i].sys_reg)

From: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com

commit c47a1900ad710fd2c97127e2ba19da1df79cf733 upstream.

Right now we run through the work around checks on a CPU from __cpuinfo_store_cpu. There are some problems with that:

1) We initialise the system wide CPU feature registers only after the Boot CPU updates its cpuinfo. Now, if a work around depends on the variance of a CPU ID feature (e.g, check for Cache Line size mismatch), we have no way of performing it cleanly for the boot CPU.

2) It is out of place, invoked from __cpuinfo_store_cpu() in cpuinfo.c. It is not an obvious place for that.

This patch rearranges the CPU specific capability(aka work around) checks.

1) At the moment we use verify_local_cpu_capabilities() to check if a new CPU has all the system advertised features. Use this for the secondary CPUs to perform the work around check. For that we rename verify_local_cpu_capabilities() => check_local_cpu_capabilities() which:

If the system wide capabilities haven't been initialised (i.e, the CPU is activated at the boot), update the system wide detected work arounds.

Otherwise (i.e a CPU hotplugged in later) verify that this CPU conforms to the system wide capabilities.

2) Boot CPU updates the work arounds from smp_prepare_boot_cpu() after we have initialised the system wide CPU feature values.

Cc: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Cc: Andre Przywara andre.przywara@arm.com Cc: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Cc: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 8 +------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 +++++++- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 0267bab6ac18..1bc51f8835e5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -177,13 +177,7 @@ void __init enable_errata_workarounds(void);

void verify_local_cpu_errata(void);

-#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU -void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void); -#else -static inline void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) -{ -} -#endif +void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void);

u64 read_system_reg(u32 id);

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 7773bea6927e..c74df3ca000e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -860,18 +860,11 @@ static inline void set_sys_caps_initialised(void) * cannot do anything to fix it up and could cause unexpected failures. So * we park the CPU. */ -void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) +static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) { int i; const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps;

- /* - * If we haven't computed the system capabilities, there is nothing - * to verify. - */ - if (!sys_caps_initialised) - return; - verify_local_cpu_errata();

caps = arm64_features; @@ -902,6 +895,20 @@ void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) } }

+void check_local_cpu_capabilities(void) +{ + /* + * If we haven't finalised the system capabilities, this CPU gets + * a chance to update the errata work arounds. + * Otherwise, this CPU should verify that it has all the system + * advertised capabilities. + */ + if (!sys_caps_initialised) + check_local_cpu_errata(); + else + verify_local_cpu_capabilities(); +} + #else /* !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */

static inline void set_sys_caps_initialised(void) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c index 0166cfbc866c..13e659fda04a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c @@ -239,8 +239,6 @@ static void __cpuinfo_store_cpu(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info) info->reg_mvfr2 = read_cpuid(MVFR2_EL1);

cpuinfo_detect_icache_policy(info); - - check_local_cpu_errata(); }

void cpuinfo_store_cpu(void) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c index 23e8ae0c6305..02b76bb78d59 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void) * this CPU ticks all of those. If it doesn't, the CPU will * fail to come online. */ - verify_local_cpu_capabilities(); + check_local_cpu_capabilities();

if (cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot) cpu_ops[cpu]->cpu_postboot(); @@ -357,6 +357,12 @@ void __init smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void) { set_my_cpu_offset(per_cpu_offset(smp_processor_id())); cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu(); + /* + * Run the errata work around checks on the boot CPU, once we have + * initialised the cpu feature infrastructure from + * cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu() above. + */ + check_local_cpu_errata(); }

static u64 __init of_get_cpu_mpidr(struct device_node *dn)

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit 0a0d111d40fd1dc588cc590fab6b55d86ddc71d3 upstream.

In order to invoke the CPU capability ->matches callback from the ->enable callback for applying local-CPU workarounds, we need a handle on the capability structure.

This patch passes a pointer to the capability structure to the ->enable callback.

Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Use &caps[i] instead as caps isn't incremented ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index c74df3ca000e..474b34243521 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ void enable_cpu_capabilities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) * uses an IPI, giving us a PSTATE that disappears when * we return. */ - stop_machine(caps[i].enable, NULL, cpu_online_mask); + stop_machine(caps[i].enable, (void *)&caps[i], cpu_online_mask); }

#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static void verify_local_cpu_capabilities(void) cpu_die_early(); } if (caps[i].enable) - caps[i].enable(NULL); + caps[i].enable((void *)&caps[i]); }

for (i = 0, caps = arm64_hwcaps; caps[i].matches; i++) {

From: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com

commit f33bcf03e6079668da6bf4eec4a7dcf9289131d0 upstream.

This patch takes the errata workaround code out of cpu_do_switch_mm into a dedicated post_ttbr0_update_workaround macro which will be reused in a subsequent patch.

Cc: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Cc: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Included cpufeature.h and adapted to use alternative_if_not ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index 2b30363a3a89..8ab46508e836 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #ifndef __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H #define __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H

+#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/cputype.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h> @@ -282,4 +283,21 @@ lr .req x30 // link register .Ldone@: .endm

+/* + * Errata workaround post TTBR0_EL1 update. + */ + .macro post_ttbr0_update_workaround +#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456 +alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456 + ret + nop + nop + nop +alternative_else + ic iallu + dsb nsh + isb +#endif + .endm + #endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S index f09636738007..4eb1084e203a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S @@ -139,17 +139,8 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_switch_mm) bfi x0, x1, #48, #16 // set the ASID msr ttbr0_el1, x0 // set TTBR0 isb -alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456 + post_ttbr0_update_workaround ret - nop - nop - nop -alternative_else - ic iallu - dsb nsh - isb - ret -alternative_endif ENDPROC(cpu_do_switch_mm)

.section ".text.init", #alloc, #execinstr

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit 0f15adbb2861ce6f75ccfc5a92b19eae0ef327d0 upstream.

Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge information from one context to another.

This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for CPUs that are affected.

Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Changes made according to 4.4 codebase ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 17 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 39 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 8 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/context.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 16 +++++++ 11 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index f18b8c26a959..5fa01073566b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -624,6 +624,23 @@ config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER However for 4K, we choose a higher default value, 11 as opposed to 10, giving us 4M allocations matching the default size used by generic code.

+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT + default y + help + Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on + being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by + executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks + can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch + predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. + + This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the + branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific + instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system + firmware. + + If unsure, say Y. + menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions" depends on COMPAT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 1bc51f8835e5..93fb24d14d95 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220 7 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456 8 #define ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0 9 +#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR 10

-#define ARM64_NCAPS 10 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 11

#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h index 990124a67eeb..8d0129210416 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #ifndef __ASM_MMU_H #define __ASM_MMU_H

+#include <linux/percpu.h> + typedef struct { atomic64_t id; void *vdso; @@ -28,6 +30,43 @@ typedef struct { */ #define ASID(mm) ((mm)->context.id.counter & 0xffff)

+typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void); + +struct bp_hardening_data { + int hyp_vectors_slot; + bp_hardening_cb_t fn; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +extern char __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start[], __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end[]; + +DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) +{ + return this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data); +} + +static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) +{ + struct bp_hardening_data *d; + + if (!cpus_have_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) + return; + + d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(); + if (d->fn) + d->fn(); +} +#else +static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + extern void paging_init(void); extern void __iomem *early_io_map(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long virt); extern void init_mem_pgprot(void); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h index 50150320f80d..523b089fb408 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h @@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ #define ID_AA64ISAR0_AES_SHIFT 4

/* id_aa64pfr0 */ +#define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT 56 +#define ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT 32 #define ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT 24 #define ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT 20 #define ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT 16 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index 474691f8b13a..aa8f28210219 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_PCI) += pci.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARMV8_DEPRECATED) += armv8_deprecated.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o

+ifeq ($(CONFIG_KVM),y) +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) += bpi.o +endif + obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ + obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m) head-y := head.o extra-y += $(head-y) vmlinux.lds diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..06a931eb2673 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Contains CPU specific branch predictor invalidation sequences + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +.macro ventry target + .rept 31 + nop + .endr + b \target +.endm + +.macro vectors target + ventry \target + 0x000 + ventry \target + 0x080 + ventry \target + 0x100 + ventry \target + 0x180 + + ventry \target + 0x200 + ventry \target + 0x280 + ventry \target + 0x300 + ventry \target + 0x380 + + ventry \target + 0x400 + ventry \target + 0x480 + ventry \target + 0x500 + ventry \target + 0x580 + + ventry \target + 0x600 + ventry \target + 0x680 + ventry \target + 0x700 + ventry \target + 0x780 +.endm + + .align 11 +ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + .rept 4 + vectors __kvm_hyp_vector + .endr +ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 047f1da59cb1..19c51d1cd302 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -43,6 +43,80 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) return (midr >= entry->midr_range_min && midr <= entry->midr_range_max); }

+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR +#include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> + +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data); + +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM +static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + void *dst = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + slot * SZ_2K; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80) + memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start); + + flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K); +} + +static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + static int last_slot = -1; + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bp_lock); + int cpu, slot = -1; + + spin_lock(&bp_lock); + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) { + slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu); + break; + } + } + + if (slot == -1) { + last_slot++; + BUG_ON(((__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end - __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) + / SZ_2K) <= last_slot); + slot = last_slot; + __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); + } + + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot); + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); + spin_unlock(&bp_lock); +} +#else +static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ + +static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, + bp_hardening_cb_t fn, + const char *hyp_vecs_start, + const char *hyp_vecs_end) +{ + u64 pfr0; + + if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) + return; + + pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1); + if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) + return; + + __install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ + #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 474b34243521..07c39d1f4479 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar0[] = { };

static struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = { - ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 32, 32, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0), + ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 32, 24, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 28, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0), ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI), diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index e6aec982dea9..05bfc71639fc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -495,13 +495,15 @@ ENDPROC(el1_irq) * Instruction abort handling */ mrs x26, far_el1 - // enable interrupts before calling the main handler - enable_dbg_and_irq + msr daifclr, #(8 | 4 | 1) +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS + bl trace_hardirqs_off +#endif ct_user_exit mov x0, x26 orr x1, x25, #1 << 24 // use reserved ISS bit for instruction aborts mov x2, sp - bl do_mem_abort + bl do_el0_ia_bp_hardening b ret_to_user el0_fpsimd_acc: /* diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c index 492d2968fa8f..be42bd3dca5c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/context.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/context.c @@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ asmlinkage void post_ttbr_update_workaround(void) "ic iallu; dsb nsh; isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456, CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456)); + + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); }

static int asids_init(void) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 89abdf9af4e6..1878c881a247 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -535,6 +535,22 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, arm64_notify_die("", regs, &info, esr); }

+asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr, + unsigned int esr, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* + * We've taken an instruction abort from userspace and not yet + * re-enabled IRQs. If the address is a kernel address, apply + * BP hardening prior to enabling IRQs and pre-emption. + */ + if (addr > TASK_SIZE) + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); + + local_irq_enable(); + do_mem_abort(addr, esr, regs); +} + /* * Handle stack alignment exceptions. */

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit 5dfc6ed27710c42cbc15db5c0d4475699991da0a upstream.

Software-step and PC alignment fault exceptions have higher priority than instruction abort exceptions, so apply the BP hardening hooks there too if the user PC appears to reside in kernel space.

Reported-by: Dan Hettena dhettena@nvidia.com Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Resolved rebase conflicts ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++-- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 05bfc71639fc..42a141f01f3b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -530,8 +530,10 @@ ENDPROC(el1_irq) * Stack or PC alignment exception handling */ mrs x26, far_el1 - // enable interrupts before calling the main handler - enable_dbg_and_irq + enable_dbg +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS + bl trace_hardirqs_off +#endif ct_user_exit mov x0, x26 mov x1, x25 diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 1878c881a247..082f385b6592 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -561,6 +561,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_sp_pc_abort(unsigned long addr, struct siginfo info; struct task_struct *tsk = current;

+ if (user_mode(regs)) { + if (instruction_pointer(regs) > TASK_SIZE) + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); + local_irq_enable(); + } + if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGBUS)) pr_info_ratelimited("%s[%d]: %s exception: pc=%p sp=%p\n", tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), @@ -621,6 +627,9 @@ asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, if (interrupts_enabled(regs)) trace_hardirqs_off();

+ if (user_mode(regs) && instruction_pointer(regs) > TASK_SIZE) + arm64_apply_bp_hardening(); + if (!inf->fn(addr_if_watchpoint, esr, regs)) { rv = 1; } else {

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit a65d219fe5dc7887fd5ca04c2ac3e9a34feb8dfc upstream.

Hook up MIDR values for the Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 CPUs, since they will soon need MIDR matches for hardening the branch predictor.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Add A73 values as well ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index f43e10cfeda2..2a1f44646048 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -77,14 +77,20 @@ #define ARM_CPU_PART_AEM_V8 0xD0F #define ARM_CPU_PART_FOUNDATION 0xD00 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57 0xD07 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72 0xD08 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A53 0xD03 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55 0xD05 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73 0xD09 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75 0xD0A

#define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000

#define CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX 0x0A1

#define MIDR_CORTEX_A55 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A72 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A73 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A75 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75)

#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com

commit aa6acde65e03186b5add8151e1ffe36c3c62639b upstream.

Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code.

This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available. The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts.

Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S index 06a931eb2673..dec95bd82e31 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -53,3 +53,27 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) vectors __kvm_hyp_vector .endr ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) +ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start) + sub sp, sp, #(8 * 18) + stp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] + stp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] + stp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] + stp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] + stp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] + stp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] + stp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] + stp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] + stp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] + mov x0, #0x84000000 + smc #0 + ldp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] + ldp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] + ldp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] + ldp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] + ldp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] + ldp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] + ldp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] + ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] + add sp, sp, #(8 * 18) +ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 80765feae955..dbd7b944a37e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);

#ifdef CONFIG_KVM +extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[]; + static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) { @@ -91,6 +93,9 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, spin_unlock(&bp_lock); } #else +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL +#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL + static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, const char *hyp_vecs_start, const char *hyp_vecs_end) @@ -115,6 +120,21 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,

__install_bp_hardening_cb(fn, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end); } + +#include <linux/psci.h> + +static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data) +{ + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data; + + if (psci_ops.get_version) + install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, + (bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version, + __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start, + __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end); + + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */

#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ @@ -192,6 +212,28 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0x00, (1 << MIDR_VARIANT_SHIFT) | 1), }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, #endif { }

From: Jayachandran C jnair@caviumnetworks.com

commit 0d90718871fe80f019b7295ec9d2b23121e396fb upstream.

Add the older Broadcom ID as well as the new Cavium ID for ThunderX2 CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C jnair@caviumnetworks.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h index c6976dd6c32a..9cc7d485c812 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h @@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA 0x000

#define CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX 0x0A1 +#define CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX2 0x0AF

#define BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN 0x516

@@ -94,6 +95,8 @@ #define MIDR_CORTEX_A72 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A73 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73) #define MIDR_CORTEX_A75 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75) +#define MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2 MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX2) +#define MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN MIDR_CPU_PART(ARM_CPU_IMP_BRCM, BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN)

#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

From: Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org

commit 98dd64f34f47ce19b388d9015f767f48393a81eb upstream.

Adds helpers to do SMC and HVC based on ARM SMC Calling Convention. CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC is enabled for architectures that may support the SMC or HVC instruction. It's the responsibility of the caller to know if the SMC instruction is supported by the platform.

This patch doesn't provide an implementation of the declared functions. Later patches will bring in implementations and set CONFIG_HAVE_ARM_SMCCC for ARM and ARM64 respectively.

Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Russell King rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk [ v4.4: Added #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ section to fix compilation issues ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- drivers/firmware/Kconfig | 3 ++ include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/arm-smccc.h

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/Kconfig index cf478fe6b335..49a3a1185bb6 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/firmware/Kconfig @@ -173,6 +173,9 @@ config QCOM_SCM_64 def_bool y depends on QCOM_SCM && ARM64

+config HAVE_ARM_SMCCC + bool + source "drivers/firmware/broadcom/Kconfig" source "drivers/firmware/google/Kconfig" source "drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig" diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..611d10580340 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015, Linaro Limited + * + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + */ +#ifndef __LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H +#define __LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* + * This file provides common defines for ARM SMC Calling Convention as + * specified in + * http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028a/index.html + */ + +#define ARM_SMCCC_STD_CALL 0 +#define ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL 1 +#define ARM_SMCCC_TYPE_SHIFT 31 + +#define ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32 0 +#define ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64 1 +#define ARM_SMCCC_CALL_CONV_SHIFT 30 + +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_MASK 0x3F +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_SHIFT 24 + +#define ARM_SMCCC_FUNC_MASK 0xFFFF + +#define ARM_SMCCC_IS_FAST_CALL(smc_val) \ + ((smc_val) & (ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL << ARM_SMCCC_TYPE_SHIFT)) +#define ARM_SMCCC_IS_64(smc_val) \ + ((smc_val) & (ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64 << ARM_SMCCC_CALL_CONV_SHIFT)) +#define ARM_SMCCC_FUNC_NUM(smc_val) ((smc_val) & ARM_SMCCC_FUNC_MASK) +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_NUM(smc_val) \ + (((smc_val) >> ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_SHIFT) & ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_MASK) + +#define ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(type, calling_convention, owner, func_num) \ + (((type) << ARM_SMCCC_TYPE_SHIFT) | \ + ((calling_convention) << ARM_SMCCC_CALL_CONV_SHIFT) | \ + (((owner) & ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_MASK) << ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_SHIFT) | \ + ((func_num) & ARM_SMCCC_FUNC_MASK)) + +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_ARCH 0 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_CPU 1 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_SIP 2 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_OEM 3 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_STANDARD 4 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_APP 48 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_APP_END 49 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS 50 +#define ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END 63 + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +/** + * struct arm_smccc_res - Result from SMC/HVC call + * @a0-a3 result values from registers 0 to 3 + */ +struct arm_smccc_res { + unsigned long a0; + unsigned long a1; + unsigned long a2; + unsigned long a3; +}; + +/** + * arm_smccc_smc() - make SMC calls + * @a0-a7: arguments passed in registers 0 to 7 + * @res: result values from registers 0 to 3 + * + * This function is used to make SMC calls following SMC Calling Convention. + * The content of the supplied param are copied to registers 0 to 7 prior + * to the SMC instruction. The return values are updated with the content + * from register 0 to 3 on return from the SMC instruction. + */ +asmlinkage void arm_smccc_smc(unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4, + unsigned long a5, unsigned long a6, unsigned long a7, + struct arm_smccc_res *res); + +/** + * arm_smccc_hvc() - make HVC calls + * @a0-a7: arguments passed in registers 0 to 7 + * @res: result values from registers 0 to 3 + * + * This function is used to make HVC calls following SMC Calling + * Convention. The content of the supplied param are copied to registers 0 + * to 7 prior to the HVC instruction. The return values are updated with + * the content from register 0 to 3 on return from the HVC instruction. + */ +asmlinkage void arm_smccc_hvc(unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, + unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4, + unsigned long a5, unsigned long a6, unsigned long a7, + struct arm_smccc_res *res); + +#endif /*__ASSEMBLY__*/ +#endif /*__LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H*/

From: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com

commit 6167ec5c9145cdf493722dfd80a5d48bafc4a18a upstream.

A new feature of SMCCC 1.1 is that it offers firmware-based CPU workarounds. In particular, SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 provides BP hardening for CVE-2017-5715.

If the host has some mitigation for this issue, report that we deal with it using SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, as we apply the host workaround on every guest exit.

Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ Viresh: Picked on only arm-smccc.h changes ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index da9f3916f9a9..1f02e4045a9e 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ 0, 1)

+#define ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + 0, 0x8000) + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__

/**

From: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com

commit e78eef554a912ef6c1e0bbf97619dafbeae3339f upstream.

Since PSCI 1.0 allows the SMCCC version to be (indirectly) probed, let's do that at boot time, and expose the version of the calling convention as part of the psci_ops structure.

Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Included arm-smccc.h ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- drivers/firmware/psci.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/psci.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/psci.c b/drivers/firmware/psci.c index 7b2665f6b38d..0809a48e8089 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/psci.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/psci.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@

#define pr_fmt(fmt) "psci: " fmt

+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <linux/of.h> @@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ bool psci_tos_resident_on(int cpu)

struct psci_operations psci_ops = { .conduit = PSCI_CONDUIT_NONE, + .smccc_version = SMCCC_VERSION_1_0, };

typedef unsigned long (psci_fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long, @@ -320,6 +322,31 @@ static void __init psci_init_migrate(void) pr_info("Trusted OS resident on physical CPU 0x%lx\n", cpuid); }

+static void __init psci_init_smccc(void) +{ + u32 ver = ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_1_0; + int feature; + + feature = psci_features(ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID); + + if (feature != PSCI_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + u32 ret; + ret = invoke_psci_fn(ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID, 0, 0, 0); + if (ret == ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_1_1) { + psci_ops.smccc_version = SMCCC_VERSION_1_1; + ver = ret; + } + } + + /* + * Conveniently, the SMCCC and PSCI versions are encoded the + * same way. No, this isn't accidental. + */ + pr_info("SMC Calling Convention v%d.%d\n", + PSCI_VERSION_MAJOR(ver), PSCI_VERSION_MINOR(ver)); + +} + static void __init psci_0_2_set_functions(void) { pr_info("Using standard PSCI v0.2 function IDs\n"); @@ -368,6 +395,7 @@ static int __init psci_probe(void) psci_init_migrate();

if (PSCI_VERSION_MAJOR(ver) >= 1) { + psci_init_smccc(); psci_init_cpu_suspend(); psci_init_system_suspend(); } diff --git a/include/linux/psci.h b/include/linux/psci.h index e071a1b8ddb5..e5c3277bfd78 100644 --- a/include/linux/psci.h +++ b/include/linux/psci.h @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ enum psci_conduit { PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC, };

+enum smccc_version { + SMCCC_VERSION_1_0, + SMCCC_VERSION_1_1, +}; + struct psci_operations { u32 (*get_version)(void); int (*cpu_suspend)(u32 state, unsigned long entry_point); @@ -40,6 +45,7 @@ struct psci_operations { unsigned long lowest_affinity_level); int (*migrate_info_type)(void); enum psci_conduit conduit; + enum smccc_version smccc_version; };

extern struct psci_operations psci_ops;

From: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com

commit f2d3b2e8759a5833df6f022e42df2d581e6d843c upstream.

One of the major improvement of SMCCC v1.1 is that it only clobbers the first 4 registers, both on 32 and 64bit. This means that it becomes very easy to provide an inline version of the SMC call primitive, and avoid performing a function call to stash the registers that would otherwise be clobbered by SMCCC v1.0.

Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 141 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index 4c45fd75db5d..60c2ad6316d8 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -122,5 +122,146 @@ asmlinkage void arm_smccc_hvc(unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a5, unsigned long a6, unsigned long a7, struct arm_smccc_res *res);

+/* SMCCC v1.1 implementation madness follows */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 + +#define SMCCC_SMC_INST "smc #0" +#define SMCCC_HVC_INST "hvc #0" + +#elif defined(CONFIG_ARM) +#include <asm/opcodes-sec.h> +#include <asm/opcodes-virt.h> + +#define SMCCC_SMC_INST __SMC(0) +#define SMCCC_HVC_INST __HVC(0) + +#endif + +#define ___count_args(_0, _1, _2, _3, _4, _5, _6, _7, _8, x, ...) x + +#define __count_args(...) \ + ___count_args(__VA_ARGS__, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) + +#define __constraint_write_0 \ + "+r" (r0), "=&r" (r1), "=&r" (r2), "=&r" (r3) +#define __constraint_write_1 \ + "+r" (r0), "+r" (r1), "=&r" (r2), "=&r" (r3) +#define __constraint_write_2 \ + "+r" (r0), "+r" (r1), "+r" (r2), "=&r" (r3) +#define __constraint_write_3 \ + "+r" (r0), "+r" (r1), "+r" (r2), "+r" (r3) +#define __constraint_write_4 __constraint_write_3 +#define __constraint_write_5 __constraint_write_4 +#define __constraint_write_6 __constraint_write_5 +#define __constraint_write_7 __constraint_write_6 + +#define __constraint_read_0 +#define __constraint_read_1 +#define __constraint_read_2 +#define __constraint_read_3 +#define __constraint_read_4 "r" (r4) +#define __constraint_read_5 __constraint_read_4, "r" (r5) +#define __constraint_read_6 __constraint_read_5, "r" (r6) +#define __constraint_read_7 __constraint_read_6, "r" (r7) + +#define __declare_arg_0(a0, res) \ + struct arm_smccc_res *___res = res; \ + register u32 r0 asm("r0") = a0; \ + register unsigned long r1 asm("r1"); \ + register unsigned long r2 asm("r2"); \ + register unsigned long r3 asm("r3") + +#define __declare_arg_1(a0, a1, res) \ + struct arm_smccc_res *___res = res; \ + register u32 r0 asm("r0") = a0; \ + register typeof(a1) r1 asm("r1") = a1; \ + register unsigned long r2 asm("r2"); \ + register unsigned long r3 asm("r3") + +#define __declare_arg_2(a0, a1, a2, res) \ + struct arm_smccc_res *___res = res; \ + register u32 r0 asm("r0") = a0; \ + register typeof(a1) r1 asm("r1") = a1; \ + register typeof(a2) r2 asm("r2") = a2; \ + register unsigned long r3 asm("r3") + +#define __declare_arg_3(a0, a1, a2, a3, res) \ + struct arm_smccc_res *___res = res; \ + register u32 r0 asm("r0") = a0; \ + register typeof(a1) r1 asm("r1") = a1; \ + register typeof(a2) r2 asm("r2") = a2; \ + register typeof(a3) r3 asm("r3") = a3 + +#define __declare_arg_4(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, res) \ + __declare_arg_3(a0, a1, a2, a3, res); \ + register typeof(a4) r4 asm("r4") = a4 + +#define __declare_arg_5(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, res) \ + __declare_arg_4(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, res); \ + register typeof(a5) r5 asm("r5") = a5 + +#define __declare_arg_6(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, res) \ + __declare_arg_5(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, res); \ + register typeof(a6) r6 asm("r6") = a6 + +#define __declare_arg_7(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, res) \ + __declare_arg_6(a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, res); \ + register typeof(a7) r7 asm("r7") = a7 + +#define ___declare_args(count, ...) __declare_arg_ ## count(__VA_ARGS__) +#define __declare_args(count, ...) ___declare_args(count, __VA_ARGS__) + +#define ___constraints(count) \ + : __constraint_write_ ## count \ + : __constraint_read_ ## count \ + : "memory" +#define __constraints(count) ___constraints(count) + +/* + * We have an output list that is not necessarily used, and GCC feels + * entitled to optimise the whole sequence away. "volatile" is what + * makes it stick. + */ +#define __arm_smccc_1_1(inst, ...) \ + do { \ + __declare_args(__count_args(__VA_ARGS__), __VA_ARGS__); \ + asm volatile(inst "\n" \ + __constraints(__count_args(__VA_ARGS__))); \ + if (___res) \ + *___res = (typeof(*___res)){r0, r1, r2, r3}; \ + } while (0) + +/* + * arm_smccc_1_1_smc() - make an SMCCC v1.1 compliant SMC call + * + * This is a variadic macro taking one to eight source arguments, and + * an optional return structure. + * + * @a0-a7: arguments passed in registers 0 to 7 + * @res: result values from registers 0 to 3 + * + * This macro is used to make SMC calls following SMC Calling Convention v1.1. + * The content of the supplied param are copied to registers 0 to 7 prior + * to the SMC instruction. The return values are updated with the content + * from register 0 to 3 on return from the SMC instruction if not NULL. + */ +#define arm_smccc_1_1_smc(...) __arm_smccc_1_1(SMCCC_SMC_INST, __VA_ARGS__) + +/* + * arm_smccc_1_1_hvc() - make an SMCCC v1.1 compliant HVC call + * + * This is a variadic macro taking one to eight source arguments, and + * an optional return structure. + * + * @a0-a7: arguments passed in registers 0 to 7 + * @res: result values from registers 0 to 3 + * + * This macro is used to make HVC calls following SMC Calling Convention v1.1. + * The content of the supplied param are copied to registers 0 to 7 prior + * to the HVC instruction. The return values are updated with the content + * from register 0 to 3 on return from the HVC instruction if not NULL. + */ +#define arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(...) __arm_smccc_1_1(SMCCC_HVC_INST, __VA_ARGS__) + #endif /*__ASSEMBLY__*/ #endif /*__LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H*/

From: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com

commit 3a0a397ff5ff8b56ca9f7908b75dee6bf0b5fabb upstream.

Now that we've standardised on SMCCC v1.1 to perform the branch prediction invalidation, let's drop the previous band-aid. If vendors haven't updated their firmware to do SMCCC 1.1, they haven't updated PSCI either, so we don't loose anything.

Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com [ v4.4: Dropped switch.c changes ] Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S | 24 ------------------ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 45 ++++++++++------------------------ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S index c72f261f4b64..dc4eb154e33b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/bpi.S @@ -54,30 +54,6 @@ ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start) vectors __kvm_hyp_vector .endr ENTRY(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_end) -ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_start) - sub sp, sp, #(8 * 18) - stp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] - stp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] - stp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] - stp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] - stp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] - stp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] - stp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] - stp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] - stp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] - mov x0, #0x84000000 - smc #0 - ldp x16, x17, [sp, #(16 * 0)] - ldp x14, x15, [sp, #(16 * 1)] - ldp x12, x13, [sp, #(16 * 2)] - ldp x10, x11, [sp, #(16 * 3)] - ldp x8, x9, [sp, #(16 * 4)] - ldp x6, x7, [sp, #(16 * 5)] - ldp x4, x5, [sp, #(16 * 6)] - ldp x2, x3, [sp, #(16 * 7)] - ldp x0, x1, [sp, #(16 * 8)] - add sp, sp, #(8 * 18) -ENTRY(__psci_hyp_bp_inval_end)

.macro smccc_workaround_1 inst sub sp, sp, #(8 * 4) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index d5fd7be563bc..2a17789bb963 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);

#ifdef CONFIG_KVM -extern char __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start[], __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end[]; extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start[]; extern char __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end[]; extern char __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start[]; @@ -97,8 +96,6 @@ static void __install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn, spin_unlock(&bp_lock); } #else -#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start NULL -#define __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end NULL #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start NULL #define __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end NULL #define __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start NULL @@ -143,24 +140,25 @@ static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void) arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL); }

-static bool check_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) +static int enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(void *data) { + const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data; bp_hardening_cb_t cb; void *smccc_start, *smccc_end; struct arm_smccc_res res;

if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) - return false; + return 0;

if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) - return false; + return 0;

switch (psci_ops.conduit) { case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); if (res.a0) - return false; + return 0; cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1; smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_start; smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_end; @@ -170,35 +168,18 @@ static bool check_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *e arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res); if (res.a0) - return false; + return 0; cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1; smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_start; smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc_end; break;

default: - return false; + return 0; }

install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);

- return true; -} - -static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data) -{ - const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry = data; - - if (psci_ops.get_version) { - if (check_smccc_arch_workaround_1(entry)) - return 0; - - install_bp_hardening_cb(entry, - (bp_hardening_cb_t)psci_ops.get_version, - __psci_hyp_bp_inval_start, - __psci_hyp_bp_inval_end); - } - return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */ @@ -283,32 +264,32 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57), - .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72), - .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73), - .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75), - .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN), - .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2), - .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, #endif {