The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to stable@vger.kernel.org.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From dcd46d897adb70d63e025f175a00a89797d31a43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:09:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty

Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill:

"In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[2]:

The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider.

This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]."

While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] existing userspace programs.

The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv.

Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so userspace has some notice about the change:

process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added

Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org... [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*... [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2... [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/

Reported-by: Ariadne Conill ariadne@dereferenced.org Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk mtk.manpages@gmail.com Cc: Matthew Wilcox willy@infradead.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Cc: Rich Felker dalias@libc.org Cc: Eric Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: Alexander Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Acked-by: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Acked-by: Ariadne Conill ariadne@dereferenced.org Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 79f2c9483302..40b1008fb0f7 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -495,8 +495,14 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. + * + * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a + * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused + * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking + * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. + * See do_execveat_common(). */ - ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); + ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (limit <= ptr_size) return -E2BIG; limit -= ptr_size; @@ -1897,6 +1903,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, }

retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); + if (retval == 0) + pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", + current->comm, bprm->filename); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; @@ -1923,6 +1932,19 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, if (retval < 0) goto out_free;

+ /* + * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to + * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing + * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also + * bprm_stack_limits(). + */ + if (bprm->argc == 0) { + retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out_free; + bprm->argc = 1; + } + retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1951,6 +1973,8 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename, }

retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) + retval = -EINVAL; if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval;