[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 01/10] mmc: atmel-mci: fix race between stop command and start of next command
From: Tobias Schramm t.schramm@manjaro.org
[ Upstream commit eca5bd666b0aa7dc0bca63292e4778968241134e ]
This commit fixes a race between completion of stop command and start of a new command. Previously the command ready interrupt was enabled before stop command was written to the command register. This caused the command ready interrupt to fire immediately since the CMDRDY flag is asserted constantly while there is no command in progress. Consequently the command state machine will immediately advance to the next state when the tasklet function is executed again, no matter actual completion state of the stop command. Thus a new command can then be dispatched immediately, interrupting and corrupting the stop command on the CMD line. Fix that by dropping the command ready interrupt enable before calling atmci_send_stop_cmd. atmci_send_stop_cmd does already enable the command ready interrupt, no further writes to ATMCI_IER are necessary.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Schramm t.schramm@manjaro.org Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches ludovic.desroches@microchip.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221230194315.809903-2-t.schramm@manjaro.org Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson ulf.hansson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c b/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c index 6f971a3e7e494..493ed8c824195 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/atmel-mci.c @@ -1818,7 +1818,6 @@ static void atmci_tasklet_func(struct tasklet_struct *t) atmci_writel(host, ATMCI_IER, ATMCI_NOTBUSY); state = STATE_WAITING_NOTBUSY; } else if (host->mrq->stop) { - atmci_writel(host, ATMCI_IER, ATMCI_CMDRDY); atmci_send_stop_cmd(host, data); state = STATE_SENDING_STOP; } else { @@ -1851,8 +1850,6 @@ static void atmci_tasklet_func(struct tasklet_struct *t) * command to send. */ if (host->mrq->stop) { - atmci_writel(host, ATMCI_IER, - ATMCI_CMDRDY); atmci_send_stop_cmd(host, data); state = STATE_SENDING_STOP; } else {
From: Yifei Liu yifeliu@cs.stonybrook.edu
[ Upstream commit 23892d383bee15b64f5463bd7195615734bb2415 ]
Bug description and fix:
1. Write data to a file, say all 1s from offset 0 to 16.
2. Truncate the file to a smaller size, say 8 bytes.
3. Write new bytes (say 2s) from an offset past the original size of the file, say at offset 20, for 4 bytes. This is supposed to create a "hole" in the file, meaning that the bytes from offset 8 (where it was truncated above) up to the new write at offset 20, should all be 0s (zeros).
4. Flush all caches using "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" (or unmount and remount) the f/s.
5. Check the content of the file. It is wrong. The 1s that used to be between bytes 9 and 16, before the truncation, have REAPPEARED (they should be 0s).
We wrote a script and helper C program to reproduce the bug (reproduce_jffs2_write_begin_issue.sh, write_file.c, and Makefile). We can make them available to anyone.
The above example is shown when writing a small file within the same first page. But the bug happens for larger files, as long as steps 1, 2, and 3 above all happen within the same page.
The problem was traced to the jffs2_write_begin code, where it goes into an 'if' statement intended to handle writes past the current EOF (i.e., writes that may create a hole). The code computes a 'pageofs' that is the floor of the write position (pos), aligned to the page size boundary. In other words, 'pageofs' will never be larger than 'pos'. The code then sets the internal jffs2_raw_inode->isize to the size of max(current inode size, pageofs) but that is wrong: the new file size should be the 'pos', which is larger than both the current inode size and pageofs.
Similarly, the code incorrectly sets the internal jffs2_raw_inode->dsize to the difference between the pageofs minus current inode size; instead it should be the current pos minus the current inode size. Finally, inode->i_size was also set incorrectly.
The patch below fixes this bug. The bug was discovered using a new tool for finding f/s bugs using model checking, called MCFS (Model Checking File Systems).
Signed-off-by: Yifei Liu yifeliu@cs.stonybrook.edu Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok ezk@cs.stonybrook.edu Signed-off-by: Manish Adkar madkar@cs.stonybrook.edu Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/jffs2/file.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jffs2/file.c b/fs/jffs2/file.c index bd7d58d27bfc6..97a3c09fd96b6 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/file.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/file.c @@ -138,19 +138,18 @@ static int jffs2_write_begin(struct file *filp, struct address_space *mapping, struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode); struct jffs2_sb_info *c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(inode->i_sb); pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; - uint32_t pageofs = index << PAGE_SHIFT; int ret = 0;
jffs2_dbg(1, "%s()\n", __func__);
- if (pageofs > inode->i_size) { - /* Make new hole frag from old EOF to new page */ + if (pos > inode->i_size) { + /* Make new hole frag from old EOF to new position */ struct jffs2_raw_inode ri; struct jffs2_full_dnode *fn; uint32_t alloc_len;
- jffs2_dbg(1, "Writing new hole frag 0x%x-0x%x between current EOF and new page\n", - (unsigned int)inode->i_size, pageofs); + jffs2_dbg(1, "Writing new hole frag 0x%x-0x%x between current EOF and new position\n", + (unsigned int)inode->i_size, (uint32_t)pos);
ret = jffs2_reserve_space(c, sizeof(ri), &alloc_len, ALLOC_NORMAL, JFFS2_SUMMARY_INODE_SIZE); @@ -170,10 +169,10 @@ static int jffs2_write_begin(struct file *filp, struct address_space *mapping, ri.mode = cpu_to_jemode(inode->i_mode); ri.uid = cpu_to_je16(i_uid_read(inode)); ri.gid = cpu_to_je16(i_gid_read(inode)); - ri.isize = cpu_to_je32(max((uint32_t)inode->i_size, pageofs)); + ri.isize = cpu_to_je32((uint32_t)pos); ri.atime = ri.ctime = ri.mtime = cpu_to_je32(JFFS2_NOW()); ri.offset = cpu_to_je32(inode->i_size); - ri.dsize = cpu_to_je32(pageofs - inode->i_size); + ri.dsize = cpu_to_je32((uint32_t)pos - inode->i_size); ri.csize = cpu_to_je32(0); ri.compr = JFFS2_COMPR_ZERO; ri.node_crc = cpu_to_je32(crc32(0, &ri, sizeof(ri)-8)); @@ -203,7 +202,7 @@ static int jffs2_write_begin(struct file *filp, struct address_space *mapping, goto out_err; } jffs2_complete_reservation(c); - inode->i_size = pageofs; + inode->i_size = pos; mutex_unlock(&f->sem); }
From: David Gow davidgow@google.com
[ Upstream commit 8849818679478933dd1d9718741f4daa3f4e8b86 ]
The kernel disables all SSE and similar FP/SIMD instructions on x86-based architectures (partly because we shouldn't be using floats in the kernel, and partly to avoid the need for stack alignment, see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53383 )
UML does not do the same thing, which isn't in itself a problem, but does add to the list of differences between UML and "normal" x86 builds.
In addition, there was a crash bug with LLVM < 15 / rustc < 1.65 when building with SSE, so disabling it fixes rust builds with earlier compiler versions, see: https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux/pull/881
Signed-off-by: David Gow davidgow@google.com Reviewed-by: Sergio González Collado sergio.collado@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/Makefile.um | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile.um b/arch/x86/Makefile.um index b3c1ae084180d..d2e95d1d4db77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile.um +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile.um @@ -1,6 +1,12 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 core-y += arch/x86/crypto/
+# +# Disable SSE and other FP/SIMD instructions to match normal x86 +# +KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-sse -mno-mmx -mno-sse2 -mno-3dnow -mno-avx +KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Ctarget-feature=-sse,-sse2,-sse3,-ssse3,-sse4.1,-sse4.2,-avx,-avx2 + ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y) START := 0x8048000
From: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 5cd740287ae5e3f9d1c46f5bfe8778972fd6d3fe ]
In ext4_fill_super(), EXT4_ORPHAN_FS flag is cleared after ext4_orphan_cleanup() is executed. Therefore, when __ext4_iget() is called to get an inode whose i_nlink is 0 when the flag exists, no error is returned. If the inode is a special inode, a null pointer dereference may occur. If the value of i_nlink is 0 for any inodes (except boot loader inodes) got by using the EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL flag, the current file system is corrupted. Therefore, make the ext4_iget() function return an error if it gets such an abnormal special inode.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199179 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216541 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216539 Reported-by: Luís Henriques lhenriques@suse.de Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230107032126.4165860-2-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 ++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 0a63863bc58c1..374256e0ce326 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4631,13 +4631,6 @@ struct inode *__ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino, goto bad_inode; raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc);
- if ((ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO) && (raw_inode->i_links_count == 0)) { - ext4_error_inode(inode, function, line, 0, - "iget: root inode unallocated"); - ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; - goto bad_inode; - } - if ((flags & EXT4_IGET_HANDLE) && (raw_inode->i_links_count == 0) && (raw_inode->i_mode == 0)) { ret = -ESTALE; @@ -4710,11 +4703,16 @@ struct inode *__ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino, * NeilBrown 1999oct15 */ if (inode->i_nlink == 0) { - if ((inode->i_mode == 0 || + if ((inode->i_mode == 0 || flags & EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL || !(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ORPHAN_FS)) && ino != EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO) { - /* this inode is deleted */ - ret = -ESTALE; + /* this inode is deleted or unallocated */ + if (flags & EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL) { + ext4_error_inode(inode, function, line, 0, + "iget: special inode unallocated"); + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + } else + ret = -ESTALE; goto bad_inode; } /* The only unlinked inodes we let through here have
From: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 3039d8b8692408438a618fac2776b629852663c3 ]
When mounting a crafted ext4 image, s_journal_inum may change after journal replay, which is obviously unreasonable because we have successfully loaded and replayed the journal through the old s_journal_inum. And the new s_journal_inum bypasses some of the checks in ext4_get_journal(), which may trigger a null pointer dereference problem. So if s_journal_inum changes after the journal replay, we ignore the change, and rewrite the current journal_inum to the superblock.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216541 Reported-by: Luís Henriques lhenriques@suse.de Signed-off-by: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230107032126.4165860-3-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/super.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 802ca160d31ed..6df4da084190f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5385,8 +5385,11 @@ static int ext4_load_journal(struct super_block *sb, if (!really_read_only && journal_devnum && journal_devnum != le32_to_cpu(es->s_journal_dev)) { es->s_journal_dev = cpu_to_le32(journal_devnum); - - /* Make sure we flush the recovery flag to disk. */ + ext4_commit_super(sb); + } + if (!really_read_only && journal_inum && + journal_inum != le32_to_cpu(es->s_journal_inum)) { + es->s_journal_inum = cpu_to_le32(journal_inum); ext4_commit_super(sb); }
From: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 0f7bfd6f8164be32dbbdf36aa1e5d00485c53cd7 ]
Syzbot reported a hung task problem: ================================================================== INFO: task syz-executor232:5073 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2-syzkaller-00024-g512dee0c00ad #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-exec232 state:D stack:21024 pid:5073 ppid:5072 flags:0x00004004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5244 [inline] __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6555 schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6631 __wait_on_freeing_inode fs/inode.c:2196 [inline] find_inode_fast+0x35a/0x4c0 fs/inode.c:950 iget_locked+0xb1/0x830 fs/inode.c:1273 __ext4_iget+0x22e/0x3ed0 fs/ext4/inode.c:4861 ext4_xattr_inode_iget+0x68/0x4e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:389 ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0x1a7/0xe50 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1148 ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb04/0xcd0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2880 ext4_evict_inode+0xd7c/0x10b0 fs/ext4/inode.c:296 evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664 ext4_orphan_cleanup+0xb60/0x1340 fs/ext4/orphan.c:474 __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5516 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x81cd/0x8700 fs/ext4/super.c:5644 get_tree_bdev+0x400/0x620 fs/super.c:1282 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fa5406fd5ea RSP: 002b:00007ffc7232f968 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fa5406fd5ea RDX: 0000000020000440 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 00007ffc7232f970 RBP: 00007ffc7232f970 R08: 00007ffc7232f9b0 R09: 0000000000000432 R10: 0000000000804a03 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 0000555556a7a2c0 R14: 00007ffc7232f9b0 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> ==================================================================
The problem is that the inode contains an xattr entry with ea_inum of 15 when cleaning up an orphan inode <15>. When evict inode <15>, the reference counting of the corresponding EA inode is decreased. When EA inode <15> is found by find_inode_fast() in __ext4_iget(), it is found that the EA inode holds the I_FREEING flag and waits for the EA inode to complete deletion. As a result, when inode <15> is being deleted, we wait for inode <15> to complete the deletion, resulting in an infinite loop and triggering Hung Task. To solve this problem, we only need to check whether the ino of EA inode and parent is the same before getting EA inode.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=77d6fcc37bbb92f26048 Reported-by: syzbot+77d6fcc37bbb92f26048@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Baokun Li libaokun1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230110133436.996350-1-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index d6edf38de31b7..3837a5f4f1d6f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -386,6 +386,17 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_iget(struct inode *parent, unsigned long ea_ino, struct inode *inode; int err;
+ /* + * We have to check for this corruption early as otherwise + * iget_locked() could wait indefinitely for the state of our + * parent inode. + */ + if (parent->i_ino == ea_ino) { + ext4_error(parent->i_sb, + "Parent and EA inode have the same ino %lu", ea_ino); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + inode = ext4_iget(parent->i_sb, ea_ino, EXT4_IGET_NORMAL); if (IS_ERR(inode)) { err = PTR_ERR(inode);
From: Qu Huang qu.huang@linux.dev
[ Upstream commit 4fc8fff378b2f2039f2a666d9f8c570f4e58352c ]
In the kfd_wait_on_events() function, the kfd_event_waiter structure is allocated by alloc_event_waiters(), but the event field of the waiter structure is not initialized; When copy_from_user() fails in the kfd_wait_on_events() function, it will enter exception handling to release the previously allocated memory of the waiter structure; Due to the event field of the waiters structure being accessed in the free_waiters() function, this results in illegal memory access and system crash, here is the crash log:
localhost kernel: RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x185/0x1e0 localhost kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffaa53c362bd60 EFLAGS: 00010082 localhost kernel: RAX: ff3d3d6bff4007cb RBX: 0000000000000282 RCX: 00000000002c0000 localhost kernel: RDX: ffff9e855eeacb80 RSI: 000000000000279c RDI: ffffe7088f6a21d0 localhost kernel: RBP: ffffe7088f6a21d0 R08: 00000000002c0000 R09: ffffaa53c362be64 localhost kernel: R10: ffffaa53c362bbd8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000002 localhost kernel: R13: ffff9e7ead15d600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e7ead15d698 localhost kernel: FS: 0000152a3d111700(0000) GS:ffff9e855ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 localhost kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 localhost kernel: CR2: 0000152938000010 CR3: 000000044d7a4000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 localhost kernel: Call Trace: localhost kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x30/0x40 localhost kernel: remove_wait_queue+0x12/0x50 localhost kernel: kfd_wait_on_events+0x1b6/0x490 [hydcu] localhost kernel: ? ftrace_graph_caller+0xa0/0xa0 localhost kernel: kfd_ioctl+0x38c/0x4a0 [hydcu] localhost kernel: ? kfd_ioctl_set_trap_handler+0x70/0x70 [hydcu] localhost kernel: ? kfd_ioctl_create_queue+0x5a0/0x5a0 [hydcu] localhost kernel: ? ftrace_graph_caller+0xa0/0xa0 localhost kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8e/0xd0 localhost kernel: ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.18+0x143/0x1b0 localhost kernel: do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 localhost kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 localhost kernel: RIP: 0033:0x152a4dff68d7
Allocate the structure with kcalloc, and remove redundant 0-initialization and a redundant loop condition check.
Signed-off-by: Qu Huang qu.huang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling Felix.Kuehling@amd.com Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling Felix.Kuehling@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_events.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_events.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_events.c index b8bdd796cd911..8b5c82af2acd7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_events.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_events.c @@ -528,16 +528,13 @@ static struct kfd_event_waiter *alloc_event_waiters(uint32_t num_events) struct kfd_event_waiter *event_waiters; uint32_t i;
- event_waiters = kmalloc_array(num_events, - sizeof(struct kfd_event_waiter), - GFP_KERNEL); + event_waiters = kcalloc(num_events, sizeof(struct kfd_event_waiter), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!event_waiters) return NULL;
- for (i = 0; (event_waiters) && (i < num_events) ; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < num_events; i++) init_wait(&event_waiters[i].wait); - event_waiters[i].activated = false; - }
return event_waiters; }
From: Eric Van Hensbergen ericvh@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit 3866584a1c56a2bbc8c0981deb4476d0b801969e ]
We are supposed to set fid->mode to reflect the flags that were used to open the file. We were actually setting it to the creation mode which is the default perms of the file not the flags the file was opened with.
Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen ericvh@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dominique Martinet asmadeus@codewreck.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/9p/client.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/9p/client.c b/net/9p/client.c index 08e0c9990af06..c4c1e44cd7ca3 100644 --- a/net/9p/client.c +++ b/net/9p/client.c @@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ int p9_client_create_dotl(struct p9_fid *ofid, const char *name, u32 flags, qid->type, qid->path, qid->version, iounit);
memmove(&ofid->qid, qid, sizeof(struct p9_qid)); - ofid->mode = mode; + ofid->mode = flags; ofid->iounit = iounit;
free_and_error:
From: Michael Karcher kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de
[ Upstream commit 250870824c1cf199b032b1ef889c8e8d69d9123a ]
GCC warns about the pattern sizeof(void*)/sizeof(void), as it looks like the abuse of a pattern to calculate the array size. This pattern appears in the unevaluated part of the ternary operator in _INTC_ARRAY if the parameter is NULL.
The replacement uses an alternate approach to return 0 in case of NULL which does not generate the pattern sizeof(void*)/sizeof(void), but still emits the warning if _INTC_ARRAY is called with a nonarray parameter.
This patch is required for successful compilation with -Werror enabled.
The idea to use _Generic for type distinction is taken from Comment #7 in https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=108483 by Jakub Jelinek
Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de Acked-by: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org # build-tested Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/619fa552-c988-35e5-b1d7-fe256c46a272@mkarcher.dial... Signed-off-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/sh_intc.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/sh_intc.h b/include/linux/sh_intc.h index c255273b02810..37ad81058d6ae 100644 --- a/include/linux/sh_intc.h +++ b/include/linux/sh_intc.h @@ -97,7 +97,10 @@ struct intc_hw_desc { unsigned int nr_subgroups; };
-#define _INTC_ARRAY(a) a, __same_type(a, NULL) ? 0 : sizeof(a)/sizeof(*a) +#define _INTC_SIZEOF_OR_ZERO(a) (_Generic(a, \ + typeof(NULL): 0, \ + default: sizeof(a))) +#define _INTC_ARRAY(a) a, _INTC_SIZEOF_OR_ZERO(a)/sizeof(*a)
#define INTC_HW_DESC(vectors, groups, mask_regs, \ prio_regs, sense_regs, ack_regs) \
From: Alex Hung alex.hung@amd.com
[ Upstream commit 031f196d1b1b6d5dfcb0533b431e3ab1750e6189 ]
[WHY] When PTEBufferSizeInRequests is zero, UBSAN reports the following warning because dml_log2 returns an unexpected negative value:
shift exponent 4294966273 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
[HOW]
In the case PTEBufferSizeInRequests is zero, skip the dml_log2() and assign the result directly.
Reviewed-by: Jun Lei Jun.Lei@amd.com Acked-by: Qingqing Zhuo qingqing.zhuo@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Hung alex.hung@amd.com Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler daniel.wheeler@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- .../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn30/display_mode_vba_30.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn30/display_mode_vba_30.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn30/display_mode_vba_30.c index 518672a2450f4..de0fa87b301a5 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn30/display_mode_vba_30.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn30/display_mode_vba_30.c @@ -1868,7 +1868,10 @@ static unsigned int CalculateVMAndRowBytes( }
if (SurfaceTiling == dm_sw_linear) { - *dpte_row_height = dml_min(128, 1 << (unsigned int) dml_floor(dml_log2(PTEBufferSizeInRequests * *PixelPTEReqWidth / Pitch), 1)); + if (PTEBufferSizeInRequests == 0) + *dpte_row_height = 1; + else + *dpte_row_height = dml_min(128, 1 << (unsigned int) dml_floor(dml_log2(PTEBufferSizeInRequests * *PixelPTEReqWidth / Pitch), 1)); *dpte_row_width_ub = (dml_ceil(((double) SwathWidth - 1) / *PixelPTEReqWidth, 1) + 1) * *PixelPTEReqWidth; *PixelPTEBytesPerRow = *dpte_row_width_ub / *PixelPTEReqWidth * *PTERequestSize; } else if (ScanDirection != dm_vert) {
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Sasha Levin