From: Liang He windhl@126.com

[ Upstream commit f4470dbfb5ff92804650bc71d115c3f150d430f6 ]

In rockchip_suspend_init(), of_find_matching_node_and_match() will return a node pointer with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() in fail path or when it is not used anymore.

Signed-off-by: Liang He windhl@126.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220616021713.3973472-1-windhl@126.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner heiko@sntech.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm/mach-rockchip/pm.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-rockchip/pm.c b/arch/arm/mach-rockchip/pm.c index 87389d9456b9..30d781d80fe0 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-rockchip/pm.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-rockchip/pm.c @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ void __init rockchip_suspend_init(void) &match); if (!match) { pr_err("Failed to find PMU node\n"); - return; + goto out_put; } pm_data = (struct rockchip_pm_data *) match->data;

@@ -320,9 +320,12 @@ void __init rockchip_suspend_init(void)

if (ret) { pr_err("%s: matches init error %d\n", __func__, ret); - return; + goto out_put; } }

suspend_set_ops(pm_data->ops); + +out_put: + of_node_put(np); }

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit a883d624aed463c84c22596006e5a96f5b44db31 ]

In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11 where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE simple.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b258efa8bf43..57dc9f822e8b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ /* FREE! ( 7*32+10) */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+12) */ +/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ @@ -294,6 +294,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA (11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX1 (11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SGX2 (11*32+ 9) /* "" SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+10) */ +/* FREE! (11*32+11) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE (11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */

/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit 15583e514eb16744b80be85dea0774ece153177d ]

This is userspace code and doesn't play by the normal kernel rules.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S index 15e35159ebb6..ef2dd1827243 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S @@ -19,17 +19,20 @@ __vsyscall_page:

mov $__NR_gettimeofday, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3

.balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_time, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3

.balign 1024, 0xcc mov $__NR_getcpu, %rax syscall - RET + ret + int3

.balign 4096, 0xcc

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit 951ddecf435659553ed15a9214e153a3af43a9a1 ]

Needed because zen_untrain_ret() will be called from noinstr code.

Also makes sense since the thunks MUST NOT contain instrumentation nor be poked with dynamic instrumentation.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 8b3435af989a..d87b493544e1 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -291,7 +291,8 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct objtool_file *file) sec->text = true;

if (!strcmp(sec->name, ".noinstr.text") || - !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text")) + !strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text") || + !strncmp(sec->name, ".text.__x86.", 12)) sec->noinstr = true;

for (offset = 0; offset < sec->sh.sh_size; offset += insn->len) {

From: Alexandre Chartre alexandre.chartre@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 ]

Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret" (JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".

Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on Intel).

[peterz: rebase; add hygon] [jpoimboe: cleanups]

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre alexandre.chartre@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 9f4f3e2ceea6..961843aa8403 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4968,6 +4968,21 @@

retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction

+ retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary + Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) + vulnerability. + + off - unconditionally disable + auto - automatically select a migitation + unret - force enable untrained return thunks, + only effective on AMD Zen {1,2} + based systems. + + Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run + time according to the CPU. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto. + rfkill.default_state= 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, etc. communication is blocked by default. diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 1d0f16b53393..babe46b4b85f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -471,6 +471,9 @@ config RETPOLINE config CC_HAS_SLS def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)

+config CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK + def_bool $(cc-option,-mfunction-return=thunk-extern) + config SLS bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation" depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c62ea37ca38a..3e01a88f7d5d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "cpu.h"

static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); @@ -120,6 +121,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)

/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + retbleed_select_mitigation(); + /* + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is + * forced for UNRET. + */ spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); @@ -745,6 +752,100 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) } early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);

+#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt + +enum retbleed_mitigation { + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE, + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET, +}; + +enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd { + RETBLEED_CMD_OFF, + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO, + RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET, +}; + +const char * const retbleed_strings[] = { + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk", +}; + +static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; +static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init = + RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + +static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "off")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF; + else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO; + else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) + retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET; + else + pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str); + + return 0; +} +early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline); + +#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n" +#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n" + +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off()) + return; + + switch (retbleed_cmd) { + case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF: + return; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET: + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + + case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO: + default: + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED)) + break; + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET; + break; + } + + switch (retbleed_mitigation) { + case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET: + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK)) { + pr_err(RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG); + retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE; + break; + } + + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); + + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) + pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG); + break; + + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt

@@ -1989,7 +2090,12 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)

static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) { - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET && + (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk on non-Zen uarch\n"); + + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); }

static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 ]

Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value reflecting the current task's MSR content.

[jpoimboe: rename]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 9783c6b08886..cd2010ecf32b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)

/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val);

/* * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 27bb40a718ae..eae8ff8067fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -49,11 +49,29 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);

-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); + +/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */ +DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);

+/* + * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ + * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update(). + */ +void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val) +{ + if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val) + return; + + this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val); +} + /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in * x86_spec_ctrl_base. @@ -1272,7 +1290,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) { /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); }

switch (mode) { @@ -1327,7 +1345,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)

static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); }

/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ @@ -1570,7 +1588,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); } else { x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base); } }

@@ -1821,7 +1839,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); + write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);

if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) x86_amd_ssb_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index f2f733bcb2b9..752776298735 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, }

if (updmsr) - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); + write_spec_ctrl_current(msr); }

static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d ]

retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on retbleed. Break this cycle.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ae7715385153..7637318f3b7e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ #include "cpu.h"

static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); -static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void); @@ -145,13 +146,19 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)

/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + /* + * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about + * spectre_v2=ibrs. + */ retbleed_select_mitigation(); /* - * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by + * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is * forced for UNRET. */ - spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation(); md_clear_select_mitigation(); @@ -1005,13 +1012,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason); }

+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd; + static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init -spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) { char arg[20]; int ret, i;

- switch (v2_cmd) { + switch (spectre_v2_cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: @@ -1045,7 +1054,7 @@ static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) }

static void __init -spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); @@ -1058,7 +1067,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) smt_possible = false;

- cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); + cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(); switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; @@ -1346,7 +1355,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) }

/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ - spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; }

static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 ]

Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 20 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c index 8bfc10330107..1f80dd3a2dd4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c @@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature)) return;

- ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat); if(ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature); } @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void) { int ret;

- ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target); + ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64); if (ret != 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret); /* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other @@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)

if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) { ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32, - xen_syscall32_target); + xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat); if (ret != 0) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32); } diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index 962d30ea01a2..2cf22624012c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode) */

/* Normal 64-bit system call target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -241,12 +241,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall_target) movq $__USER_CS, 1*8(%rsp)

jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_64)

#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION

/* 32-bit compat syscall target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY popq %rcx popq %r11 @@ -260,10 +260,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)

jmp entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)

/* 32-bit compat sysenter target */ -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY /* * NB: Xen is polite and clears TF from EFLAGS for us. This means @@ -281,18 +281,18 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) movq $__USER32_CS, 1*8(%rsp)

jmp entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat)

#else /* !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */

-SYM_CODE_START(xen_syscall32_target) -SYM_CODE_START(xen_sysenter_target) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat) +SYM_CODE_START(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY lea 16(%rsp), %rsp /* strip %rcx, %r11 */ mov $-ENOSYS, %rax pushq $0 jmp hypercall_iret -SYM_CODE_END(xen_sysenter_target) -SYM_CODE_END(xen_syscall32_target) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat) +SYM_CODE_END(xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat)

#endif /* CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h index 8bc8b72a205d..16aed4b12129 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ /* These are code, but not functions. Defined in entry.S */ extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[];

-void xen_sysenter_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -void xen_syscall_target(void); -void xen_syscall32_target(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void); +void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void); #endif

extern void *xen_initial_gdt;

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 ]

Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting.

Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN.

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 320826cbfb69..aecc76b4dfbe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -515,6 +515,9 @@ /* Fam 17h MSRs */ #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9

+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN 0xc00110e3 +#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT BIT_ULL(1) + /* Fam 16h MSRs */ #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230 #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 4edb6f0f628c..c3a23c398680 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -886,6 +886,26 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); }

+void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 value; + + /* + * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation. + * + * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it + * suppresses non-branch predictions. + * + * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H + */ + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) { + if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) { + value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT; + wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value); + } + } +} + static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); @@ -931,7 +951,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break; - case 0x17: fallthrough; + case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c); + fallthrough; case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break; }

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 2a8e584fc991..7c9b5893c30a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ static inline void tsx_init(void) { } static inline void tsx_ap_init(void) { } #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */

+extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c index 3fcdda4c1e11..21fd425088fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c @@ -302,6 +302,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */ c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id();

+ /* + * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT + * + init_spectral_chicken(c); + */ + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN); set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);

From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 8bd200d23ec42d66ccd517a72dd0b9cc6132d2fd ]

Move the vmx_vm{enter,exit}() functionality into __vmx_vcpu_run(). This will make it easier to do the spec_ctrl handling before the first RET.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 119 ++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 435c187927c4..c83163fb2e9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -30,68 +30,6 @@

.section .noinstr.text, "ax"

-/** - * vmx_vmenter - VM-Enter the current loaded VMCS - * - * %RFLAGS.ZF: !VMCS.LAUNCHED, i.e. controls VMLAUNCH vs. VMRESUME - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.CF is set on VM-Fail Invalid - * %RFLAGS.ZF is set on VM-Fail Valid - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * Note that VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH fall-through and return directly if - * they VM-Fail, whereas a successful VM-Enter + VM-Exit will jump - * to vmx_vmexit. - */ -SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(vmx_vmenter) - /* EFLAGS.ZF is set if VMCS.LAUNCHED == 0 */ - je 2f - -1: vmresume - RET - -2: vmlaunch - RET - -3: cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting - je 4f - RET -4: ud2 - - _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b) - _ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 3b) - -SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter) - -/** - * vmx_vmexit - Handle a VMX VM-Exit - * - * Returns: - * %RFLAGS.{CF,ZF} are cleared on VM-Success, i.e. VM-Exit - * - * This is vmx_vmenter's partner in crime. On a VM-Exit, control will jump - * here after hardware loads the host's state, i.e. this is the destination - * referred to by VMCS.HOST_RIP. - */ -SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit) -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */ - push %_ASM_AX - - /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RFLAGS.CF and RFLAGS.ZF to preserve VM-Exit, i.e. !VM-Fail. */ - or $1, %_ASM_AX - - pop %_ASM_AX -.Lvmexit_skip_rsb: -#endif - RET -SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit) - /** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) @@ -124,8 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Copy @launched to BL, _ASM_ARG3 is volatile. */ mov %_ASM_ARG3B, %bl

- /* Adjust RSP to account for the CALL to vmx_vmenter(). */ - lea -WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 + lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2 call vmx_update_host_rsp

/* Load @regs to RAX. */ @@ -154,11 +91,37 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */ mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX

- /* Enter guest mode */ - call vmx_vmenter + /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'testb' above */ + je .Lvmlaunch + + /* + * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" + * resumes below at 'vmx_vmexit' due to the VMCS HOST_RIP setting. + * So this isn't a typical function and objtool needs to be told to + * save the unwind state here and restore it below. + */ + UNWIND_HINT_SAVE + +/* + * If VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH and corresponding vmexit succeed, execution resumes at + * the 'vmx_vmexit' label below. + */ +.Lvmresume: + vmresume + jmp .Lvmfail + +.Lvmlaunch: + vmlaunch + jmp .Lvmfail + + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmresume, .Lfixup) + _ASM_EXTABLE(.Lvmlaunch, .Lfixup)

- /* Jump on VM-Fail. */ - jbe 2f +SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + + /* Restore unwind state from before the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH. */ + UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE + ENDBR

/* Temporarily save guest's RAX. */ push %_ASM_AX @@ -185,9 +148,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif

+ /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ xor %eax, %eax

+.Lclear_regs: /* * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded @@ -197,7 +164,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. */ -1: xor %ecx, %ecx + xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx xor %ebx, %ebx xor %ebp, %ebp @@ -216,8 +183,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)

/* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP - pop %_ASM_BX

+ pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 pop %r13 @@ -230,9 +197,15 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) pop %_ASM_BP RET

- /* VM-Fail. Out-of-line to avoid a taken Jcc after VM-Exit. */ -2: mov $1, %eax - jmp 1b +.Lfixup: + cmpb $0, kvm_rebooting + jne .Lvmfail + ud2 +.Lvmfail: + /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ + mov $1, %eax + jmp .Lclear_regs + SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run)

From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf ]

On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.

Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 +++++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 6189609bede3..4ef9cc93d584 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)

/* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);

/* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c59db48472dc..13a2ee4737f6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -199,6 +199,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif }

+/* + * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path. + * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead. + */ void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h index 57f4c664ea9c..edc3f16cc189 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H

#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1)

#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index ddc3bf85db33..8641ea74a307 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -33,9 +33,10 @@

/** * __vmx_vcpu_run - Run a vCPU via a transition to VMX guest mode - * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * (forwarded to vmx_update_host_rsp) + * @vmx: struct vcpu_vmx * * @regs: unsigned long * (to guest registers) - * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * @flags: VMX_RUN_VMRESUME: use VMRESUME instead of VMLAUNCH + * VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL: save guest SPEC_CTRL into vmx->spec_ctrl * * Returns: * 0 on VM-Exit, 1 on VM-Fail @@ -54,6 +55,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) #endif push %_ASM_BX

+ /* Save @vmx for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG1 + + /* Save @flags for SPEC_CTRL handling */ + push %_ASM_ARG3 + /* * Save @regs, _ASM_ARG2 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp() and * @regs is needed after VM-Exit to save the guest's register values. @@ -149,25 +156,23 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) mov %r15, VCPU_R15(%_ASM_AX) #endif

- /* IMPORTANT: RSB must be stuffed before the first return. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_BX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE - - /* Clear RAX to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ - xor %eax, %eax + /* Clear return value to indicate VM-Exit (as opposed to VM-Fail). */ + xor %ebx, %ebx

.Lclear_regs: /* - * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent + * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RBX to prevent * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded * via the stack. In theory, an L1 cache miss when restoring registers * could lead to speculative execution with the guest's values. * Zeroing XORs are dirt cheap, i.e. the extra paranoia is essentially * free. RSP and RAX are exempt as RSP is restored by hardware during - * VM-Exit and RAX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to return VM-Fail. + * VM-Exit and RBX is explicitly loaded with 0 or 1 to hold the return + * value. */ + xor %eax, %eax xor %ecx, %ecx xor %edx, %edx - xor %ebx, %ebx xor %ebp, %ebp xor %esi, %esi xor %edi, %edi @@ -185,6 +190,28 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* "POP" @regs. */ add $WORD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP

+ /* + * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before + * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! + * + * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries + * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * + * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't + * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled + * before the first unbalanced RET. + */ + + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + + pop %_ASM_ARG2 /* @flags */ + pop %_ASM_ARG1 /* @vmx */ + + call vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host + + /* Put return value in AX */ + mov %_ASM_BX, %_ASM_AX + pop %_ASM_BX #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 pop %r12 @@ -204,7 +231,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(vmx_vmexit, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ud2 .Lvmfail: /* VM-Fail: set return value to 1 */ - mov $1, %eax + mov $1, %_ASM_BX jmp .Lclear_regs

SYM_FUNC_END(__vmx_vcpu_run) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index bac08c265ddf..f668df996668 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -842,6 +842,14 @@ unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched) flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;

+ /* + * If writes to the SPEC_CTRL MSR aren't intercepted, the guest is free + * to change it directly without causing a vmexit. In that case read + * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl. + */ + if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) + flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL; + return flags; }

@@ -6664,6 +6672,26 @@ void noinstr vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp) } }

+void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned int flags) +{ + u64 hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current); + + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) + return; + + if (flags & VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL) + vmx->spec_ctrl = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); + + /* + * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value. + */ + if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval) + native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval); + + barrier_nospec(); +} + static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { switch (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic) { @@ -6799,26 +6827,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */ vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));

- /* - * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the - * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and - * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding - * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former - * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM. - * - * For non-nested case: - * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - * - * For nested case: - * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to - * save it. - */ - if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) - vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - - x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0); - /* All fields are clean at this point */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) { current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |= diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 35476115cbd0..a8b8150252bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, unsigned int flags);

From: Felix Fietkau nbd@nbd.name

[ Upstream commit f856373e2f31ffd340e47e2b00027bd4070f74b3 ]

When a vif is being removed and sdata->bss is cleared, __ieee80211_wake_txqs can still be called on it, which crashes as soon as sdata->bss is being dereferenced. To fix this properly, check for SDATA_STATE_RUNNING before waking queues, and take the fq lock when setting it (to ensure that __ieee80211_wake_txqs observes the change when running on a different CPU)

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau nbd@nbd.name Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen toke@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531190824.60019-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/mac80211/iface.c | 2 ++ net/mac80211/util.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c index 041859b5b71d..1f6878a14fff 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c @@ -377,7 +377,9 @@ static void ieee80211_do_stop(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, bool going_do bool cancel_scan; struct cfg80211_nan_func *func;

+ spin_lock_bh(&local->fq.lock); clear_bit(SDATA_STATE_RUNNING, &sdata->state); + spin_unlock_bh(&local->fq.lock);

cancel_scan = rcu_access_pointer(local->scan_sdata) == sdata; if (cancel_scan) diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c index be1911d8089f..d85a39a7b843 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ static void __ieee80211_wake_txqs(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int ac) local_bh_disable(); spin_lock(&fq->lock);

+ if (!test_bit(SDATA_STATE_RUNNING, &sdata->state)) + goto out; + if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) ps = &sdata->bss->ps;

From: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 144248515246e52a3706de1ee928af29a63794b8 ]

The Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 830F / 830L use a panel which has been mounted 90 degrees rotated. Add a quirk for this.

Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas javierm@redhat.com Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220623112710.15693-1-hdegoed... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c index f5ab891731d0..ad75e7712ebb 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c @@ -266,6 +266,21 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id orientation_data[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Lenovo YB1-X9"), }, .driver_data = (void *)&lcd1200x1920_rightside_up, + }, { /* Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 830F / 830L */ + .matches = { + /* + * Note this also matches the Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 1050F/L + * since that uses the same mainboard. The resolution match + * will limit this to only matching on the 830F/L. Neither has + * any external video outputs so those are not a concern. + */ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corp."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "VALLEYVIEW C0 PLATFORM"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "BYT-T FFD8"), + /* Partial match on beginning of BIOS version */ + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "BLADE_21"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)&lcd1200x1920_rightside_up, }, { /* OneGX1 Pro */ .matches = { DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SYSTEM_MANUFACTURER"),

From: David Owens daowens01@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit f0d96937d31c4615a6418e4bed5cee50a952040e ]

Convert to managed versions of sysfs and clk allocation to simplify unbinding and error handling in probe. Managed sysfs node creation specifically addresses the following error seen the second time probe is attempted after sdma_pcm_platform_register() previously requsted probe deferral:

sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/68000000.ocp/49022000.mcbsp/max_tx_thres'

Signed-off-by: David Owens dowens@precisionplanting.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220620183744.3176557-1-dowens@precisionplanting.... Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h | 2 -- sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c | 14 ++------------ sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c | 19 ++----------------- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h index 7865cda4bf0a..da519ea1f303 100644 --- a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h +++ b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-priv.h @@ -316,8 +316,6 @@ static inline int omap_mcbsp_read(struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp, u16 reg,

/* Sidetone specific API */ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev); -void omap_mcbsp_st_cleanup(struct platform_device *pdev); - int omap_mcbsp_st_start(struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp); int omap_mcbsp_st_stop(struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp);

diff --git a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c index 0bc7d26c660a..7e8179cae92e 100644 --- a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c +++ b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp-st.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!st_data) return -ENOMEM;

- st_data->mcbsp_iclk = clk_get(mcbsp->dev, "ick"); + st_data->mcbsp_iclk = devm_clk_get(mcbsp->dev, "ick"); if (IS_ERR(st_data->mcbsp_iclk)) { dev_warn(mcbsp->dev, "Failed to get ick, sidetone might be broken\n"); @@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!st_data->io_base_st) return -ENOMEM;

- ret = sysfs_create_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &sidetone_attr_group); + ret = devm_device_add_group(mcbsp->dev, &sidetone_attr_group); if (ret) return ret;

@@ -368,16 +368,6 @@ int omap_mcbsp_st_init(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; }

-void omap_mcbsp_st_cleanup(struct platform_device *pdev) -{ - struct omap_mcbsp *mcbsp = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); - - if (mcbsp->st_data) { - sysfs_remove_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &sidetone_attr_group); - clk_put(mcbsp->st_data->mcbsp_iclk); - } -} - static int omap_mcbsp_st_info_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_ctl_elem_info *uinfo) { diff --git a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c index 4479d74f0a45..9933b33c80ca 100644 --- a/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c +++ b/sound/soc/ti/omap-mcbsp.c @@ -702,8 +702,7 @@ static int omap_mcbsp_init(struct platform_device *pdev) mcbsp->max_tx_thres = max_thres(mcbsp) - 0x10; mcbsp->max_rx_thres = max_thres(mcbsp) - 0x10;

- ret = sysfs_create_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, - &additional_attr_group); + ret = devm_device_add_group(mcbsp->dev, &additional_attr_group); if (ret) { dev_err(mcbsp->dev, "Unable to create additional controls\n"); @@ -711,16 +710,7 @@ static int omap_mcbsp_init(struct platform_device *pdev) } }

- ret = omap_mcbsp_st_init(pdev); - if (ret) - goto err_st; - - return 0; - -err_st: - if (mcbsp->pdata->buffer_size) - sysfs_remove_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &additional_attr_group); - return ret; + return omap_mcbsp_st_init(pdev); }

/* @@ -1431,11 +1421,6 @@ static int asoc_mcbsp_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) if (cpu_latency_qos_request_active(&mcbsp->pm_qos_req)) cpu_latency_qos_remove_request(&mcbsp->pm_qos_req);

- if (mcbsp->pdata->buffer_size) - sysfs_remove_group(&mcbsp->dev->kobj, &additional_attr_group); - - omap_mcbsp_st_cleanup(pdev); - return 0; }

From: Charles Keepax ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com

[ Upstream commit 71b5ab96ffe6589abe7a2e302b83f7a426ebe099 ]

The output compensation controls always returns zero regardless of if the control value was updated. This results in missing notifications to user-space of the control change. Update the handling to return 1 when the value is changed.

Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628153409.3266932-1-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus... Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c b/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c index 621598608bf0..fc3d4e1a9c55 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/wm5102.c @@ -680,12 +680,17 @@ static int wm5102_out_comp_coeff_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, { struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol); struct arizona *arizona = dev_get_drvdata(component->dev->parent); + uint16_t dac_comp_coeff = get_unaligned_be16(ucontrol->value.bytes.data); + int ret = 0;

mutex_lock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock); - arizona->dac_comp_coeff = get_unaligned_be16(ucontrol->value.bytes.data); + if (arizona->dac_comp_coeff != dac_comp_coeff) { + arizona->dac_comp_coeff = dac_comp_coeff; + ret = 1; + } mutex_unlock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock);

- return 0; + return ret; }

static int wm5102_out_comp_switch_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, @@ -706,12 +711,20 @@ static int wm5102_out_comp_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, { struct snd_soc_component *component = snd_soc_kcontrol_component(kcontrol); struct arizona *arizona = dev_get_drvdata(component->dev->parent); + struct soc_mixer_control *mc = (struct soc_mixer_control *)kcontrol->private_value; + int ret = 0; + + if (ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] > mc->max) + return -EINVAL;

mutex_lock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock); - arizona->dac_comp_enabled = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; + if (arizona->dac_comp_enabled != ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]) { + arizona->dac_comp_enabled = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; + ret = 1; + } mutex_unlock(&arizona->dac_comp_lock);

- return 0; + return ret; }

static const char * const wm5102_osr_text[] = {

From: Charles Keepax ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com

[ Upstream commit 870d72ab9228575b2f005c9a23ea08787e0f63e6 ]

cs47l92_put_demux returns the value of snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power, which returns a 1 if a path was found for the kcontrol. This is obviously different to the expected return a 1 if the control was updated value. This results in spurious notifications to user-space. Update the handling to only return a 1 when the value is changed.

Signed-off-by: Charles Keepax ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628153409.3266932-3-ckeepax@opensource.cirrus... Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c index 1a0280416d92..ad6f41741372 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs47l92.c @@ -119,7 +119,13 @@ static int cs47l92_put_demux(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, end: snd_soc_dapm_mutex_unlock(dapm);

- return snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, mux, e, NULL); + ret = snd_soc_dapm_mux_update_power(dapm, kcontrol, mux, e, NULL); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(madera->dev, "Failed to update demux power state: %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + return change; }

static SOC_ENUM_SINGLE_DECL(cs47l92_outdemux_enum,

From: Mike Christie michael.christie@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit ccd3f449052449a917a3e577d8ba0368f43b8f29 ]

In newer version of the SBC specs, we have a NDOB bit that indicates there is no data buffer that gets written out. If this bit is set using commands like "sg_write_same --ndob" we will crash in target_core_iblock/file's execute_write_same handlers when we go to access the se_cmd->t_data_sg because its NULL.

This patch adds a check for the NDOB bit in the common WRITE SAME code because we don't support it. And, it adds a check for zero SG elements in each handler in case the initiator tries to send a normal WRITE SAME with no data buffer.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628022325.14627-2-michael.christie@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Mike Christie michael.christie@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/target/target_core_file.c | 3 +++ drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c | 4 ++++ drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c b/drivers/target/target_core_file.c index ef4a8e189fba..64138b32b5a2 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_file.c @@ -447,6 +447,9 @@ fd_execute_write_same(struct se_cmd *cmd) return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE; }

+ if (!cmd->t_data_nents) + return TCM_INVALID_CDB_FIELD; + if (cmd->t_data_nents > 1 || cmd->t_data_sg[0].length != cmd->se_dev->dev_attrib.block_size) { pr_err("WRITE_SAME: Illegal SGL t_data_nents: %u length: %u" diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c b/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c index 4069a1edcfa3..1555f6cf55a1 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c @@ -496,6 +496,10 @@ iblock_execute_write_same(struct se_cmd *cmd) " backends not supported\n"); return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE; } + + if (!cmd->t_data_nents) + return TCM_INVALID_CDB_FIELD; + sg = &cmd->t_data_sg[0];

if (cmd->t_data_nents > 1 || diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c b/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c index ca1b2312d6e7..f6132836eb38 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_sbc.c @@ -312,6 +312,12 @@ sbc_setup_write_same(struct se_cmd *cmd, unsigned char flags, struct sbc_ops *op pr_warn("WRITE SAME with ANCHOR not supported\n"); return TCM_INVALID_CDB_FIELD; } + + if (flags & 0x01) { + pr_warn("WRITE SAME with NDOB not supported\n"); + return TCM_INVALID_CDB_FIELD; + } + /* * Special case for WRITE_SAME w/ UNMAP=1 that ends up getting * translated into block discard requests within backend code.

From: Misaka19465 misaka19465@olddoctor.net

[ Upstream commit f56e676a7f1ca7de9002526df3d2ee0e47dfd8ce ]

On laptops like ASUS TUF Gaming A15, which have hotkeys to start Armoury Crate or AURA Sync, these hotkeys are unavailable. This patch add mappings for them.

Signed-off-by: Misaka19465 misaka19465@olddoctor.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220710113727.281634-1-misaka19465@olddoctor.net Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c index a81dc4b191b7..6ec9529f8142 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/asus-nb-wmi.c @@ -522,6 +522,7 @@ static const struct key_entry asus_nb_wmi_keymap[] = { { KE_KEY, 0x31, { KEY_VOLUMEDOWN } }, { KE_KEY, 0x32, { KEY_MUTE } }, { KE_KEY, 0x35, { KEY_SCREENLOCK } }, + { KE_KEY, 0x38, { KEY_PROG3 } }, /* Armoury Crate */ { KE_KEY, 0x40, { KEY_PREVIOUSSONG } }, { KE_KEY, 0x41, { KEY_NEXTSONG } }, { KE_KEY, 0x43, { KEY_STOPCD } }, /* Stop/Eject */ @@ -573,6 +574,7 @@ static const struct key_entry asus_nb_wmi_keymap[] = { { KE_KEY, 0xA5, { KEY_SWITCHVIDEOMODE } }, /* SDSP LCD + TV + HDMI */ { KE_KEY, 0xA6, { KEY_SWITCHVIDEOMODE } }, /* SDSP CRT + TV + HDMI */ { KE_KEY, 0xA7, { KEY_SWITCHVIDEOMODE } }, /* SDSP LCD + CRT + TV + HDMI */ + { KE_KEY, 0xB3, { KEY_PROG4 } }, /* AURA */ { KE_KEY, 0xB5, { KEY_CALC } }, { KE_KEY, 0xC4, { KEY_KBDILLUMUP } }, { KE_KEY, 0xC5, { KEY_KBDILLUMDOWN } },

From: Po-Wen Kao powen.kao@mediatek.com

[ Upstream commit 52a518019ca187227b786f8b8ee20869a97f3af4 ]

In ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore(), ufshcd_set_clk_freq() is called to scale clock rate. However, this did not call vops->clk_scale_notify() to inform platform driver of clock change.

Call ufshcd_scale_clks() instead so that clock change can be properly handled.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711144224.17916-2-powen.kao@mediatek.com Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche bvanassche@acm.org Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu stanley.chu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Po-Wen Kao powen.kao@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 5c9a31f18b7f..a2eb54d51418 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -7060,7 +7060,7 @@ static int ufshcd_host_reset_and_restore(struct ufs_hba *hba) hba->silence_err_logs = false;

/* scale up clocks to max frequency before full reinitialization */ - ufshcd_set_clk_freq(hba, true); + ufshcd_scale_clks(hba, true);

err = ufshcd_hba_enable(hba);

From: Changyuan Lyu changyuanl@google.com

[ Upstream commit 355bf2e036c954317ddc4a9618b4f7e38ea5a970 ]

Negotiated link rate needs to be updated to 'Disabled' when phy is stopped.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708205026.969161-1-changyuanl@google.com Reviewed-by: Igor Pylypiv ipylypiv@google.com Signed-off-by: Changyuan Lyu changyuanl@google.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c b/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c index 04746df26c6c..146402037488 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c @@ -3776,8 +3776,12 @@ static int mpi_phy_stop_resp(struct pm8001_hba_info *pm8001_ha, void *piomb) pm8001_dbg(pm8001_ha, MSG, "phy:0x%x status:0x%x\n", phyid, status); if (status == PHY_STOP_SUCCESS || - status == PHY_STOP_ERR_DEVICE_ATTACHED) + status == PHY_STOP_ERR_DEVICE_ATTACHED) { phy->phy_state = PHY_LINK_DISABLE; + phy->sas_phy.phy->negotiated_linkrate = SAS_PHY_DISABLED; + phy->sas_phy.linkrate = SAS_PHY_DISABLED; + } + return 0; }

From: Nick Desaulniers ndesaulniers@google.com

[ Upstream commit e5d523f1ae8f2cef01f8e071aeee432654166708 ]

Building with UBSAN_DIV_ZERO with clang produces numerous fallthrough warnings from objtool.

In the case of uncheck division, UBSAN_DIV_ZERO may introduce new control flow to check for division by zero.

Because the result of the division is undefined, LLVM may optimize the control flow such that after the call to __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow doesn't matter. If panic_on_warn was set, __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow would panic.

The problem is is that panic_on_warn is run time configurable. If it's disabled, then we cannot guarantee that we will be able to recover safely. Disable this config for clang until we can come up with a solution in LLVM.

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1657 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/56289 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wj1qhf7y3VNACEexyp5EbkNpdcu_542k-xZpzmYLO... Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers ndesaulniers@google.com Acked-by: Nathan Chancellor nathan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan index 236c5cefc4cc..641ac2d0477c 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan +++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan @@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ config UBSAN_SHIFT config UBSAN_DIV_ZERO bool "Perform checking for integer divide-by-zero" depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero) + # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1657 + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/56289 + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG help This option enables -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero which checks for integer division by zero. This is effectively redundant with the