This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.282 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.282-rc... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Linux 4.14.282-rc1
Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com bpf: Enlarge offset check value to INT_MAX in bpf_skb_{load,store}_bytes
Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()
Akira Yokosawa akiyks@gmail.com docs: submitting-patches: Fix crossref to 'The canonical patch format'
Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com tpm: ibmvtpm: Correct the return value in tpm_ibmvtpm_probe()
Sarthak Kukreti sarthakkukreti@google.com dm verity: set DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE feature flag
Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com dm stats: add cond_resched when looping over entries
Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com dm crypt: make printing of the key constant-time
Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com dm integrity: fix error code in dm_integrity_ctr()
Sultan Alsawaf sultan@kerneltoast.com zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration
Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de netfilter: conntrack: re-fetch conntrack after insertion
Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty
Haimin Zhang tcs.kernel@gmail.com block-map: add __GFP_ZERO flag for alloc_page in function bio_copy_kern
Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavoars@kernel.org drm/i915: Fix -Wstringop-overflow warning in call to intel_read_wm_latency()
Stephen Brennan stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com assoc_array: Fix BUG_ON during garbage collect
Piyush Malgujar pmalgujar@marvell.com drivers: i2c: thunderx: Allow driver to work with ACPI defined TWSI controllers
Joel Stanley joel@jms.id.au net: ftgmac100: Disable hardware checksum on AST2600
Thomas Bartschies thomas.bartschies@cvk.de net: af_key: check encryption module availability consistency
Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping
Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use
Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation
Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time
Denis Efremov (Oracle) efremov@linux.com staging: rtl8723bs: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan()
Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de x86/pci/xen: Disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking for XEN_HVM guests
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 2 +- Makefile | 4 +-- arch/x86/pci/xen.c | 5 ++++ block/bio.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/sysfs.c | 23 +++++++++++----- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c | 2 +- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c | 1 + drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 14 +++++++--- drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 2 -- drivers/md/dm-stats.c | 8 ++++++ drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c | 5 ++++ drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 6 +++-- fs/exec.c | 17 ++++++++++++ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 12 +++------ include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 2 +- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h | 7 ++++- include/net/secure_seq.h | 4 +-- lib/assoc_array.c | 8 ++++++ mm/zsmalloc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- net/core/filter.c | 4 +-- net/core/secure_seq.c | 4 +-- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 28 ++++++++++++++----- net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 4 +-- net/key/af_key.c | 6 ++--- 26 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de
commit 7e0815b3e09986d2fe651199363e135b9358132a upstream.
When a XEN_HVM guest uses the XEN PIRQ/Eventchannel mechanism, then PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely controlled by the hypervisor, but contrary to XEN_PV guests this does not disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking in the PCI/MSI layer.
This can lead to a situation where the PCI/MSI layer masks an MSI[-X] interrupt and the hypervisor grants the write despite the fact that it already requested the interrupt. As a consequence interrupt delivery on the affected device is not happening ever.
Set pci_msi_ignore_mask to prevent that like it's done for XEN_PV guests already.
Fixes: 809f9267bbab ("xen: map MSIs into pirqs") Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com Reported-by: Dusty Mabe dustymabe@redhat.com Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Tested-by: Noah Meyerhans noahm@debian.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuaduxj5.ffs@tglx [nmeyerha@amazon.com: backported to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Noah Meyerhans nmeyerha@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/pci/xen.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c @@ -442,6 +442,11 @@ void __init xen_msi_init(void)
x86_msi.setup_msi_irqs = xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs; x86_msi.teardown_msi_irq = xen_teardown_msi_irq; + /* + * With XEN PIRQ/Eventchannels in use PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely + * controlled by the hypervisor. + */ + pci_msi_ignore_mask = 1; } #endif
From: "Denis Efremov (Oracle)" efremov@linux.com
This code has a check to prevent read overflow but it needs another check to prevent writing beyond the end of the ->Ssid[] array.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov (Oracle) efremov@linux.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -1438,9 +1438,11 @@ static int rtw_wx_set_scan(struct net_de
sec_len = *(pos++); len-= 1;
- if (sec_len>0 && sec_len<=len) { + if (sec_len > 0 && + sec_len <= len && + sec_len <= 32) { ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength = sec_len; - memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength); + memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, sec_len); /* DBG_871X("%s COMBO_SCAN with specific ssid:%s, %d\n", __func__ */ /* , ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength); */ ssid_index++;
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
commit 190cc82489f46f9d88e73c81a47e14f80a791e1a upstream.
RFC 6056 (Recommendations for Transport-Protocol Port Randomization) provides good summary of why source selection needs extra care.
David Dworken reminded us that linux implements Algorithm 3 as described in RFC 6056 3.3.3
Quoting David : In the context of the web, this creates an interesting info leak where websites can count how many TCP connections a user's computer is establishing over time. For example, this allows a website to count exactly how many subresources a third party website loaded. This also allows: - Distinguishing between different users behind a VPN based on distinct source port ranges. - Tracking users over time across multiple networks. - Covert communication channels between different browsers/browser profiles running on the same computer - Tracking what applications are running on a computer based on the pattern of how fast source ports are getting incremented.
Section 3.3.4 describes an enhancement, that reduces attackers ability to use the basic information currently stored into the shared 'u32 hint'.
This change also decreases collision rate when multiple applications need to connect() to different destinations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: David Dworken ddworken@google.com Cc: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net [SG: Adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea stefan.ghinea@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -587,6 +587,17 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
+/* RFC 6056 3.3.4. Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm + * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers') + * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this + * property might be used by clever attacker. + * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, + * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and + * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory. + */ +#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8 +static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT]; + int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset, int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *, @@ -600,7 +611,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_time struct inet_bind_bucket *tb; u32 remaining, offset; int ret, i, low, high; - static u32 hint; + u32 index;
if (port) { head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port, @@ -625,7 +636,10 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_time if (likely(remaining > 1)) remaining &= ~1U;
- offset = (hint + port_offset) % remaining; + net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb)); + index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT); + + offset = (READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset) % remaining; /* In first pass we try ports of @low parity. * inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice. */ @@ -678,7 +692,7 @@ next_port: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok: - hint += i + 2; + WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */ inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
From: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu
commit b2d057560b8107c633b39aabe517ff9d93f285e3 upstream.
SipHash replaced MD5 in secure_ipv{4,6}_port_ephemeral() via commit 7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5"), but the output remained truncated to 32-bit only. In order to exploit more bits from the hash, let's make the functions return the full 64-bit of siphash_3u32(). We also make sure the port offset calculation in __inet_hash_connect() remains done on 32-bit to avoid the need for div_u64_rem() and an extra cost on 32-bit systems.
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Cc: Moshe Kol moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il Cc: Yossi Gilad yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il Cc: Amit Klein aksecurity@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org [SG: Adjusted context] Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea stefan.ghinea@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 2 +- include/net/secure_seq.h | 4 ++-- net/core/secure_seq.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 10 ++++++---- net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--- a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h +++ b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static inline void sk_rcv_saddr_set(stru }
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, - struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset, + struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset, int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *, struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **)); --- a/include/net/secure_seq.h +++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport); -u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, +u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport); +u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, __be16 dport); u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport); --- a/net/core/secure_seq.c +++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr } EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_seq);
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, +u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, __be16 dport) { const struct { @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 return seq_scale(hash); }
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport) +u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport) { net_secret_init(); return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr, --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ not_unique: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; }
-static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) +static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) { const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash); static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, - struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset, + struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset, int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *, struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **)) { @@ -639,7 +639,9 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_time net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb)); index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
- offset = (READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset) % remaining; + offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset; + offset %= remaining; + /* In first pass we try ports of @low parity. * inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice. */ @@ -715,7 +717,7 @@ ok: int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, struct sock *sk) { - u32 port_offset = 0; + u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk); --- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ not_unique: return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; }
-static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) +static u64 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk) { const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const st int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row, struct sock *sk) { - u32 port_offset = 0; + u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num) port_offset = inet6_sk_port_offset(sk);
From: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
commit bdd56d7d8931e842775d2e5b93d426a8d1940e33 upstream.
Sparse is not happy about address space in use in acpi_data_show():
drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:428:14: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:428:14: expected void [noderef] __iomem *base drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:428:14: got void * drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:431:59: warning: incorrect type in argument 4 (different address spaces) drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:431:59: expected void const *from drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:431:59: got void [noderef] __iomem *base drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:433:30: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:433:30: expected void *logical_address drivers/acpi/sysfs.c:433:30: got void [noderef] __iomem *base
Indeed, acpi_os_map_memory() returns a void pointer with dropped specific address space. Hence, we don't need to carry out __iomem in acpi_data_show().
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: dann frazier dann.frazier@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/acpi/sysfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct fil loff_t offset, size_t count) { struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr; - void __iomem *base; + void *base; ssize_t rc;
data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr);
From: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com
commit 1bbc21785b7336619fb6a67f1fff5afdaf229acc upstream.
Currently the sysfs interface maps the BERT error region as "memory" (through acpi_os_map_memory()) in order to copy the error records into memory buffers through memory operations (eg memory_read_from_buffer()).
The OS system cannot detect whether the BERT error region is part of system RAM or it is "device memory" (eg BMC memory) and therefore it cannot detect which memory attributes the bus to memory support (and corresponding kernel mapping, unless firmware provides the required information).
The acpi_os_map_memory() arch backend implementation determines the mapping attributes. On arm64, if the BERT error region is not present in the EFI memory map, the error region is mapped as device-nGnRnE; this triggers alignment faults since memcpy unaligned accesses are not allowed in device-nGnRnE regions.
The ACPI sysfs code cannot therefore map by default the BERT error region with memory semantics but should use a safer default.
Change the sysfs code to map the BERT error region as MMIO (through acpi_os_map_iomem()) and use the memcpy_fromio() interface to read the error region into the kernel buffer.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/31ffe8fc-f5ee-2858-26c5-0fd8bdd6870... Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-acpi/CAJZ5v0g+OVbhuUUDrLUCfX_mVqY_e8ubgLTU98=j... Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com Tested-by: Veronika Kabatova vkabatov@redhat.com Tested-by: Aristeu Rozanski aris@redhat.com Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: dann frazier dann.frazier@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/acpi/sysfs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c @@ -435,19 +435,30 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct fil loff_t offset, size_t count) { struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr; - void *base; - ssize_t rc; + void __iomem *base; + ssize_t size;
data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr); + size = data_attr->attr.size;
- base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size); + if (offset < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (offset >= size) + return 0; + + if (count > size - offset) + count = size - offset; + + base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size); if (!base) return -ENOMEM; - rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base, - data_attr->attr.size); - acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);
- return rc; + memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count); + + acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size); + + return count; }
static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)
From: Thomas Bartschies thomas.bartschies@cvk.de
[ Upstream commit 015c44d7bff3f44d569716117becd570c179ca32 ]
Since the recent introduction supporting the SM3 and SM4 hash algos for IPsec, the kernel produces invalid pfkey acquire messages, when these encryption modules are disabled. This happens because the availability of the algos wasn't checked in all necessary functions. This patch adds these checks.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bartschies thomas.bartschies@cvk.de Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/key/af_key.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index 3d5a46080169..990de0702b79 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -2908,7 +2908,7 @@ static int count_ah_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t) break; if (!aalg->pfkey_supported) continue; - if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg)) + if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available) sz += sizeof(struct sadb_comb); } return sz + sizeof(struct sadb_prop); @@ -2926,7 +2926,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t) if (!ealg->pfkey_supported) continue;
- if (!(ealg_tmpl_set(t, ealg))) + if (!(ealg_tmpl_set(t, ealg) && ealg->available)) continue;
for (k = 1; ; k++) { @@ -2937,7 +2937,7 @@ static int count_esp_combs(const struct xfrm_tmpl *t) if (!aalg->pfkey_supported) continue;
- if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg)) + if (aalg_tmpl_set(t, aalg) && aalg->available) sz += sizeof(struct sadb_comb); } }
From: Joel Stanley joel@jms.id.au
[ Upstream commit 6fd45e79e8b93b8d22fb8fe22c32fbad7e9190bd ]
The AST2600 when using the i210 NIC over NC-SI has been observed to produce incorrect checksum results with specific MTU values. This was first observed when sending data across a long distance set of networks.
On a local network, the following test was performed using a 1MB file of random data.
On the receiver run this script:
#!/bin/bash while [ 1 ]; do # Zero the stats nstat -r > /dev/null nc -l 9899 > test-file # Check for checksum errors TcpInCsumErrors=$(nstat | grep TcpInCsumErrors) if [ -z "$TcpInCsumErrors" ]; then echo No TcpInCsumErrors else echo TcpInCsumErrors = $TcpInCsumErrors fi done
On an AST2600 system:
# nc <IP of receiver host> 9899 < test-file
The test was repeated with various MTU values:
# ip link set mtu 1410 dev eth0
The observed results:
1500 - good 1434 - bad 1400 - good 1410 - bad 1420 - good
The test was repeated after disabling tx checksumming:
# ethtool -K eth0 tx-checksumming off
And all MTU values tested resulted in transfers without error.
An issue with the driver cannot be ruled out, however there has been no bug discovered so far.
David has done the work to take the original bug report of slow data transfer between long distance connections and triaged it down to this test case.
The vendor suspects this this is a hardware issue when using NC-SI. The fixes line refers to the patch that introduced AST2600 support.
Reported-by: David Wilder wilder@us.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Dylan Hung dylan_hung@aspeedtech.com Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley joel@jms.id.au Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c index f35c5dbe54ee..a1caca6accf3 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/faraday/ftgmac100.c @@ -1845,6 +1845,11 @@ static int ftgmac100_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) /* AST2400 doesn't have working HW checksum generation */ if (np && (of_device_is_compatible(np, "aspeed,ast2400-mac"))) netdev->hw_features &= ~NETIF_F_HW_CSUM; + + /* AST2600 tx checksum with NCSI is broken */ + if (priv->use_ncsi && of_device_is_compatible(np, "aspeed,ast2600-mac")) + netdev->hw_features &= ~NETIF_F_HW_CSUM; + if (np && of_get_property(np, "no-hw-checksum", NULL)) netdev->hw_features &= ~(NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_RXCSUM); netdev->features |= netdev->hw_features;
From: Piyush Malgujar pmalgujar@marvell.com
[ Upstream commit 03a35bc856ddc09f2cc1f4701adecfbf3b464cb3 ]
Due to i2c->adap.dev.fwnode not being set, ACPI_COMPANION() wasn't properly found for TWSI controllers.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Balcerak sbalcerak@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Piyush Malgujar pmalgujar@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang wsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c index df0976f4432a..4f0456fe8691 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-thunderx-pcidrv.c @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static int thunder_i2c_probe_pci(struct pci_dev *pdev, i2c->adap.bus_recovery_info = &octeon_i2c_recovery_info; i2c->adap.dev.parent = dev; i2c->adap.dev.of_node = pdev->dev.of_node; + i2c->adap.dev.fwnode = dev->fwnode; snprintf(i2c->adap.name, sizeof(i2c->adap.name), "Cavium ThunderX i2c adapter at %s", dev_name(dev)); i2c_set_adapdata(&i2c->adap, i2c);
From: Stephen Brennan stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com
commit d1dc87763f406d4e67caf16dbe438a5647692395 upstream.
A rare BUG_ON triggered in assoc_array_gc:
[3430308.818153] kernel BUG at lib/assoc_array.c:1609!
Which corresponded to the statement currently at line 1593 upstream:
BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));
Using the data from the core dump, I was able to generate a userspace reproducer[1] and determine the cause of the bug.
[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/assoc_array_gc
After running the iterator on the entire branch, an internal tree node looked like the following:
NODE (nr_leaves_on_branch: 3) SLOT [0] NODE (2 leaves) SLOT [1] NODE (1 leaf) SLOT [2..f] NODE (empty)
In the userspace reproducer, the pr_devel output when compressing this node was:
-- compress node 0x5607cc089380 -- free=0, leaves=0 [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0] [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0] [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2] [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2] [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2] [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2] [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2] [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2] [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2] [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2] [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2] [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2] [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2] [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2] [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2] [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2] after: 3
At slot 0, an internal node with 2 leaves could not be folded into the node, because there was only one available slot (slot 0). Thus, the internal node was retained. At slot 1, the node had one leaf, and was able to be folded in successfully. The remaining nodes had no leaves, and so were removed. By the end of the compression stage, there were 14 free slots, and only 3 leaf nodes. The tree was ascended and then its parent node was compressed. When this node was seen, it could not be folded, due to the internal node it contained.
The invariant for compression in this function is: whenever nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT, the node should contain all leaf nodes. The compression step currently cannot guarantee this, given the corner case shown above.
To fix this issue, retry compression whenever we have retained a node, and yet nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT. This second compression will then allow the node in slot 1 to be folded in, satisfying the invariant. Below is the output of the reproducer once the fix is applied:
-- compress node 0x560e9c562380 -- free=0, leaves=0 [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0] [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0] [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2] [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2] [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2] [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2] [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2] [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2] [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2] [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2] [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2] [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2] [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2] [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2] [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2] [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2] internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 -- free=14, leaves=1 [0] fold node 2/15 [nx 0] after: 3
Changes ======= DH: - Use false instead of 0. - Reorder the inserted lines in a couple of places to put retained before next_slot.
ver #2) - Fix typo in pr_devel, correct comparison to "<="
Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com cc: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511225517.407935-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.c... # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512215045.489140-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.c... # v2 Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- lib/assoc_array.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/lib/assoc_array.c +++ b/lib/assoc_array.c @@ -1478,6 +1478,7 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *a struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr; struct assoc_array_ptr *new_root, *new_parent, **new_ptr_pp; unsigned long nr_leaves_on_tree; + bool retained; int keylen, slot, nr_free, next_slot, i;
pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__); @@ -1554,6 +1555,7 @@ continue_node: goto descend; }
+retry_compress: pr_devel("-- compress node %p --\n", new_n);
/* Count up the number of empty slots in this node and work out the @@ -1571,6 +1573,7 @@ continue_node: pr_devel("free=%d, leaves=%lu\n", nr_free, new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
/* See what we can fold in */ + retained = false; next_slot = 0; for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) { struct assoc_array_shortcut *s; @@ -1620,9 +1623,14 @@ continue_node: pr_devel("[%d] retain node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n", slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1, next_slot); + retained = true; } }
+ if (retained && new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) { + pr_devel("internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying\n"); + goto retry_compress; + } pr_devel("after: %lu\n", new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);
nr_leaves_on_tree = new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch;
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavoars@kernel.org
commit 336feb502a715909a8136eb6a62a83d7268a353b upstream.
Fix the following -Wstringop-overflow warnings when building with GCC-11:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3106:9: warning: ‘intel_read_wm_latency’ accessing 16 bytes in a region of size 10 [-Wstringop-overflow=] 3106 | intel_read_wm_latency(dev_priv, dev_priv->wm.pri_latency); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3106:9: note: referencing argument 2 of type ‘u16 *’ {aka ‘short unsigned int *’} drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:2861:13: note: in a call to function ‘intel_read_wm_latency’ 2861 | static void intel_read_wm_latency(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by removing the over-specified array size from the argument declarations.
It seems that this code is actually safe because the size of the array depends on the hardware generation, and the function checks for that.
Notice that wm can be an array of 5 elements: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3109: intel_read_wm_latency(dev_priv, dev_priv->wm.pri_latency);
or an array of 8 elements: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c:3131: intel_read_wm_latency(dev_priv, dev_priv->wm.skl_latency);
and the compiler legitimately complains about that.
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Wstringop-overflow.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/181 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva gustavoars@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_pm.c @@ -2793,7 +2793,7 @@ hsw_compute_linetime_wm(const struct int }
static void intel_read_wm_latency(struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv, - uint16_t wm[8]) + uint16_t wm[]) { if (INTEL_GEN(dev_priv) >= 9) { uint32_t val;
From: Haimin Zhang tcs.kernel@gmail.com
commit cc8f7fe1f5eab010191aa4570f27641876fa1267 upstream.
Add __GFP_ZERO flag for alloc_page in function bio_copy_kern to initialize the buffer of a bio.
Signed-off-by: Haimin Zhang tcs.kernel@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni kch@nvidia.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216084038.15635-1-tcs.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk [DP: Backported to 4.19: Manually added __GFP_ZERO flag] Signed-off-by: Dragos-Marian Panait dragos.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- block/bio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/block/bio.c +++ b/block/bio.c @@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ struct bio *bio_copy_kern(struct request if (bytes > len) bytes = len;
- page = alloc_page(q->bounce_gfp | gfp_mask); + page = alloc_page(q->bounce_gfp | __GFP_ZERO | gfp_mask); if (!page) goto cleanup;
From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
commit dcd46d897adb70d63e025f175a00a89797d31a43 upstream.
Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill:
"In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[2]:
The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider.
This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]."
While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] existing userspace programs.
The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv.
Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so userspace has some notice about the change:
process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added
Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org... [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*... [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2... [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Reported-by: Ariadne Conill ariadne@dereferenced.org Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk mtk.manpages@gmail.com Cc: Matthew Wilcox willy@infradead.org Cc: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Cc: Rich Felker dalias@libc.org Cc: Eric Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: Alexander Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Acked-by: Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org Acked-by: Ariadne Conill ariadne@dereferenced.org Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org [vegard: fixed conflicts due to missing 886d7de631da71e30909980fdbf318f7caade262^- and 3950e975431bc914f7e81b8f2a2dbdf2064acb0f^- and 655c16a8ce9c15842547f40ce23fd148aeccc074] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum vegard.nossum@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/exec.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
This has been tested in both argc == 0 and argc >= 1 cases, but I would still appreciate a review given the differences with mainline. If it's considered too risky I'm also fine with dropping it -- just wanted to make sure this didn't fall through the cracks, as it does block a real (albeit old by now) exploit.
--- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1788,6 +1788,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, st goto out_unmark;
bprm->argc = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); + if (bprm->argc == 0) + pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", + current->comm, bprm->filename); if ((retval = bprm->argc) < 0) goto out;
@@ -1812,6 +1815,20 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, st if (retval < 0) goto out;
+ /* + * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to + * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing + * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also + * bprm_stack_limits(). + */ + if (bprm->argc == 0) { + const char *argv[] = { "", NULL }; + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, argv, bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out; + bprm->argc = 1; + } + retval = exec_binprm(bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out;
From: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de
commit 56b14ecec97f39118bf85c9ac2438c5a949509ed upstream.
In case the conntrack is clashing, insertion can free skb->_nfct and set skb->_nfct to the already-confirmed entry.
This wasn't found before because the conntrack entry and the extension space used to free'd after an rcu grace period, plus the race needs events enabled to trigger.
Reported-by: syzbot+793a590957d9c1b96620@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 71d8c47fc653 ("netfilter: conntrack: introduce clash resolution on insertion race") Fixes: 2ad9d7747c10 ("netfilter: conntrack: free extension area immediately") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h @@ -67,8 +67,13 @@ static inline int nf_conntrack_confirm(s int ret = NF_ACCEPT;
if (ct) { - if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) + if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) { ret = __nf_conntrack_confirm(skb); + + if (ret == NF_ACCEPT) + ct = (struct nf_conn *)skb_nfct(skb); + } + if (likely(ret == NF_ACCEPT)) nf_ct_deliver_cached_events(ct); }
From: Sultan Alsawaf sultan@kerneltoast.com
commit 2505a981114dcb715f8977b8433f7540854851d8 upstream.
The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page list without defending against page migration. Since pages which haven't yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different lethal races.
It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages (since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the process).
Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize with page migration.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509024703.243847-1-sultan@kerneltoast.com Fixes: 77ff465799c602 ("zsmalloc: zs_page_migrate: skip unnecessary loops but not return -EBUSY if zspage is not inuse") Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf sultan@kerneltoast.com Acked-by: Minchan Kim minchan@kernel.org Cc: Nitin Gupta ngupta@vflare.org Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky senozhatsky@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- mm/zsmalloc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/zsmalloc.c +++ b/mm/zsmalloc.c @@ -952,11 +952,40 @@ static void reset_page(struct page *page */ void lock_zspage(struct zspage *zspage) { - struct page *page = get_first_page(zspage); + struct page *curr_page, *page;
- do { - lock_page(page); - } while ((page = get_next_page(page)) != NULL); + /* + * Pages we haven't locked yet can be migrated off the list while we're + * trying to lock them, so we need to be careful and only attempt to + * lock each page under migrate_read_lock(). Otherwise, the page we lock + * may no longer belong to the zspage. This means that we may wait for + * the wrong page to unlock, so we must take a reference to the page + * prior to waiting for it to unlock outside migrate_read_lock(). + */ + while (1) { + migrate_read_lock(zspage); + page = get_first_page(zspage); + if (trylock_page(page)) + break; + get_page(page); + migrate_read_unlock(zspage); + wait_on_page_locked(page); + put_page(page); + } + + curr_page = page; + while ((page = get_next_page(curr_page))) { + if (trylock_page(page)) { + curr_page = page; + } else { + get_page(page); + migrate_read_unlock(zspage); + wait_on_page_locked(page); + put_page(page); + migrate_read_lock(zspage); + } + } + migrate_read_unlock(zspage); }
int trylock_zspage(struct zspage *zspage)
From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com
commit d3f2a14b8906df913cb04a706367b012db94a6e8 upstream.
The "r" variable shadows an earlier "r" that has function scope. It means that we accidentally return success instead of an error code. Smatch has a warning for this:
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:4503 dm_integrity_ctr() warn: missing error code 'r'
Fixes: 7eada909bfd7 ("dm: add integrity target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c @@ -3156,8 +3156,6 @@ static int dm_integrity_ctr(struct dm_ta }
if (should_write_sb) { - int r; - init_journal(ic, 0, ic->journal_sections, 0); r = dm_integrity_failed(ic); if (unlikely(r)) {
From: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com
commit 567dd8f34560fa221a6343729474536aa7ede4fd upstream.
The device mapper dm-crypt target is using scnprintf("%02x", cc->key[i]) to report the current key to userspace. However, this is not a constant-time operation and it may leak information about the key via timing, via cache access patterns or via the branch predictor.
Change dm-crypt's key printing to use "%c" instead of "%02x". Also introduce hex2asc() that carefully avoids any branching or memory accesses when converting a number in the range 0 ... 15 to an ascii character.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Tested-by: Milan Broz gmazyland@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c @@ -2942,6 +2942,11 @@ static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *t return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED; }
+static char hex2asc(unsigned char c) +{ + return c + '0' + ((unsigned)(9 - c) >> 4 & 0x27); +} + static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, unsigned status_flags, char *result, unsigned maxlen) { @@ -2960,9 +2965,12 @@ static void crypt_status(struct dm_targe if (cc->key_size > 0) { if (cc->key_string) DMEMIT(":%u:%s", cc->key_size, cc->key_string); - else - for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++) - DMEMIT("%02x", cc->key[i]); + else { + for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++) { + DMEMIT("%c%c", hex2asc(cc->key[i] >> 4), + hex2asc(cc->key[i] & 0xf)); + } + } } else DMEMIT("-");
From: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com
commit bfe2b0146c4d0230b68f5c71a64380ff8d361f8b upstream.
dm-stats can be used with a very large number of entries (it is only limited by 1/4 of total system memory), so add rescheduling points to the loops that iterate over the entries.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/md/dm-stats.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-stats.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-stats.c @@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void dm_stats_cleanup(struct dm_stats *s atomic_read(&shared->in_flight[READ]), atomic_read(&shared->in_flight[WRITE])); } + cond_resched(); } dm_stat_free(&s->rcu_head); } @@ -312,6 +313,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_sta for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) { atomic_set(&s->stat_shared[ni].in_flight[READ], 0); atomic_set(&s->stat_shared[ni].in_flight[WRITE], 0); + cond_resched(); }
if (s->n_histogram_entries) { @@ -324,6 +326,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_sta for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) { s->stat_shared[ni].tmp.histogram = hi; hi += s->n_histogram_entries + 1; + cond_resched(); } }
@@ -344,6 +347,7 @@ static int dm_stats_create(struct dm_sta for (ni = 0; ni < n_entries; ni++) { p[ni].histogram = hi; hi += s->n_histogram_entries + 1; + cond_resched(); } } } @@ -473,6 +477,7 @@ static int dm_stats_list(struct dm_stats } DMEMIT("\n"); } + cond_resched(); } mutex_unlock(&stats->mutex);
@@ -749,6 +754,7 @@ static void __dm_stat_clear(struct dm_st local_irq_enable(); } } + cond_resched(); } }
@@ -864,6 +870,8 @@ static int dm_stats_print(struct dm_stat
if (unlikely(sz + 1 >= maxlen)) goto buffer_overflow; + + cond_resched(); }
if (clear)
From: Sarthak Kukreti sarthakkukreti@google.com
commit 4caae58406f8ceb741603eee460d79bacca9b1b5 upstream.
The device-mapper framework provides a mechanism to mark targets as immutable (and hence fail table reloads that try to change the target type). Add the DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE flag to the dm-verity target's feature flags to prevent switching the verity target with a different target type.
Fixes: a4ffc152198e ("dm: add verity target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sarthak Kukreti sarthakkukreti@google.com Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -1163,6 +1163,7 @@ bad:
static struct target_type verity_target = { .name = "verity", + .features = DM_TARGET_IMMUTABLE, .version = {1, 3, 0}, .module = THIS_MODULE, .ctr = verity_ctr,
From: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com
commit d0dc1a7100f19121f6e7450f9cdda11926aa3838 upstream.
Currently it returns zero when CRQ response timed out, it should return an error code instead.
Fixes: d8d74ea3c002 ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Wait for buffer to be set before proceeding") Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger stefanb@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c @@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_ if (!wait_event_timeout(ibmvtpm->crq_queue.wq, ibmvtpm->rtce_buf != NULL, HZ)) { + rc = -ENODEV; dev_err(dev, "CRQ response timed out\n"); goto init_irq_cleanup; }
From: Akira Yokosawa akiyks@gmail.com
commit 6d5aa418b3bd42cdccc36e94ee199af423ef7c84 upstream.
The reference to `explicit_in_reply_to` is pointless as when the reference was added in the form of "#15" [1], Section 15) was "The canonical patch format". The reference of "#15" had not been properly updated in a couple of reorganizations during the plain-text SubmittingPatches era.
Fix it by using `the_canonical_patch_format`.
[1]: 2ae19acaa50a ("Documentation: Add "how to write a good patch summary" to SubmittingPatches")
Signed-off-by: Akira Yokosawa akiyks@gmail.com Fixes: 5903019b2a5e ("Documentation/SubmittingPatches: convert it to ReST markup") Fixes: 9b2c76777acc ("Documentation/SubmittingPatches: enrich the Sphinx output") Cc: Jonathan Corbet corbet@lwn.net Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64e105a5-50be-23f2-6cae-903a2ea98e18@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet corbet@lwn.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ as you intend it to.
The maintainer will thank you if you write your patch description in a form which can be easily pulled into Linux's source code management -system, ``git``, as a "commit log". See :ref:`explicit_in_reply_to`. +system, ``git``, as a "commit log". See :ref:`the_canonical_patch_format`.
Solve only one problem per patch. If your description starts to get long, that's a sign that you probably need to split up your patch.
From: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com
commit ce3c4ad7f4ce5db7b4f08a1e237d8dd94b39180b upstream.
nfsd4_release_lockowner() holds clp->cl_lock when it calls check_for_locks(). However, check_for_locks() calls nfsd_file_get() / nfsd_file_put() to access the backing inode's flc_posix list, and nfsd_file_put() can sleep if the inode was recently removed.
Let's instead rely on the stateowner's reference count to gate whether the release is permitted. This should be a reliable indication of locks-in-use since file lock operations and ->lm_get_owner take appropriate references, which are released appropriately when file locks are removed.
Reported-by: Dai Ngo dai.ngo@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -6351,16 +6351,12 @@ nfsd4_release_lockowner(struct svc_rqst if (sop->so_is_open_owner || !same_owner_str(sop, owner)) continue;
- /* see if there are still any locks associated with it */ - lo = lockowner(sop); - list_for_each_entry(stp, &sop->so_stateids, st_perstateowner) { - if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file, lo)) { - status = nfserr_locks_held; - spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); - return status; - } + if (atomic_read(&sop->so_count) != 1) { + spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); + return nfserr_locks_held; }
+ lo = lockowner(sop); nfs4_get_stateowner(sop); break; }
From: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com
commit 45969b4152c1752089351cd6836a42a566d49bcf upstream.
The data length of skb frags + frag_list may be greater than 0xffff, and skb_header_pointer can not handle negative offset. So, here INT_MAX is used to check the validity of offset. Add the same change to the related function skb_store_bytes.
Fixes: 05c74e5e53f6 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_load_bytes helper") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Song Liu songliubraving@fb.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220416105801.88708-2-liujian56@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -1443,7 +1443,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_store_bytes, struct s
if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_RECOMPUTE_CSUM | BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH))) return -EINVAL; - if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff)) + if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX)) return -EFAULT; if (unlikely(bpf_try_make_writable(skb, offset + len))) return -EFAULT; @@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_skb_load_bytes, const str { void *ptr;
- if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff)) + if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX)) goto err_clear;
ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, len, to);
On Fri, 3 Jun 2022 at 23:11, Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.282 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.282-rc... or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm. No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing lkft@linaro.org
## Build * kernel: 4.14.282-rc1 * git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc * git branch: linux-4.14.y * git commit: f412febea824d191dc7d71faf706d9312f5cac7a * git describe: v4.14.281-24-gf412febea824 * test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.14.y/build/v4.14....
## Test Regressions (compared to v4.14.281-7-g6eab7c1004f3) No test regressions found.
## Metric Regressions (compared to v4.14.281-7-g6eab7c1004f3) No metric regressions found.
## Test Fixes (compared to v4.14.281-7-g6eab7c1004f3) No test fixes found.
## Metric Fixes (compared to v4.14.281-7-g6eab7c1004f3) No metric fixes found.
## Test result summary total: 111312, pass: 98345, fail: 140, skip: 11289, xfail: 1538
## Build Summary * arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed * arm: 293 total, 287 passed, 6 failed * arm64: 52 total, 45 passed, 7 failed * i386: 27 total, 23 passed, 4 failed * mips: 22 total, 22 passed, 0 failed * parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed * powerpc: 16 total, 16 passed, 0 failed * s390: 12 total, 9 passed, 3 failed * sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed * sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed * x86_64: 49 total, 47 passed, 2 failed
## Test suites summary * fwts * igt-gpu-tools * kunit * kvm-unit-tests * libhugetlbfs * log-parser-boot * log-parser-test * ltp-cap_bounds * ltp-cap_bounds-tests * ltp-commands-tests * ltp-containers * ltp-containers-tests * ltp-controllers-tests * ltp-cpuhotplug-tests * ltp-crypto * ltp-crypto-tests * ltp-cve-tests * ltp-dio-tests * ltp-fcntl-locktests * ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests * ltp-filecaps * ltp-filecaps-tests * ltp-fs * ltp-fs-tests * ltp-fs_bind * ltp-fs_bind-tests * ltp-fs_perms_simple * ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests * ltp-fsx * ltp-fsx-tests * ltp-hugetlb * ltp-hugetlb-tests * ltp-io * ltp-io-tests * ltp-ipc * ltp-ipc-tests * ltp-math-tests * ltp-mm-tests * ltp-nptl * ltp-nptl-tests * ltp-open-posix-tests * ltp-pty * ltp-pty-tests * ltp-sched * ltp-sched-tests * ltp-securebits * ltp-securebits-tests * ltp-syscalls-tests * ltp-tracing-tests * network-basic-tests * packetdrill * rcutorture * v4l2-compliance * vdso
-- Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
On Fri, Jun 03, 2022 at 07:39:27PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.282 release. There are 23 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Jun 2022 17:38:05 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results: total: 169 pass: 169 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 424 pass: 424 fail: 0
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net
Guenter
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org