Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows:
/* * CPU1: User space performs * ioctl(SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES) * on enclave page X */ sgx_encl_remove_pages() {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl); /* * verify that page is * trimmed and accepted */
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
/* * remove PTE entry; cannot * be performed under lock */ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl); /* * Fault on CPU2 on same page X */ sgx_vma_fault() { /* * PTE entry was removed, but the * page is still in enclave's xarray */ xa_load(&encl->page_array) != NULL -> /* * SGX driver thinks that this page * was swapped out and loads it */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * this is effectively a no-op */ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(); /* * add PTE entry * * *BUG*: a PTE is installed for a * page in process of being removed */ vmf_insert_pfn(...);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; } /* * continue with page removal */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page) { /* * remove page via EREMOVE */ /* * free EPC page */ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); }
xa_erase(&encl->page_array);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }
Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page.
Fix this race by forcing the fault handler on CPU2 to back off if the page is currently being removed (on CPU1). This is achieved by setting SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY flag right-before the first mutex_unlock() in sgx_encl_remove_pages(). Upon loading the page, CPU2 checks whether this page is busy, and if yes then CPU2 backs off and waits until the page is completely removed. After that, any memory access to this page results in a normal "allocate and EAUG a page on #PF" flow.
Fixes: 9849bb27152c ("x86/sgx: Support complete page removal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 5d390df21440..02441883401d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,14 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, /* * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). + * + * Releasing encl->lock leads to a data race: while CPU1 + * performs sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() and removes the PTE entry + * for the enclave page, CPU2 may attempt to load this page + * (because the page is still in enclave's xarray). To prevent + * CPU2 from loading the page, mark the page as busy. */ + entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY; mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
On Fri, 05 Jul 2024 02:45:24 -0500, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel.com wrote:
Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows:
/*
- CPU1: User space performs
- ioctl(SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES)
- on enclave page X
*/ sgx_encl_remove_pages() {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl); /*
- verify that page is
- trimmed and accepted
*/
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
/*
- remove PTE entry; cannot
- be performed under lock
*/ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl); /* * Fault on CPU2 on same page X */ sgx_vma_fault() { /* * PTE entry was removed, but the * page is still in enclave's xarray */ xa_load(&encl->page_array) != NULL -> /* * SGX driver thinks that this page * was swapped out and loads it */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * this is effectively a no-op */ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(); /* * add PTE entry * * *BUG*: a PTE is installed for a * page in process of being removed */ vmf_insert_pfn(...);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; }/*
- continue with page removal
*/ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page) { /* * remove page via EREMOVE */ /* * free EPC page */ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); }
xa_erase(&encl->page_array);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }
Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page.
Fix this race by forcing the fault handler on CPU2 to back off if the page is currently being removed (on CPU1). This is achieved by setting SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY flag right-before the first mutex_unlock() in sgx_encl_remove_pages(). Upon loading the page, CPU2 checks whether this page is busy, and if yes then CPU2 backs off and waits until the page is completely removed. After that, any memory access to this page results in a normal "allocate and EAUG a page on #PF" flow.
Fixes: 9849bb27152c ("x86/sgx: Support complete page removal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel.com
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 5d390df21440..02441883401d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,14 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, /* * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
** Releasing encl->lock leads to a data race: while CPU1* performs sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() and removes the PTE entry* for the enclave page, CPU2 may attempt to load this page* (because the page is still in enclave's xarray). To prevent* CPU2 from loading the page, mark the page as busy.entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY;
Reviewed-by: Haitao Huang haitao.huang@linux.intel.com Thanks Haitao
On Fri Jul 5, 2024 at 10:45 AM EEST, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii wrote:
Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows:
/*
- CPU1: User space performs
- ioctl(SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES)
- on enclave page X
*/ sgx_encl_remove_pages() {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl); /*
- verify that page is
- trimmed and accepted
*/
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
/*
- remove PTE entry; cannot
- be performed under lock
*/ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl); /* * Fault on CPU2 on same page X */ sgx_vma_fault() { /* * PTE entry was removed, but the * page is still in enclave's xarray */ xa_load(&encl->page_array) != NULL -> /* * SGX driver thinks that this page * was swapped out and loads it */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * this is effectively a no-op */ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(); /* * add PTE entry * * *BUG*: a PTE is installed for a * page in process of being removed */ vmf_insert_pfn(...);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; }/*
- continue with page removal
*/ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page) { /* * remove page via EREMOVE */ /* * free EPC page */ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); }
xa_erase(&encl->page_array);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }
Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page.
Fix this race by forcing the fault handler on CPU2 to back off if the page is currently being removed (on CPU1). This is achieved by setting SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY flag right-before the first mutex_unlock() in sgx_encl_remove_pages(). Upon loading the page, CPU2 checks whether this page is busy, and if yes then CPU2 backs off and waits until the page is completely removed. After that, any memory access to this page results in a normal "allocate and EAUG a page on #PF" flow.
Fixes: 9849bb27152c ("x86/sgx: Support complete page removal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel.com
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 5d390df21440..02441883401d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,14 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, /* * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
** Releasing encl->lock leads to a data race: while CPU1* performs sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() and removes the PTE entry* for the enclave page, CPU2 may attempt to load this page* (because the page is still in enclave's xarray). To prevent* CPU2 from loading the page, mark the page as busy.entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY;sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
Ditto.
BR, Jarkko
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 01:38:59PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
Ditto.
Just to be sure: I assume this means "Fixes should be in the head of the series so please reorder"? If yes, please see my reply in the other email [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240812082128.3084051-1-dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel...
-- Dmitrii Kuvaiskii
On Mon Aug 12, 2024 at 11:25 AM EEST, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii wrote:
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 01:38:59PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
Ditto.
Just to be sure: I assume this means "Fixes should be in the head of the series so please reorder"? If yes, please see my reply in the other email [1].
OK, based on your earlier remarks and references I agree with you.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240812082128.3084051-1-dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel...
-- Dmitrii Kuvaiskii
I think for future and since we have bunch of state flags, removing that "e.g." is worth of doing. Often you need to go through all of the flags to remind you how they interact, and at that point "one vs many" does help navigating the complexity.
BR, Jarkko
On Thu Aug 15, 2024 at 9:34 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Mon Aug 12, 2024 at 11:25 AM EEST, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii wrote:
On Wed, Jul 17, 2024 at 01:38:59PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
Ditto.
Just to be sure: I assume this means "Fixes should be in the head of the series so please reorder"? If yes, please see my reply in the other email [1].
OK, based on your earlier remarks and references I agree with you.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240812082128.3084051-1-dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel...
-- Dmitrii Kuvaiskii
I think for future and since we have bunch of state flags, removing that "e.g." is worth of doing. Often you need to go through all of the flags to remind you how they interact, and at that point "one vs many" does help navigating the complexity.
Actually every time there's a patch that has anything to do with the state flags I go through all of em as a reminder. Might seem like irrelevant detail but really is not (and neither unnecessarry nitpicking). All small clues speed up that process or can mislead.
BR, Jarkko
On 5/07/2024 7:45 pm, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii wrote:
Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows:
/*
- CPU1: User space performs
- ioctl(SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES)
- on enclave page X
*/ sgx_encl_remove_pages() {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl); /* * verify that page is * trimmed and accepted */
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
/* * remove PTE entry; cannot * be performed under lock */ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl); /* * Fault on CPU2 on same page X */ sgx_vma_fault() { /* * PTE entry was removed, but the * page is still in enclave's xarray */ xa_load(&encl->page_array) != NULL -> /* * SGX driver thinks that this page * was swapped out and loads it */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * this is effectively a no-op */ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(); /* * add PTE entry * * *BUG*: a PTE is installed for a * page in process of being removed */ vmf_insert_pfn(...);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; }/* * continue with page removal */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page) { /* * remove page via EREMOVE */ /* * free EPC page */ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); }
xa_erase(&encl->page_array);
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); }
Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page.
Reading the code, it seems the ioctl(sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types) also zaps EPC mapping when converting a normal page to TSC. Thus IIUC it should also suffer this issue?
Fix this race by forcing the fault handler on CPU2 to back off if the page is currently being removed (on CPU1). This is achieved by setting SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY flag right-before the first mutex_unlock() in sgx_encl_remove_pages(). Upon loading the page, CPU2 checks whether this page is busy, and if yes then CPU2 backs off and waits until the page is completely removed. After that, any memory access to this page results in a normal "allocate and EAUG a page on #PF" flow.
Fixes: 9849bb27152c ("x86/sgx: Support complete page removal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii dmitrii.kuvaiskii@intel.com
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index 5d390df21440..02441883401d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -1141,7 +1141,14 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, /* * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
** Releasing encl->lock leads to a data race: while CPU1* performs sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() and removes the PTE entry* for the enclave page, CPU2 may attempt to load this page* (because the page is still in enclave's xarray). To prevent* CPU2 from loading the page, mark the page as busy.entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY;sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
The fix seems reasonable to me for the REMOVE case. But IIUC the BUSY flag should be applied to the above case (PT change) too?
On Thu, Jul 25, 2024 at 01:21:56PM +1200, Huang, Kai wrote:
Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows:
[ ... skipped ... ]
Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page.
Reading the code, it seems the ioctl(sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types) also zaps EPC mapping when converting a normal page to TSC. Thus IIUC it should also suffer this issue?
Technically yes, sgx_enclave_modify_types() has a similar code path and can be patched in a similar way.
Practically though, I can't imagine an SGX program or framework to allow a scenario when CPU1 modifies the type of the enclave page from REG to TCS and at the same time CPU2 performs a memory access on the same page. This would be clearly a bug in the SGX program/framework. For example, Gramine always follows the path of: create a new REG enclave page, modify it to TCS, only then start using it; i.e., there is never a point in time at which the REG page is allocated and ready to be converted to a TCS page, and some other thread/CPU accesses it in-between these steps.
TLDR: I can add similar handling to sgx_enclave_modify_types() if reviewers insist, but I don't see how this data race can ever be triggered by benign real-world SGX applications.
-- Dmitrii Kuvaiskii
On Fri, 2024-08-09 at 02:35 -0700, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii wrote:
On Thu, Jul 25, 2024 at 01:21:56PM +1200, Huang, Kai wrote:
Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows:
[ ... skipped ... ]
Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page.
Reading the code, it seems the ioctl(sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types) also zaps EPC mapping when converting a normal page to TSC. Thus IIUC it should also suffer this issue?
Technically yes, sgx_enclave_modify_types() has a similar code path and can be patched in a similar way.
Practically though, I can't imagine an SGX program or framework to allow a scenario when CPU1 modifies the type of the enclave page from REG to TCS and at the same time CPU2 performs a memory access on the same page. This would be clearly a bug in the SGX program/framework. For example, Gramine always follows the path of: create a new REG enclave page, modify it to TCS, only then start using it; i.e., there is never a point in time at which the REG page is allocated and ready to be converted to a TCS page, and some other thread/CPU accesses it in-between these steps.
I think we need to understand the consequence of such bug (assuming such behaviour is 100% a bug) both to kernel and to enclave.
To the kernel I don't see any big issue: for the sgx_vma_fault() path it will find the EPC page is already loaded thus just setup the mapping again; for the sgx_enclave_modify_types() path the worst case is __emodt() could fail, resulting in enclave being killed probably.
So if this race is 100% a bug, and will also certainly kill the enclave, then I guess it is fine not to handle. But there's an "assuming" here.
On the other hand, there's no risk if we apply BUSY flag here too. If it is a bug in enclave, then it can die anyway; otherwise it may survive.
TLDR: I can add similar handling to sgx_enclave_modify_types() if reviewers insist, but I don't see how this data race can ever be triggered by benign real-world SGX applications.
So as mentioned above, I intend to suggest to also apply the BUSY flag here. And we can have a consist rule in the kernel:
If an enclave page is under certainly operation by the kernel with the mapping removed, other threads trying to access that page are temporarily blocked and should retry.
But this is only my 2cents, and I'll leave to maintainers.
On Fri, Aug 09, 2024 at 11:19:22AM +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
TLDR: I can add similar handling to sgx_enclave_modify_types() if reviewers insist, but I don't see how this data race can ever be triggered by benign real-world SGX applications.
So as mentioned above, I intend to suggest to also apply the BUSY flag here. And we can have a consist rule in the kernel:
If an enclave page is under certainly operation by the kernel with the mapping removed, other threads trying to access that page are temporarily blocked and should retry.
I agree with your assessment on the consequences of such bug in sgx_enclave_modify_types(). To my understanding, this bug can only affect the SGX enclave (i.e. the userspace) -- either the SGX enclave will hang or will be terminated.
Anyway, I will apply the BUSY flag also in sgx_enclave_modify_types() in the next iteration of this patch series.
-- Dmitrii Kuvaiskii
On Mon, 2024-08-12 at 01:32 -0700, Kuvaiskii, Dmitrii wrote:
On Fri, Aug 09, 2024 at 11:19:22AM +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
TLDR: I can add similar handling to sgx_enclave_modify_types() if reviewers insist, but I don't see how this data race can ever be triggered by benign real-world SGX applications.
So as mentioned above, I intend to suggest to also apply the BUSY flag here. And we can have a consist rule in the kernel:
If an enclave page is under certainly operation by the kernel with the mapping removed, other threads trying to access that page are temporarily blocked and should retry.
I agree with your assessment on the consequences of such bug in sgx_enclave_modify_types(). To my understanding, this bug can only affect the SGX enclave (i.e. the userspace) -- either the SGX enclave will hang or will be terminated.
Anyway, I will apply the BUSY flag also in sgx_enclave_modify_types() in the next iteration of this patch series.
Thanks.
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Dmitrii Kuvaiskii -
Haitao Huang -
Huang, Kai -
Jarkko Sakkinen