This is the backport of the arm64 SSBD patches to 4.14. I've had to cherry-pick a number of dependencies:
- parts of the SDEI series that allow tpidr_el2 to be used as the per-cpu offset - one patch from the VHE series that introduce vcpu retrieval as a per-cpu variable - one patch from the the EL2 randomisation series, allowing relative addressing of global structures - the dynamic patching infrastructure
Christoffer Dall (1): KVM: arm64: Avoid storing the vcpu pointer on the stack
James Morse (5): KVM: arm64: Store vcpu on the stack during __guest_enter() KVM: arm/arm64: Convert kvm_host_cpu_state to a static per-cpu allocation KVM: arm64: Change hyp_panic()s dependency on tpidr_el2 arm64: alternatives: use tpidr_el2 on VHE hosts KVM: arm64: Stop save/restoring host tpidr_el1 on VHE
Marc Zyngier (16): arm64: alternatives: Add dynamic patching feature KVM: arm/arm64: Do not use kern_hyp_va() with kvm_vgic_global_state arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1 arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation arm64: ssbd: Restore mitigation status on CPU resume arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 ++ arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++ arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 12 ++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 9 + arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h | 43 ++++- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 8 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 22 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 41 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 43 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 44 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h | 11 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 52 +++-- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 180 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 17 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 30 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c | 11 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c | 108 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c | 8 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 4 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 12 +- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 62 ++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 64 +++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c | 21 +- arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 4 + arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 8 + include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 10 + virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 22 +-- virt/kvm/arm/hyp/vgic-v2-sr.c | 2 +- virt/kvm/arm/psci.c | 18 +- 33 files changed, 823 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c
From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com
Commit 32b03d1059667a39e089c45ee38ec9c16332430f upstream.
KVM uses tpidr_el2 as its private vcpu register, which makes sense for non-vhe world switch as only KVM can access this register. This means vhe Linux has to use tpidr_el1, which KVM has to save/restore as part of the host context.
If the SDEI handler code runs behind KVMs back, it mustn't access any per-cpu variables. To allow this on systems with vhe we need to make the host use tpidr_el2, saving KVM from save/restoring it.
__guest_enter() stores the host_ctxt on the stack, do the same with the vcpu.
Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall cdall@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 10 +++++++--- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S index 9c45c6af1f58..fe4678f20a85 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S @@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter) // Store the host regs save_callee_saved_regs x1
- // Store the host_ctxt for use at exit time - str x1, [sp, #-16]! + // Store host_ctxt and vcpu for use at exit time + stp x1, x0, [sp, #-16]!
add x18, x0, #VCPU_CONTEXT
@@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ abort_guest_exit_end: ENDPROC(__guest_exit)
ENTRY(__fpsimd_guest_restore) + // x0: esr + // x1: vcpu + // x2-x29,lr: vcpu regs + // vcpu x0-x1 on the stack stp x2, x3, [sp, #-16]! stp x4, lr, [sp, #-16]!
@@ -173,7 +177,7 @@ alternative_else alternative_endif isb
- mrs x3, tpidr_el2 + mov x3, x1
ldr x0, [x3, #VCPU_HOST_CONTEXT] kern_hyp_va x0 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index f49b53331d28..fc1613955090 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ el1_trap: /* * x0: ESR_EC */ + ldr x1, [sp, #16 + 8] // vcpu stored by __guest_enter
/* * We trap the first access to the FP/SIMD to save the host context @@ -132,19 +133,18 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD b.eq __fpsimd_guest_restore alternative_else_nop_endif
- mrs x1, tpidr_el2 mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP b __guest_exit
el1_irq: stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]! - mrs x1, tpidr_el2 + ldr x1, [sp, #16 + 8] mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ b __guest_exit
el1_error: stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]! - mrs x1, tpidr_el2 + ldr x1, [sp, #16 + 8] mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR b __guest_exit
From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com
Commit 36989e7fd386a9a5822c48691473863f8fbb404d upstream.
kvm_host_cpu_state is a per-cpu allocation made from kvm_arch_init() used to store the host EL1 registers when KVM switches to a guest.
Make it easier for ASM to generate pointers into this per-cpu memory by making it a static allocation.
Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Acked-by: Christoffer Dall cdall@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 18 +++--------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c index 9bee849db682..4aede98b92eb 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c @@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ __asm__(".arch_extension virt"); #endif
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(kvm_cpu_context_t, kvm_host_cpu_state); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page); -static kvm_cpu_context_t __percpu *kvm_host_cpu_state;
/* Per-CPU variable containing the currently running vcpu. */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_vcpu *, kvm_arm_running_vcpu); @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) }
vcpu->cpu = cpu; - vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context = this_cpu_ptr(kvm_host_cpu_state); + vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context = this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_cpu_state);
kvm_arm_set_running_vcpu(vcpu);
@@ -1259,19 +1259,8 @@ static inline void hyp_cpu_pm_exit(void) } #endif
-static void teardown_common_resources(void) -{ - free_percpu(kvm_host_cpu_state); -} - static int init_common_resources(void) { - kvm_host_cpu_state = alloc_percpu(kvm_cpu_context_t); - if (!kvm_host_cpu_state) { - kvm_err("Cannot allocate host CPU state\n"); - return -ENOMEM; - } - /* set size of VMID supported by CPU */ kvm_vmid_bits = kvm_get_vmid_bits(); kvm_info("%d-bit VMID\n", kvm_vmid_bits); @@ -1413,7 +1402,7 @@ static int init_hyp_mode(void) for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { kvm_cpu_context_t *cpu_ctxt;
- cpu_ctxt = per_cpu_ptr(kvm_host_cpu_state, cpu); + cpu_ctxt = per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_cpu_state, cpu); err = create_hyp_mappings(cpu_ctxt, cpu_ctxt + 1, PAGE_HYP);
if (err) { @@ -1497,7 +1486,6 @@ int kvm_arch_init(void *opaque) if (!in_hyp_mode) teardown_hyp_mode(); out_err: - teardown_common_resources(); return err; }
From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com
Commit c97e166e54b662717d20ec2e36761758d2b6a7c2 upstream.
Make tpidr_el2 a cpu-offset for per-cpu variables in the same way the host uses tpidr_el1. This lets tpidr_el{1,2} have the same value, and on VHE they can be the same register.
KVM calls hyp_panic() when anything unexpected happens. This may occur while a guest owns the EL1 registers. KVM stashes the vcpu pointer in tpidr_el2, which it uses to find the host context in order to restore the host EL1 registers before parachuting into the host's panic().
The host context is a struct kvm_cpu_context allocated in the per-cpu area, and mapped to hyp. Given the per-cpu offset for this CPU, this is easy to find. Change hyp_panic() to take a pointer to the struct kvm_cpu_context. Wrap these calls with an asm function that retrieves the struct kvm_cpu_context from the host's per-cpu area.
Copy the per-cpu offset from the hosts tpidr_el1 into tpidr_el2 during kvm init. (Later patches will make this unnecessary for VHE hosts)
We print out the vcpu pointer as part of the panic message. Add a back reference to the 'running vcpu' in the host cpu context to preserve this.
Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall cdall@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 8abec9f7f430..7b373e56750f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -194,6 +194,8 @@ struct kvm_cpu_context { u64 sys_regs[NR_SYS_REGS]; u32 copro[NR_COPRO_REGS]; }; + + struct kvm_vcpu *__hyp_running_vcpu; };
typedef struct kvm_cpu_context kvm_cpu_context_t; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index fc1613955090..f36464bd57c5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -179,6 +179,18 @@ ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic) eret ENDPROC(__hyp_do_panic)
+ENTRY(__hyp_panic) + /* + * '=kvm_host_cpu_state' is a host VA from the constant pool, it may + * not be accessible by this address from EL2, hyp_panic() converts + * it with kern_hyp_va() before use. + */ + ldr x0, =kvm_host_cpu_state + mrs x1, tpidr_el2 + add x0, x0, x1 + b hyp_panic +ENDPROC(__hyp_panic) + .macro invalid_vector label, target = __hyp_panic .align 2 \label: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c index a81f5e10fc8c..7fb88274eba1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c @@ -84,5 +84,8 @@ u32 __hyp_text __init_stage2_translation(void)
write_sysreg(val, vtcr_el2);
+ /* copy tpidr_el1 into tpidr_el2 for use by HYP */ + write_sysreg(read_sysreg(tpidr_el1), tpidr_el2); + return parange; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c index e08ae6b6b63e..8875bca6868a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c @@ -289,9 +289,9 @@ int __hyp_text __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) u64 exit_code;
vcpu = kern_hyp_va(vcpu); - write_sysreg(vcpu, tpidr_el2);
host_ctxt = kern_hyp_va(vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context); + host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu = vcpu; guest_ctxt = &vcpu->arch.ctxt;
__sysreg_save_host_state(host_ctxt); @@ -406,7 +406,8 @@ int __hyp_text __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static const char __hyp_panic_string[] = "HYP panic:\nPS:%08llx PC:%016llx ESR:%08llx\nFAR:%016llx HPFAR:%016llx PAR:%016llx\nVCPU:%p\n";
-static void __hyp_text __hyp_call_panic_nvhe(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par) +static void __hyp_text __hyp_call_panic_nvhe(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { unsigned long str_va;
@@ -420,35 +421,35 @@ static void __hyp_text __hyp_call_panic_nvhe(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par) __hyp_do_panic(str_va, spsr, elr, read_sysreg(esr_el2), read_sysreg_el2(far), - read_sysreg(hpfar_el2), par, - (void *)read_sysreg(tpidr_el2)); + read_sysreg(hpfar_el2), par, vcpu); }
-static void __hyp_text __hyp_call_panic_vhe(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par) +static void __hyp_text __hyp_call_panic_vhe(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { panic(__hyp_panic_string, spsr, elr, read_sysreg_el2(esr), read_sysreg_el2(far), - read_sysreg(hpfar_el2), par, - (void *)read_sysreg(tpidr_el2)); + read_sysreg(hpfar_el2), par, vcpu); }
static hyp_alternate_select(__hyp_call_panic, __hyp_call_panic_nvhe, __hyp_call_panic_vhe, ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN);
-void __hyp_text __noreturn __hyp_panic(void) +void __hyp_text __noreturn hyp_panic(struct kvm_cpu_context *__host_ctxt) { + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = NULL; + u64 spsr = read_sysreg_el2(spsr); u64 elr = read_sysreg_el2(elr); u64 par = read_sysreg(par_el1);
if (read_sysreg(vttbr_el2)) { - struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt;
- vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *)read_sysreg(tpidr_el2); - host_ctxt = kern_hyp_va(vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context); + host_ctxt = kern_hyp_va(__host_ctxt); + vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu; __timer_save_state(vcpu); __deactivate_traps(vcpu); __deactivate_vm(vcpu); @@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ void __hyp_text __noreturn __hyp_panic(void) }
/* Call panic for real */ - __hyp_call_panic()(spsr, elr, par); + __hyp_call_panic()(spsr, elr, par, vcpu);
unreachable(); }
From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com
Commit 6d99b68933fbcf51f84fcbba49246ce1209ec193 upstream.
Now that KVM uses tpidr_el2 in the same way as Linux's cpu_offset in tpidr_el1, merge the two. This saves KVM from save/restoring tpidr_el1 on VHE hosts, and allows future code to blindly access per-cpu variables without triggering world-switch.
Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall cdall@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h | 11 +++++++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 9 +++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/proc.S | 8 ++++++++ 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h index 4a85c6952a22..669028172fd6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #include <linux/stddef.h> #include <linux/stringify.h>
+extern int alternatives_applied; + struct alt_instr { s32 orig_offset; /* offset to original instruction */ s32 alt_offset; /* offset to replacement instruction */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index 25b2a4161c7a..66aea4aa455d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -260,7 +260,11 @@ lr .req x30 // link register #else adr_l \dst, \sym #endif +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN mrs \tmp, tpidr_el1 +alternative_else + mrs \tmp, tpidr_el2 +alternative_endif add \dst, \dst, \tmp .endm
@@ -271,7 +275,11 @@ lr .req x30 // link register */ .macro ldr_this_cpu dst, sym, tmp adr_l \dst, \sym +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN mrs \tmp, tpidr_el1 +alternative_else + mrs \tmp, tpidr_el2 +alternative_endif ldr \dst, [\dst, \tmp] .endm
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h index 3bd498e4de4c..43393208229e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h @@ -16,11 +16,15 @@ #ifndef __ASM_PERCPU_H #define __ASM_PERCPU_H
+#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/stack_pointer.h>
static inline void set_my_cpu_offset(unsigned long off) { - asm volatile("msr tpidr_el1, %0" :: "r" (off) : "memory"); + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("msr tpidr_el1, %0", + "msr tpidr_el2, %0", + ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN) + :: "r" (off) : "memory"); }
static inline unsigned long __my_cpu_offset(void) @@ -31,7 +35,10 @@ static inline unsigned long __my_cpu_offset(void) * We want to allow caching the value, so avoid using volatile and * instead use a fake stack read to hazard against barrier(). */ - asm("mrs %0, tpidr_el1" : "=r" (off) : + asm(ALTERNATIVE("mrs %0, tpidr_el1", + "mrs %0, tpidr_el2", + ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN) + : "=r" (off) : "Q" (*(const unsigned long *)current_stack_pointer));
return off; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c index 6dd0a3a3e5c9..414288a558c8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ #define ALT_ORIG_PTR(a) __ALT_PTR(a, orig_offset) #define ALT_REPL_PTR(a) __ALT_PTR(a, alt_offset)
+int alternatives_applied; + struct alt_region { struct alt_instr *begin; struct alt_instr *end; @@ -143,7 +145,6 @@ static void __apply_alternatives(void *alt_region, bool use_linear_alias) */ static int __apply_alternatives_multi_stop(void *unused) { - static int patched = 0; struct alt_region region = { .begin = (struct alt_instr *)__alt_instructions, .end = (struct alt_instr *)__alt_instructions_end, @@ -151,14 +152,14 @@ static int __apply_alternatives_multi_stop(void *unused)
/* We always have a CPU 0 at this point (__init) */ if (smp_processor_id()) { - while (!READ_ONCE(patched)) + while (!READ_ONCE(alternatives_applied)) cpu_relax(); isb(); } else { - BUG_ON(patched); + BUG_ON(alternatives_applied); __apply_alternatives(®ion, true); /* Barriers provided by the cache flushing */ - WRITE_ONCE(patched, 1); + WRITE_ONCE(alternatives_applied, 1); }
return 0; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c index 718822ab6e4b..376cf12edf0c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -880,6 +880,22 @@ static int __init parse_kpti(char *str) early_param("kpti", parse_kpti); #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
+static int cpu_copy_el2regs(void *__unused) +{ + /* + * Copy register values that aren't redirected by hardware. + * + * Before code patching, we only set tpidr_el1, all CPUs need to copy + * this value to tpidr_el2 before we patch the code. Once we've done + * that, freshly-onlined CPUs will set tpidr_el2, so we don't need to + * do anything here. + */ + if (!alternatives_applied) + write_sysreg(read_sysreg(tpidr_el1), tpidr_el2); + + return 0; +} + static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc = "GIC system register CPU interface", @@ -949,6 +965,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .capability = ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN, .def_scope = SCOPE_SYSTEM, .matches = runs_at_el2, + .enable = cpu_copy_el2regs, }, { .desc = "32-bit EL0 Support", diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S index bf0821b7b1ab..10c835f13f62 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/proc.S @@ -70,7 +70,11 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_suspend) mrs x8, mdscr_el1 mrs x9, oslsr_el1 mrs x10, sctlr_el1 +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN mrs x11, tpidr_el1 +alternative_else + mrs x11, tpidr_el2 +alternative_endif mrs x12, sp_el0 stp x2, x3, [x0] stp x4, xzr, [x0, #16] @@ -116,7 +120,11 @@ ENTRY(cpu_do_resume) msr mdscr_el1, x10
msr sctlr_el1, x12 +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN msr tpidr_el1, x13 +alternative_else + msr tpidr_el2, x13 +alternative_endif msr sp_el0, x14 /* * Restore oslsr_el1 by writing oslar_el1
From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com
Commit 1f742679c33bc083722cb0b442a95d458c491b56 upstream.
Now that a VHE host uses tpidr_el2 for the cpu offset we no longer need KVM to save/restore tpidr_el1. Move this from the 'common' code into the non-vhe code. While we're at it, on VHE we don't need to save the ELR or SPSR as kernel_entry in entry.S will have pushed these onto the kernel stack, and will restore them from there. Move these to the non-vhe code as we need them to get back to the host.
Finally remove the always-copy-tpidr we hid in the stage2 setup code, cpufeature's enable callback will do this for VHE, we only need KVM to do it for non-vhe. Add the copy into kvm-init instead.
Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall cdall@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c | 3 --- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S index 870828c364c5..dea20651a5f1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S @@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ CPU_BE( orr x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_EE) kern_hyp_va x2 msr vbar_el2, x2
+ /* copy tpidr_el1 into tpidr_el2 for use by HYP */ + mrs x1, tpidr_el1 + msr tpidr_el2, x1 + /* Hello, World! */ eret ENDPROC(__kvm_hyp_init) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c index 7fb88274eba1..a81f5e10fc8c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/s2-setup.c @@ -84,8 +84,5 @@ u32 __hyp_text __init_stage2_translation(void)
write_sysreg(val, vtcr_el2);
- /* copy tpidr_el1 into tpidr_el2 for use by HYP */ - write_sysreg(read_sysreg(tpidr_el1), tpidr_el2); - return parange; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c index 934137647837..c54cc2afb92b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_do_nothing(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) { } /* * Non-VHE: Both host and guest must save everything. * - * VHE: Host must save tpidr*_el[01], actlr_el1, mdscr_el1, sp0, pc, - * pstate, and guest must save everything. + * VHE: Host must save tpidr*_el0, actlr_el1, mdscr_el1, sp_el0, + * and guest must save everything. */
static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_common_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) @@ -36,11 +36,8 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_common_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) ctxt->sys_regs[ACTLR_EL1] = read_sysreg(actlr_el1); ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDR_EL0] = read_sysreg(tpidr_el0); ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDRRO_EL0] = read_sysreg(tpidrro_el0); - ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDR_EL1] = read_sysreg(tpidr_el1); ctxt->sys_regs[MDSCR_EL1] = read_sysreg(mdscr_el1); ctxt->gp_regs.regs.sp = read_sysreg(sp_el0); - ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pc = read_sysreg_el2(elr); - ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pstate = read_sysreg_el2(spsr); }
static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) @@ -62,10 +59,13 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_save_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) ctxt->sys_regs[AMAIR_EL1] = read_sysreg_el1(amair); ctxt->sys_regs[CNTKCTL_EL1] = read_sysreg_el1(cntkctl); ctxt->sys_regs[PAR_EL1] = read_sysreg(par_el1); + ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDR_EL1] = read_sysreg(tpidr_el1);
ctxt->gp_regs.sp_el1 = read_sysreg(sp_el1); ctxt->gp_regs.elr_el1 = read_sysreg_el1(elr); ctxt->gp_regs.spsr[KVM_SPSR_EL1]= read_sysreg_el1(spsr); + ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pc = read_sysreg_el2(elr); + ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pstate = read_sysreg_el2(spsr); }
static hyp_alternate_select(__sysreg_call_save_host_state, @@ -89,11 +89,8 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_common_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctx write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[ACTLR_EL1], actlr_el1); write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDR_EL0], tpidr_el0); write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDRRO_EL0], tpidrro_el0); - write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDR_EL1], tpidr_el1); write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[MDSCR_EL1], mdscr_el1); write_sysreg(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.sp, sp_el0); - write_sysreg_el2(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pc, elr); - write_sysreg_el2(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pstate, spsr); }
static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) @@ -115,10 +112,13 @@ static void __hyp_text __sysreg_restore_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt) write_sysreg_el1(ctxt->sys_regs[AMAIR_EL1], amair); write_sysreg_el1(ctxt->sys_regs[CNTKCTL_EL1], cntkctl); write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[PAR_EL1], par_el1); + write_sysreg(ctxt->sys_regs[TPIDR_EL1], tpidr_el1);
write_sysreg(ctxt->gp_regs.sp_el1, sp_el1); write_sysreg_el1(ctxt->gp_regs.elr_el1, elr); write_sysreg_el1(ctxt->gp_regs.spsr[KVM_SPSR_EL1],spsr); + write_sysreg_el2(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pc, elr); + write_sysreg_el2(ctxt->gp_regs.regs.pstate, spsr); }
static hyp_alternate_select(__sysreg_call_restore_host_state,
Commit dea5e2a4c5bcf196f879a66cebdcca07793e8ba4 upstream.
We've so far relied on a patching infrastructure that only gave us a single alternative, without any way to provide a range of potential replacement instructions. For a single feature, this is an all or nothing thing.
It would be interesting to have a more flexible grained way of patching the kernel though, where we could dynamically tune the code that gets injected.
In order to achive this, let's introduce a new form of dynamic patching, assiciating a callback to a patching site. This callback gets source and target locations of the patching request, as well as the number of instructions to be patched.
Dynamic patching is declared with the new ALTERNATIVE_CB and alternative_cb directives:
asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE_CB("mov %0, #0\n", callback) : "r" (v)); or alternative_cb callback mov x0, #0 alternative_cb_end
where callback is the C function computing the alternative.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h index 669028172fd6..a91933b1e2e6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/alternative.h @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ #include <asm/cpucaps.h> #include <asm/insn.h>
+#define ARM64_CB_PATCH ARM64_NCAPS + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/init.h> @@ -22,12 +24,19 @@ struct alt_instr { u8 alt_len; /* size of new instruction(s), <= orig_len */ };
+typedef void (*alternative_cb_t)(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst); + void __init apply_alternatives_all(void); void apply_alternatives(void *start, size_t length);
-#define ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature) \ +#define ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature,cb) \ " .word 661b - .\n" /* label */ \ + " .if " __stringify(cb) " == 0\n" \ " .word 663f - .\n" /* new instruction */ \ + " .else\n" \ + " .word " __stringify(cb) "- .\n" /* callback */ \ + " .endif\n" \ " .hword " __stringify(feature) "\n" /* feature bit */ \ " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* source len */ \ " .byte 664f-663f\n" /* replacement len */ @@ -45,15 +54,18 @@ void apply_alternatives(void *start, size_t length); * but most assemblers die if insn1 or insn2 have a .inst. This should * be fixed in a binutils release posterior to 2.25.51.0.2 (anything * containing commit 4e4d08cf7399b606 or c1baaddf8861). + * + * Alternatives with callbacks do not generate replacement instructions. */ -#define __ALTERNATIVE_CFG(oldinstr, newinstr, feature, cfg_enabled) \ +#define __ALTERNATIVE_CFG(oldinstr, newinstr, feature, cfg_enabled, cb) \ ".if "__stringify(cfg_enabled)" == 1\n" \ "661:\n\t" \ oldinstr "\n" \ "662:\n" \ ".pushsection .altinstructions,"a"\n" \ - ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature) \ + ALTINSTR_ENTRY(feature,cb) \ ".popsection\n" \ + " .if " __stringify(cb) " == 0\n" \ ".pushsection .altinstr_replacement, "a"\n" \ "663:\n\t" \ newinstr "\n" \ @@ -61,11 +73,17 @@ void apply_alternatives(void *start, size_t length); ".popsection\n\t" \ ".org . - (664b-663b) + (662b-661b)\n\t" \ ".org . - (662b-661b) + (664b-663b)\n" \ + ".else\n\t" \ + "663:\n\t" \ + "664:\n\t" \ + ".endif\n" \ ".endif\n"
#define _ALTERNATIVE_CFG(oldinstr, newinstr, feature, cfg, ...) \ - __ALTERNATIVE_CFG(oldinstr, newinstr, feature, IS_ENABLED(cfg)) + __ALTERNATIVE_CFG(oldinstr, newinstr, feature, IS_ENABLED(cfg), 0)
+#define ALTERNATIVE_CB(oldinstr, cb) \ + __ALTERNATIVE_CFG(oldinstr, "NOT_AN_INSTRUCTION", ARM64_CB_PATCH, 1, cb) #else
#include <asm/assembler.h> @@ -132,6 +150,14 @@ void apply_alternatives(void *start, size_t length); 661: .endm
+.macro alternative_cb cb + .set .Lasm_alt_mode, 0 + .pushsection .altinstructions, "a" + altinstruction_entry 661f, \cb, ARM64_CB_PATCH, 662f-661f, 0 + .popsection +661: +.endm + /* * Provide the other half of the alternative code sequence. */ @@ -157,6 +183,13 @@ void apply_alternatives(void *start, size_t length); .org . - (662b-661b) + (664b-663b) .endm
+/* + * Callback-based alternative epilogue + */ +.macro alternative_cb_end +662: +.endm + /* * Provides a trivial alternative or default sequence consisting solely * of NOPs. The number of NOPs is chosen automatically to match the diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c index 414288a558c8..5c4bce4ac381 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c @@ -107,32 +107,53 @@ static u32 get_alt_insn(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *insnptr, __le32 *altinsnp return insn; }
+static void patch_alternative(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) +{ + __le32 *replptr; + int i; + + replptr = ALT_REPL_PTR(alt); + for (i = 0; i < nr_inst; i++) { + u32 insn; + + insn = get_alt_insn(alt, origptr + i, replptr + i); + updptr[i] = cpu_to_le32(insn); + } +} + static void __apply_alternatives(void *alt_region, bool use_linear_alias) { struct alt_instr *alt; struct alt_region *region = alt_region; - __le32 *origptr, *replptr, *updptr; + __le32 *origptr, *updptr; + alternative_cb_t alt_cb;
for (alt = region->begin; alt < region->end; alt++) { - u32 insn; - int i, nr_inst; + int nr_inst;
- if (!cpus_have_cap(alt->cpufeature)) + /* Use ARM64_CB_PATCH as an unconditional patch */ + if (alt->cpufeature < ARM64_CB_PATCH && + !cpus_have_cap(alt->cpufeature)) continue;
- BUG_ON(alt->alt_len != alt->orig_len); + if (alt->cpufeature == ARM64_CB_PATCH) + BUG_ON(alt->alt_len != 0); + else + BUG_ON(alt->alt_len != alt->orig_len);
pr_info_once("patching kernel code\n");
origptr = ALT_ORIG_PTR(alt); - replptr = ALT_REPL_PTR(alt); updptr = use_linear_alias ? lm_alias(origptr) : origptr; - nr_inst = alt->alt_len / sizeof(insn); + nr_inst = alt->orig_len / AARCH64_INSN_SIZE;
- for (i = 0; i < nr_inst; i++) { - insn = get_alt_insn(alt, origptr + i, replptr + i); - updptr[i] = cpu_to_le32(insn); - } + if (alt->cpufeature < ARM64_CB_PATCH) + alt_cb = patch_alternative; + else + alt_cb = ALT_REPL_PTR(alt); + + alt_cb(alt, origptr, updptr, nr_inst);
flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)origptr, (uintptr_t)(origptr + nr_inst));
Commit 44a497abd621a71c645f06d3d545ae2f46448830 upstream.
kvm_vgic_global_state is part of the read-only section, and is usually accessed using a PC-relative address generation (adrp + add).
It is thus useless to use kern_hyp_va() on it, and actively problematic if kern_hyp_va() becomes non-idempotent. On the other hand, there is no way that the compiler is going to guarantee that such access is always PC relative.
So let's bite the bullet and provide our own accessor.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Reviewed-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 7 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ virt/kvm/arm/hyp/vgic-v2-sr.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h index 08cd720eae01..4d6b17e23d31 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h @@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ */ #define kern_hyp_va(kva) (kva)
+/* Contrary to arm64, there is no need to generate a PC-relative address */ +#define hyp_symbol_addr(s) \ + ({ \ + typeof(s) *addr = &(s); \ + addr; \ + }) + /* * KVM_MMU_CACHE_MIN_PAGES is the number of stage2 page table translation levels. */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h index fe55b516f018..c84e95e0e522 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h @@ -130,6 +130,26 @@ static inline unsigned long __kern_hyp_va(unsigned long v)
#define kern_hyp_va(v) ((typeof(v))(__kern_hyp_va((unsigned long)(v))))
+/* + * Obtain the PC-relative address of a kernel symbol + * s: symbol + * + * The goal of this macro is to return a symbol's address based on a + * PC-relative computation, as opposed to a loading the VA from a + * constant pool or something similar. This works well for HYP, as an + * absolute VA is guaranteed to be wrong. Only use this if trying to + * obtain the address of a symbol (i.e. not something you obtained by + * following a pointer). + */ +#define hyp_symbol_addr(s) \ + ({ \ + typeof(s) *addr; \ + asm("adrp %0, %1\n" \ + "add %0, %0, :lo12:%1\n" \ + : "=r" (addr) : "S" (&s)); \ + addr; \ + }) + /* * We currently only support a 40bit IPA. */ diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/hyp/vgic-v2-sr.c b/virt/kvm/arm/hyp/vgic-v2-sr.c index d7fd46fe9efb..4b4221b0d4ba 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/hyp/vgic-v2-sr.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/hyp/vgic-v2-sr.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int __hyp_text __vgic_v2_perform_cpuif_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return -1;
rd = kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(vcpu); - addr = kern_hyp_va((kern_hyp_va(&kvm_vgic_global_state))->vcpu_base_va); + addr = kern_hyp_va(hyp_symbol_addr(kvm_vgic_global_state)->vcpu_base_va); addr += fault_ipa - vgic->vgic_cpu_base;
if (kvm_vcpu_dabt_iswrite(vcpu)) {
From: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@linaro.org
Commit 4464e210de9e80e38de59df052fe09ea2ff80b1b upstream.
We already have the percpu area for the host cpu state, which points to the VCPU, so there's no need to store the VCPU pointer on the stack on every context switch. We can be a little more clever and just use tpidr_el2 for the percpu offset and load the VCPU pointer from the host context.
This has the benefit of being able to retrieve the host context even when our stack is corrupted, and it has a potential performance benefit because we trade a store plus a load for an mrs and a load on a round trip to the guest.
This does require us to calculate the percpu offset without including the offset from the kernel mapping of the percpu array to the linear mapping of the array (which is what we store in tpidr_el1), because a PC-relative generated address in EL2 is already giving us the hyp alias of the linear mapping of a kernel address. We do this in __cpu_init_hyp_mode() by using kvm_ksym_ref().
The code that accesses ESR_EL2 was previously using an alternative to use the _EL1 accessor on VHE systems, but this was actually unnecessary as the _EL1 accessor aliases the ESR_EL2 register on VHE, and the _EL2 accessor does the same thing on both systems.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones drjones@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 6 +----- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 28 ++++++++++------------------ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 5 +---- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c | 5 +++++ 7 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h index a7ef5a051911..1ed5cb9c322c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #define KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY_SHIFT 0 #define KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY (1 << KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY_SHIFT)
+/* Translate a kernel address of @sym into its equivalent linear mapping */ #define kvm_ksym_ref(sym) \ ({ \ void *val = &sym; \ @@ -68,6 +69,20 @@ extern u32 __init_stage2_translation(void);
extern void __qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors(void);
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +.macro get_host_ctxt reg, tmp + adr_l \reg, kvm_host_cpu_state + mrs \tmp, tpidr_el2 + add \reg, \reg, \tmp +.endm + +.macro get_vcpu_ptr vcpu, ctxt + get_host_ctxt \ctxt, \vcpu + ldr \vcpu, [\ctxt, #HOST_CONTEXT_VCPU] + kern_hyp_va \vcpu +.endm + #endif
#endif /* __ARM_KVM_ASM_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 7b373e56750f..147389bd87b9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -350,10 +350,15 @@ int kvm_perf_teardown(void);
struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_mpidr_to_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long mpidr);
+void __kvm_set_tpidr_el2(u64 tpidr_el2); +DECLARE_PER_CPU(kvm_cpu_context_t, kvm_host_cpu_state); + static inline void __cpu_init_hyp_mode(phys_addr_t pgd_ptr, unsigned long hyp_stack_ptr, unsigned long vector_ptr) { + u64 tpidr_el2; + /* * Call initialization code, and switch to the full blown HYP code. * If the cpucaps haven't been finalized yet, something has gone very @@ -362,6 +367,16 @@ static inline void __cpu_init_hyp_mode(phys_addr_t pgd_ptr, */ BUG_ON(!static_branch_likely(&arm64_const_caps_ready)); __kvm_call_hyp((void *)pgd_ptr, hyp_stack_ptr, vector_ptr); + + /* + * Calculate the raw per-cpu offset without a translation from the + * kernel's mapping to the linear mapping, and store it in tpidr_el2 + * so that we can use adr_l to access per-cpu variables in EL2. + */ + tpidr_el2 = (u64)this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_host_cpu_state) + - (u64)kvm_ksym_ref(kvm_host_cpu_state); + + kvm_call_hyp(__kvm_set_tpidr_el2, tpidr_el2); }
static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {} diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c index af247d10252f..2a1a04c87e9a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(CPU_FP_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_regs, fp_regs)); DEFINE(VCPU_FPEXC32_EL2, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt.sys_regs[FPEXC32_EL2])); DEFINE(VCPU_HOST_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.host_cpu_context)); + DEFINE(HOST_CONTEXT_VCPU, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, __hyp_running_vcpu)); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM DEFINE(CPU_SUSPEND_SZ, sizeof(struct cpu_suspend_ctx)); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S index fe4678f20a85..a7b3c198d4de 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S @@ -62,9 +62,6 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter) // Store the host regs save_callee_saved_regs x1
- // Store host_ctxt and vcpu for use at exit time - stp x1, x0, [sp, #-16]! - add x18, x0, #VCPU_CONTEXT
// Restore guest regs x0-x17 @@ -118,8 +115,7 @@ ENTRY(__guest_exit) // Store the guest regs x19-x29, lr save_callee_saved_regs x1
- // Restore the host_ctxt from the stack - ldr x2, [sp], #16 + get_host_ctxt x2, x3
// Now restore the host regs restore_callee_saved_regs x2 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index f36464bd57c5..82fbc368f738 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -57,13 +57,8 @@ ENDPROC(__vhe_hyp_call) el1_sync: // Guest trapped into EL2 stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
-alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN - mrs x1, esr_el2 -alternative_else - mrs x1, esr_el1 -alternative_endif - lsr x0, x1, #ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT - + mrs x0, esr_el2 + lsr x0, x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT cmp x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_HVC64 ccmp x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32, #4, ne b.ne el1_trap @@ -117,10 +112,14 @@ el1_hvc_guest: eret
el1_trap: + get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0 + + mrs x0, esr_el2 + lsr x0, x0, #ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT /* * x0: ESR_EC + * x1: vcpu pointer */ - ldr x1, [sp, #16 + 8] // vcpu stored by __guest_enter
/* * We trap the first access to the FP/SIMD to save the host context @@ -138,13 +137,13 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
el1_irq: stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]! - ldr x1, [sp, #16 + 8] + get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0 mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_IRQ b __guest_exit
el1_error: stp x0, x1, [sp, #-16]! - ldr x1, [sp, #16 + 8] + get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0 mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR b __guest_exit
@@ -180,14 +179,7 @@ ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic) ENDPROC(__hyp_do_panic)
ENTRY(__hyp_panic) - /* - * '=kvm_host_cpu_state' is a host VA from the constant pool, it may - * not be accessible by this address from EL2, hyp_panic() converts - * it with kern_hyp_va() before use. - */ - ldr x0, =kvm_host_cpu_state - mrs x1, tpidr_el2 - add x0, x0, x1 + get_host_ctxt x0, x1 b hyp_panic ENDPROC(__hyp_panic)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c index 8875bca6868a..1f41b0fe59bc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static hyp_alternate_select(__hyp_call_panic, __hyp_call_panic_nvhe, __hyp_call_panic_vhe, ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN);
-void __hyp_text __noreturn hyp_panic(struct kvm_cpu_context *__host_ctxt) +void __hyp_text __noreturn hyp_panic(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = NULL;
@@ -446,9 +446,6 @@ void __hyp_text __noreturn hyp_panic(struct kvm_cpu_context *__host_ctxt) u64 par = read_sysreg(par_el1);
if (read_sysreg(vttbr_el2)) { - struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt; - - host_ctxt = kern_hyp_va(__host_ctxt); vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu; __timer_save_state(vcpu); __deactivate_traps(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c index c54cc2afb92b..e19d89cabf2a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c @@ -183,3 +183,8 @@ void __hyp_text __sysreg32_restore_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (vcpu->arch.debug_flags & KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY) write_sysreg(sysreg[DBGVCR32_EL2], dbgvcr32_el2); } + +void __hyp_text __kvm_set_tpidr_el2(u64 tpidr_el2) +{ + asm("msr tpidr_el2, %0": : "r" (tpidr_el2)); +}
commit eff0e9e1078ea7dc1d794dc50e31baef984c46d7 upstream.
We've so far used the PSCI return codes for SMCCC because they were extremely similar. But with the new ARM DEN 0070A specification, "NOT_REQUIRED" (-2) is clashing with PSCI's "PSCI_RET_INVALID_PARAMS".
Let's bite the bullet and add SMCCC specific return codes. Users can be repainted as and when required.
Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index a031897fca76..c89da86de99f 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -291,5 +291,10 @@ asmlinkage void __arm_smccc_hvc(unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1, */ #define arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(...) __arm_smccc_1_1(SMCCC_HVC_INST, __VA_ARGS__)
+/* Return codes defined in ARM DEN 0070A */ +#define SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS 0 +#define SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED -1 +#define SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED -2 + #endif /*__ASSEMBLY__*/ #endif /*__LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_H*/
commit 8e2906245f1e3b0d027169d9f2e55ce0548cb96e upstream.
In order for the kernel to protect itself, let's call the SSBD mitigation implemented by the higher exception level (either hypervisor or firmware) on each transition between userspace and kernel.
We must take the PSCI conduit into account in order to target the right exception level, hence the introduction of a runtime patching callback.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Reviewed-by: Julien Grall julien.grall@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index b5a28336c077..44798a700f6c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -228,6 +228,30 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data) } #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD +void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, + int nr_inst) +{ + u32 insn; + + BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); + + switch (psci_ops.conduit) { + case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: + insn = aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value(); + break; + case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: + insn = aarch64_insn_get_smc_value(); + break; + default: + return; + } + + *updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */ + #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, \ .matches = is_affected_midr_range, \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 93958d1341bb..f9473efee9c5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ * along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/linkage.h>
@@ -137,6 +138,18 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif add \dst, \dst, #(\sym - .entry.tramp.text) .endm
+ // This macro corrupts x0-x3. It is the caller's duty + // to save/restore them if required. + .macro apply_ssbd, state +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 + mov w1, #\state +alternative_cb arm64_update_smccc_conduit + nop // Patched to SMC/HVC #0 +alternative_cb_end +#endif + .endm + .macro kernel_entry, el, regsize = 64 .if \regsize == 32 mov w0, w0 // zero upper 32 bits of x0 @@ -163,6 +176,13 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif ldr x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] // since we can unmask debug disable_step_tsk x19, x20 // exceptions when scheduling.
+ apply_ssbd 1 + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + ldp x0, x1, [sp, #16 * 0] + ldp x2, x3, [sp, #16 * 1] +#endif + mov x29, xzr // fp pointed to user-space .else add x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE @@ -301,6 +321,8 @@ alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_845719 alternative_else_nop_endif #endif 3: + apply_ssbd 0 + .endif
msr elr_el1, x21 // set up the return data diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index c89da86de99f..ca1d2cc2cdfa 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ 0, 0x8000)
+#define ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + 0, 0x7fff) + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/linkage.h>
commit 5cf9ce6e5ea50f805c6188c04ed0daaec7b6887d upstream.
In a heterogeneous system, we can end up with both affected and unaffected CPUs. Let's check their status before calling into the firmware.
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall julien.grall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 44798a700f6c..62530ba60497 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data) #endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); + void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index f9473efee9c5..caa77d060af1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -140,8 +140,10 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
// This macro corrupts x0-x3. It is the caller's duty // to save/restore them if required. - .macro apply_ssbd, state + .macro apply_ssbd, state, targ, tmp1, tmp2 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + ldr_this_cpu \tmp2, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, \tmp1 + cbz \tmp2, \targ mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 mov w1, #\state alternative_cb arm64_update_smccc_conduit @@ -176,12 +178,13 @@ alternative_cb_end ldr x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] // since we can unmask debug disable_step_tsk x19, x20 // exceptions when scheduling.
- apply_ssbd 1 + apply_ssbd 1, 1f, x22, x23
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD ldp x0, x1, [sp, #16 * 0] ldp x2, x3, [sp, #16 * 1] #endif +1:
mov x29, xzr // fp pointed to user-space .else @@ -321,8 +324,8 @@ alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_845719 alternative_else_nop_endif #endif 3: - apply_ssbd 0 - + apply_ssbd 0, 5f, x0, x1 +5: .endif
msr elr_el1, x21 // set up the return data
commit a725e3dda1813ed306734823ac4c65ca04e38500 upstream.
As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation.
A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a config option.
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall julien.grall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 9 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 2d5f7aca156d..1bbb89d37f57 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -849,6 +849,15 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
If unsure, say Y.
+config ARM64_SSBD + bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT + default y + help + This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores + by speculative loads. + + If unsure, say Y. + menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions" depends on COMPAT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h index 2e7b236bc596..76c0d23ca161 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 23 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR 24 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT 25 +#define ARM64_SSBD 26
-#define ARM64_NCAPS 26 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 27
#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 62530ba60497..86cd3b690f35 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -252,6 +252,67 @@ void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
*updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn); } + +static void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) +{ + switch (psci_ops.conduit) { + case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, NULL); + break; + + case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, NULL); + break; + + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + break; + } +} + +static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, + int scope) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + bool supported = true; + + WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); + + if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) + return false; + + /* + * The probe function return value is either negative + * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero + * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the + * last case. + */ + switch (psci_ops.conduit) { + case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); + if ((int)res.a0 != 0) + supported = false; + break; + + case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); + if ((int)res.a0 != 0) + supported = false; + break; + + default: + supported = false; + } + + if (supported) { + __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); + arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); + } + + return supported; +} #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
#define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \ @@ -451,6 +512,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2), .enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1, }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + { + .desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable", + .def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU, + .capability = ARM64_SSBD, + .matches = has_ssbd_mitigation, + }, #endif { }
commit a43ae4dfe56a01f5b98ba0cb2f784b6a43bafcc6 upstream.
On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, it may be useful to either permanently enable or disable the workaround for cases where the user decides that they'd rather not get a trap overhead, and keep the mitigation permanently on or off instead of switching it on exception entry/exit.
In any case, default to the mitigation being enabled.
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall julien.grall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 103 +++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 0380a45ecf4b..d6d7669e667f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -3997,6 +3997,23 @@ expediting. Set to zero to disable automatic expediting.
+ ssbd= [ARM64,HW] + Speculative Store Bypass Disable control + + On CPUs that are vulnerable to the Speculative + Store Bypass vulnerability and offer a + firmware based mitigation, this parameter + indicates how the mitigation should be used: + + force-on: Unconditionally enable mitigation for + for both kernel and userspace + force-off: Unconditionally disable mitigation for + for both kernel and userspace + kernel: Always enable mitigation in the + kernel, and offer a prctl interface + to allow userspace to register its + interest in being mitigated too. + stack_guard_gap= [MM] override the default stack gap protection. The value is in page units and it defines how many pages prior diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 428ee1f2468c..0bd5ebfb328e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -262,6 +262,12 @@ static inline bool system_uses_ttbr0_pan(void) !cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_PAN); }
+#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1 +#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0 +#define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL 1 +#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2 +#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED 3 + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 86cd3b690f35..b3df8e5986e0 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -231,6 +231,38 @@ static int qcom_enable_link_stack_sanitization(void *data) #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
+int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL; + +static const struct ssbd_options { + const char *str; + int state; +} ssbd_options[] = { + { "force-on", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, }, + { "force-off", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, }, + { "kernel", ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL, }, +}; + +static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf) +{ + int i; + + if (!buf || !buf[0]) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) { + int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str); + + if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len)) + continue; + + ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state; + return 0; + } + + return -EINVAL; +} +early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg); + void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, int nr_inst) @@ -274,44 +306,83 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - bool supported = true; + bool required = true; + s32 val;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
- if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) + if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) { + ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; return false; + }
- /* - * The probe function return value is either negative - * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero - * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the - * last case. - */ switch (psci_ops.conduit) { case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 != 0) - supported = false; break;
case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); - if ((int)res.a0 != 0) - supported = false; break;
default: - supported = false; + ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; + return false; + } + + val = (s32)res.a0; + + switch (val) { + case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED: + ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; + return false; + + case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED: + pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc); + ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED; + return false; + + case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS: + required = true; + break; + + case 1: /* Mitigation not required on this CPU */ + required = false; + break; + + default: + WARN_ON(1); + return false; }
- if (supported) { - __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); + switch (ssbd_state) { + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: + pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc); + arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false); + required = false; + break; + + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: + if (required) { + __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); + arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); + } + break; + + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: + pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc); arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); + required = true; + break; + + default: + WARN_ON(1); + break; }
- return supported; + return required; } #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
commit c32e1736ca03904c03de0e4459a673be194f56fd upstream.
We're about to need the mitigation state in various parts of the kernel in order to do the right thing for userspace and guests.
Let's expose an accessor that will let other subsystems know about the state.
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall julien.grall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 0bd5ebfb328e..a2415ee6b8a3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -268,6 +268,16 @@ static inline bool system_uses_ttbr0_pan(void) #define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2 #define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED 3
+static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + extern int ssbd_state; + return ssbd_state; +#else + return ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; +#endif +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif
commit 986372c4367f46b34a3c0f6918d7fb95cbdf39d6 upstream.
In order to avoid checking arm64_ssbd_callback_required on each kernel entry/exit even if no mitigation is required, let's add yet another alternative that by default jumps over the mitigation, and that gets nop'ed out if we're doing dynamic mitigation.
Think of it as a poor man's static key...
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall julien.grall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index b3df8e5986e0..012dab9d9a01 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -285,6 +285,20 @@ void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, *updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn); }
+void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(struct alt_instr *alt, + __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, + int nr_inst) +{ + BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1); + /* + * Only allow mitigation on EL1 entry/exit and guest + * ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling if the SSBD state allows it to + * be flipped. + */ + if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL) + *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop()); +} + static void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) { switch (psci_ops.conduit) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index caa77d060af1..5a585976d14c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif // to save/restore them if required. .macro apply_ssbd, state, targ, tmp1, tmp2 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD +alternative_cb arm64_enable_wa2_handling + b \targ +alternative_cb_end ldr_this_cpu \tmp2, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, \tmp1 cbz \tmp2, \targ mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
commit 647d0519b53f440a55df163de21c52a8205431cc upstream.
On a system where firmware can dynamically change the state of the mitigation, the CPU will always come up with the mitigation enabled, including when coming back from suspend.
If the user has requested "no mitigation" via a command line option, let's enforce it by calling into the firmware again to disable it.
Similarily, for a resume from hibernate, the mitigation could have been disabled by the boot kernel. Let's ensure that it is set back on in that case.
Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index a2415ee6b8a3..c5bc80a03515 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -278,6 +278,12 @@ static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void) #endif }
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD +void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state); +#else +static inline void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) {} +#endif + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 012dab9d9a01..eccdb28b4a39 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(struct alt_instr *alt, *updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop()); }
-static void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) +void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) { switch (psci_ops.conduit) { case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c index 095d3c170f5d..a028cc95afe1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c @@ -313,6 +313,17 @@ int swsusp_arch_suspend(void)
sleep_cpu = -EINVAL; __cpu_suspend_exit(); + + /* + * Just in case the boot kernel did turn the SSBD + * mitigation off behind our back, let's set the state + * to what we expect it to be. + */ + switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: + arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); + } }
local_dbg_restore(flags); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c index 77cd655e6eb7..7a655e60cf4b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c @@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ void notrace __cpu_suspend_exit(void) */ if (hw_breakpoint_restore) hw_breakpoint_restore(cpu); + + /* + * On resume, firmware implementing dynamic mitigation will + * have turned the mitigation on. If the user has forcefully + * disabled it, make sure their wishes are obeyed. + */ + if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) + arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false); }
/*
commit 9dd9614f5476687abbff8d4b12cd08ae70d7c2ad upstream.
In order to allow userspace to be mitigated on demand, let's introduce a new thread flag that prevents the mitigation from being turned off when exiting to userspace, and doesn't turn it on on entry into the kernel (with the assumption that the mitigation is always enabled in the kernel itself).
This will be used by a prctl interface introduced in a later patch.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index ddded6497a8a..fc786d344e46 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK 20 #define TIF_SINGLESTEP 21 #define TIF_32BIT 22 /* 32bit process */ +#define TIF_SSBD 23 /* Wants SSB mitigation */
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 5a585976d14c..c1ffa95c0ad2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ alternative_cb arm64_enable_wa2_handling alternative_cb_end ldr_this_cpu \tmp2, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, \tmp1 cbz \tmp2, \targ + ldr \tmp2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] + tbnz \tmp2, #TIF_SSBD, \targ mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 mov w1, #\state alternative_cb arm64_update_smccc_conduit
commit 9cdc0108baa8ef87c76ed834619886a46bd70cbe upstream.
If running on a system that performs dynamic SSBD mitigation, allow userspace to request the mitigation for itself. This is implemented as a prctl call, allowing the mitigation to be enabled or disabled at will for this particular thread.
Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index def8d5623fd1..714fe90dbf66 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o \ arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_RELOC_TEST) += arm64-reloc-test.o arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD) += ssbd.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_KVM),y) arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) += bpi.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0560738c1d5c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/thread_info.h> + +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> + +/* + * prctl interface for SSBD + */ +static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) +{ + int state = arm64_get_ssbd_state(); + + /* Unsupported */ + if (state == ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Treat the unaffected/mitigated state separately */ + if (state == ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED) { + switch (ctrl) { + case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + return -EPERM; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * Things are a bit backward here: the arm64 internal API + * *enables the mitigation* when the userspace API *disables + * speculation*. So much fun. + */ + switch (ctrl) { + case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */ + if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE || + task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) + return -EPERM; + task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task); + clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); + break; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) + return -EPERM; + task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); + set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); + break; + case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: + if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) + return -EPERM; + task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); + task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task); + set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); + break; + default: + return -ERANGE; + } + + return 0; +} + +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which, + unsigned long ctrl) +{ + switch (which) { + case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: + return ssbd_prctl_set(task, ctrl); + default: + return -ENODEV; + } +} + +static int ssbd_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) +{ + switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { + case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN: + return -EINVAL; + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: + return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: + if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; + if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: + return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + default: + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + } +} + +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) +{ + switch (which) { + case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: + return ssbd_prctl_get(task); + default: + return -ENODEV; + } +}
commit 85478bab409171de501b719971fd25a3d5d639f9 upstream.
As we're going to require to access per-cpu variables at EL2, let's craft the minimum set of accessors required to implement reading a per-cpu variable, relying on tpidr_el2 to contain the per-cpu offset.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h index 1ed5cb9c322c..b956418f73bd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h @@ -69,14 +69,37 @@ extern u32 __init_stage2_translation(void);
extern void __qcom_hyp_sanitize_btac_predictors(void);
+/* Home-grown __this_cpu_{ptr,read} variants that always work at HYP */ +#define __hyp_this_cpu_ptr(sym) \ + ({ \ + void *__ptr = hyp_symbol_addr(sym); \ + __ptr += read_sysreg(tpidr_el2); \ + (typeof(&sym))__ptr; \ + }) + +#define __hyp_this_cpu_read(sym) \ + ({ \ + *__hyp_this_cpu_ptr(sym); \ + }) + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-.macro get_host_ctxt reg, tmp - adr_l \reg, kvm_host_cpu_state +.macro hyp_adr_this_cpu reg, sym, tmp + adr_l \reg, \sym mrs \tmp, tpidr_el2 add \reg, \reg, \tmp .endm
+.macro hyp_ldr_this_cpu reg, sym, tmp + adr_l \reg, \sym + mrs \tmp, tpidr_el2 + ldr \reg, [\reg, \tmp] +.endm + +.macro get_host_ctxt reg, tmp + hyp_adr_this_cpu \reg, kvm_host_cpu_state, \tmp +.endm + .macro get_vcpu_ptr vcpu, ctxt get_host_ctxt \ctxt, \vcpu ldr \vcpu, [\ctxt, #HOST_CONTEXT_VCPU]
commit 55e3748e8902ff641e334226bdcb432f9a5d78d3 upstream.
In order to offer ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support to guests, we need a bit of infrastructure.
Let's add a flag indicating whether or not the guest uses SSBD mitigation. Depending on the state of this flag, allow KVM to disable ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 before entering the guest, and enable it when exiting it.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 5 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 4 ++++ 6 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h index 4d6b17e23d31..8a098e65f5f8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h @@ -254,6 +254,11 @@ static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void) return 0; }
+static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void) +{ + return 0; +} + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __ARM_KVM_MMU_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h index b956418f73bd..1a6d02350fc6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ #define KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY_SHIFT 0 #define KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY (1 << KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY_SHIFT)
+#define VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT 0 +#define VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG (_AC(1, UL) << VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT) + /* Translate a kernel address of @sym into its equivalent linear mapping */ #define kvm_ksym_ref(sym) \ ({ \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 147389bd87b9..3d1774bcf108 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -210,6 +210,9 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch { /* Exception Information */ struct kvm_vcpu_fault_info fault;
+ /* State of various workarounds, see kvm_asm.h for bit assignment */ + u64 workaround_flags; + /* Guest debug state */ u64 debug_flags;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h index c84e95e0e522..e42c1f0ae6cf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h @@ -383,5 +383,29 @@ static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void) } #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD +DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); + +static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void) +{ + int cpu, err; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + u64 *ptr; + + ptr = per_cpu_ptr(&arm64_ssbd_callback_required, cpu); + err = create_hyp_mappings(ptr, ptr + 1, PAGE_HYP); + if (err) + return err; + } + return 0; +} +#else +static inline int hyp_map_aux_data(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_MMU_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c index 1f41b0fe59bc..b2f1992c6234 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ * along with this program. If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <uapi/linux/psci.h> @@ -281,6 +282,39 @@ static void __hyp_text __skip_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) write_sysreg_el2(*vcpu_pc(vcpu), elr); }
+static inline bool __hyp_text __needs_ssbd_off(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SSBD)) + return false; + + return !(vcpu->arch.workaround_flags & VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG); +} + +static void __hyp_text __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + /* + * The host runs with the workaround always present. If the + * guest wants it disabled, so be it... + */ + if (__needs_ssbd_off(vcpu) && + __hyp_this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required)) + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, 0, NULL); +#endif +} + +static void __hyp_text __set_host_arch_workaround_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD + /* + * If the guest has disabled the workaround, bring it back on. + */ + if (__needs_ssbd_off(vcpu) && + __hyp_this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required)) + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, 1, NULL); +#endif +} + int __hyp_text __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt; @@ -311,6 +345,8 @@ int __hyp_text __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) __sysreg_restore_guest_state(guest_ctxt); __debug_restore_state(vcpu, kern_hyp_va(vcpu->arch.debug_ptr), guest_ctxt);
+ __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(vcpu); + /* Jump in the fire! */ again: exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu, host_ctxt); @@ -367,6 +403,8 @@ int __hyp_text __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* 0 falls through to be handled out of EL2 */ }
+ __set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu); + if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT)) { u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c index 4aede98b92eb..d5f1d8364571 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c @@ -1411,6 +1411,10 @@ static int init_hyp_mode(void) } }
+ err = hyp_map_aux_data(); + if (err) + kvm_err("Cannot map host auxilary data: %d\n", err); + return 0;
out_err:
commit b4f18c063a13dfb33e3a63fe1844823e19c2265e upstream.
In order to forward the guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 calls to EL3, add a small(-ish) sequence to handle it at EL2. Special care must be taken to track the state of the guest itself by updating the workaround flags. We also rely on patching to enable calls into the firmware.
Note that since we need to execute branches, this always executes after the Spectre-v2 mitigation has been applied.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 2a1a04c87e9a..b5e43b01b396 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ int main(void) BLANK(); #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_ARM_HOST DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt)); + DEFINE(VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.workaround_flags)); DEFINE(CPU_GP_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, gp_regs)); DEFINE(CPU_USER_PT_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_regs, regs)); DEFINE(CPU_FP_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_regs, fp_regs)); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S index 82fbc368f738..3c283fd8c8f5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -106,8 +106,44 @@ el1_hvc_guest: */ ldr x1, [sp] // Guest's x0 eor w1, w1, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 + cbz w1, wa_epilogue + + /* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */ + eor w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 ^ \ + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2) cbnz w1, el1_trap - mov x0, x1 + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD +alternative_cb arm64_enable_wa2_handling + b wa2_end +alternative_cb_end + get_vcpu_ptr x2, x0 + ldr x0, [x2, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS] + + // Sanitize the argument and update the guest flags + ldr x1, [sp, #8] // Guest's x1 + clz w1, w1 // Murphy's device: + lsr w1, w1, #5 // w1 = !!w1 without using + eor w1, w1, #1 // the flags... + bfi x0, x1, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT, #1 + str x0, [x2, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS] + + /* Check that we actually need to perform the call */ + hyp_ldr_this_cpu x0, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, x2 + cbz x0, wa2_end + + mov w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 + smc #0 + + /* Don't leak data from the SMC call */ + mov x3, xzr +wa2_end: + mov x2, xzr + mov x1, xzr +#endif + +wa_epilogue: + mov x0, xzr add sp, sp, #16 eret
commit 5d81f7dc9bca4f4963092433e27b508cbe524a32 upstream.
Now that all our infrastructure is in place, let's expose the availability of ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to guests. We take this opportunity to tidy up a couple of SMCCC constants.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall christoffer.dall@arm.com Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier marc.zyngier@arm.com --- arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 4 ++++ virt/kvm/arm/psci.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 8f973e3b7348..65572e14306c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -302,4 +302,16 @@ static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void) return false; }
+#define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1 +#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0 +#define KVM_SSBD_KERNEL 1 +#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2 +#define KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED 3 + +static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void) +{ + /* No way to detect it yet, pretend it is not there. */ + return KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN; +} + #endif /* __ARM_KVM_HOST_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 3d1774bcf108..b01ad3489bd8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -412,4 +412,27 @@ static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void) return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR); }
+#define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1 +#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0 +#define KVM_SSBD_KERNEL 1 +#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2 +#define KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED 3 + +static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void) +{ + switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: + return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE; + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: + return KVM_SSBD_KERNEL; + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: + return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE; + case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED: + return KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED; + case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN: + default: + return KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN; + } +} + #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c index 3256b9228e75..a74311beda35 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c @@ -122,6 +122,10 @@ int kvm_reset_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) /* Reset PMU */ kvm_pmu_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
+ /* Default workaround setup is enabled (if supported) */ + if (kvm_arm_have_ssbd() == KVM_SSBD_KERNEL) + vcpu->arch.workaround_flags |= VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG; + /* Reset timer */ return kvm_timer_vcpu_reset(vcpu); } diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c b/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c index c4762bef13c6..c95ab4c5a475 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/psci.c @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static int kvm_psci_call(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { u32 func_id = smccc_get_function(vcpu); - u32 val = PSCI_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED; + u32 val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED; u32 feature;
switch (func_id) { @@ -417,7 +417,21 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) switch(feature) { case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1: if (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) - val = 0; + val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; + case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2: + switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) { + case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: + case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN: + break; + case KVM_SSBD_KERNEL: + val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS; + break; + case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: + case KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED: + val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED; + break; + } break; } break;
On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 10:52:50AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
This is the backport of the arm64 SSBD patches to 4.14. I've had to cherry-pick a number of dependencies:
- parts of the SDEI series that allow tpidr_el2 to be used as the per-cpu offset
- one patch from the VHE series that introduce vcpu retrieval as a per-cpu variable
- one patch from the the EL2 randomisation series, allowing relative addressing of global structures
- the dynamic patching infrastructure
Thanks for these, all now applied.
greg k-h
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