commit 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e upstream.

In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a better separation of concerns: - ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only - IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new semantics.

Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.

Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:

- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence, an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is not.

- X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is already set.

That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g. a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected mitigation config.

- UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.

For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.

For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard, since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration. Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.

Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.

Fixes: 864bcaa38ee4 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1] Fixes: d893832d0e1e ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2] Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed yosryahmed@google.com Signed-off-by: Patrick Bellasi derkling@google.com Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2f6312e7ce81f..90ac8d84389cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2449,7 +2449,8 @@ config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 default y help - Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation. + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and + spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.

config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f84d59cd180b3..dfc02fb32375c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1092,6 +1092,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)

case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB: setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); + mitigate_smt = true;

/* * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for @@ -1101,8 +1103,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);

- mitigate_smt = true; - /* * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, @@ -2607,6 +2607,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { if (has_microcode) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;

/* @@ -2616,6 +2617,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) */ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); + + /* + * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures + * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, + * regardless of IBPB implementation. + */ + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); } } else { pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); @@ -2624,8 +2632,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) break;

case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (has_microcode) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;

@@ -2637,9 +2645,9 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); } } else { - pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); goto pred_cmd; - } + } break;

default: