Memory access #VE's are hard for Linux to handle in contexts like the entry code or NMIs. But other OSes need them for functionality. There's a static (pre-guest-boot) way for a VMM to choose one or the other. But VMMs don't always know which OS they are booting, so they choose to deliver those #VE's so the "other" OSes will work. That, unfortunately has left us in the lurch and exposed to these hard-to-handle #VEs.
The TDX module has introduced a new feature. Even if the static configuration is "send nasty #VE's", the kernel can dynamically request that they be disabled.
Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible.
If the TD allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader) changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Fixes: 373e715e31bf ("x86/tdx: Panic on bad configs that #VE on "private" memory access") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 10 +++- 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index 08ce488b54d0..ba3103877b21 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline void tdcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args) }
/* Read TD-scoped metadata */ -static inline u64 __maybe_unused tdg_vm_rd(u64 field, u64 *value) +static inline u64 tdg_vm_rd(u64 field, u64 *value) { struct tdx_module_args args = { .rdx = field, @@ -193,6 +193,62 @@ static void __noreturn tdx_panic(const char *msg) __tdx_hypercall(&args); }
+/* + * The kernel cannot handle #VEs when accessing normal kernel memory. Ensure + * that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to TD-private memory. + * + * TDX 1.0 does not allow the guest to disable SEPT #VE on its own. The VMM + * controls if the guest will receive such #VE with TD attribute + * ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE. + * + * Newer TDX module allows the guest to control if it wants to receive SEPT + * violation #VEs. + * + * Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible. + * + * If the TD allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE + * attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the + * control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader) + * changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to + * determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled. + */ +static void disable_sept_ve(u64 td_attr) +{ + const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT #VE has to be disabled"; + bool debug = td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG; + u64 config, controls; + + /* Is this TD allowed to disable SEPT #VE */ + tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS, &config); + if (!(config & TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE)) { + /* No SEPT #VE controls for the guest: check the attribute */ + if (td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE) + return; + + /* Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD for backtraces */ + if (debug) + pr_warn("%s\n", msg); + else + tdx_panic(msg); + return; + } + + /* Check if SEPT #VE has been disabled before us */ + tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_TD_CTLS, &controls); + if (controls & TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE) + return; + + /* Keep #VEs enabled for splats in debugging environments */ + if (debug) + return; + + /* Disable SEPT #VEs */ + tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_TD_CTLS, TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE, + TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE); + + return; +} + static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask) { struct tdx_module_args args = {}; @@ -218,24 +274,12 @@ static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask) gpa_width = args.rcx & GENMASK(5, 0); *cc_mask = BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
+ td_attr = args.rdx; + /* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */ tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL);
- /* - * The kernel can not handle #VE's when accessing normal kernel - * memory. Ensure that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to - * TD-private memory. Only VMM-shared memory (MMIO) will #VE. - */ - td_attr = args.rdx; - if (!(td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE)) { - const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute must be set."; - - /* Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD. */ - if (td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG) - pr_warn("%s\n", msg); - else - tdx_panic(msg); - } + disable_sept_ve(td_attr); }
/* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h index 7e12cfa28bec..fecb2a6e864b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h @@ -19,9 +19,17 @@ #define TDG_VM_RD 7 #define TDG_VM_WR 8
-/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */ +/* TDX TD-Scope Metadata. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD */ +#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS 0x1110000300000016 +#define TDCS_TD_CTLS 0x1110000300000017 #define TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES 0x9100000000000010
+/* TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS bits */ +#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE BIT_ULL(1) + +/* TDCS_TD_CTLS bits */ +#define TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE BIT_ULL(0) + /* TDX hypercall Leaf IDs */ #define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001 #define TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002
On 10/08/2024 1:09 am, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
Memory access #VE's are hard for Linux to handle in contexts like the
#VE's -> #VEs
entry code or NMIs. But other OSes need them for functionality. There's a static (pre-guest-boot) way for a VMM to choose one or the other. But VMMs don't always know which OS they are booting, so they choose to deliver those #VE's so the "other" OSes will work. That,
#VE's -> #VEs
unfortunately has left us in the lurch and exposed to these hard-to-handle #VEs.
The TDX module has introduced a new feature. Even if the static > configuration is "send nasty #VE's", the kernel can dynamically request that they be disabled.
#VE's -> #VEs.
"request that they be disable" -> "request they to be disabled".
Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible.
IMHO it would be better to mention "Secure-EPT #VEs" somewhere before here.
If the TD allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE
"allowed" -> "is allowed".
attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader) changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Fixes: 373e715e31bf ("x86/tdx: Panic on bad configs that #VE on "private" memory access") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 10 +++- 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index 08ce488b54d0..ba3103877b21 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline void tdcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args) } /* Read TD-scoped metadata */ -static inline u64 __maybe_unused tdg_vm_rd(u64 field, u64 *value) +static inline u64 tdg_vm_rd(u64 field, u64 *value) { struct tdx_module_args args = { .rdx = field, @@ -193,6 +193,62 @@ static void __noreturn tdx_panic(const char *msg) __tdx_hypercall(&args); } +/*
- The kernel cannot handle #VEs when accessing normal kernel memory. Ensure
- that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to TD-private memory.
- TDX 1.0 does not allow the guest to disable SEPT #VE on its own. The VMM
- controls if the guest will receive such #VE with TD attribute
- ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE.
- Newer TDX module allows the guest to control if it wants to receive SEPT
- violation #VEs.
Newer TDX modules allow.
"SEPT violation #VEs" -> "SEPT #VEs"? Since the latter is used in all other places.
- Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible.
- If the TD allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE
is allowed
- attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the
- control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader)
- changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to
- determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
- */
+static void disable_sept_ve(u64 td_attr) +{
- const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT #VE has to be disabled";
The original msg was:
"TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute must be set."
Any reason to change?
- bool debug = td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG;
- u64 config, controls;
- /* Is this TD allowed to disable SEPT #VE */
- tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS, &config);
- if (!(config & TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE)) {
Does this field ID exist in TDX1.0? I.e., whether it can fail here and should we check the return value first?
/* No SEPT #VE controls for the guest: check the attribute */if (td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE)return;/* Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD for backtraces */if (debug)pr_warn("%s\n", msg);elsetdx_panic(msg);return;- }
- /* Check if SEPT #VE has been disabled before us */
- tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_TD_CTLS, &controls);
- if (controls & TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE)
return; > +- /* Keep #VEs enabled for splats in debugging environments */
- if (debug)
return;- /* Disable SEPT #VEs */
- tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_TD_CTLS, TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE,
TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE);- return;
+}
- static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask) { struct tdx_module_args args = {};
@@ -218,24 +274,12 @@ static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask) gpa_width = args.rcx & GENMASK(5, 0); *cc_mask = BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
- td_attr = args.rdx;
- /* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */ tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL);
- /*
* The kernel can not handle #VE's when accessing normal kernel* memory. Ensure that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to* TD-private memory. Only VMM-shared memory (MMIO) will #VE.*/- td_attr = args.rdx;
- if (!(td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE)) {
const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute must be set.";/* Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD. */if (td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG)pr_warn("%s\n", msg);elsetdx_panic(msg);- }
- disable_sept_ve(td_attr); }
/* diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h index 7e12cfa28bec..fecb2a6e864b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h @@ -19,9 +19,17 @@ #define TDG_VM_RD 7 #define TDG_VM_WR 8 -/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */ +/* TDX TD-Scope Metadata. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD */
I am not sure whether this change is necessary.
+#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS 0x1110000300000016 +#define TDCS_TD_CTLS 0x1110000300000017
The TDX 1.5 spec 'td_scope_metadata.json' says they are 0x9110000300000016 and 0x9110000300000017.
I know the bit 63 is ignored by the TDX module, but since (IIUC) those two fields are introduced in TDX1.5, it's just better to follow what TDX1.5 spec says.
#define TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES 0x9100000000000010 +/* TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS bits */ +#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE BIT_ULL(1)
+/* TDCS_TD_CTLS bits */ +#define TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE BIT_ULL(0)
- /* TDX hypercall Leaf IDs */ #define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001 #define TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002
On Wed, Aug 21, 2024 at 01:52:49PM +1200, Huang, Kai wrote:
- attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the
- control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader)
- changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to
- determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
- */
+static void disable_sept_ve(u64 td_attr) +{
- const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT #VE has to be disabled";
The original msg was:
"TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute must be set."
Any reason to change?
Because the attribute is not the only way to control if #VE is going to be injected.
- bool debug = td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG;
- u64 config, controls;
- /* Is this TD allowed to disable SEPT #VE */
- tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS, &config);
- if (!(config & TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE)) {
Does this field ID exist in TDX1.0? I.e., whether it can fail here and should we check the return value first?
See TDG.VM.RD definition:
R8 Contents of the field In case of no success, as indicated by RAX, R8 returns 0.
No need in error checking here.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h index 7e12cfa28bec..fecb2a6e864b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h @@ -19,9 +19,17 @@ #define TDG_VM_RD 7 #define TDG_VM_WR 8 -/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */ +/* TDX TD-Scope Metadata. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD */
I am not sure whether this change is necessary.
It is more in-line with spec json dump.
+#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS 0x1110000300000016 +#define TDCS_TD_CTLS 0x1110000300000017
The TDX 1.5 spec 'td_scope_metadata.json' says they are 0x9110000300000016 and 0x9110000300000017.
The spec is broken. It is going to be fixed. I use correct values.
I know the bit 63 is ignored by the TDX module, but since (IIUC) those two fields are introduced in TDX1.5, it's just better to follow what TDX1.5 spec says.
Newer modules will ignore this bit and both values are going to acceptable.
On 27/08/2024 10:04 pm, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
On Wed, Aug 21, 2024 at 01:52:49PM +1200, Huang, Kai wrote:
- attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the
- control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader)
- changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to
- determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
- */
+static void disable_sept_ve(u64 td_attr) +{
- const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT #VE has to be disabled";
The original msg was:
"TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute must be set."
Any reason to change?
Because the attribute is not the only way to control if #VE is going to be injected.
- bool debug = td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG;
- u64 config, controls;
- /* Is this TD allowed to disable SEPT #VE */
- tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS, &config);
- if (!(config & TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE)) {
Does this field ID exist in TDX1.0? I.e., whether it can fail here and should we check the return value first?
See TDG.VM.RD definition:
R8 Contents of the field In case of no success, as indicated by RAX, R8 returns 0.
No need in error checking here.
OK. Thanks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h index 7e12cfa28bec..fecb2a6e864b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h @@ -19,9 +19,17 @@ #define TDG_VM_RD 7 #define TDG_VM_WR 8 -/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */ +/* TDX TD-Scope Metadata. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD */
I am not sure whether this change is necessary.
It is more in-line with spec json dump.
+#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS 0x1110000300000016 +#define TDCS_TD_CTLS 0x1110000300000017
The TDX 1.5 spec 'td_scope_metadata.json' says they are 0x9110000300000016 and 0x9110000300000017.
The spec is broken. It is going to be fixed. I use correct values.
OK. I didn't know they are going to change the value in the JSON file.
I know the bit 63 is ignored by the TDX module, but since (IIUC) those two fields are introduced in TDX1.5, it's just better to follow what TDX1.5 spec says.
Newer modules will ignore this bit and both values are going to acceptable.
Yeah.
Acked-by: Kai Huang kai.huang@intel.com
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Huang, Kai -
Kirill A. Shutemov