On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 4:14 PM Nikolay Borisov nborisov@suse.com wrote:
On 1.04.19 г. 12:01 ч., Johannes Thumshirn wrote:
Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not thousands of security vulnerabilities.
One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so I've decided to put an end to it.
If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux anymore.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de
Ack-by: Nikolay Borisov nborisov@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v1.0+
Do we want to extend this to other subsystems? Should it be a default secomp filter?
fs/open.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index f1c2f855fd43..3a3b460beccd 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -1056,6 +1056,20 @@ long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode) struct open_flags op; int fd = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op); struct filename *tmp;
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];int i;static const char * const list[] = {"syzkaller","syz-executor,""trinity",NULL};get_task_comm(comm, current);for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++)if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i])))return -EPERM; if (fd) return fd;
On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 10:50 AM Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 4:14 PM Nikolay Borisov nborisov@suse.com wrote:
On 1.04.19 г. 12:01 ч., Johannes Thumshirn wrote:
One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so I've decided to put an end to it.
If one of the above mentioned processes tries opening a file, return -EPERM indicating this process does not have the permission to open files on Linux anymore.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de
Ack-by: Nikolay Borisov nborisov@suse.com
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v1.0+
Do we want to extend this to other subsystems? Should it be a default secomp filter?
Yes, this protection could make those processes fail too many syscalls. I agree: it would be better to have all syscalls return 0 with a seccomp filter. I have updated the patch:
Subject: [PATCH] exec: Fix most outstanding security bugs From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
Over the last 20 years, the Linux kernel has accumulated hundreds if not thousands of security vulnerabilities.
One common pattern in most of these security related reports is processes called "syzkaller", "trinity" or "syz-executor" opening files and then abuse kernel interfaces causing kernel crashes or even worse threats using memory overwrites or by exploiting race conditions.
Hunting down these bugs has become time consuming and very expensive, so we've decided to put an end to it.
If one of the above mentioned processes tries to execute a system call, the call will be skipped but will return zero. This will keep the process happy without changing kernel state, keeping things safe.
Co-developed-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com Singed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org --- fs/exec.c | 1 + include/linux/seccomp.h | 2 ++ kernel/seccomp.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 2e0033348d8e..c0a73c8e22ff 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1393,6 +1393,7 @@ void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) task_lock(current->group_leader); current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK] = bprm->rlim_stack; task_unlock(current->group_leader); + seccomp_default(current); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(finalize_exec);
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index 84868d37b35d..2d98cd0d79ed 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void); extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, void __user *); +extern void seccomp_default(struct task_struct *task);
static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s) { @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2, char __user *arg3) { return -EINVAL; } +static inline void seccomp_default(struct task_struct *task) { }
static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s) { diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 54a0347ca812..92faee4cded4 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1395,6 +1395,45 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags, return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs); }
+/* Certain processes should see all syscalls succeed. */ +void seccomp_default(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct sock_filter filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | 0), + }; + struct sock_fprog prog = { + .len = ARRAY_SIZE(filter), + .filter = filter, + }; + static const char * const list[] = { + "syzkaller", + "syz-executor", + "trinity", + }; + char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; + mm_segment_t old_fs; + bool found = false; + int i; + + get_task_comm(comm, task); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(list); i++) { + if (!strncmp(comm, list[i], strlen(list[i]))) { + found = true; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) + return; + + old_fs = get_fs(); + set_fs(KERNEL_DS); + seccomp_set_mode_filter(0, (void * __user)&prog); + set_fs(old_fs); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(seccomp_default); + /** * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Dmitry Vyukov -
Kees Cook