All for 4.14 backported and tested.
Thanks!
Alexei Starovoitov (2): bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero
Daniel Borkmann (3): bpf: avoid false sharing of map refcount with max_entries bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd bpf, arm64: fix stack_depth tracking in combination with tail calls
Eric Dumazet (1): bpf: fix divides by zero
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 20 +++++++++------- include/linux/bpf.h | 21 ++++++++++++---- init/Kconfig | 7 ++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/test_bpf.c | 11 +++++---- net/core/filter.c | 10 ++++---- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 6 +++++ net/socket.c | 9 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 10 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
From: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org
[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ]
The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.
A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."
To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64
The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden
v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)
v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next
Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net --- init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ lib/test_bpf.c | 11 +++++++---- net/core/filter.c | 6 ++---- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 6 ++++++ net/socket.c | 9 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 3c1faaa..4607532 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1342,6 +1342,13 @@ config BPF_SYSCALL Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate eBPF programs and maps via file descriptors.
+config BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON + bool "Permanently enable BPF JIT and remove BPF interpreter" + depends on BPF_SYSCALL && HAVE_EBPF_JIT && BPF_JIT + help + Enables BPF JIT and removes BPF interpreter to avoid + speculative execution of BPF instructions by the interpreter + config SHMEM bool "Use full shmem filesystem" if EXPERT default y diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 7b62df8..aaa4424 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ noinline u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__bpf_call_base);
+#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON /** * __bpf_prog_run - run eBPF program on a given context * @ctx: is the data we are operating on @@ -1310,6 +1311,14 @@ EVAL6(PROG_NAME_LIST, 224, 256, 288, 320, 352, 384) EVAL4(PROG_NAME_LIST, 416, 448, 480, 512) };
+#else +static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret0(const void *ctx, + const struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + bool bpf_prog_array_compatible(struct bpf_array *array, const struct bpf_prog *fp) { @@ -1357,9 +1366,13 @@ static int bpf_check_tail_call(const struct bpf_prog *fp) */ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err) { +#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth = max_t(u32, fp->aux->stack_depth, 1);
fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1]; +#else + fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0; +#endif
/* eBPF JITs can rewrite the program in case constant * blinding is active. However, in case of error during @@ -1368,6 +1381,12 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err) * be JITed, but falls back to the interpreter. */ fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(fp); +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON + if (!fp->jited) { + *err = -ENOTSUPP; + return fp; + } +#endif bpf_prog_lock_ro(fp);
/* The tail call compatibility check can only be done at diff --git a/lib/test_bpf.c b/lib/test_bpf.c index aa8812a..6fbb73f 100644 --- a/lib/test_bpf.c +++ b/lib/test_bpf.c @@ -6207,9 +6207,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog *generate_filter(int which, int *err) return NULL; } } - /* We don't expect to fail. */ if (*err) { - pr_cont("FAIL to attach err=%d len=%d\n", + pr_cont("FAIL to prog_create err=%d len=%d\n", *err, fprog.len); return NULL; } @@ -6233,6 +6232,10 @@ static struct bpf_prog *generate_filter(int which, int *err) * checks. */ fp = bpf_prog_select_runtime(fp, err); + if (*err) { + pr_cont("FAIL to select_runtime err=%d\n", *err); + return NULL; + } break; }
@@ -6418,8 +6421,8 @@ static __init int test_bpf(void) pass_cnt++; continue; } - - return err; + err_cnt++; + continue; }
pr_cont("jited:%u ", fp->jited); diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 6ae94f8..29043bd 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -1053,11 +1053,9 @@ static struct bpf_prog *bpf_migrate_filter(struct bpf_prog *fp) */ goto out_err_free;
- /* We are guaranteed to never error here with cBPF to eBPF - * transitions, since there's no issue with type compatibility - * checks on program arrays. - */ fp = bpf_prog_select_runtime(fp, &err); + if (err) + goto out_err_free;
kfree(old_prog); return fp; diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c index cbc3dde..a47ad6c 100644 --- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c @@ -325,7 +325,13 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .data = &bpf_jit_enable, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, +#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON .proc_handler = proc_dointvec +#else + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &one, + .extra2 = &one, +#endif }, # ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT { diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index c729625..d894c7c 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -2642,6 +2642,15 @@ static int __init sock_init(void)
core_initcall(sock_init); /* early initcall */
+static int __init jit_init(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON + bpf_jit_enable = 1; +#endif + return 0; +} +pure_initcall(jit_init); + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS void socket_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq) {
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Jan 29 13:14:09 CET 2018
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:36:42 +0100 Subject: bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Message-ID: 20180128233647.21154-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
From: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org
[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ]
The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.
A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."
To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64
The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden
v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)
v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next
Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ lib/test_bpf.c | 11 +++++++---- net/core/filter.c | 6 ++---- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 6 ++++++ net/socket.c | 9 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1342,6 +1342,13 @@ config BPF_SYSCALL Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate eBPF programs and maps via file descriptors.
+config BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON + bool "Permanently enable BPF JIT and remove BPF interpreter" + depends on BPF_SYSCALL && HAVE_EBPF_JIT && BPF_JIT + help + Enables BPF JIT and removes BPF interpreter to avoid + speculative execution of BPF instructions by the interpreter + config SHMEM bool "Use full shmem filesystem" if EXPERT default y --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ noinline u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__bpf_call_base);
+#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON /** * __bpf_prog_run - run eBPF program on a given context * @ctx: is the data we are operating on @@ -1310,6 +1311,14 @@ EVAL6(PROG_NAME_LIST, 224, 256, 288, 320 EVAL4(PROG_NAME_LIST, 416, 448, 480, 512) };
+#else +static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret0(const void *ctx, + const struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + bool bpf_prog_array_compatible(struct bpf_array *array, const struct bpf_prog *fp) { @@ -1357,9 +1366,13 @@ static int bpf_check_tail_call(const str */ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err) { +#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth = max_t(u32, fp->aux->stack_depth, 1);
fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1]; +#else + fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0; +#endif
/* eBPF JITs can rewrite the program in case constant * blinding is active. However, in case of error during @@ -1368,6 +1381,12 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime * be JITed, but falls back to the interpreter. */ fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(fp); +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON + if (!fp->jited) { + *err = -ENOTSUPP; + return fp; + } +#endif bpf_prog_lock_ro(fp);
/* The tail call compatibility check can only be done at --- a/lib/test_bpf.c +++ b/lib/test_bpf.c @@ -6207,9 +6207,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog *generate_filter( return NULL; } } - /* We don't expect to fail. */ if (*err) { - pr_cont("FAIL to attach err=%d len=%d\n", + pr_cont("FAIL to prog_create err=%d len=%d\n", *err, fprog.len); return NULL; } @@ -6233,6 +6232,10 @@ static struct bpf_prog *generate_filter( * checks. */ fp = bpf_prog_select_runtime(fp, err); + if (*err) { + pr_cont("FAIL to select_runtime err=%d\n", *err); + return NULL; + } break; }
@@ -6418,8 +6421,8 @@ static __init int test_bpf(void) pass_cnt++; continue; } - - return err; + err_cnt++; + continue; }
pr_cont("jited:%u ", fp->jited); --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -1053,11 +1053,9 @@ static struct bpf_prog *bpf_migrate_filt */ goto out_err_free;
- /* We are guaranteed to never error here with cBPF to eBPF - * transitions, since there's no issue with type compatibility - * checks on program arrays. - */ fp = bpf_prog_select_runtime(fp, &err); + if (err) + goto out_err_free;
kfree(old_prog); return fp; --- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c @@ -325,7 +325,13 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] .data = &bpf_jit_enable, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, +#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON .proc_handler = proc_dointvec +#else + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &one, + .extra2 = &one, +#endif }, # ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT { --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -2642,6 +2642,15 @@ out_fs:
core_initcall(sock_init); /* early initcall */
+static int __init jit_init(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON + bpf_jit_enable = 1; +#endif + return 0; +} +pure_initcall(jit_init); + #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS void socket_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq) {
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch queue-4.14/bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch queue-4.14/bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch
[ upstream commit be95a845cc4402272994ce290e3ad928aff06cb9 ]
In addition to commit b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") also change the layout of struct bpf_map such that false sharing of fast-path members like max_entries is avoided when the maps reference counter is altered. Therefore enforce them to be placed into separate cachelines.
pahole dump after change:
struct bpf_map { const struct bpf_map_ops * ops; /* 0 8 */ struct bpf_map * inner_map_meta; /* 8 8 */ void * security; /* 16 8 */ enum bpf_map_type map_type; /* 24 4 */ u32 key_size; /* 28 4 */ u32 value_size; /* 32 4 */ u32 max_entries; /* 36 4 */ u32 map_flags; /* 40 4 */ u32 pages; /* 44 4 */ u32 id; /* 48 4 */ int numa_node; /* 52 4 */ bool unpriv_array; /* 56 1 */
/* XXX 7 bytes hole, try to pack */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ struct user_struct * user; /* 64 8 */ atomic_t refcnt; /* 72 4 */ atomic_t usercnt; /* 76 4 */ struct work_struct work; /* 80 32 */ char name[16]; /* 112 16 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) --- */
/* size: 128, cachelines: 2, members: 17 */ /* sum members: 121, holes: 1, sum holes: 7 */ };
Now all entries in the first cacheline are read only throughout the life time of the map, set up once during map creation. Overall struct size and number of cachelines doesn't change from the reordering. struct bpf_map is usually first member and embedded in map structs in specific map implementations, so also avoid those members to sit at the end where it could potentially share the cacheline with first map values e.g. in the array since remote CPUs could trigger map updates just as well for those (easily dirtying members like max_entries intentionally as well) while having subsequent values in cache.
Quoting from Google's Project Zero blog [1]:
Additionally, at least on the Intel machine on which this was tested, bouncing modified cache lines between cores is slow, apparently because the MESI protocol is used for cache coherence [8]. Changing the reference counter of an eBPF array on one physical CPU core causes the cache line containing the reference counter to be bounced over to that CPU core, making reads of the reference counter on all other CPU cores slow until the changed reference counter has been written back to memory. Because the length and the reference counter of an eBPF array are stored in the same cache line, this also means that changing the reference counter on one physical CPU core causes reads of the eBPF array's length to be slow on other physical CPU cores (intentional false sharing).
While this doesn't 'control' the out-of-bounds speculation through masking the index as in commit b2157399cc98, triggering a manipulation of the map's reference counter is really trivial, so lets not allow to easily affect max_entries from it.
Splitting to separate cachelines also generally makes sense from a performance perspective anyway in that fast-path won't have a cache miss if the map gets pinned, reused in other progs, etc out of control path, thus also avoids unintentional false sharing.
[1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ch/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with...
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org --- include/linux/bpf.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 0bcf803..5c5be80 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -42,7 +42,14 @@ struct bpf_map_ops { };
struct bpf_map { - atomic_t refcnt; + /* 1st cacheline with read-mostly members of which some + * are also accessed in fast-path (e.g. ops, max_entries). + */ + const struct bpf_map_ops *ops ____cacheline_aligned; + struct bpf_map *inner_map_meta; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; +#endif enum bpf_map_type map_type; u32 key_size; u32 value_size; @@ -52,11 +59,15 @@ struct bpf_map { u32 id; int numa_node; bool unpriv_array; - struct user_struct *user; - const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; - struct work_struct work; + /* 7 bytes hole */ + + /* 2nd cacheline with misc members to avoid false sharing + * particularly with refcounting. + */ + struct user_struct *user ____cacheline_aligned; + atomic_t refcnt; atomic_t usercnt; - struct bpf_map *inner_map_meta; + struct work_struct work; };
/* function argument constraints */
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: avoid false sharing of map refcount with max_entries
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Jan 29 13:14:09 CET 2018
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:36:43 +0100 Subject: bpf: avoid false sharing of map refcount with max_entries To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Message-ID: 20180128233647.21154-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
[ upstream commit be95a845cc4402272994ce290e3ad928aff06cb9 ]
In addition to commit b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") also change the layout of struct bpf_map such that false sharing of fast-path members like max_entries is avoided when the maps reference counter is altered. Therefore enforce them to be placed into separate cachelines.
pahole dump after change:
struct bpf_map { const struct bpf_map_ops * ops; /* 0 8 */ struct bpf_map * inner_map_meta; /* 8 8 */ void * security; /* 16 8 */ enum bpf_map_type map_type; /* 24 4 */ u32 key_size; /* 28 4 */ u32 value_size; /* 32 4 */ u32 max_entries; /* 36 4 */ u32 map_flags; /* 40 4 */ u32 pages; /* 44 4 */ u32 id; /* 48 4 */ int numa_node; /* 52 4 */ bool unpriv_array; /* 56 1 */
/* XXX 7 bytes hole, try to pack */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */ struct user_struct * user; /* 64 8 */ atomic_t refcnt; /* 72 4 */ atomic_t usercnt; /* 76 4 */ struct work_struct work; /* 80 32 */ char name[16]; /* 112 16 */ /* --- cacheline 2 boundary (128 bytes) --- */
/* size: 128, cachelines: 2, members: 17 */ /* sum members: 121, holes: 1, sum holes: 7 */ };
Now all entries in the first cacheline are read only throughout the life time of the map, set up once during map creation. Overall struct size and number of cachelines doesn't change from the reordering. struct bpf_map is usually first member and embedded in map structs in specific map implementations, so also avoid those members to sit at the end where it could potentially share the cacheline with first map values e.g. in the array since remote CPUs could trigger map updates just as well for those (easily dirtying members like max_entries intentionally as well) while having subsequent values in cache.
Quoting from Google's Project Zero blog [1]:
Additionally, at least on the Intel machine on which this was tested, bouncing modified cache lines between cores is slow, apparently because the MESI protocol is used for cache coherence [8]. Changing the reference counter of an eBPF array on one physical CPU core causes the cache line containing the reference counter to be bounced over to that CPU core, making reads of the reference counter on all other CPU cores slow until the changed reference counter has been written back to memory. Because the length and the reference counter of an eBPF array are stored in the same cache line, this also means that changing the reference counter on one physical CPU core causes reads of the eBPF array's length to be slow on other physical CPU cores (intentional false sharing).
While this doesn't 'control' the out-of-bounds speculation through masking the index as in commit b2157399cc98, triggering a manipulation of the map's reference counter is really trivial, so lets not allow to easily affect max_entries from it.
Splitting to separate cachelines also generally makes sense from a performance perspective anyway in that fast-path won't have a cache miss if the map gets pinned, reused in other progs, etc out of control path, thus also avoids unintentional false sharing.
[1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ch/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with...
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/bpf.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -42,7 +42,14 @@ struct bpf_map_ops { };
struct bpf_map { - atomic_t refcnt; + /* 1st cacheline with read-mostly members of which some + * are also accessed in fast-path (e.g. ops, max_entries). + */ + const struct bpf_map_ops *ops ____cacheline_aligned; + struct bpf_map *inner_map_meta; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; +#endif enum bpf_map_type map_type; u32 key_size; u32 value_size; @@ -52,11 +59,15 @@ struct bpf_map { u32 id; int numa_node; bool unpriv_array; - struct user_struct *user; - const struct bpf_map_ops *ops; - struct work_struct work; + /* 7 bytes hole */ + + /* 2nd cacheline with misc members to avoid false sharing + * particularly with refcounting. + */ + struct user_struct *user ____cacheline_aligned; + atomic_t refcnt; atomic_t usercnt; - struct bpf_map *inner_map_meta; + struct work_struct work; };
/* function argument constraints */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch queue-4.14/bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch queue-4.14/bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
[ upstream commit c366287ebd698ef5e3de300d90cd62ee9ee7373e ]
Divides by zero are not nice, lets avoid them if possible.
Also do_div() seems not needed when dealing with 32bit operands, but this seems a minor detail.
Fixes: bd4cf0ed331a ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index aaa4424..2246115 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ static unsigned int ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, DST = tmp; CONT; ALU_MOD_X: - if (unlikely(SRC == 0)) + if (unlikely((u32)SRC == 0)) return 0; tmp = (u32) DST; DST = do_div(tmp, (u32) SRC); @@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ static unsigned int ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, DST = div64_u64(DST, SRC); CONT; ALU_DIV_X: - if (unlikely(SRC == 0)) + if (unlikely((u32)SRC == 0)) return 0; tmp = (u32) DST; do_div(tmp, (u32) SRC);
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: fix divides by zero
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Jan 29 13:14:09 CET 2018
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:36:44 +0100 Subject: bpf: fix divides by zero To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Message-ID: 20180128233647.21154-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
[ upstream commit c366287ebd698ef5e3de300d90cd62ee9ee7373e ]
Divides by zero are not nice, lets avoid them if possible.
Also do_div() seems not needed when dealing with 32bit operands, but this seems a minor detail.
Fixes: bd4cf0ed331a ("net: filter: rework/optimize internal BPF interpreter's instruction set") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ select_insn: DST = tmp; CONT; ALU_MOD_X: - if (unlikely(SRC == 0)) + if (unlikely((u32)SRC == 0)) return 0; tmp = (u32) DST; DST = do_div(tmp, (u32) SRC); @@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ select_insn: DST = div64_u64(DST, SRC); CONT; ALU_DIV_X: - if (unlikely(SRC == 0)) + if (unlikely((u32)SRC == 0)) return 0; tmp = (u32) DST; do_div(tmp, (u32) SRC);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch queue-4.14/bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch queue-4.14/bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch
From: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org
[ upstream commit 68fda450a7df51cff9e5a4d4a4d9d0d5f2589153 ]
due to some JITs doing if (src_reg == 0) check in 64-bit mode for div/mod operations mask upper 32-bits of src register before doing the check
Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT") Fixes: 7a12b5031c6b ("sparc64: Add eBPF JIT.") Reported-by: syzbot+48340bb518e88849e2e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ net/core/filter.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 75a5c33..ab2be68 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4304,6 +4304,24 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int i, cnt, delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || + insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { + /* due to JIT bugs clear upper 32-bits of src register + * before div/mod operation + */ + insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg); + insn_buf[1] = *insn; + cnt = 2; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + continue; + } + if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) continue;
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 29043bd..d5158a1 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -457,6 +457,10 @@ static int bpf_convert_filter(struct sock_filter *prog, int len, convert_bpf_extensions(fp, &insn)) break;
+ if (fp->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || + fp->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X)) + *insn++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(BPF_REG_X, BPF_REG_X); + *insn = BPF_RAW_INSN(fp->code, BPF_REG_A, BPF_REG_X, 0, fp->k); break;
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Jan 29 13:14:09 CET 2018
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:36:45 +0100 Subject: bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Message-ID: 20180128233647.21154-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
From: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org
[ upstream commit 68fda450a7df51cff9e5a4d4a4d9d0d5f2589153 ]
due to some JITs doing if (src_reg == 0) check in 64-bit mode for div/mod operations mask upper 32-bits of src register before doing the check
Fixes: 622582786c9e ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT") Fixes: 7a12b5031c6b ("sparc64: Add eBPF JIT.") Reported-by: syzbot+48340bb518e88849e2e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ net/core/filter.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4304,6 +4304,24 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve int i, cnt, delta = 0;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) || + insn->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X)) { + /* due to JIT bugs clear upper 32-bits of src register + * before div/mod operation + */ + insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg); + insn_buf[1] = *insn; + cnt = 2; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + continue; + } + if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL)) continue;
--- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -457,6 +457,10 @@ do_pass: convert_bpf_extensions(fp, &insn)) break;
+ if (fp->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X) || + fp->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_X)) + *insn++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(BPF_REG_X, BPF_REG_X); + *insn = BPF_RAW_INSN(fp->code, BPF_REG_A, BPF_REG_X, 0, fp->k); break;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch queue-4.14/bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch queue-4.14/bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch
[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ]
Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.
The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add test cases as well for BPF selftests.
Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index ab2be68..f9339c3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -986,6 +986,13 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]); }
+static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) +{ + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &env->cur_state.regs[regno]; + + return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; +} + static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size, bool strict) { @@ -1258,6 +1265,12 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins return -EACCES; }
+ if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { + verbose("BPF_XADD stores into R%d context is not allowed\n", + insn->dst_reg); + return -EACCES; + } + /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1); @@ -3859,6 +3872,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (err) return err;
+ if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { + verbose("BPF_ST stores into R%d context is not allowed\n", + insn->dst_reg); + return -EACCES; + } + /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c index 1241487..1629993 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -2596,6 +2596,29 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, }, { + "context stores via ST", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark), 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "BPF_ST stores into R1 context is not allowed", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { + "context stores via XADD", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, + BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark), 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "BPF_XADD stores into R1 context is not allowed", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { "direct packet access: test1", .insns = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, @@ -4317,7 +4340,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { .fixup_map1 = { 2 }, .errstr_unpriv = "R2 leaks addr into mem", .result_unpriv = REJECT, - .result = ACCEPT, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "BPF_XADD stores into R1 context is not allowed", }, { "leak pointer into ctx 2", @@ -4331,7 +4355,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { }, .errstr_unpriv = "R10 leaks addr into mem", .result_unpriv = REJECT, - .result = ACCEPT, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "BPF_XADD stores into R1 context is not allowed", }, { "leak pointer into ctx 3",
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Jan 29 13:14:09 CET 2018
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:36:46 +0100 Subject: bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Message-ID: 20180128233647.21154-6-daniel@iogearbox.net
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ]
Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.
The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add test cases as well for BPF selftests.
Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields") Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -986,6 +986,13 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_ return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]); }
+static bool is_ctx_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) +{ + const struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &env->cur_state.regs[regno]; + + return reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX; +} + static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size, bool strict) { @@ -1258,6 +1265,12 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifie return -EACCES; }
+ if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { + verbose("BPF_XADD stores into R%d context is not allowed\n", + insn->dst_reg); + return -EACCES; + } + /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1); @@ -3859,6 +3872,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_ if (err) return err;
+ if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) { + verbose("BPF_ST stores into R%d context is not allowed\n", + insn->dst_reg); + return -EACCES; + } + /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -2596,6 +2596,29 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, }, { + "context stores via ST", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark), 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "BPF_ST stores into R1 context is not allowed", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { + "context stores via XADD", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_STX | BPF_XADD | BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, + BPF_REG_0, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark), 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .errstr = "BPF_XADD stores into R1 context is not allowed", + .result = REJECT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + }, + { "direct packet access: test1", .insns = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, @@ -4317,7 +4340,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { .fixup_map1 = { 2 }, .errstr_unpriv = "R2 leaks addr into mem", .result_unpriv = REJECT, - .result = ACCEPT, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "BPF_XADD stores into R1 context is not allowed", }, { "leak pointer into ctx 2", @@ -4331,7 +4355,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { }, .errstr_unpriv = "R10 leaks addr into mem", .result_unpriv = REJECT, - .result = ACCEPT, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "BPF_XADD stores into R1 context is not allowed", }, { "leak pointer into ctx 3",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch queue-4.14/bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch queue-4.14/bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch
[ upstream commit a2284d912bfc865cdca4c00488e08a3550f9a405 ]
Using dynamic stack_depth tracking in arm64 JIT is currently broken in combination with tail calls. In prologue, we cache ctx->stack_size and adjust SP reg for setting up function call stack, and tearing it down again in epilogue. Problem is that when doing a tail call, the cached ctx->stack_size might not be the same.
One way to fix the problem with minimal overhead is to re-adjust SP in emit_bpf_tail_call() and properly adjust it to the current program's ctx->stack_size. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8.
Fixes: f1c9eed7f437 ("bpf, arm64: take advantage of stack_depth tracking") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index ba38d40..bb32f7f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static inline int epilogue_offset(const struct jit_ctx *ctx) /* Stack must be multiples of 16B */ #define STACK_ALIGN(sz) (((sz) + 15) & ~15)
-#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 8 +/* Tail call offset to jump into */ +#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 7
static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx) { @@ -200,19 +201,19 @@ static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx) /* Initialize tail_call_cnt */ emit(A64_MOVZ(1, tcc, 0, 0), ctx);
- /* 4 byte extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */ - ctx->stack_size = prog->aux->stack_depth + 4; - ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(ctx->stack_size); - - /* Set up function call stack */ - emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx); - cur_offset = ctx->idx - idx0; if (cur_offset != PROLOGUE_OFFSET) { pr_err_once("PROLOGUE_OFFSET = %d, expected %d!\n", cur_offset, PROLOGUE_OFFSET); return -1; } + + /* 4 byte extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */ + ctx->stack_size = prog->aux->stack_depth + 4; + ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(ctx->stack_size); + + /* Set up function call stack */ + emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx); return 0; }
@@ -260,11 +261,12 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx) emit(A64_LDR64(prg, tmp, prg), ctx); emit(A64_CBZ(1, prg, jmp_offset), ctx);
- /* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_size); */ + /* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_offset); */ off = offsetof(struct bpf_prog, bpf_func); emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, off, ctx); emit(A64_LDR64(tmp, prg, tmp), ctx); emit(A64_ADD_I(1, tmp, tmp, sizeof(u32) * PROLOGUE_OFFSET), ctx); + emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx); emit(A64_BR(tmp), ctx);
/* out: */
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
bpf, arm64: fix stack_depth tracking in combination with tail calls
to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git%3Ba=su...
The filename of the patch is: bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let stable@vger.kernel.org know about it.
From foo@baz Mon Jan 29 13:14:09 CET 2018
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:36:47 +0100 Subject: bpf, arm64: fix stack_depth tracking in combination with tail calls To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: ast@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Message-ID: 20180128233647.21154-7-daniel@iogearbox.net
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
[ upstream commit a2284d912bfc865cdca4c00488e08a3550f9a405 ]
Using dynamic stack_depth tracking in arm64 JIT is currently broken in combination with tail calls. In prologue, we cache ctx->stack_size and adjust SP reg for setting up function call stack, and tearing it down again in epilogue. Problem is that when doing a tail call, the cached ctx->stack_size might not be the same.
One way to fix the problem with minimal overhead is to re-adjust SP in emit_bpf_tail_call() and properly adjust it to the current program's ctx->stack_size. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8.
Fixes: f1c9eed7f437 ("bpf, arm64: take advantage of stack_depth tracking") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static inline int epilogue_offset(const /* Stack must be multiples of 16B */ #define STACK_ALIGN(sz) (((sz) + 15) & ~15)
-#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 8 +/* Tail call offset to jump into */ +#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 7
static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx) { @@ -200,19 +201,19 @@ static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx /* Initialize tail_call_cnt */ emit(A64_MOVZ(1, tcc, 0, 0), ctx);
- /* 4 byte extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */ - ctx->stack_size = prog->aux->stack_depth + 4; - ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(ctx->stack_size); - - /* Set up function call stack */ - emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx); - cur_offset = ctx->idx - idx0; if (cur_offset != PROLOGUE_OFFSET) { pr_err_once("PROLOGUE_OFFSET = %d, expected %d!\n", cur_offset, PROLOGUE_OFFSET); return -1; } + + /* 4 byte extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */ + ctx->stack_size = prog->aux->stack_depth + 4; + ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(ctx->stack_size); + + /* Set up function call stack */ + emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx); return 0; }
@@ -260,11 +261,12 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit emit(A64_LDR64(prg, tmp, prg), ctx); emit(A64_CBZ(1, prg, jmp_offset), ctx);
- /* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_size); */ + /* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_offset); */ off = offsetof(struct bpf_prog, bpf_func); emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, off, ctx); emit(A64_LDR64(tmp, prg, tmp), ctx); emit(A64_ADD_I(1, tmp, tmp, sizeof(u32) * PROLOGUE_OFFSET), ctx); + emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx); emit(A64_BR(tmp), ctx);
/* out: */
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from daniel@iogearbox.net are
queue-4.14/bpf-avoid-false-sharing-of-map-refcount-with-max_entries.patch queue-4.14/bpf-reject-stores-into-ctx-via-st-and-xadd.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-32-bit-divide-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-fix-divides-by-zero.patch queue-4.14/bpf-arm64-fix-stack_depth-tracking-in-combination-with-tail-calls.patch queue-4.14/bpf-introduce-bpf_jit_always_on-config.patch
On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 12:36:41AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
All for 4.14 backported and tested.
Thanks!
Alexei Starovoitov (2): bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config bpf: fix 32-bit divide by zero
Daniel Borkmann (3): bpf: avoid false sharing of map refcount with max_entries bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd bpf, arm64: fix stack_depth tracking in combination with tail calls
Eric Dumazet (1): bpf: fix divides by zero
Thanks for these, all now queued up.
greg k-h
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Daniel Borkmann -
Greg KH -
gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org