From: Sascha Hauer s.hauer@pengutronix.de
[ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ]
integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is a short read then this positive value is returned from ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value. Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error, so translate a short read into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 20e66291ca99a..5155c343406e0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -298,8 +298,11 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]); rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len); - if (rc != rbuf_len) + if (rc != rbuf_len) { + if (rc >= 0) + rc = -EINVAL; goto out3; + }
if (rbuf[1] && offset) { /* Using two buffers, and it is not the first
From: Jia-Ju Bai baijiaju1990@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit e2751463eaa6f9fec8fea80abbdc62dbc487b3c5 ]
In encode_attrs(), there is an if statement on line 1145 to check whether label is NULL: if (label && (attrmask[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL))
When label is NULL, it is used on lines 1178-1181: *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len); p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, label->label, label->len);
To fix these bugs, label is checked before being used.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai baijiaju1990@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c index 5e2724a928ed3..d7f8d5ce30e3e 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c @@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap, } else *p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME); } - if (bmval[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL) { + if (label && (bmval[2] & FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL)) { *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->lfs); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->pi); *p++ = cpu_to_be32(label->len);
From: Chengguang Xu cgxu519@zoho.com.cn
[ Upstream commit c87a37ebd40b889178664c2c09cc187334146292 ]
Currently on mmap cache policy, we always attach writeback_fid whether mmap type is SHARED or PRIVATE. However, in the use case of kata-container which combines 9p(Guest OS) with overlayfs(Host OS), this behavior will trigger overlayfs' copy-up when excute command inside container.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820100325.10313-1-cgxu519@zoho.com.cn Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu cgxu519@zoho.com.cn Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet dominique.martinet@cea.fr Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/9p/vfs_file.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_file.c b/fs/9p/vfs_file.c index 79ff727254bb6..e963b83afc717 100644 --- a/fs/9p/vfs_file.c +++ b/fs/9p/vfs_file.c @@ -528,6 +528,7 @@ v9fs_mmap_file_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) v9inode = V9FS_I(inode); mutex_lock(&v9inode->v_mutex); if (!v9inode->writeback_fid && + (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) { /* * clone a fid and add it to writeback_fid @@ -629,6 +630,8 @@ static void v9fs_mmap_vm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma) (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start - 1), };
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) + return;
p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_VFS, "9p VMA close, %p, flushing", vma);
From: Igor Druzhinin igor.druzhinin@citrix.com
[ Upstream commit a4098bc6eed5e31e0391bcc068e61804c98138df ]
If MCFG area is not reserved in E820, Xen by default will defer its usage until Dom0 registers it explicitly after ACPI parser recognizes it as a reserved resource in DSDT. Having it reserved in E820 is not mandatory according to "PCI Firmware Specification, rev 3.2" (par. 4.1.2) and firmware is free to keep a hole in E820 in that place. Xen doesn't know what exactly is inside this hole since it lacks full ACPI view of the platform therefore it's potentially harmful to access MCFG region without additional checks as some machines are known to provide inconsistent information on the size of the region.
Now xen_mcfg_late() runs after acpi_init() which is too late as some basic PCI enumeration starts exactly there as well. Trying to register a device prior to MCFG reservation causes multiple problems with PCIe extended capability initializations in Xen (e.g. SR-IOV VF BAR sizing). There are no convenient hooks for us to subscribe to so register MCFG areas earlier upon the first invocation of xen_add_device(). It should be safe to do once since all the boot time buses must have their MCFG areas in MCFG table already and we don't support PCI bus hot-plug.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin igor.druzhinin@citrix.com Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/xen/pci.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/pci.c b/drivers/xen/pci.c index 7494dbeb4409c..db58aaa4dc598 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/pci.c +++ b/drivers/xen/pci.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ #include "../pci/pci.h" #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG #include <asm/pci_x86.h> + +static int xen_mcfg_late(void); #endif
static bool __read_mostly pci_seg_supported = true; @@ -40,7 +42,18 @@ static int xen_add_device(struct device *dev) #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV struct pci_dev *physfn = pci_dev->physfn; #endif - +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG + static bool pci_mcfg_reserved = false; + /* + * Reserve MCFG areas in Xen on first invocation due to this being + * potentially called from inside of acpi_init immediately after + * MCFG table has been finally parsed. + */ + if (!pci_mcfg_reserved) { + xen_mcfg_late(); + pci_mcfg_reserved = true; + } +#endif if (pci_seg_supported) { struct { struct physdev_pci_device_add add; @@ -213,7 +226,7 @@ static int __init register_xen_pci_notifier(void) arch_initcall(register_xen_pci_notifier);
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG -static int __init xen_mcfg_late(void) +static int xen_mcfg_late(void) { struct pci_mmcfg_region *cfg; int rc; @@ -252,8 +265,4 @@ static int __init xen_mcfg_late(void) } return 0; } -/* - * Needs to be done after acpi_init which are subsys_initcall. - */ -subsys_initcall_sync(xen_mcfg_late); #endif
From: Luis Henriques lhenriques@suse.com
[ Upstream commit 750670341a24cb714e624e0fd7da30900ad93752 ]
When filling an inode with info from the MDS, i_blkbits is being initialized using fl_stripe_unit, which contains the stripe unit in bytes. Unfortunately, this doesn't make sense for directories as they have fl_stripe_unit set to '0'. This means that i_blkbits will be set to 0xff, causing an UBSAN undefined behaviour in i_blocksize():
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ./include/linux/fs.h:731:12 shift exponent 255 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Fix this by initializing i_blkbits to CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT if fl_stripe_unit is zero.
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques lhenriques@suse.com Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton jlayton@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ceph/inode.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c index 339fdf6355df7..7fcddaaca8a5d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/inode.c +++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c @@ -800,7 +800,12 @@ static int fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, ci->i_version = le64_to_cpu(info->version); inode->i_version++; inode->i_rdev = le32_to_cpu(info->rdev); - inode->i_blkbits = fls(le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) - 1; + /* directories have fl_stripe_unit set to zero */ + if (le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) + inode->i_blkbits = + fls(le32_to_cpu(info->layout.fl_stripe_unit)) - 1; + else + inode->i_blkbits = CEPH_BLOCK_SHIFT;
if ((new_version || (new_issued & CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED)) && (issued & CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL) == 0) {
From: Erqi Chen chenerqi@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 71a228bc8d65900179e37ac309e678f8c523f133 ]
If client mds session is evicted in CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPENING state, mds won't send session msg to client, and delayed_work skip CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPENING state session, the session hang forever.
Allow ceph_con_keepalive to reconnect a session in OPENING to avoid session hang. Also, ensure that we skip sessions in RESTARTING and REJECTED states since those states can't be resurrected by issuing a keepalive.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/41551 Signed-off-by: Erqi Chen chenerqi@gmail.com Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" zyan@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton jlayton@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index 67cb9d078bfa7..3139fbd4c34e3 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -3410,7 +3410,9 @@ static void delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) pr_info("mds%d hung\n", s->s_mds); } } - if (s->s_state < CEPH_MDS_SESSION_OPEN) { + if (s->s_state == CEPH_MDS_SESSION_NEW || + s->s_state == CEPH_MDS_SESSION_RESTARTING || + s->s_state == CEPH_MDS_SESSION_REJECTED) { /* this mds is failed or recovering, just wait */ ceph_put_mds_session(s); continue;
From: Trek trek00@inbox.ru
[ Upstream commit 73d8e6c7b841d9bf298c8928f228fb433676635c ]
Do not try to allocate any amount of memory requested by the user. Instead limit it to 128 registers. Actually the longest series of consecutive allowed registers are 48, mmGB_TILE_MODE0-31 and mmGB_MACROTILE_MODE0-15 (0x2644-0x2673).
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111273 Signed-off-by: Trek trek00@inbox.ru Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c index 3938fca1ea8e5..24941a7b659f4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c @@ -430,6 +430,9 @@ static int amdgpu_info_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file if (sh_num == AMDGPU_INFO_MMR_SH_INDEX_MASK) sh_num = 0xffffffff;
+ if (info->read_mmr_reg.count > 128) + return -EINVAL; + regs = kmalloc_array(info->read_mmr_reg.count, sizeof(*regs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!regs) return -ENOMEM;
From: Bjørn Mork bjorn@mork.no
[ Upstream commit 3fe4b3351301660653a2bc73f2226da0ebd2b95e ]
Endpoints with zero wMaxPacketSize are not usable for transferring data. Ignore such endpoints when looking for valid in, out and status pipes, to make the driver more robust against invalid and meaningless descriptors.
The wMaxPacketSize of the out pipe is used as divisor. So this change fixes a divide-by-zero bug.
Reported-by: syzbot+ce366e2b8296e25d84f5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork bjorn@mork.no Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c index 7b158674ceeda..43e28d2b0de7f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c @@ -679,8 +679,12 @@ cdc_ncm_find_endpoints(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) u8 ep;
for (ep = 0; ep < intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) { - e = intf->cur_altsetting->endpoint + ep; + + /* ignore endpoints which cannot transfer data */ + if (!usb_endpoint_maxp(&e->desc)) + continue; + switch (e->desc.bmAttributes & USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK) { case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT: if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc)) {
From: Bjørn Mork bjorn@mork.no
[ Upstream commit 8d3d7c2029c1b360f1a6b0a2fca470b57eb575c0 ]
Endpoints with zero wMaxPacketSize are not usable for transferring data. Ignore such endpoints when looking for valid in, out and status pipes, to make the drivers more robust against invalid and meaningless descriptors.
The wMaxPacketSize of these endpoints are used for memory allocations and as divisors in many usbnet minidrivers. Avoiding zero is therefore critical.
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork bjorn@mork.no Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c index a5acbcb3c0445..6d0efeb28f5cb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ int usbnet_get_endpoints(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf) int intr = 0;
e = alt->endpoint + ep; + + /* ignore endpoints which cannot transfer data */ + if (!usb_endpoint_maxp(&e->desc)) + continue; + switch (e->desc.bmAttributes) { case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT: if (!usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc))
From: Peter Mamonov pmamonov@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit e47488b2df7f9cb405789c7f5d4c27909fc597ae ]
According to the DP83865 datasheet "the 10 Mbps HDX loopback can be disabled in the expanded memory register 0x1C0.1". The driver erroneously used bit 0 instead of bit 1.
Fixes: 4621bf129856 ("phy: Add file missed in previous commit.") Signed-off-by: Peter Mamonov pmamonov@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn andrew@lunn.ch Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/phy/national.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/national.c b/drivers/net/phy/national.c index 2a1b490bc5871..718cd3c59e92c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/national.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/national.c @@ -110,14 +110,17 @@ static void ns_giga_speed_fallback(struct phy_device *phydev, int mode)
static void ns_10_base_t_hdx_loopack(struct phy_device *phydev, int disable) { + u16 lb_dis = BIT(1); + if (disable) - ns_exp_write(phydev, 0x1c0, ns_exp_read(phydev, 0x1c0) | 1); + ns_exp_write(phydev, 0x1c0, + ns_exp_read(phydev, 0x1c0) | lb_dis); else ns_exp_write(phydev, 0x1c0, - ns_exp_read(phydev, 0x1c0) & 0xfffe); + ns_exp_read(phydev, 0x1c0) & ~lb_dis);
pr_debug("10BASE-T HDX loopback %s\n", - (ns_exp_read(phydev, 0x1c0) & 0x0001) ? "off" : "on"); + (ns_exp_read(phydev, 0x1c0) & lb_dis) ? "off" : "on"); }
static int ns_config_init(struct phy_device *phydev)
From: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com
[ Upstream commit 1851799e1d2978f68eea5d9dff322e121dcf59c1 ]
thermal_zone_device_unregister() cancels the delayed work that polls the thermal zone, but it does not wait for it to finish. This is racy with respect to the freeing of the thermal zone device, which can result in a use-after-free [1].
Fix this by waiting for the delayed work to finish before freeing the thermal zone device. Note that thermal_zone_device_set_polling() is never invoked from an atomic context, so it is safe to call cancel_delayed_work_sync() that can block.
[1] [ +0.002221] ================================================================== [ +0.000064] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x1076/0x11c0 [ +0.000016] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881e48e0450 by task kworker/1:0/17
[ +0.000023] CPU: 1 PID: 17 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-custom-02495-g8e73ca3be4af #1701 [ +0.000010] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2100-CB2FO/SA001017, BIOS 5.6.5 06/07/2016 [ +0.000016] Workqueue: events_freezable_power_ thermal_zone_device_check [ +0.000012] Call Trace: [ +0.000021] dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e [ +0.000020] print_address_description.cold.2+0x9/0x25e [ +0.000018] __kasan_report.cold.3+0x78/0x9d [ +0.000016] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ +0.000016] __mutex_lock+0x1076/0x11c0 [ +0.000014] step_wise_throttle+0x72/0x150 [ +0.000018] handle_thermal_trip+0x167/0x760 [ +0.000019] thermal_zone_device_update+0x19e/0x5f0 [ +0.000019] process_one_work+0x969/0x16f0 [ +0.000017] worker_thread+0x91/0xc40 [ +0.000014] kthread+0x33d/0x400 [ +0.000015] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ +0.000020] Allocated by task 1: [ +0.000015] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ +0.000015] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.4+0xc1/0xd0 [ +0.000014] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x320 [ +0.000015] thermal_zone_device_register+0x1b4/0x13a0 [ +0.000015] mlxsw_thermal_init+0xc92/0x23d0 [ +0.000014] __mlxsw_core_bus_device_register+0x659/0x11b0 [ +0.000013] mlxsw_core_bus_device_register+0x3d/0x90 [ +0.000013] mlxsw_pci_probe+0x355/0x4b0 [ +0.000014] local_pci_probe+0xc3/0x150 [ +0.000013] pci_device_probe+0x280/0x410 [ +0.000013] really_probe+0x26a/0xbb0 [ +0.000013] driver_probe_device+0x208/0x2e0 [ +0.000013] device_driver_attach+0xfe/0x140 [ +0.000013] __driver_attach+0x110/0x310 [ +0.000013] bus_for_each_dev+0x14b/0x1d0 [ +0.000013] driver_register+0x1c0/0x400 [ +0.000015] mlxsw_sp_module_init+0x5d/0xd3 [ +0.000014] do_one_initcall+0x239/0x4dd [ +0.000013] kernel_init_freeable+0x42b/0x4e8 [ +0.000012] kernel_init+0x11/0x18b [ +0.000013] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ +0.000015] Freed by task 581: [ +0.000013] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ +0.000014] __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170 [ +0.000013] kfree+0xf3/0x310 [ +0.000013] thermal_release+0xc7/0xf0 [ +0.000014] device_release+0x77/0x200 [ +0.000014] kobject_put+0x1a8/0x4c0 [ +0.000014] device_unregister+0x38/0xc0 [ +0.000014] thermal_zone_device_unregister+0x54e/0x6a0 [ +0.000014] mlxsw_thermal_fini+0x184/0x35a [ +0.000014] mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister+0x10a/0x640 [ +0.000013] mlxsw_devlink_core_bus_device_reload+0x92/0x210 [ +0.000015] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0x113/0x1f0 [ +0.000014] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x700/0xee0 [ +0.000013] genl_rcv_msg+0xca/0x170 [ +0.000013] netlink_rcv_skb+0x137/0x3a0 [ +0.000012] genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 [ +0.000013] netlink_unicast+0x49b/0x660 [ +0.000013] netlink_sendmsg+0x755/0xc90 [ +0.000013] __sys_sendto+0x3de/0x430 [ +0.000013] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe2/0x1b0 [ +0.000013] do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x4d0 [ +0.000013] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ +0.000017] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881e48e0008 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 [ +0.000012] The buggy address is located 1096 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8881e48e0008, ffff8881e48e0808) [ +0.000007] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ +0.000012] page:ffffea0007923800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88823680d0c0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ +0.000020] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) [ +0.000019] raw: 0200000000010200 ffffea0007682008 ffffea00076ab808 ffff88823680d0c0 [ +0.000016] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000d000d 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ +0.000007] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ +0.000012] Memory state around the buggy address: [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000012] >ffff8881e48e0400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000008] ^ [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000012] ffff8881e48e0500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ +0.000007] ==================================================================
Fixes: b1569e99c795 ("ACPI: move thermal trip handling to generic thermal layer") Reported-by: Jiri Pirko jiri@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com Acked-by: Jiri Pirko jiri@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui rui.zhang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c b/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c index cd82ae34ddfa3..57603be42c507 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static void thermal_zone_device_set_polling(struct thermal_zone_device *tz, mod_delayed_work(system_freezable_wq, &tz->poll_queue, msecs_to_jiffies(delay)); else - cancel_delayed_work(&tz->poll_queue); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&tz->poll_queue); }
static void monitor_thermal_zone(struct thermal_zone_device *tz)
From: zhengbin zhengbin13@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 9ad09b1976c562061636ff1e01bfc3a57aebe56b ]
If cuse_send_init fails, need to fuse_conn_put cc->fc.
cuse_channel_open->fuse_conn_init->refcount_set(&fc->count, 1) ->fuse_dev_alloc->fuse_conn_get ->fuse_dev_free->fuse_conn_put
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure") Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Signed-off-by: zhengbin zhengbin13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi mszeredi@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/fuse/cuse.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/cuse.c b/fs/fuse/cuse.c index c5b6b71654893..d9aba97007267 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/cuse.c +++ b/fs/fuse/cuse.c @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ static int cuse_channel_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) rc = cuse_send_init(cc); if (rc) { fuse_dev_free(fud); + fuse_conn_put(&cc->fc); return rc; } file->private_data = fud;
From: Uwe Kleine-König u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de
[ Upstream commit 02a07046834e64970f3bcd87a422ac2b0adb80de ]
struct archdr is only big enough to hold the header of various types of arcnet packets. So to provide enough space to hold the data read from hardware provide a buffer large enough to hold a packet with maximal size.
The problem was noticed by the stack protector which makes the kernel oops.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Michael Grzeschik m.grzeschik@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/arcnet/arcnet.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/arcnet/arcnet.c b/drivers/net/arcnet/arcnet.c index 6ea963e3b89a1..85ffd0561827e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/arcnet/arcnet.c +++ b/drivers/net/arcnet/arcnet.c @@ -1009,31 +1009,34 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(arcnet_interrupt); static void arcnet_rx(struct net_device *dev, int bufnum) { struct arcnet_local *lp = netdev_priv(dev); - struct archdr pkt; + union { + struct archdr pkt; + char buf[512]; + } rxdata; struct arc_rfc1201 *soft; int length, ofs;
- soft = &pkt.soft.rfc1201; + soft = &rxdata.pkt.soft.rfc1201;
- lp->hw.copy_from_card(dev, bufnum, 0, &pkt, ARC_HDR_SIZE); - if (pkt.hard.offset[0]) { - ofs = pkt.hard.offset[0]; + lp->hw.copy_from_card(dev, bufnum, 0, &rxdata.pkt, ARC_HDR_SIZE); + if (rxdata.pkt.hard.offset[0]) { + ofs = rxdata.pkt.hard.offset[0]; length = 256 - ofs; } else { - ofs = pkt.hard.offset[1]; + ofs = rxdata.pkt.hard.offset[1]; length = 512 - ofs; }
/* get the full header, if possible */ - if (sizeof(pkt.soft) <= length) { - lp->hw.copy_from_card(dev, bufnum, ofs, soft, sizeof(pkt.soft)); + if (sizeof(rxdata.pkt.soft) <= length) { + lp->hw.copy_from_card(dev, bufnum, ofs, soft, sizeof(rxdata.pkt.soft)); } else { - memset(&pkt.soft, 0, sizeof(pkt.soft)); + memset(&rxdata.pkt.soft, 0, sizeof(rxdata.pkt.soft)); lp->hw.copy_from_card(dev, bufnum, ofs, soft, length); }
arc_printk(D_DURING, dev, "Buffer #%d: received packet from %02Xh to %02Xh (%d+4 bytes)\n", - bufnum, pkt.hard.source, pkt.hard.dest, length); + bufnum, rxdata.pkt.hard.source, rxdata.pkt.hard.dest, length);
dev->stats.rx_packets++; dev->stats.rx_bytes += length + ARC_HDR_SIZE; @@ -1042,13 +1045,13 @@ static void arcnet_rx(struct net_device *dev, int bufnum) if (arc_proto_map[soft->proto]->is_ip) { if (BUGLVL(D_PROTO)) { struct ArcProto - *oldp = arc_proto_map[lp->default_proto[pkt.hard.source]], + *oldp = arc_proto_map[lp->default_proto[rxdata.pkt.hard.source]], *newp = arc_proto_map[soft->proto];
if (oldp != newp) { arc_printk(D_PROTO, dev, "got protocol %02Xh; encap for host %02Xh is now '%c' (was '%c')\n", - soft->proto, pkt.hard.source, + soft->proto, rxdata.pkt.hard.source, newp->suffix, oldp->suffix); } } @@ -1057,10 +1060,10 @@ static void arcnet_rx(struct net_device *dev, int bufnum) lp->default_proto[0] = soft->proto;
/* in striking contrast, the following isn't a hack. */ - lp->default_proto[pkt.hard.source] = soft->proto; + lp->default_proto[rxdata.pkt.hard.source] = soft->proto; } /* call the protocol-specific receiver. */ - arc_proto_map[soft->proto]->rx(dev, bufnum, &pkt, length); + arc_proto_map[soft->proto]->rx(dev, bufnum, &rxdata.pkt, length); }
static void null_rx(struct net_device *dev, int bufnum,
From: Takeshi Misawa jeliantsurux@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 4c247de564f1ff614d11b3bb5313fb70d7b9598b ]
When ppp is closing, __ppp_xmit_process() failed to enqueue skb and skb allocated in ppp_write() is leaked.
syzbot reported : BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88812a17bc00 (size 224): comm "syz-executor673", pid 6952, jiffies 4294942888 (age 13.040s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000d110fff9>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline] [<00000000d110fff9>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:522 [inline] [<00000000d110fff9>] slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3262 [inline] [<00000000d110fff9>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x163/0x2f0 mm/slab.c:3574 [<000000002d616113>] __alloc_skb+0x6e/0x210 net/core/skbuff.c:197 [<000000000167fc45>] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1055 [inline] [<000000000167fc45>] ppp_write+0x48/0x120 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:502 [<000000009ab42c0b>] __vfs_write+0x43/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:494 [<00000000086b2e22>] vfs_write fs/read_write.c:558 [inline] [<00000000086b2e22>] vfs_write+0xee/0x210 fs/read_write.c:542 [<00000000a2b70ef9>] ksys_write+0x7c/0x130 fs/read_write.c:611 [<00000000ce5e0fdd>] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] [<00000000ce5e0fdd>] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline] [<00000000ce5e0fdd>] __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30 fs/read_write.c:620 [<00000000d9d7b370>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 [<0000000006e6d506>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fix this by freeing skb, if ppp is closing.
Fixes: 6d066734e9f0 ("ppp: avoid loop in xmit recursion detection code") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d9c8bf24e56416d7ce2c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Takeshi Misawa jeliantsurux@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Guillaume Nault gnault@redhat.com Tested-by: Guillaume Nault gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c index 1e4969d90f1a6..801bab5968d04 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c @@ -1432,6 +1432,8 @@ static void __ppp_xmit_process(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb) netif_wake_queue(ppp->dev); else netif_stop_queue(ppp->dev); + } else { + kfree_skb(skb); } ppp_xmit_unlock(ppp); }
From: KeMeng Shi shikemeng@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 714e501e16cd473538b609b3e351b2cc9f7f09ed ]
An oops can be triggered in the scheduler when running qemu on arm64:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008effe40 Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP Process migration/0 (pid: 12, stack limit = 0x00000000084e3736) pstate: 20000085 (nzCv daIf -PAN -UAO) pc : __ll_sc___cmpxchg_case_acq_4+0x4/0x20 lr : move_queued_task.isra.21+0x124/0x298 ... Call trace: __ll_sc___cmpxchg_case_acq_4+0x4/0x20 __migrate_task+0xc8/0xe0 migration_cpu_stop+0x170/0x180 cpu_stopper_thread+0xec/0x178 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8 kthread+0x134/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr() will choose an active dest_cpu in affinity mask to migrage the process if process is not currently running on any one of the CPUs specified in affinity mask. __set_cpus_allowed_ptr() will choose an invalid dest_cpu (dest_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids, 1024 in my virtual machine) if CPUS in an affinity mask are deactived by cpu_down after cpumask_intersects check. cpumask_test_cpu() of dest_cpu afterwards is overflown and may pass if corresponding bit is coincidentally set. As a consequence, kernel will access an invalid rq address associate with the invalid CPU in migration_cpu_stop->__migrate_task->move_queued_task and the Oops occurs.
The reproduce the crash:
1) A process repeatedly binds itself to cpu0 and cpu1 in turn by calling sched_setaffinity.
2) A shell script repeatedly does "echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online" and "echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online" in turn.
3) Oops appears if the invalid CPU is set in memory after tested cpumask.
Signed-off-by: KeMeng Shi shikemeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider valentin.schneider@arm.com Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1568616808-16808-1-git-send-email-shikemeng@huawei... Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/sched/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 3861dd6da91e7..bbaf094a48400 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -1162,7 +1162,8 @@ static int __set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p, if (cpumask_equal(&p->cpus_allowed, new_mask)) goto out;
- if (!cpumask_intersects(new_mask, cpu_valid_mask)) { + dest_cpu = cpumask_any_and(cpu_valid_mask, new_mask); + if (dest_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -1183,7 +1184,6 @@ static int __set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p, if (cpumask_test_cpu(task_cpu(p), new_mask)) goto out;
- dest_cpu = cpumask_any_and(cpu_valid_mask, new_mask); if (task_running(rq, p) || p->state == TASK_WAKING) { struct migration_arg arg = { p, dest_cpu }; /* Need help from migration thread: drop lock and wait. */
From: Valdis Kletnieks valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu
[ Upstream commit 0f74914071ab7e7b78731ed62bf350e3a344e0a5 ]
When building with W=1, gcc properly complains that there's no prototypes:
CC kernel/elfcore.o kernel/elfcore.c:7:17: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_extra_phdrs' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 7 | Elf_Half __weak elf_core_extra_phdrs(void) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/elfcore.c:12:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_write_extra_phdrs' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 12 | int __weak elf_core_write_extra_phdrs(struct coredump_params *cprm, loff_t offset) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/elfcore.c:17:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_write_extra_data' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 17 | int __weak elf_core_write_extra_data(struct coredump_params *cprm) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/elfcore.c:22:15: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_extra_data_size' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 22 | size_t __weak elf_core_extra_data_size(void) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Provide the include file so gcc is happy, and we don't have potential code drift
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29875.1565224705@turing-police Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/elfcore.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/kernel/elfcore.c b/kernel/elfcore.c index e556751d15d94..a2b29b9bdfcb2 100644 --- a/kernel/elfcore.c +++ b/kernel/elfcore.c @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/elfcore.h>
Elf_Half __weak elf_core_extra_phdrs(void) {
From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit ba56d8ce38c8252fff5b745db3899cf092578ede ]
Fei Liu reported a crash when doing netperf on a topo of macsec dev over veth:
[ 448.919128] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 449.090460] Call trace: [ 449.092895] refcount_sub_and_test+0xb4/0xc0 [ 449.097155] tcp_wfree+0x2c/0x150 [ 449.100460] ip_rcv+0x1d4/0x3a8 [ 449.103591] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x554/0xae0 [ 449.108282] __netif_receive_skb+0x28/0x78 [ 449.112366] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x54/0x100 [ 449.117144] napi_gro_complete+0x70/0xc0 [ 449.121054] napi_gro_flush+0x6c/0x90 [ 449.124703] napi_complete_done+0x50/0x130 [ 449.128788] gro_cell_poll+0x8c/0xa8 [ 449.132351] net_rx_action+0x16c/0x3f8 [ 449.136088] __do_softirq+0x128/0x320
The issue was caused by skb's true_size changed without its sk's sk_wmem_alloc increased in tcp/skb_gro_receive(). Later when the skb is being freed and the skb's truesize is subtracted from its sk's sk_wmem_alloc in tcp_wfree(), underflow occurs.
macsec is calling gro_cells_receive() to receive a packet, which actually requires skb->sk to be NULL. However when macsec dev is over veth, it's possible the skb->sk is still set if the skb was not unshared or expanded from the peer veth.
ip_rcv() is calling skb_orphan() to drop the skb's sk for tproxy, but it is too late for macsec's calling gro_cells_receive(). So fix it by dropping the skb's sk earlier on rx path of macsec.
Fixes: 5491e7c6b1a9 ("macsec: enable GRO and RPS on macsec devices") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu xmu@redhat.com Reported-by: Fei Liu feliu@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/macsec.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c index d91f020a8491d..da10104be16cf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c @@ -1240,6 +1240,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa); macsec_rxsc_put(rx_sc);
+ skb_orphan(skb); ret = gro_cells_receive(&macsec->gro_cells, skb); if (ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS) count_rx(dev, skb->len);
From: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com
[ Upstream commit 280ceaed79f18db930c0cc8bb21f6493490bf29c ]
After a reset packet sizes and device mtu can change and need to be reevaluated to calculate queue sizes. Malicious devices can set this to zero and we divide by it. Introduce sanity checking.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6102c120be558c885f04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c index 6d0efeb28f5cb..0b5fd1499ac06 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @@ -354,6 +354,8 @@ void usbnet_update_max_qlen(struct usbnet *dev) { enum usb_device_speed speed = dev->udev->speed;
+ if (!dev->rx_urb_size || !dev->hard_mtu) + goto insanity; switch (speed) { case USB_SPEED_HIGH: dev->rx_qlen = MAX_QUEUE_MEMORY / dev->rx_urb_size; @@ -370,6 +372,7 @@ void usbnet_update_max_qlen(struct usbnet *dev) dev->tx_qlen = 5 * MAX_QUEUE_MEMORY / dev->hard_mtu; break; default: +insanity: dev->rx_qlen = dev->tx_qlen = 4; } }
From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com
[ Upstream commit b41d936b5ecfdb3a4abc525ce6402a6c49cffddc ]
syzbot managed to crash the kernel in tabledist() loading an empty distribution table.
t = dist->table[rnd % dist->size];
Simply return an error when such load is attempted.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/sched/sch_netem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_netem.c b/net/sched/sch_netem.c index e9812e21dbc9b..12e3ae09c4ba1 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_netem.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_netem.c @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int get_dist_table(struct Qdisc *sch, const struct nlattr *attr) int i; size_t s;
- if (n > NETEM_DIST_MAX) + if (!n || n > NETEM_DIST_MAX) return -EINVAL;
s = sizeof(struct disttable) + n * sizeof(s16);
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Sasha Levin