From: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org

commit 35556bed836f8dc07ac55f69c8d17dce3e7f0e25 upstream.

When calling into hid_map_usage(), the passed event code is blindly stored as is, even if it doesn't fit in the associated bitmap.

This event code can come from a variety of sources, including devices masquerading as input devices, only a bit more "programmable".

Instead of taking the event code at face value, check that it actually fits the corresponding bitmap, and if it doesn't: - spit out a warning so that we know which device is acting up - NULLify the bitmap pointer so that we catch unexpected uses

Code paths that can make use of untrusted inputs can now check that the mapping was indeed correct and bail out if not.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires benjamin.tissoires@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/hid/hid-input.c | 4 ++++ drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 2 ++ include/linux/hid.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c @@ -1125,6 +1125,10 @@ static void hidinput_configure_usage(str }

mapped: + /* Mapping failed, bail out */ + if (!bit) + return; + if (device->driver->input_mapped && device->driver->input_mapped(device, hidinput, field, usage, &bit, &max) < 0) { --- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c @@ -841,6 +841,8 @@ static int mt_touch_input_mapping(struct code = BTN_0 + ((usage->hid - 1) & HID_USAGE);

hid_map_usage(hi, usage, bit, max, EV_KEY, code); + if (!*bit) + return -1; input_set_capability(hi->input, EV_KEY, code); return 1;

--- a/include/linux/hid.h +++ b/include/linux/hid.h @@ -956,34 +956,49 @@ static inline void hid_device_io_stop(st * @max: maximal valid usage->code to consider later (out parameter) * @type: input event type (EV_KEY, EV_REL, ...) * @c: code which corresponds to this usage and type + * + * The value pointed to by @bit will be set to NULL if either @type is + * an unhandled event type, or if @c is out of range for @type. This + * can be used as an error condition. */ static inline void hid_map_usage(struct hid_input *hidinput, struct hid_usage *usage, unsigned long **bit, int *max, - __u8 type, __u16 c) + __u8 type, unsigned int c) { struct input_dev *input = hidinput->input; - - usage->type = type; - usage->code = c; + unsigned long *bmap = NULL; + unsigned int limit = 0;

switch (type) { case EV_ABS: - *bit = input->absbit; - *max = ABS_MAX; + bmap = input->absbit; + limit = ABS_MAX; break; case EV_REL: - *bit = input->relbit; - *max = REL_MAX; + bmap = input->relbit; + limit = REL_MAX; break; case EV_KEY: - *bit = input->keybit; - *max = KEY_MAX; + bmap = input->keybit; + limit = KEY_MAX; break; case EV_LED: - *bit = input->ledbit; - *max = LED_MAX; + bmap = input->ledbit; + limit = LED_MAX; break; } + + if (unlikely(c > limit || !bmap)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: Invalid code %d type %d\n", + input->name, c, type); + *bit = NULL; + return; + } + + usage->type = type; + usage->code = c; + *max = limit; + *bit = bmap; }

/** @@ -997,7 +1012,8 @@ static inline void hid_map_usage_clear(s __u8 type, __u16 c) { hid_map_usage(hidinput, usage, bit, max, type, c); - clear_bit(c, *bit); + if (*bit) + clear_bit(usage->code, *bit); }

/**

From: Bodo Stroesser bstroesser@ts.fujitsu.com

commit 8c4e0f212398cdd1eb4310a5981d06a723cdd24f upstream.

1) If remaining ring space before the end of the ring is smaller then the next cmd to write, tcmu writes a padding entry which fills the remaining space at the end of the ring.

Then tcmu calls tcmu_flush_dcache_range() with the size of struct tcmu_cmd_entry as data length to flush. If the space filled by the padding was smaller then tcmu_cmd_entry, tcmu_flush_dcache_range() is called for an address range reaching behind the end of the vmalloc'ed ring.

tcmu_flush_dcache_range() in a loop calls flush_dcache_page(virt_to_page(start)); for every page being part of the range. On x86 the line is optimized out by the compiler, as flush_dcache_page() is empty on x86.

But I assume the above can cause trouble on other architectures that really have a flush_dcache_page(). For paddings only the header part of an entry is relevant due to alignment rules the header always fits in the remaining space, if padding is needed. So tcmu_flush_dcache_range() can safely be called with sizeof(entry->hdr) as the length here.

2) After it has written a command to cmd ring, tcmu calls tcmu_flush_dcache_range() using the size of a struct tcmu_cmd_entry as data length to flush. But if a command needs many iovecs, the real size of the command may be bigger then tcmu_cmd_entry, so a part of the written command is not flushed then.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200528193108.9085-1-bstroesser@ts.fujitsu.com Acked-by: Mike Christie michael.christie@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Bodo Stroesser bstroesser@ts.fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/target/target_core_user.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/target/target_core_user.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_user.c @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static int queue_cmd_ring(struct tcmu_cm entry->hdr.cmd_id = 0; /* not used for PAD */ entry->hdr.kflags = 0; entry->hdr.uflags = 0; - tcmu_flush_dcache_range(entry, sizeof(*entry)); + tcmu_flush_dcache_range(entry, sizeof(entry->hdr));

UPDATE_HEAD(mb->cmd_head, pad_size, udev->cmdr_size); tcmu_flush_dcache_range(mb, sizeof(*mb)); @@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ static int queue_cmd_ring(struct tcmu_cm cdb_off = CMDR_OFF + cmd_head + base_command_size; memcpy((void *) mb + cdb_off, se_cmd->t_task_cdb, scsi_command_size(se_cmd->t_task_cdb)); entry->req.cdb_off = cdb_off; - tcmu_flush_dcache_range(entry, sizeof(*entry)); + tcmu_flush_dcache_range(entry, command_size);

UPDATE_HEAD(mb->cmd_head, command_size, udev->cmdr_size); tcmu_flush_dcache_range(mb, sizeof(*mb));

From: John Stultz john.stultz@linaro.org

[ Upstream commit 975efc66d4e654207c17f939eb737ac591ac38fe ]

When booting with heavily modularized config, the serial console may not be able to load until after init when modules that satisfy needed dependencies have time to load.

Unfortunately, as qcom_geni_console_setup is marked as __init, the function may have been freed before we get to run it, causing boot time crashes such as:

[ 6.469057] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffe645d4e6cc [ 6.481623] Mem abort info: [ 6.484466] ESR = 0x86000007 [ 6.487557] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 6.492929] SET = 0, FnV = 0g [ 6.496016] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 6.499202] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=000000008151e000 [ 6.501286] ufshcd-qcom 1d84000.ufshc: ufshcd_print_pwr_info:[RX, TX]: gear=[3, 3], lane[2, 2], pwr[FAST MODE, FAST MODE], rate = 2 [ 6.505977] [ffffffe645d4e6cc] pgd=000000017df9f003, p4d=000000017df9f003, pud=000000017df9f003, pmd=000000017df9c003, pte=0000000000000000 [ 6.505990] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 6.505995] Modules linked in: zl10353 zl10039 zl10036 zd1301_demod xc5000 xc4000 ves1x93 ves1820 tuner_xc2028 tuner_simple tuner_types tua9001 tua6100 1 [ 6.506152] isl6405 [ 6.518104] ufshcd-qcom 1d84000.ufshc: ufshcd_find_max_sup_active_icc_level: Regulator capability was not set, actvIccLevel=0 [ 6.530549] horus3a helene fc2580 fc0013 fc0012 fc0011 ec100 e4000 dvb_pll ds3000 drxk drxd drx39xyj dib9000 dib8000 dib7000p dib7000m dib3000mc dibx003 [ 6.624271] CPU: 7 PID: 148 Comm: kworker/7:2 Tainted: G W 5.8.0-mainline-12021-g6defd37ba1cd #3455 [ 6.624273] Hardware name: Thundercomm Dragonboard 845c (DT) [ 6.624290] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func [ 6.624296] pstate: 40c00005 (nZcv daif +PAN +UAO BTYPE=--) [ 6.624307] pc : qcom_geni_console_setup+0x0/0x110 [ 6.624316] lr : try_enable_new_console+0xa0/0x140 [ 6.624318] sp : ffffffc010843a30 [ 6.624320] x29: ffffffc010843a30 x28: ffffffe645c3e7d0 [ 6.624325] x27: ffffff80f8022180 x26: ffffffc010843b28 [ 6.637937] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffffe6462a2000 [ 6.637941] x23: ffffffe646398000 x22: 0000000000000000 [ 6.637945] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffe6462a5ce8 [ 6.637952] x19: ffffffe646398e38 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 6.680296] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffe64492b900 [ 6.680300] x15: ffffffe6461e9d08 x14: 69202930203d2064 [ 6.680305] x13: 7561625f65736162 x12: 202c363331203d20 [ 6.696434] x11: 0000000000000030 x10: 0101010101010101 [ 6.696438] x9 : 4d4d20746120304d x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f [ 6.707249] x7 : feff4c524c787373 x6 : 0000000000008080 [ 6.707253] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 8080000000000000 [ 6.707257] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffe645d4e6cc [ 6.744223] qcom_geni_serial 898000.serial: dev_pm_opp_set_rate: failed to find OPP for freq 102400000 (-34) [ 6.744966] x1 : fffffffefe74e174 x0 : ffffffe6462a5ce8 [ 6.753580] qcom_geni_serial 898000.serial: dev_pm_opp_set_rate: failed to find OPP for freq 102400000 (-34) [ 6.761634] Call trace: [ 6.761639] qcom_geni_console_setup+0x0/0x110 [ 6.761645] register_console+0x29c/0x2f8 [ 6.767981] Bluetooth: hci0: Frame reassembly failed (-84) [ 6.775252] uart_add_one_port+0x438/0x500 [ 6.775258] qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x2c4/0x4a8 [ 6.775266] platform_drv_probe+0x58/0xa8 [ 6.855359] really_probe+0xec/0x398 [ 6.855362] driver_probe_device+0x5c/0xb8 [ 6.855367] __device_attach_driver+0x98/0xb8 [ 7.184945] bus_for_each_drv+0x74/0xd8 [ 7.188825] __device_attach+0xec/0x148 [ 7.192705] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30 [ 7.196937] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa8 [ 7.200816] deferred_probe_work_func+0x7c/0xb8 [ 7.205398] process_one_work+0x20c/0x4b0 [ 7.209456] worker_thread+0x48/0x460 [ 7.213157] kthread+0x14c/0x158 [ 7.216432] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 7.220049] Code: bad PC value [ 7.223139] ---[ end trace 73f3b21e251d5a70 ]---

Thus this patch removes the __init avoiding crash in such configs.

Cc: Andy Gross agross@kernel.org Cc: Jiri Slaby jirislaby@kernel.org Cc: Saravana Kannan saravanak@google.com Cc: Todd Kjos tkjos@google.com Cc: Amit Pundir amit.pundir@linaro.org Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Saravana Kannan saravanak@google.com Signed-off-by: John Stultz john.stultz@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200811025044.70626-1-john.stultz@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c index 0d405cc58e722..cd0768c3e773e 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c @@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ static unsigned int qcom_geni_serial_tx_empty(struct uart_port *uport) }

#ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_QCOM_GENI_CONSOLE -static int __init qcom_geni_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options) +static int qcom_geni_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options) { struct uart_port *uport; struct qcom_geni_serial_port *port;

From: Tom Rix trix@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit cecf7560f00a8419396a2ed0f6e5d245ccb4feac ]

clang static analysis reports this representative problem

applesmc.c:758:10: warning: 1st function call argument is an uninitialized value left = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)(buffer + 6)) >> 2; ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

buffer is filled by the earlier call

ret = applesmc_read_key(LIGHT_SENSOR_LEFT_KEY, ...

This problem is reported because a goto skips the status check. Other similar problems use data from applesmc_read_key before checking the status. So move the checks to before the use.

Signed-off-by: Tom Rix trix@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Henrik Rydberg rydberg@bitmath.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820131932.10590-1-trix@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/hwmon/applesmc.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/applesmc.c b/drivers/hwmon/applesmc.c index 5c677ba440143..b201129a9beae 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/applesmc.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/applesmc.c @@ -760,15 +760,18 @@ static ssize_t applesmc_light_show(struct device *dev, }

ret = applesmc_read_key(LIGHT_SENSOR_LEFT_KEY, buffer, data_length); + if (ret) + goto out; /* newer macbooks report a single 10-bit bigendian value */ if (data_length == 10) { left = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)(buffer + 6)) >> 2; goto out; } left = buffer[2]; + + ret = applesmc_read_key(LIGHT_SENSOR_RIGHT_KEY, buffer, data_length); if (ret) goto out; - ret = applesmc_read_key(LIGHT_SENSOR_RIGHT_KEY, buffer, data_length); right = buffer[2];

out: @@ -817,12 +820,11 @@ static ssize_t applesmc_show_fan_speed(struct device *dev, to_index(attr));

ret = applesmc_read_key(newkey, buffer, 2); - speed = ((buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1]) >> 2); - if (ret) return ret; - else - return snprintf(sysfsbuf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", speed); + + speed = ((buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1]) >> 2); + return snprintf(sysfsbuf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", speed); }

static ssize_t applesmc_store_fan_speed(struct device *dev, @@ -858,12 +860,11 @@ static ssize_t applesmc_show_fan_manual(struct device *dev, u8 buffer[2];

ret = applesmc_read_key(FANS_MANUAL, buffer, 2); - manual = ((buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1]) >> to_index(attr)) & 0x01; - if (ret) return ret; - else - return snprintf(sysfsbuf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", manual); + + manual = ((buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1]) >> to_index(attr)) & 0x01; + return snprintf(sysfsbuf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", manual); }

static ssize_t applesmc_store_fan_manual(struct device *dev, @@ -879,10 +880,11 @@ static ssize_t applesmc_store_fan_manual(struct device *dev, return -EINVAL;

ret = applesmc_read_key(FANS_MANUAL, buffer, 2); - val = (buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1]); if (ret) goto out;

+ val = (buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1]); + if (input) val = val | (0x01 << to_index(attr)); else @@ -958,13 +960,12 @@ static ssize_t applesmc_key_count_show(struct device *dev, u32 count;

ret = applesmc_read_key(KEY_COUNT_KEY, buffer, 4); - count = ((u32)buffer[0]<<24) + ((u32)buffer[1]<<16) + - ((u32)buffer[2]<<8) + buffer[3]; - if (ret) return ret; - else - return snprintf(sysfsbuf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", count); + + count = ((u32)buffer[0]<<24) + ((u32)buffer[1]<<16) + + ((u32)buffer[2]<<8) + buffer[3]; + return snprintf(sysfsbuf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", count); }

static ssize_t applesmc_key_at_index_read_show(struct device *dev,

From: Dmitry Baryshkov dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org

[ Upstream commit f5749d6181fa7df5ae741788e5d96f593d3a60b6 ]

New Qualcomm firmware has changed a way it reports back the 'started' event. Support new register values.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark robdclark@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gmu.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gmu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gmu.c index 9cde79a7335c8..739ca9c2081a6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gmu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gmu.c @@ -117,12 +117,22 @@ static int a6xx_gmu_start(struct a6xx_gmu *gmu) { int ret; u32 val; + u32 mask, reset_val; + + val = gmu_read(gmu, REG_A6XX_GMU_CM3_DTCM_START + 0xff8); + if (val <= 0x20010004) { + mask = 0xffffffff; + reset_val = 0xbabeface; + } else { + mask = 0x1ff; + reset_val = 0x100; + }

gmu_write(gmu, REG_A6XX_GMU_CM3_SYSRESET, 1); gmu_write(gmu, REG_A6XX_GMU_CM3_SYSRESET, 0);

ret = gmu_poll_timeout(gmu, REG_A6XX_GMU_CM3_FW_INIT_RESULT, val, - val == 0xbabeface, 100, 10000); + (val & mask) == reset_val, 100, 10000);

if (ret) dev_err(gmu->dev, "GMU firmware initialization timed out\n");

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit 49d9c5936314e44d314c605c39cce0fd947f9c3a ]

Match the pattern elsewhere in this file.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Tested-by: Marco Elver elver@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200821085348.251340558@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c index 6df894d65d9e2..2d182dc1b49ed 100644 --- a/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c +++ b/drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c @@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static void enter_s2idle_proper(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, */ stop_critical_timings(); drv->states[index].enter_s2idle(dev, drv, index); - WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled())) + local_irq_disable(); /* * timekeeping_resume() that will be called by tick_unfreeze() for the * first CPU executing it calls functions containing RCU read-side

From: Simon Leiner simon@leiner.me

[ Upstream commit d742db70033c745e410523e00522ee0cfe2aa416 ]

On some architectures (like ARM), virt_to_gfn cannot be used for vmalloc'd memory because of its reliance on virt_to_phys. This patch introduces a check for vmalloc'd addresses and obtains the PFN using vmalloc_to_pfn in that case.

Signed-off-by: Simon Leiner simon@leiner.me Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini sstabellini@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200825093153.35500-1-simon@leiner.me Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c index e94a61eaeceb0..f7b553faadb10 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_client.c @@ -365,8 +365,14 @@ int xenbus_grant_ring(struct xenbus_device *dev, void *vaddr, int i, j;

for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { - err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, - virt_to_gfn(vaddr), 0); + unsigned long gfn; + + if (is_vmalloc_addr(vaddr)) + gfn = pfn_to_gfn(vmalloc_to_pfn(vaddr)); + else + gfn = virt_to_gfn(vaddr); + + err = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id, gfn, 0); if (err < 0) { xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "granting access to ring page");

From: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org

[ Upstream commit 303216e76dcab6049c9d42390b1032f0649a8206 ]

The gateway client code can try to optimize the delivery of DHCP packets to avoid broadcasting them through the whole mesh. But also transmissions to the client can be optimized by looking up the destination via the chaddr of the DHCP packet.

But the chaddr is currently only done when chaddr is fully inside the non-paged area of the skbuff. Otherwise it will not be initialized and the unoptimized path should have been taken.

But the implementation didn't handle this correctly. It didn't retrieve the correct chaddr but still tried to perform the TT lookup with this uninitialized memory.

Reported-by: syzbot+ab16e463b903f5a37036@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 6c413b1c22a2 ("batman-adv: send every DHCP packet as bat-unicast") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli a@unstable.cc Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich sw@simonwunderlich.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c b/net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c index 140c61a3f1ecf..0c59fefc13719 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/gateway_client.c @@ -714,8 +714,10 @@ batadv_gw_dhcp_recipient_get(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int *header_len,

chaddr_offset = *header_len + BATADV_DHCP_CHADDR_OFFSET; /* store the client address if the message is going to a client */ - if (ret == BATADV_DHCP_TO_CLIENT && - pskb_may_pull(skb, chaddr_offset + ETH_ALEN)) { + if (ret == BATADV_DHCP_TO_CLIENT) { + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, chaddr_offset + ETH_ALEN)) + return BATADV_DHCP_NO; + /* check if the DHCP packet carries an Ethernet DHCP */ p = skb->data + *header_len + BATADV_DHCP_HTYPE_OFFSET; if (*p != BATADV_DHCP_HTYPE_ETHERNET)

From: Jussi Kivilinna jussi.kivilinna@haltian.com

[ Upstream commit 279e89b2281af3b1a9f04906e157992c19c9f163 ]

batadv_bla_send_claim() gets called from worker thread context through batadv_bla_periodic_work(), thus netif_rx_ni needs to be used in that case. This fixes "NOHZ: local_softirq_pending 08" log messages seen when batman-adv is enabled.

Fixes: 23721387c409 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code") Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna jussi.kivilinna@haltian.com Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann sven@narfation.org Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich sw@simonwunderlich.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c index 85faf25c29122..9b8bf06ccb613 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c @@ -450,7 +450,10 @@ static void batadv_bla_send_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *mac, batadv_add_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_RX_BYTES, skb->len + ETH_HLEN);

- netif_rx(skb); + if (in_interrupt()) + netif_rx(skb); + else + netif_rx_ni(skb); out: if (primary_if) batadv_hardif_put(primary_if);

From: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit dbfc95f98f0158958d1f1e6bf06d74be38dbd821 ]

When the BMIPS generic cpu-feature-overrides.h file was introduced, cpu_has_inclusive_caches/MIPS_CPU_INCLUSIVE_CACHES was not set for BMIPS5000 CPUs. Correct this when we have initialized the MIPS secondary cache successfully.

Fixes: f337967d6d87 ("MIPS: BMIPS: Add cpu-feature-overrides.h") Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer tsbogend@alpha.franken.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/mips/mm/c-r4k.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/mips/mm/c-r4k.c b/arch/mips/mm/c-r4k.c index 05a539d3a5970..7650edd5cf7ff 100644 --- a/arch/mips/mm/c-r4k.c +++ b/arch/mips/mm/c-r4k.c @@ -1789,7 +1789,11 @@ static void setup_scache(void) printk("MIPS secondary cache %ldkB, %s, linesize %d bytes.\n", scache_size >> 10, way_string[c->scache.ways], c->scache.linesz); + + if (current_cpu_type() == CPU_BMIPS5000) + c->options |= MIPS_CPU_INCLUSIVE_CACHES; } + #else if (!(c->scache.flags & MIPS_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT)) panic("Dunno how to handle MIPS32 / MIPS64 second level cache");

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org

[ Upstream commit 6f03bf43ee05b31d3822def2a80f11b3591c55b3 ]

Kernel sends an empty NFTA_SET_USERDATA attribute with no value if userspace adds a set with no NFTA_SET_USERDATA attribute.

Fixes: e6d8ecac9e68 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add new attributes into nft_set to store user data.") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 1b8a53081632f..159ec1533c980 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -3204,7 +3204,8 @@ static int nf_tables_fill_set(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nft_ctx *ctx, goto nla_put_failure; }

- if (nla_put(skb, NFTA_SET_USERDATA, set->udlen, set->udata)) + if (set->udata && + nla_put(skb, NFTA_SET_USERDATA, set->udlen, set->udata)) goto nla_put_failure;

desc = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_SET_DESC);

From: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de

[ Upstream commit 1e105e6afa6c3d32bfb52c00ffa393894a525c27 ]

Following bug was reported via irc: nft list ruleset set knock_candidates_ipv4 { type ipv4_addr . inet_service size 65535 elements = { 127.0.0.1 . 123, 127.0.0.1 . 123 } } .. udp dport 123 add @knock_candidates_ipv4 { ip saddr . 123 } udp dport 123 add @knock_candidates_ipv4 { ip saddr . udp dport }

It should not have been possible to add a duplicate set entry.

After some debugging it turned out that the problem is the immediate value (123) in the second-to-last rule.

Concatenations use 32bit registers, i.e. the elements are 8 bytes each, not 6 and it turns out the kernel inserted

inet firewall @knock_candidates_ipv4 element 0100007f ffff7b00 : 0 [end] element 0100007f 00007b00 : 0 [end]

Note the non-zero upper bits of the first element. It turns out that nft_immediate doesn't zero the destination register, but this is needed when the length isn't a multiple of 4.

Furthermore, the zeroing in nft_payload is broken. We can't use [len / 4] = 0 -- if len is a multiple of 4, index is off by one.

Skip zeroing in this case and use a conditional instead of (len -1) / 4.

Fixes: 49499c3e6e18 ("netfilter: nf_tables: switch registers to 32 bit addressing") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nft_payload.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h index 024636c31adcf..93253ba1eeac3 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ static inline u8 nft_reg_load8(u32 *sreg) static inline void nft_data_copy(u32 *dst, const struct nft_data *src, unsigned int len) { + if (len % NFT_REG32_SIZE) + dst[len / NFT_REG32_SIZE] = 0; memcpy(dst, src, len); }

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c index 19446a89a2a81..b1a9f330a51fe 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c @@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ static void nft_payload_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, u32 *dest = &regs->data[priv->dreg]; int offset;

- dest[priv->len / NFT_REG32_SIZE] = 0; + if (priv->len % NFT_REG32_SIZE) + dest[priv->len / NFT_REG32_SIZE] = 0; + switch (priv->base) { case NFT_PAYLOAD_LL_HEADER: if (!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb))

From: Dinghao Liu dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn

[ Upstream commit 7ef1fc57301f3cef7201497aa27e89ccb91737fe ]

When devm_kcalloc() fails, dev should be freed just like what we've done in the subsequent error paths.

Fixes: 7b78be48a8eb6 ("net: systemport: Dynamically allocate number of TX rings") Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c index 6b761f6b8fd56..9a614c5cdfa22 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c @@ -2441,8 +2441,10 @@ static int bcm_sysport_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) priv->tx_rings = devm_kcalloc(&pdev->dev, txq, sizeof(struct bcm_sysport_tx_ring), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!priv->tx_rings) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!priv->tx_rings) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_free_netdev; + }

priv->is_lite = params->is_lite; priv->num_rx_desc_words = params->num_rx_desc_words;

From: Dinghao Liu dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn

[ Upstream commit e2d79cd8875fa8c3cc7defa98a8cc99a1ed0c62f ]

When devm_gpiod_get_optional() fails, bus should be freed just like when of_mdiobus_register() fails.

Fixes: 1bddd96cba03d ("net: arc_emac: support the phy reset for emac driver") Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn andrew@lunn.ch Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_mdio.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_mdio.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_mdio.c index 0187dbf3b87df..54cdafdd067db 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_mdio.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/arc/emac_mdio.c @@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ int arc_mdio_probe(struct arc_emac_priv *priv) if (IS_ERR(data->reset_gpio)) { error = PTR_ERR(data->reset_gpio); dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to request gpio: %d\n", error); + mdiobus_free(bus); return error; }

From: Nicolas Dichtel nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com

[ Upstream commit b274e47d9e3f4dcd4ad4028a316ec22dc4533ac7 ]

During a dump, this attribute is essential, it enables the userspace to know on which interface the context is linked to.

Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com Tested-by: Gabriel Ganne gabriel.ganne@6wind.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/gtp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c index d73850ebb671f..f2fecb6842209 100644 --- a/drivers/net/gtp.c +++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c @@ -1187,6 +1187,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 snd_portid, u32 snd_seq, goto nlmsg_failure;

if (nla_put_u32(skb, GTPA_VERSION, pctx->gtp_version) || + nla_put_u32(skb, GTPA_LINK, pctx->dev->ifindex) || nla_put_be32(skb, GTPA_PEER_ADDRESS, pctx->peer_addr_ip4.s_addr) || nla_put_be32(skb, GTPA_MS_ADDRESS, pctx->ms_addr_ip4.s_addr)) goto nla_put_failure;

From: Vasundhara Volam vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit dbbfa96ad920c50d58bcaefa57f5f33ceef9d00e ]

If firmware goes into unstable state, HWRM_NVM_GET_DIR_INFO firmware command may return zero dir entries. Return error in such case to avoid zero length dma buffer request.

Fixes: c0c050c58d84 ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Vasundhara Volam vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c index 14fe4f9f24b88..a1cb99110092d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c @@ -1877,6 +1877,9 @@ static int bnxt_get_nvram_directory(struct net_device *dev, u32 len, u8 *data) if (rc != 0) return rc;

+ if (!dir_entries || !entry_length) + return -EIO; + /* Insert 2 bytes of directory info (count and size of entries) */ if (len < 2) return -EINVAL;

From: Edwin Peer edwin.peer@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit 12cce90b934bf2b0ed9c339b4d5503e69954351a ]

Firmware returns RESOURCE_ACCESS_DENIED for HWRM_TEMP_MONITORY_QUERY for VFs. This produces unpleasing error messages in the log when temp1_input is queried via the hwmon sysfs interface from a VF.

The error is harmless and expected, so silence it and return unknown as the value. Since the device temperature is not particularly sensitive information, provide flexibility to change this policy in future by silencing the error rather than avoiding the HWRM call entirely for VFs.

Fixes: cde49a42a9bb ("bnxt_en: Add hwmon sysfs support to read temperature") Cc: Marc Smith msmith626@gmail.com Reported-by: Marc Smith msmith626@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Edwin Peer edwin.peer@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c index 7047f4237ceaf..df3514503dee9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -6836,16 +6836,19 @@ static ssize_t bnxt_show_temp(struct device *dev, struct hwrm_temp_monitor_query_input req = {0}; struct hwrm_temp_monitor_query_output *resp; struct bnxt *bp = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - u32 temp = 0; + u32 len = 0;

resp = bp->hwrm_cmd_resp_addr; bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(bp, &req, HWRM_TEMP_MONITOR_QUERY, -1, -1); mutex_lock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock); - if (!_hwrm_send_message(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT)) - temp = resp->temp * 1000; /* display millidegree */ + if (!_hwrm_send_message_silent(bp, &req, sizeof(req), HWRM_CMD_TIMEOUT)) + len = sprintf(buf, "%u\n", resp->temp * 1000); /* display millidegree */ mutex_unlock(&bp->hwrm_cmd_lock);

- return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", temp); + if (len) + return len; + + return sprintf(buf, "unknown\n"); } static SENSOR_DEVICE_ATTR(temp1_input, 0444, bnxt_show_temp, NULL, 0);

From: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 96ecdcc992eb7f468b2cf829b0f5408a1fad4668 ]

Netpoll can try to poll napi as soon as napi_enable() is called. It crashes trying to access a doorbell which is still NULL:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 59 PID: 6039 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc1-00469-g5fd99b5d9950-dirty #26 RIP: 0010:bnxt_poll+0x121/0x1c0 Code: c4 20 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 41 8b 86 a0 01 00 00 41 23 85 18 01 00 00 49 8b 96 a8 01 00 00 0d 00 00 00 24 <89> 02 41 f6 45 77 02 74 cb 49 8b ae d8 01 00 00 31 c0 c7 44 24 1a netpoll_poll_dev+0xbd/0x1a0 __netpoll_send_skb+0x1b2/0x210 netpoll_send_udp+0x2c9/0x406 write_ext_msg+0x1d7/0x1f0 console_unlock+0x23c/0x520 vprintk_emit+0xe0/0x1d0 printk+0x58/0x6f x86_vector_activate.cold+0xf/0x46 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x50/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 __irq_domain_activate_irq+0x32/0x80 irq_domain_activate_irq+0x25/0x40 __setup_irq+0x2d2/0x700 request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160 __bnxt_open_nic+0x3b1/0x750 bnxt_open_nic+0x19/0x30 ethtool_set_channels+0x1ac/0x220 dev_ethtool+0x11ba/0x2240 dev_ioctl+0x1cf/0x390 sock_do_ioctl+0x95/0x130

Reported-by: Rob Sherwood rsher@fb.com Fixes: c0c050c58d84 ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c index df3514503dee9..a267380b267d7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -7027,15 +7027,15 @@ static int __bnxt_open_nic(struct bnxt *bp, bool irq_re_init, bool link_re_init) } }

- bnxt_enable_napi(bp); - bnxt_debug_dev_init(bp); - rc = bnxt_init_nic(bp, irq_re_init); if (rc) { netdev_err(bp->dev, "bnxt_init_nic err: %x\n", rc); - goto open_err; + goto open_err_irq; }

+ bnxt_enable_napi(bp); + bnxt_debug_dev_init(bp); + if (link_re_init) { mutex_lock(&bp->link_lock); rc = bnxt_update_phy_setting(bp); @@ -7066,10 +7066,6 @@ static int __bnxt_open_nic(struct bnxt *bp, bool irq_re_init, bool link_re_init) bnxt_vf_reps_open(bp); return 0;

-open_err: - bnxt_debug_dev_exit(bp); - bnxt_disable_napi(bp); - open_err_irq: bnxt_del_napi(bp);

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org

[ Upstream commit ee921183557af39c1a0475f982d43b0fcac25e2e ]

Frontend callback reports EAGAIN to nfnetlink to retry a command, this is used to signal that module autoloading is required. Unfortunately, nlmsg_unicast() reports EAGAIN in case the receiver socket buffer gets full, so it enters a busy-loop.

This patch updates nfnetlink_unicast() to turn EAGAIN into ENOBUFS and to use nlmsg_unicast(). Remove the flags field in nfnetlink_unicast() since this is always MSG_DONTWAIT in the existing code which is exactly what nlmsg_unicast() passes to netlink_unicast() as parameter.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables") Reported-by: Phil Sutter phil@nwl.cc Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h | 3 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 61 ++++++++++++++--------------- net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 11 ++++-- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h b/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h index cf09ab37b45b7..e713476ff29db 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h @@ -43,8 +43,7 @@ int nfnetlink_has_listeners(struct net *net, unsigned int group); int nfnetlink_send(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 portid, unsigned int group, int echo, gfp_t flags); int nfnetlink_set_err(struct net *net, u32 portid, u32 group, int error); -int nfnetlink_unicast(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 portid, - int flags); +int nfnetlink_unicast(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 portid);

static inline u16 nfnl_msg_type(u8 subsys, u8 msg_type) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 159ec1533c980..5b4632826dc66 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -718,11 +718,11 @@ static int nf_tables_gettable(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE, 0, family, table); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_table_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);

-err: +err_fill_table_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } @@ -1383,11 +1383,11 @@ static int nf_tables_getchain(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN, 0, family, table, chain); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_chain_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);

-err: +err_fill_chain_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } @@ -2488,11 +2488,11 @@ static int nf_tables_getrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, 0, family, table, chain, rule); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_rule_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);

-err: +err_fill_rule_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } @@ -3377,11 +3377,11 @@ static int nf_tables_getset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk,

err = nf_tables_fill_set(skb2, &ctx, set, NFT_MSG_NEWSET, 0); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_set_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);

-err: +err_fill_set_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } @@ -4157,24 +4157,18 @@ static int nft_get_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, err = -ENOMEM; skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_ATOMIC); if (skb == NULL) - goto err1; + return err;

err = nf_tables_fill_setelem_info(skb, ctx, ctx->seq, ctx->portid, NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM, 0, set, &elem); if (err < 0) - goto err2; + goto err_fill_setelem;

- err = nfnetlink_unicast(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid, MSG_DONTWAIT); - /* This avoids a loop in nfnetlink. */ - if (err < 0) - goto err1; + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb, ctx->net, ctx->portid);

- return 0; -err2: +err_fill_setelem: kfree_skb(skb); -err1: - /* this avoids a loop in nfnetlink. */ - return err == -EAGAIN ? -ENOBUFS : err; + return err; }

/* called with rcu_read_lock held */ @@ -5273,10 +5267,11 @@ static int nf_tables_getobj(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWOBJ, 0, family, table, obj, reset); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_obj_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); -err: + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + +err_fill_obj_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } @@ -5933,10 +5928,11 @@ static int nf_tables_getflowtable(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NFT_MSG_NEWFLOWTABLE, 0, family, flowtable); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_flowtable_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); -err: + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + +err_fill_flowtable_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } @@ -6097,10 +6093,11 @@ static int nf_tables_getgen(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, err = nf_tables_fill_gen_info(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq); if (err < 0) - goto err; + goto err_fill_gen_info;

- return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); -err: + return nfnetlink_unicast(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); + +err_fill_gen_info: kfree_skb(skb2); return err; } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c index 7f2c1915763f8..9bacddc761ba4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c @@ -148,10 +148,15 @@ int nfnetlink_set_err(struct net *net, u32 portid, u32 group, int error) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfnetlink_set_err);

-int nfnetlink_unicast(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 portid, - int flags) +int nfnetlink_unicast(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net, u32 portid) { - return netlink_unicast(net->nfnl, skb, portid, flags); + int err; + + err = nlmsg_unicast(net->nfnl, skb, portid); + if (err == -EAGAIN) + err = -ENOBUFS; + + return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfnetlink_unicast);

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index 332c69d27b478..25298b3eb8546 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -359,8 +359,7 @@ __nfulnl_send(struct nfulnl_instance *inst) goto out; } } - nfnetlink_unicast(inst->skb, inst->net, inst->peer_portid, - MSG_DONTWAIT); + nfnetlink_unicast(inst->skb, inst->net, inst->peer_portid); out: inst->qlen = 0; inst->skb = NULL; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index d33094f4ec41e..f81a3ce0fe48e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ __nfqnl_enqueue_packet(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, *packet_id_ptr = htonl(entry->id);

/* nfnetlink_unicast will either free the nskb or add it to a socket */ - err = nfnetlink_unicast(nskb, net, queue->peer_portid, MSG_DONTWAIT); + err = nfnetlink_unicast(nskb, net, queue->peer_portid); if (err < 0) { if (queue->flags & NFQA_CFG_F_FAIL_OPEN) { failopen = 1;

From: Al Grant al.grant@foss.arm.com

[ Upstream commit 39c0a53b114d0317e5c4e76b631f41d133af5cb0 ]

perf_event.h has macros that define the field offsets in the data_src bitmask in perf records. The SNOOPX and REMOTE offsets were both 37.

These are distinct fields, and the bitfield layout in perf_mem_data_src confirms that SNOOPX should be at offset 38.

Committer notes:

This was extracted from a larger patch that also contained kernel changes.

Fixes: 52839e653b5629bd ("perf tools: Add support for printing new mem_info encodings") Signed-off-by: Al Grant al.grant@arm.com Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter adrian.hunter@intel.com Cc: Ian Rogers irogers@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa jolsa@kernel.org Cc: Namhyung Kim namhyung@kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/9974f2d0-bf7f-518e-d9f7-4520e5ff1bb0@foss.arm.co... Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h index f35eb72739c09..a45e7b4f03163 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ union perf_mem_data_src {

#define PERF_MEM_SNOOPX_FWD 0x01 /* forward */ /* 1 free */ -#define PERF_MEM_SNOOPX_SHIFT 37 +#define PERF_MEM_SNOOPX_SHIFT 38

/* locked instruction */ #define PERF_MEM_LOCK_NA 0x01 /* not available */

From: Shung-Hsi Yu shung-hsi.yu@suse.com

[ Upstream commit cbedcb044e9cc4e14bbe6658111224bb923094f4 ]

On machines with much memory (> 2 TByte) and log_mtts_per_seg == 0, a max_order of 31 will be passed to mlx_buddy_init(), which results in s = BITS_TO_LONGS(1 << 31) becoming a negative value, leading to kvmalloc_array() failure when it is converted to size_t.

mlx4_core 0000:b1:00.0: Failed to initialize memory region table, aborting mlx4_core: probe of 0000:b1:00.0 failed with error -12

Fix this issue by changing the left shifting operand from a signed literal to an unsigned one.

Fixes: 225c7b1feef1 ("IB/mlx4: Add a driver Mellanox ConnectX InfiniBand adapters") Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu shung-hsi.yu@suse.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mr.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mr.c index 1a11bc0e16123..cfa0bba3940fb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mr.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/mr.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int mlx4_buddy_init(struct mlx4_buddy *buddy, int max_order) goto err_out;

for (i = 0; i <= buddy->max_order; ++i) { - s = BITS_TO_LONGS(1 << (buddy->max_order - i)); + s = BITS_TO_LONGS(1UL << (buddy->max_order - i)); buddy->bits[i] = kvmalloc_array(s, sizeof(long), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!buddy->bits[i]) goto err_out_free;

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit eb0f3bc463d59d86402f19c59aa44e82dc3fab6d ]

We recently added some calls to clk_disable_unprepare() but we missed the last error path if register_netdev() fails.

I made a couple cleanups so we avoid mistakes like this in the future. First I reversed the "if (!ret)" condition and pulled the code in one indent level. Also, the "port->netdev = NULL;" is not required because "port" isn't used again outside this function so I deleted that line.

Fixes: 4d5ae32f5e1e ("net: ethernet: Add a driver for Gemini gigabit ethernet") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c | 34 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c index 16de0fa92ab74..5242687060b44 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c @@ -2451,8 +2451,8 @@ static int gemini_ethernet_port_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) port->reset = devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(dev, NULL); if (IS_ERR(port->reset)) { dev_err(dev, "no reset\n"); - clk_disable_unprepare(port->pclk); - return PTR_ERR(port->reset); + ret = PTR_ERR(port->reset); + goto unprepare; } reset_control_reset(port->reset); usleep_range(100, 500); @@ -2507,25 +2507,25 @@ static int gemini_ethernet_port_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) IRQF_SHARED, port_names[port->id], port); - if (ret) { - clk_disable_unprepare(port->pclk); - return ret; - } + if (ret) + goto unprepare;

ret = register_netdev(netdev); - if (!ret) { + if (ret) + goto unprepare; + + netdev_info(netdev, + "irq %d, DMA @ 0x%pap, GMAC @ 0x%pap\n", + port->irq, &dmares->start, + &gmacres->start); + ret = gmac_setup_phy(netdev); + if (ret) netdev_info(netdev, - "irq %d, DMA @ 0x%pap, GMAC @ 0x%pap\n", - port->irq, &dmares->start, - &gmacres->start); - ret = gmac_setup_phy(netdev); - if (ret) - netdev_info(netdev, - "PHY init failed, deferring to ifup time\n"); - return 0; - } + "PHY init failed, deferring to ifup time\n"); + return 0;

- port->netdev = NULL; +unprepare: + clk_disable_unprepare(port->pclk); return ret; }

From: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit d0c20d38af135b2b4b90aa59df7878ef0c8fbef4 ]

The realtime flag only applies to the data fork, so don't use the realtime block number checks on the attr fork of a realtime file.

Fixes: 30b0984d9117 ("xfs: refactor bmap record validation") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen sandeen@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c index 0b7145fdb8aa1..f35e1801f1c90 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c @@ -6130,7 +6130,7 @@ xfs_bmap_validate_extent(

isrt = XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip); endfsb = irec->br_startblock + irec->br_blockcount - 1; - if (isrt) { + if (isrt && whichfork == XFS_DATA_FORK) { if (!xfs_verify_rtbno(mp, irec->br_startblock)) return __this_address; if (!xfs_verify_rtbno(mp, endfsb))

From: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit 556699341efa98243e08e34401b3f601da91f5a3 ]

If tg3_reset_task() fails, the device state is left in an inconsistent state with IFF_RUNNING still set but NAPI state not enabled. A subsequent operation, such as ifdown or AER error can cause it to soft lock up when it tries to disable NAPI state.

Fix it by bringing down the device to !IFF_RUNNING state when tg3_reset_task() fails. tg3_reset_task() running from workqueue will now call tg3_close() when the reset fails. We need to modify tg3_reset_task_cancel() slightly to avoid tg3_close() calling cancel_work_sync() to cancel tg3_reset_task(). Otherwise cancel_work_sync() will wait forever for tg3_reset_task() to finish.

Reported-by: David Christensen drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com Reported-by: Baptiste Covolato baptiste@arista.com Fixes: db2199737990 ("tg3: Schedule at most one tg3_reset_task run") Signed-off-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c index be845df050399..6fcf9646d141b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c @@ -7219,8 +7219,8 @@ static inline void tg3_reset_task_schedule(struct tg3 *tp)

static inline void tg3_reset_task_cancel(struct tg3 *tp) { - cancel_work_sync(&tp->reset_task); - tg3_flag_clear(tp, RESET_TASK_PENDING); + if (test_and_clear_bit(TG3_FLAG_RESET_TASK_PENDING, tp->tg3_flags)) + cancel_work_sync(&tp->reset_task); tg3_flag_clear(tp, TX_RECOVERY_PENDING); }

@@ -11213,18 +11213,27 @@ static void tg3_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)

tg3_halt(tp, RESET_KIND_SHUTDOWN, 0); err = tg3_init_hw(tp, true); - if (err) + if (err) { + tg3_full_unlock(tp); + tp->irq_sync = 0; + tg3_napi_enable(tp); + /* Clear this flag so that tg3_reset_task_cancel() will not + * call cancel_work_sync() and wait forever. + */ + tg3_flag_clear(tp, RESET_TASK_PENDING); + dev_close(tp->dev); goto out; + }

tg3_netif_start(tp);

-out: tg3_full_unlock(tp);

if (!err) tg3_phy_start(tp);

tg3_flag_clear(tp, RESET_TASK_PENDING); +out: rtnl_unlock(); }

From: Lu Baolu baolu.lu@linux.intel.com

[ Upstream commit 6e4e9ec65078093165463c13d4eb92b3e8d7b2e8 ]

The VT-d spec requires (10.4.4 Global Command Register, GCMD_REG General Description) that:

If multiple control fields in this register need to be modified, software must serialize the modifications through multiple writes to this register.

However, in irq_remapping.c, modifications of IRE and CFI are done in one write. We need to do two separate writes with STS checking after each. It also checks the status register before writing command register to avoid unnecessary register write.

Fixes: af8d102f999a4 ("x86/intel/irq_remapping: Clean up x2apic opt-out security warning mess") Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian kevin.tian@intel.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@amacapital.net Cc: Jacob Pan jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com Cc: Kevin Tian kevin.tian@intel.com Cc: Ashok Raj ashok.raj@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200828000615.8281-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c b/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c index 15a4ad31c510a..9d2d03545bb07 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel_irq_remapping.c @@ -479,12 +479,18 @@ static void iommu_enable_irq_remapping(struct intel_iommu *iommu)

/* Enable interrupt-remapping */ iommu->gcmd |= DMA_GCMD_IRE; - iommu->gcmd &= ~DMA_GCMD_CFI; /* Block compatibility-format MSIs */ writel(iommu->gcmd, iommu->reg + DMAR_GCMD_REG); - IOMMU_WAIT_OP(iommu, DMAR_GSTS_REG, readl, (sts & DMA_GSTS_IRES), sts);

+ /* Block compatibility-format MSIs */ + if (sts & DMA_GSTS_CFIS) { + iommu->gcmd &= ~DMA_GCMD_CFI; + writel(iommu->gcmd, iommu->reg + DMAR_GCMD_REG); + IOMMU_WAIT_OP(iommu, DMAR_GSTS_REG, + readl, !(sts & DMA_GSTS_CFIS), sts); + } + /* * With CFI clear in the Global Command register, we should be * protected from dangerous (i.e. compatibility) interrupts

From: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com

[ Upstream commit 428fc0aff4e59399ec719ffcc1f7a5d29a4ee476 ]

Otherwise gcc generates warnings if the expression is complicated.

Fixes: 312a0c170945 ("[PATCH] LOG2: Alter roundup_pow_of_two() so that it can use a ilog2() on a constant") Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0-v1-8a2697e3c003+41165-log_brackets_jgg@nvidia.co... Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/log2.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/log2.h b/include/linux/log2.h index 2af7f77866d03..78496801cddf0 100644 --- a/include/linux/log2.h +++ b/include/linux/log2.h @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ unsigned long __rounddown_pow_of_two(unsigned long n) #define roundup_pow_of_two(n) \ ( \ __builtin_constant_p(n) ? ( \ - (n == 1) ? 1 : \ + ((n) == 1) ? 1 : \ (1UL << (ilog2((n) - 1) + 1)) \ ) : \ __roundup_pow_of_two(n) \

From: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com

commit b17164e258e3888d376a7434415013175d637377 upstream.

When running in a dax mode, if the user maps a page with MAP_PRIVATE and PROT_WRITE, the xfs filesystem would incorrectly update ctime and mtime when the user hits a COW fault.

This breaks building of the Linux kernel. How to reproduce:

1. extract the Linux kernel tree on dax-mounted xfs filesystem 2. run make clean 3. run make -j12 4. run make -j12

at step 4, make would incorrectly rebuild the whole kernel (although it was already built in step 3).

The reason for the breakage is that almost all object files depend on objtool. When we run objtool, it takes COW page fault on its .data section, and these faults will incorrectly update the timestamp of the objtool binary. The updated timestamp causes make to rebuild the whole tree.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/xfs/xfs_file.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_file.c @@ -1095,6 +1095,14 @@ __xfs_filemap_fault( return ret; }

+static inline bool +xfs_is_write_fault( + struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ + return (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && + (vmf->vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED); +} + static vm_fault_t xfs_filemap_fault( struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1102,7 +1110,7 @@ xfs_filemap_fault( /* DAX can shortcut the normal fault path on write faults! */ return __xfs_filemap_fault(vmf, PE_SIZE_PTE, IS_DAX(file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file)) && - (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)); + xfs_is_write_fault(vmf)); }

static vm_fault_t @@ -1115,7 +1123,7 @@ xfs_filemap_huge_fault(

/* DAX can shortcut the normal fault path on write faults! */ return __xfs_filemap_fault(vmf, pe_size, - (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)); + xfs_is_write_fault(vmf)); }

static vm_fault_t

From: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com

commit 41311242221e3482b20bfed10fa4d9db98d87016 upstream.

With conversion to follow_pfn(), DMA mapping a PFNMAP range depends on the range being faulted into the vma. Add support to manually provide that, in the same way as done on KVM with hva_to_pfn_remapped().

Reviewed-by: Peter Xu peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com [Ajay: Regenerated the patch for v4.19] Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher akaher@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c index 52083b710b87e..05d8553635ee7 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c @@ -343,6 +343,32 @@ static int put_pfn(unsigned long pfn, int prot) return 0; }

+static int follow_fault_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct mm_struct *mm, + unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long *pfn, + bool write_fault) +{ + int ret; + + ret = follow_pfn(vma, vaddr, pfn); + if (ret) { + bool unlocked = false; + + ret = fixup_user_fault(NULL, mm, vaddr, + FAULT_FLAG_REMOTE | + (write_fault ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0), + &unlocked); + if (unlocked) + return -EAGAIN; + + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = follow_pfn(vma, vaddr, pfn); + } + + return ret; +} + static int vaddr_get_pfn(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr, int prot, unsigned long *pfn) { @@ -382,12 +408,16 @@ static int vaddr_get_pfn(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr,

down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);

+retry: vma = find_vma_intersection(mm, vaddr, vaddr + 1);

if (vma && vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP) { - if (!follow_pfn(vma, vaddr, pfn) && - is_invalid_reserved_pfn(*pfn)) - ret = 0; + ret = follow_fault_pfn(vma, mm, vaddr, pfn, prot & IOMMU_WRITE); + if (ret == -EAGAIN) + goto retry; + + if (!ret && !is_invalid_reserved_pfn(*pfn)) + ret = -EFAULT; }

up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);

From: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com

commit abafbc551fddede3e0a08dee1dcde08fc0eb8476 upstream.

Accessing the disabled memory space of a PCI device would typically result in a master abort response on conventional PCI, or an unsupported request on PCI express. The user would generally see these as a -1 response for the read return data and the write would be silently discarded, possibly with an uncorrected, non-fatal AER error triggered on the host. Some systems however take it upon themselves to bring down the entire system when they see something that might indicate a loss of data, such as this discarded write to a disabled memory space.

To avoid this, we want to try to block the user from accessing memory spaces while they're disabled. We start with a semaphore around the memory enable bit, where writers modify the memory enable state and must be serialized, while readers make use of the memory region and can access in parallel. Writers include both direct manipulation via the command register, as well as any reset path where the internal mechanics of the reset may both explicitly and implicitly disable memory access, and manipulation of the MSI-X configuration, where the MSI-X vector table resides in MMIO space of the device. Readers include the read and write file ops to access the vfio device fd offsets as well as memory mapped access. In the latter case, we make use of our new vma list support to zap, or invalidate, those memory mappings in order to force them to be faulted back in on access.

Our semaphore usage will stall user access to MMIO spaces across internal operations like reset, but the user might experience new behavior when trying to access the MMIO space while disabled via the PCI command register. Access via read or write while disabled will return -EIO and access via memory maps will result in a SIGBUS. This is expected to be compatible with known use cases and potentially provides better error handling capabilities than present in the hardware, while avoiding the more readily accessible and severe platform error responses that might otherwise occur.

Fixes: CVE-2020-12888 Reviewed-by: Peter Xu peterx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com [Ajay: Regenerated the patch for v4.19] Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher akaher@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 291 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 36 +++- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 14 ++ drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h | 9 + drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c | 24 ++- 5 files changed, 331 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c index 3cd596023c2bb..9f72a6ee13b53 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/vfio.h> #include <linux/vgaarb.h> #include <linux/nospec.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h>

#include "vfio_pci_private.h"

@@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ no_mmap:

static void vfio_pci_try_bus_reset(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev); static void vfio_pci_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev); +static int vfio_pci_try_zap_and_vma_lock_cb(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *data);

/* * INTx masking requires the ability to disable INTx signaling via PCI_COMMAND @@ -623,6 +625,12 @@ int vfio_pci_register_dev_region(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, return 0; }

+struct vfio_devices { + struct vfio_device **devices; + int cur_index; + int max_index; +}; + static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { @@ -696,7 +704,7 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data, { void __iomem *io; size_t size; - u16 orig_cmd; + u16 cmd;

info.offset = VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(info.index); info.flags = 0; @@ -716,10 +724,7 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data, * Is it really there? Enable memory decode for * implicit access in pci_map_rom(). */ - pci_read_config_word(pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &orig_cmd); - pci_write_config_word(pdev, PCI_COMMAND, - orig_cmd | PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); - + cmd = vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(vdev); io = pci_map_rom(pdev, &size); if (io) { info.flags = VFIO_REGION_INFO_FLAG_READ; @@ -727,8 +732,8 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data, } else { info.size = 0; } + vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(vdev, cmd);

- pci_write_config_word(pdev, PCI_COMMAND, orig_cmd); break; } case VFIO_PCI_VGA_REGION_INDEX: @@ -865,8 +870,16 @@ static long vfio_pci_ioctl(void *device_data, return ret;

} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_RESET) { - return vdev->reset_works ? - pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev) : -EINVAL; + int ret; + + if (!vdev->reset_works) + return -EINVAL; + + vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock(vdev); + ret = pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev); + up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + + return ret;

} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_PCI_HOT_RESET_INFO) { struct vfio_pci_hot_reset_info hdr; @@ -946,8 +959,9 @@ reset_info_exit: int32_t *group_fds; struct vfio_pci_group_entry *groups; struct vfio_pci_group_info info; + struct vfio_devices devs = { .cur_index = 0 }; bool slot = false; - int i, count = 0, ret = 0; + int i, group_idx, mem_idx = 0, count = 0, ret = 0;

minsz = offsetofend(struct vfio_pci_hot_reset, count);

@@ -999,9 +1013,9 @@ reset_info_exit: * user interface and store the group and iommu ID. This * ensures the group is held across the reset. */ - for (i = 0; i < hdr.count; i++) { + for (group_idx = 0; group_idx < hdr.count; group_idx++) { struct vfio_group *group; - struct fd f = fdget(group_fds[i]); + struct fd f = fdget(group_fds[group_idx]); if (!f.file) { ret = -EBADF; break; @@ -1014,8 +1028,9 @@ reset_info_exit: break; }

- groups[i].group = group; - groups[i].id = vfio_external_user_iommu_id(group); + groups[group_idx].group = group; + groups[group_idx].id = + vfio_external_user_iommu_id(group); }

kfree(group_fds); @@ -1034,13 +1049,63 @@ reset_info_exit: ret = vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(vdev->pdev, vfio_pci_validate_devs, &info, slot); - if (!ret) - /* User has access, do the reset */ - ret = pci_reset_bus(vdev->pdev); + if (ret) + goto hot_reset_release; + + devs.max_index = count; + devs.devices = kcalloc(count, sizeof(struct vfio_device *), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!devs.devices) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto hot_reset_release; + } + + /* + * We need to get memory_lock for each device, but devices + * can share mmap_sem, therefore we need to zap and hold + * the vma_lock for each device, and only then get each + * memory_lock. + */ + ret = vfio_pci_for_each_slot_or_bus(vdev->pdev, + vfio_pci_try_zap_and_vma_lock_cb, + &devs, slot); + if (ret) + goto hot_reset_release; + + for (; mem_idx < devs.cur_index; mem_idx++) { + struct vfio_pci_device *tmp; + + tmp = vfio_device_data(devs.devices[mem_idx]); + + ret = down_write_trylock(&tmp->memory_lock); + if (!ret) { + ret = -EBUSY; + goto hot_reset_release; + } + mutex_unlock(&tmp->vma_lock); + } + + /* User has access, do the reset */ + ret = pci_reset_bus(vdev->pdev);

hot_reset_release: - for (i--; i >= 0; i--) - vfio_group_put_external_user(groups[i].group); + for (i = 0; i < devs.cur_index; i++) { + struct vfio_device *device; + struct vfio_pci_device *tmp; + + device = devs.devices[i]; + tmp = vfio_device_data(device); + + if (i < mem_idx) + up_write(&tmp->memory_lock); + else + mutex_unlock(&tmp->vma_lock); + vfio_device_put(device); + } + kfree(devs.devices); + + for (group_idx--; group_idx >= 0; group_idx--) + vfio_group_put_external_user(groups[group_idx].group);

kfree(groups); return ret; @@ -1121,8 +1186,126 @@ static ssize_t vfio_pci_write(void *device_data, const char __user *buf, return vfio_pci_rw(device_data, (char __user *)buf, count, ppos, true); }

-static int vfio_pci_add_vma(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, - struct vm_area_struct *vma) +/* Return 1 on zap and vma_lock acquired, 0 on contention (only with @try) */ +static int vfio_pci_zap_and_vma_lock(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, bool try) +{ + struct vfio_pci_mmap_vma *mmap_vma, *tmp; + + /* + * Lock ordering: + * vma_lock is nested under mmap_sem for vm_ops callback paths. + * The memory_lock semaphore is used by both code paths calling + * into this function to zap vmas and the vm_ops.fault callback + * to protect the memory enable state of the device. + * + * When zapping vmas we need to maintain the mmap_sem => vma_lock + * ordering, which requires using vma_lock to walk vma_list to + * acquire an mm, then dropping vma_lock to get the mmap_sem and + * reacquiring vma_lock. This logic is derived from similar + * requirements in uverbs_user_mmap_disassociate(). + * + * mmap_sem must always be the top-level lock when it is taken. + * Therefore we can only hold the memory_lock write lock when + * vma_list is empty, as we'd need to take mmap_sem to clear + * entries. vma_list can only be guaranteed empty when holding + * vma_lock, thus memory_lock is nested under vma_lock. + * + * This enables the vm_ops.fault callback to acquire vma_lock, + * followed by memory_lock read lock, while already holding + * mmap_sem without risk of deadlock. + */ + while (1) { + struct mm_struct *mm = NULL; + + if (try) { + if (!mutex_trylock(&vdev->vma_lock)) + return 0; + } else { + mutex_lock(&vdev->vma_lock); + } + while (!list_empty(&vdev->vma_list)) { + mmap_vma = list_first_entry(&vdev->vma_list, + struct vfio_pci_mmap_vma, + vma_next); + mm = mmap_vma->vma->vm_mm; + if (mmget_not_zero(mm)) + break; + + list_del(&mmap_vma->vma_next); + kfree(mmap_vma); + mm = NULL; + } + if (!mm) + return 1; + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock); + + if (try) { + if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) { + mmput(mm); + return 0; + } + } else { + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + } + if (mmget_still_valid(mm)) { + if (try) { + if (!mutex_trylock(&vdev->vma_lock)) { + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmput(mm); + return 0; + } + } else { + mutex_lock(&vdev->vma_lock); + } + list_for_each_entry_safe(mmap_vma, tmp, + &vdev->vma_list, vma_next) { + struct vm_area_struct *vma = mmap_vma->vma; + + if (vma->vm_mm != mm) + continue; + + list_del(&mmap_vma->vma_next); + kfree(mmap_vma); + + zap_vma_ptes(vma, vma->vm_start, + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start); + } + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock); + } + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + mmput(mm); + } +} + +void vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) +{ + vfio_pci_zap_and_vma_lock(vdev, false); + down_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock); +} + +u16 vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) +{ + u16 cmd; + + down_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + pci_read_config_word(vdev->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd); + if (!(cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY)) + pci_write_config_word(vdev->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, + cmd | PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); + + return cmd; +} + +void vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, u16 cmd) +{ + pci_write_config_word(vdev->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, cmd); + up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); +} + +/* Caller holds vma_lock */ +static int __vfio_pci_add_vma(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, + struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct vfio_pci_mmap_vma *mmap_vma;

@@ -1131,10 +1314,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_add_vma(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, return -ENOMEM;

mmap_vma->vma = vma; - - mutex_lock(&vdev->vma_lock); list_add(&mmap_vma->vma_next, &vdev->vma_list); - mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock);

return 0; } @@ -1168,15 +1348,32 @@ static vm_fault_t vfio_pci_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) { struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; struct vfio_pci_device *vdev = vma->vm_private_data; + vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; + + mutex_lock(&vdev->vma_lock); + down_read(&vdev->memory_lock); + + if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev)) { + ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock); + goto up_out; + } + + if (__vfio_pci_add_vma(vdev, vma)) { + ret = VM_FAULT_OOM; + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock); + goto up_out; + }

- if (vfio_pci_add_vma(vdev, vma)) - return VM_FAULT_OOM; + mutex_unlock(&vdev->vma_lock);

if (remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff, vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start, vma->vm_page_prot)) - return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;

- return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; +up_out: + up_read(&vdev->memory_lock); + return ret; }

static const struct vm_operations_struct vfio_pci_mmap_ops = { @@ -1315,6 +1512,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->ioeventfds_list); mutex_init(&vdev->vma_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->vma_list); + init_rwsem(&vdev->memory_lock);

ret = vfio_add_group_dev(&pdev->dev, &vfio_pci_ops, vdev); if (ret) { @@ -1410,12 +1608,6 @@ static struct pci_driver vfio_pci_driver = { .err_handler = &vfio_err_handlers, };

-struct vfio_devices { - struct vfio_device **devices; - int cur_index; - int max_index; -}; - static int vfio_pci_get_devs(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *data) { struct vfio_devices *devs = data; @@ -1437,6 +1629,39 @@ static int vfio_pci_get_devs(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *data) return 0; }

+static int vfio_pci_try_zap_and_vma_lock_cb(struct pci_dev *pdev, void *data) +{ + struct vfio_devices *devs = data; + struct vfio_device *device; + struct vfio_pci_device *vdev; + + if (devs->cur_index == devs->max_index) + return -ENOSPC; + + device = vfio_device_get_from_dev(&pdev->dev); + if (!device) + return -EINVAL; + + if (pci_dev_driver(pdev) != &vfio_pci_driver) { + vfio_device_put(device); + return -EBUSY; + } + + vdev = vfio_device_data(device); + + /* + * Locking multiple devices is prone to deadlock, runaway and + * unwind if we hit contention. + */ + if (!vfio_pci_zap_and_vma_lock(vdev, true)) { + vfio_device_put(device); + return -EBUSY; + } + + devs->devices[devs->cur_index++] = device; + return 0; +} + /* * Attempt to do a bus/slot reset if there are devices affected by a reset for * this device that are needs_reset and all of the affected devices are unused diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c index 36bc8f104e42e..4fe71fbce1942 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c @@ -398,6 +398,14 @@ static inline void p_setd(struct perm_bits *p, int off, u32 virt, u32 write) *(__le32 *)(&p->write[off]) = cpu_to_le32(write); }

+/* Caller should hold memory_lock semaphore */ +bool __vfio_pci_memory_enabled(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) +{ + u16 cmd = le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)&vdev->vconfig[PCI_COMMAND]); + + return cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY; +} + /* * Restore the *real* BARs after we detect a FLR or backdoor reset. * (backdoor = some device specific technique that we didn't catch) @@ -558,13 +566,18 @@ static int vfio_basic_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos,

new_cmd = le32_to_cpu(val);

+ phys_io = !!(phys_cmd & PCI_COMMAND_IO); + virt_io = !!(le16_to_cpu(*virt_cmd) & PCI_COMMAND_IO); + new_io = !!(new_cmd & PCI_COMMAND_IO); + phys_mem = !!(phys_cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); virt_mem = !!(le16_to_cpu(*virt_cmd) & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); new_mem = !!(new_cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY);

- phys_io = !!(phys_cmd & PCI_COMMAND_IO); - virt_io = !!(le16_to_cpu(*virt_cmd) & PCI_COMMAND_IO); - new_io = !!(new_cmd & PCI_COMMAND_IO); + if (!new_mem) + vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock(vdev); + else + down_write(&vdev->memory_lock);

/* * If the user is writing mem/io enable (new_mem/io) and we @@ -581,8 +594,11 @@ static int vfio_basic_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, }

count = vfio_default_config_write(vdev, pos, count, perm, offset, val); - if (count < 0) + if (count < 0) { + if (offset == PCI_COMMAND) + up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); return count; + }

/* * Save current memory/io enable bits in vconfig to allow for @@ -593,6 +609,8 @@ static int vfio_basic_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos,

*virt_cmd &= cpu_to_le16(~mask); *virt_cmd |= cpu_to_le16(new_cmd & mask); + + up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); }

/* Emulate INTx disable */ @@ -830,8 +848,11 @@ static int vfio_exp_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, pos - offset + PCI_EXP_DEVCAP, &cap);

- if (!ret && (cap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_FLR)) + if (!ret && (cap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_FLR)) { + vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock(vdev); pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev); + up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + } }

/* @@ -909,8 +930,11 @@ static int vfio_af_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, pos - offset + PCI_AF_CAP, &cap);

- if (!ret && (cap & PCI_AF_CAP_FLR) && (cap & PCI_AF_CAP_TP)) + if (!ret && (cap & PCI_AF_CAP_FLR) && (cap & PCI_AF_CAP_TP)) { + vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock(vdev); pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev); + up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + } }

return count; diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c index 94594dc63c417..bdfdd506bc588 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c @@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix) struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev; unsigned int flag = msix ? PCI_IRQ_MSIX : PCI_IRQ_MSI; int ret; + u16 cmd;

if (!is_irq_none(vdev)) return -EINVAL; @@ -261,13 +262,16 @@ static int vfio_msi_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int nvec, bool msix) return -ENOMEM;

/* return the number of supported vectors if we can't get all: */ + cmd = vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(vdev); ret = pci_alloc_irq_vectors(pdev, 1, nvec, flag); if (ret < nvec) { if (ret > 0) pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev); + vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(vdev, cmd); kfree(vdev->ctx); return ret; } + vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(vdev, cmd);

vdev->num_ctx = nvec; vdev->irq_type = msix ? VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX : @@ -290,6 +294,7 @@ static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev; struct eventfd_ctx *trigger; int irq, ret; + u16 cmd;

if (vector < 0 || vector >= vdev->num_ctx) return -EINVAL; @@ -298,7 +303,11 @@ static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,

if (vdev->ctx[vector].trigger) { irq_bypass_unregister_producer(&vdev->ctx[vector].producer); + + cmd = vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(vdev); free_irq(irq, vdev->ctx[vector].trigger); + vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(vdev, cmd); + kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name); eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->ctx[vector].trigger); vdev->ctx[vector].trigger = NULL; @@ -326,6 +335,7 @@ static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, * such a reset it would be unsuccessful. To avoid this, restore the * cached value of the message prior to enabling. */ + cmd = vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(vdev); if (msix) { struct msi_msg msg;

@@ -335,6 +345,7 @@ static int vfio_msi_set_vector_signal(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,

ret = request_irq(irq, vfio_msihandler, 0, vdev->ctx[vector].name, trigger); + vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(vdev, cmd); if (ret) { kfree(vdev->ctx[vector].name); eventfd_ctx_put(trigger); @@ -379,6 +390,7 @@ static void vfio_msi_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, bool msix) { struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev; int i; + u16 cmd;

for (i = 0; i < vdev->num_ctx; i++) { vfio_virqfd_disable(&vdev->ctx[i].unmask); @@ -387,7 +399,9 @@ static void vfio_msi_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, bool msix)

vfio_msi_set_block(vdev, 0, vdev->num_ctx, NULL, msix);

+ cmd = vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(vdev); pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev); + vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(vdev, cmd);

/* * Both disable paths above use pci_intx_for_msi() to clear DisINTx diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h index 9743c934199d6..17d2bae5b013c 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_private.h @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ struct vfio_pci_device { struct list_head ioeventfds_list; struct mutex vma_lock; struct list_head vma_list; + struct rw_semaphore memory_lock; };

#define is_intx(vdev) (vdev->irq_type == VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX) @@ -156,6 +157,14 @@ extern int vfio_pci_register_dev_region(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, unsigned int type, unsigned int subtype, const struct vfio_pci_regops *ops, size_t size, u32 flags, void *data); + +extern bool __vfio_pci_memory_enabled(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev); +extern void vfio_pci_zap_and_down_write_memory_lock(struct vfio_pci_device + *vdev); +extern u16 vfio_pci_memory_lock_and_enable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev); +extern void vfio_pci_memory_unlock_and_restore(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, + u16 cmd); + #ifdef CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_IGD extern int vfio_pci_igd_init(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev); #else diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c index a6029d0a55244..3d0ec2bbe131f 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ ssize_t vfio_pci_bar_rw(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, char __user *buf, size_t x_start = 0, x_end = 0; resource_size_t end; void __iomem *io; + struct resource *res = &vdev->pdev->resource[bar]; ssize_t done;

if (pci_resource_start(pdev, bar)) @@ -180,6 +181,14 @@ ssize_t vfio_pci_bar_rw(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, char __user *buf,

count = min(count, (size_t)(end - pos));

+ if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) { + down_read(&vdev->memory_lock); + if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev)) { + up_read(&vdev->memory_lock); + return -EIO; + } + } + if (bar == PCI_ROM_RESOURCE) { /* * The ROM can fill less space than the BAR, so we start the @@ -187,13 +196,17 @@ ssize_t vfio_pci_bar_rw(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, char __user *buf, * filling large ROM BARs much faster. */ io = pci_map_rom(pdev, &x_start); - if (!io) - return -ENOMEM; + if (!io) { + done = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } x_end = end; } else { int ret = vfio_pci_setup_barmap(vdev, bar); - if (ret) - return ret; + if (ret) { + done = ret; + goto out; + }

io = vdev->barmap[bar]; } @@ -210,6 +223,9 @@ ssize_t vfio_pci_bar_rw(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, char __user *buf,

if (bar == PCI_ROM_RESOURCE) pci_unmap_rom(pdev, io); +out: + if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) + up_read(&vdev->memory_lock);

return done; }

From: Nikolay Borisov nborisov@suse.com

[ Upstream commit 24cee18a1c1d7c731ea5987e0c99daea22ae7f4a ]

When a rewound buffer is created it already has a ref count of 1 and the dummy flag set. Then another ref is taken bumping the count to 2. Finally when this buffer is released from btrfs_release_path the extra reference is decremented by the special handling code in free_extent_buffer.

However, this special code is in fact redundant sinca ref count of 1 is still correct since the buffer is only accessed via btrfs_path struct. This paves the way forward of removing the special handling in free_extent_buffer.

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov nborisov@suse.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/btrfs/ctree.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c index 6c13d7d83f5ca..12b1a1c80c1b3 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c @@ -1347,7 +1347,6 @@ tree_mod_log_rewind(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct btrfs_path *path, btrfs_tree_read_unlock_blocking(eb); free_extent_buffer(eb);

- extent_buffer_get(eb_rewin); btrfs_tree_read_lock(eb_rewin); __tree_mod_log_rewind(fs_info, eb_rewin, time_seq, tm); WARN_ON(btrfs_header_nritems(eb_rewin) >

From: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 3d7081822f7f9eab867d9bcc8fd635208ec438e0 ]

Add probe_user_read(), strncpy_from_unsafe_user() and strnlen_unsafe_user() which allows caller to access user-space in IRQ context.

Current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are not available for user-space memory, because it sets KERNEL_DS while accessing data. On some arch, user address space and kernel address space can be co-exist, but others can not. In that case, setting KERNEL_DS means given address is treated as a kernel address space. Also strnlen_user() is only available from user context since it can sleep if pagefault is enabled.

To access user-space memory without pagefault, we need these new functions which sets USER_DS while accessing the data.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789869802.26965.4940338412595759063.stgit@devnot...

Acked-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/uaccess.h | 14 +++++ mm/maccess.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h index d55b68b113de1..db88f36540e9e 100644 --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -242,6 +242,17 @@ static inline unsigned long __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *to, extern long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size); extern long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);

+/* + * probe_user_read(): safely attempt to read from a location in user space + * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data + * @src: address to read from + * @size: size of the data chunk + * + * Safely read from address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault + * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT. + */ +extern long probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size); + /* * probe_kernel_write(): safely attempt to write to a location * @dst: address to write to @@ -255,6 +266,9 @@ extern long notrace probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size); extern long notrace __probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);

extern long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count); +extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_user(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr, + long count); +extern long strnlen_unsafe_user(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count);

/** * probe_kernel_address(): safely attempt to read from a location diff --git a/mm/maccess.c b/mm/maccess.c index ec00be51a24fd..80d70cb5cc0bd 100644 --- a/mm/maccess.c +++ b/mm/maccess.c @@ -5,8 +5,20 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>

+static __always_inline long +probe_read_common(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size) +{ + long ret; + + pagefault_disable(); + ret = __copy_from_user_inatomic(dst, src, size); + pagefault_enable(); + + return ret ? -EFAULT : 0; +} + /** - * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from a location + * probe_kernel_read(): safely attempt to read from a kernel-space location * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data * @src: address to read from * @size: size of the data chunk @@ -29,16 +41,40 @@ long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();

set_fs(KERNEL_DS); - pagefault_disable(); - ret = __copy_from_user_inatomic(dst, - (__force const void __user *)src, size); - pagefault_enable(); + ret = probe_read_common(dst, (__force const void __user *)src, size); set_fs(old_fs);

- return ret ? -EFAULT : 0; + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_kernel_read);

+/** + * probe_user_read(): safely attempt to read from a user-space location + * @dst: pointer to the buffer that shall take the data + * @src: address to read from. This must be a user address. + * @size: size of the data chunk + * + * Safely read from user address @src to the buffer at @dst. If a kernel fault + * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT. + */ + +long __weak probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size) + __attribute__((alias("__probe_user_read"))); + +long __probe_user_read(void *dst, const void __user *src, size_t size) +{ + long ret = -EFAULT; + mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs(); + + set_fs(USER_DS); + if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, src, size)) + ret = probe_read_common(dst, src, size); + set_fs(old_fs); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_user_read); + /** * probe_kernel_write(): safely attempt to write to a location * @dst: address to write to @@ -66,6 +102,7 @@ long __probe_kernel_write(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_kernel_write);

+ /** * strncpy_from_unsafe: - Copy a NUL terminated string from unsafe address. * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at @@ -105,3 +142,76 @@ long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count)

return ret ? -EFAULT : src - unsafe_addr; } + +/** + * strncpy_from_unsafe_user: - Copy a NUL terminated string from unsafe user + * address. + * @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at + * least @count bytes long. + * @unsafe_addr: Unsafe user address. + * @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL. + * + * Copies a NUL-terminated string from unsafe user address to kernel buffer. + * + * On success, returns the length of the string INCLUDING the trailing NUL. + * + * If access fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been copied + * and the trailing NUL added). + * + * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes, + * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count. + */ +long strncpy_from_unsafe_user(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr, + long count) +{ + mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs(); + long ret; + + if (unlikely(count <= 0)) + return 0; + + set_fs(USER_DS); + pagefault_disable(); + ret = strncpy_from_user(dst, unsafe_addr, count); + pagefault_enable(); + set_fs(old_fs); + + if (ret >= count) { + ret = count; + dst[ret - 1] = '\0'; + } else if (ret > 0) { + ret++; + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * strnlen_unsafe_user: - Get the size of a user string INCLUDING final NUL. + * @unsafe_addr: The string to measure. + * @count: Maximum count (including NUL) + * + * Get the size of a NUL-terminated string in user space without pagefault. + * + * Returns the size of the string INCLUDING the terminating NUL. + * + * If the string is too long, returns a number larger than @count. User + * has to check the return value against "> count". + * On exception (or invalid count), returns 0. + * + * Unlike strnlen_user, this can be used from IRQ handler etc. because + * it disables pagefaults. + */ +long strnlen_unsafe_user(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count) +{ + mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs(); + int ret; + + set_fs(USER_DS); + pagefault_disable(); + ret = strnlen_user(unsafe_addr, count); + pagefault_enable(); + set_fs(old_fs); + + return ret; +}

From: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com

[ Upstream commit a48b73eca4ceb9b8a4b97f290a065335dbcd8a04 ]

With the conversion of the tree locks to rwsem I got the following lockdep splat:

====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ compsize/11122 is trying to acquire lock: ffff889fabca8768 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x3e/0x90

but task is already holding lock: ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}: down_write_nested+0x3b/0x70 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x120 btrfs_search_slot+0x756/0x990 btrfs_lookup_inode+0x3a/0xb4 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x93/0x270 btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x168/0x230 btrfs_work_helper+0xd4/0x570 process_one_work+0x2ad/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x3a/0x3d0 kthread+0x133/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

-> #1 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930 btrfs_delayed_update_inode+0x50/0x440 btrfs_update_inode+0x8a/0xf0 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x5b/0xd0 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640 do_mmap+0x376/0x580 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 __might_fault+0x68/0x90 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300 search_ioctl+0x106/0x200 btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0 btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-fs-00

Possible unsafe locking scenario:

CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-fs-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-fs-00); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);

*** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by compsize/11122: #0: ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180

stack backtrace: CPU: 17 PID: 11122 Comm: compsize Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922 Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x78/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x165/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 ? find_held_lock+0x72/0x90 __might_fault+0x68/0x90 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300 ? btrfs_search_forward+0x2a6/0x360 search_ioctl+0x106/0x200 btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0 btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0 ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x5a/0x70 ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The problem is we're doing a copy_to_user() while holding tree locks, which can deadlock if we have to do a page fault for the copy_to_user(). This exists even without my locking changes, so it needs to be fixed. Rework the search ioctl to do the pre-fault and then copy_to_user_nofault for the copying.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 8 ++++---- fs/btrfs/extent_io.h | 6 +++--- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index fbcd18d96c524..82d597b16152c 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -5377,9 +5377,9 @@ void read_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, void *dstv, } }

-int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb, - void __user *dstv, - unsigned long start, unsigned long len) +int read_extent_buffer_to_user_nofault(const struct extent_buffer *eb, + void __user *dstv, + unsigned long start, unsigned long len) { size_t cur; size_t offset; @@ -5400,7 +5400,7 @@ int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,

cur = min(len, (PAGE_SIZE - offset)); kaddr = page_address(page); - if (copy_to_user(dst, kaddr + offset, cur)) { + if (probe_user_write(dst, kaddr + offset, cur)) { ret = -EFAULT; break; } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.h b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.h index a3598b24441e1..d5089cadd7c49 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.h @@ -448,9 +448,9 @@ int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv, void read_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, void *dst, unsigned long start, unsigned long len); -int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb, - void __user *dst, unsigned long start, - unsigned long len); +int read_extent_buffer_to_user_nofault(const struct extent_buffer *eb, + void __user *dst, unsigned long start, + unsigned long len); void write_extent_buffer_fsid(struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *src); void write_extent_buffer_chunk_tree_uuid(struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *src); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index a5ae02bf3652b..85990755edd90 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -2079,9 +2079,14 @@ static noinline int copy_to_sk(struct btrfs_path *path, sh.len = item_len; sh.transid = found_transid;

- /* copy search result header */ - if (copy_to_user(ubuf + *sk_offset, &sh, sizeof(sh))) { - ret = -EFAULT; + /* + * Copy search result header. If we fault then loop again so we + * can fault in the pages and -EFAULT there if there's a + * problem. Otherwise we'll fault and then copy the buffer in + * properly this next time through + */ + if (probe_user_write(ubuf + *sk_offset, &sh, sizeof(sh))) { + ret = 0; goto out; }

@@ -2089,10 +2094,14 @@ static noinline int copy_to_sk(struct btrfs_path *path,

if (item_len) { char __user *up = ubuf + *sk_offset; - /* copy the item */ - if (read_extent_buffer_to_user(leaf, up, - item_off, item_len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; + /* + * Copy the item, same behavior as above, but reset the + * * sk_offset so we copy the full thing again. + */ + if (read_extent_buffer_to_user_nofault(leaf, up, + item_off, item_len)) { + ret = 0; + *sk_offset -= sizeof(sh); goto out; }

@@ -2180,6 +2189,10 @@ static noinline int search_ioctl(struct inode *inode, key.offset = sk->min_offset;

while (1) { + ret = fault_in_pages_writeable(ubuf, *buf_size - sk_offset); + if (ret) + break; + ret = btrfs_search_forward(root, &key, path, sk->min_transid); if (ret != 0) { if (ret > 0)

From: Rogan Dawes rogan@dawes.za.net

[ Upstream commit 7d6053097311643545a8118100175a39bd6fa637 ]

Signed-off-by: Rogan Dawes rogan@dawes.za.net Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 41fbb8669845e..af58bf54aa9b6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -1227,6 +1227,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = { {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2001, 0x7e16, 3)}, /* D-Link DWM-221 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2001, 0x7e19, 4)}, /* D-Link DWM-221 B1 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2001, 0x7e35, 4)}, /* D-Link DWM-222 */ + {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2001, 0x7e3d, 4)}, /* D-Link DWM-222 A2 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2020, 0x2031, 4)}, /* Olicard 600 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2020, 0x2033, 4)}, /* BroadMobi BM806U */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2020, 0x2060, 4)}, /* BroadMobi BM818 */

From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de

commit 949a1ebe8cea7b342085cb6a4946b498306b9493 upstream.

The PCM OSS mulaw plugin has a check of the format of the counter part whether it's a linear format. The check is with snd_BUG_ON() that emits WARN_ON() when the debug config is set, and it confuses syzkaller as if it were a serious issue. Let's drop snd_BUG_ON() for avoiding that.

While we're at it, correct the error code to a more suitable, EINVAL.

Reported-by: syzbot+23b22dc2e0b81cbfcc95@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901131802.18157-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- sound/core/oss/mulaw.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/oss/mulaw.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/mulaw.c @@ -329,8 +329,8 @@ int snd_pcm_plugin_build_mulaw(struct sn snd_BUG(); return -EINVAL; } - if (snd_BUG_ON(!snd_pcm_format_linear(format->format))) - return -ENXIO; + if (!snd_pcm_format_linear(format->format)) + return -EINVAL;

err = snd_pcm_plugin_build(plug, "Mu-Law<->linear conversion", src_format, dst_format,

From: Takashi Sakamoto o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp

commit acd46a6b6de88569654567810acad2b0a0a25cea upstream.

Avid Adrenaline is reported that ALSA firewire-digi00x driver is bound to. However, as long as he investigated, the design of this model is hardly similar to the one of Digi 00x family. It's better to exclude the model from modalias of ALSA firewire-digi00x driver.

This commit changes device entries so that the model is excluded.

$ python3 crpp < ~/git/am-config-rom/misc/avid-adrenaline.img ROM header and bus information block ----------------------------------------------------------------- 400 04203a9c bus_info_length 4, crc_length 32, crc 15004 404 31333934 bus_name "1394" 408 e064a002 irmc 1, cmc 1, isc 1, bmc 0, cyc_clk_acc 100, max_rec 10 (2048) 40c 00a07e01 company_id 00a07e | 410 00085257 device_id 0100085257 | EUI-64 00a07e0100085257

root directory ----------------------------------------------------------------- 414 0005d08c directory_length 5, crc 53388 418 0300a07e vendor 41c 8100000c --> descriptor leaf at 44c 420 0c008380 node capabilities 424 8d000002 --> eui-64 leaf at 42c 428 d1000004 --> unit directory at 438

eui-64 leaf at 42c ----------------------------------------------------------------- 42c 0002410f leaf_length 2, crc 16655 430 00a07e01 company_id 00a07e | 434 00085257 device_id 0100085257 | EUI-64 00a07e0100085257

unit directory at 438 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 438 0004d6c9 directory_length 4, crc 54985 43c 1200a02d specifier id: 1394 TA 440 13014001 version: Vender Unique and AV/C 444 17000001 model 448 81000009 --> descriptor leaf at 46c

descriptor leaf at 44c ----------------------------------------------------------------- 44c 00077205 leaf_length 7, crc 29189 450 00000000 textual descriptor 454 00000000 minimal ASCII 458 41766964 "Avid" 45c 20546563 " Tec" 460 686e6f6c "hnol" 464 6f677900 "ogy" 468 00000000

descriptor leaf at 46c ----------------------------------------------------------------- 46c 000599a5 leaf_length 5, crc 39333 470 00000000 textual descriptor 474 00000000 minimal ASCII 478 41647265 "Adre" 47c 6e616c69 "nali" 480 6e650000 "ne"

Reported-by: Simon Wood simon@mungewell.org Fixes: 9edf723fd858 ("ALSA: firewire-digi00x: add skeleton for Digi 002/003 family") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200823075545.56305-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- sound/firewire/digi00x/digi00x.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/firewire/digi00x/digi00x.c +++ b/sound/firewire/digi00x/digi00x.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); #define VENDOR_DIGIDESIGN 0x00a07e #define MODEL_CONSOLE 0x000001 #define MODEL_RACK 0x000002 +#define SPEC_VERSION 0x000001

static int name_card(struct snd_dg00x *dg00x) { @@ -185,14 +186,18 @@ static const struct ieee1394_device_id s /* Both of 002/003 use the same ID. */ { .match_flags = IEEE1394_MATCH_VENDOR_ID | + IEEE1394_MATCH_VERSION | IEEE1394_MATCH_MODEL_ID, .vendor_id = VENDOR_DIGIDESIGN, + .version = SPEC_VERSION, .model_id = MODEL_CONSOLE, }, { .match_flags = IEEE1394_MATCH_VENDOR_ID | + IEEE1394_MATCH_VERSION | IEEE1394_MATCH_MODEL_ID, .vendor_id = VENDOR_DIGIDESIGN, + .version = SPEC_VERSION, .model_id = MODEL_RACK, }, {}

From: Dan Crawford dnlcrwfrd@gmail.com

commit 15cbff3fbbc631952c346744f862fb294504b5e2 upstream.

Following Christian Lachner's patch for Gigabyte X570-based motherboards, also patch the MSI X570-A PRO motherboard; the ALC1220 codec requires the same workaround for Clevo laptops to enforce the DAC/mixer connection path. Set up a quirk entry for that.

I suspect most if all X570 motherboards will require similar patches.

[ The entries reordered in the SSID order -- tiwai ]

Related buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205275 Signed-off-by: Dan Crawford dnlcrwfrd@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200829024946.5691-1-dnlcrwfrd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -2452,6 +2452,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc882 SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0x1276, "MSI-GL73", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_P950), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0x1293, "MSI-GP65", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_P950), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0x7350, "MSI-7350", ALC889_FIXUP_CD), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0x9c37, "MSI X570-A PRO", ALC1220_FIXUP_CLEVO_P950), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xda57, "MSI Z270-Gaming", ALC1220_FIXUP_GB_DUAL_CODECS), SND_PCI_QUIRK_VENDOR(0x1462, "MSI", ALC882_FIXUP_GPIO3), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x147b, 0x107a, "Abit AW9D-MAX", ALC882_FIXUP_ABIT_AW9D_MAX),

From: Sean Young sean@mess.org

commit 4f0835d6677dc69263f90f976524cb92b257d9f4 upstream.

Only report uevent file contents if device still registered, else we might read freed memory.

Reported-by: syzbot+ceef16277388d6f24898@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Hillf Danton hdanton@sina.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16+ Signed-off-by: Sean Young sean@mess.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/rc-main.c @@ -1568,25 +1568,25 @@ static void rc_dev_release(struct device kfree(dev); }

-#define ADD_HOTPLUG_VAR(fmt, val...) \ - do { \ - int err = add_uevent_var(env, fmt, val); \ - if (err) \ - return err; \ - } while (0) - static int rc_dev_uevent(struct device *device, struct kobj_uevent_env *env) { struct rc_dev *dev = to_rc_dev(device); + int ret = 0;

- if (dev->rc_map.name) - ADD_HOTPLUG_VAR("NAME=%s", dev->rc_map.name); - if (dev->driver_name) - ADD_HOTPLUG_VAR("DRV_NAME=%s", dev->driver_name); - if (dev->device_name) - ADD_HOTPLUG_VAR("DEV_NAME=%s", dev->device_name); + mutex_lock(&dev->lock);

- return 0; + if (!dev->registered) + ret = -ENODEV; + if (ret == 0 && dev->rc_map.name) + ret = add_uevent_var(env, "NAME=%s", dev->rc_map.name); + if (ret == 0 && dev->driver_name) + ret = add_uevent_var(env, "DRV_NAME=%s", dev->driver_name); + if (ret == 0 && dev->device_name) + ret = add_uevent_var(env, "DEV_NAME=%s", dev->device_name); + + mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); + + return ret; }

/* @@ -1970,14 +1970,14 @@ void rc_unregister_device(struct rc_dev del_timer_sync(&dev->timer_keyup); del_timer_sync(&dev->timer_repeat);

- rc_free_rx_device(dev); - mutex_lock(&dev->lock); if (dev->users && dev->close) dev->close(dev); dev->registered = false; mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);

+ rc_free_rx_device(dev); + /* * lirc device should be freed with dev->registered = false, so * that userspace polling will get notified.

From: Ming Lei ming.lei@redhat.com

commit 7e24969022cbd61ddc586f14824fc205661bb124 upstream.

Block layer usually doesn't support or allow zero-length bvec. Since commit 1bdc76aea115 ("iov_iter: use bvec iterator to implement iterate_bvec()"), iterate_bvec() switches to bvec iterator. However, Al mentioned that 'Zero-length segments are not disallowed' in iov_iter.

Fixes for_each_bvec() so that it can move on after seeing one zero length bvec.

Fixes: 1bdc76aea115 ("iov_iter: use bvec iterator to implement iterate_bvec()") Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+61acc40a49a3e46e25ea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ming Lei ming.lei@redhat.com Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: Matthew Wilcox willy@infradead.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org/msg2262077.html Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/linux/bvec.h | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/include/linux/bvec.h +++ b/include/linux/bvec.h @@ -119,11 +119,18 @@ static inline bool bvec_iter_rewind(cons return true; }

+static inline void bvec_iter_skip_zero_bvec(struct bvec_iter *iter) +{ + iter->bi_bvec_done = 0; + iter->bi_idx++; +} + #define for_each_bvec(bvl, bio_vec, iter, start) \ for (iter = (start); \ (iter).bi_size && \ ((bvl = bvec_iter_bvec((bio_vec), (iter))), 1); \ - bvec_iter_advance((bio_vec), &(iter), (bvl).bv_len)) + (bvl).bv_len ? (void)bvec_iter_advance((bio_vec), &(iter), \ + (bvl).bv_len) : bvec_iter_skip_zero_bvec(&(iter)))

/* for iterating one bio from start to end */ #define BVEC_ITER_ALL_INIT (struct bvec_iter) \

From: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com

commit f9e040efcc28309e5c592f7e79085a9a52e31f58 upstream.

The function dax_direct_access doesn't take partitions into account, it always maps pages from the beginning of the device. Therefore, persistent_memory_claim() must get the partition offset using get_start_sect() and add it to the page offsets passed to dax_direct_access().

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Fixes: 48debafe4f2f ("dm: add writecache target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+ Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/md/dm-writecache.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-writecache.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-writecache.c @@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static int persistent_memory_claim(struc pfn_t pfn; int id; struct page **pages; + sector_t offset;

wc->memory_vmapped = false;

@@ -244,9 +245,16 @@ static int persistent_memory_claim(struc goto err1; }

+ offset = get_start_sect(wc->ssd_dev->bdev); + if (offset & (PAGE_SIZE / 512 - 1)) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto err1; + } + offset >>= PAGE_SHIFT - 9; + id = dax_read_lock();

- da = dax_direct_access(wc->ssd_dev->dax_dev, 0, p, &wc->memory_map, &pfn); + da = dax_direct_access(wc->ssd_dev->dax_dev, offset, p, &wc->memory_map, &pfn); if (da < 0) { wc->memory_map = NULL; r = da; @@ -268,7 +276,7 @@ static int persistent_memory_claim(struc i = 0; do { long daa; - daa = dax_direct_access(wc->ssd_dev->dax_dev, i, p - i, + daa = dax_direct_access(wc->ssd_dev->dax_dev, offset + i, p - i, NULL, &pfn); if (daa <= 0) { r = daa ? daa : -EINVAL;

From: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com

commit 219403d7e56f9b716ad80ab87db85d29547ee73e upstream.

Maybe __create_persistent_data_objects() caller will use PTR_ERR as a pointer, it will lead to some strange things.

Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c @@ -698,12 +698,16 @@ static int __create_persistent_data_obje THIN_MAX_CONCURRENT_LOCKS); if (IS_ERR(pmd->bm)) { DMERR("could not create block manager"); - return PTR_ERR(pmd->bm); + r = PTR_ERR(pmd->bm); + pmd->bm = NULL; + return r; }

r = __open_or_format_metadata(pmd, format_device); - if (r) + if (r) { dm_block_manager_destroy(pmd->bm); + pmd->bm = NULL; + }

return r; }

From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com

commit e9ee186bb735bfc17fa81dbc9aebf268aee5b41e upstream.

KVM has a one instruction window where it will allow an SError exception to be consumed by the hypervisor without treating it as a hypervisor bug. This is used to consume asynchronous external abort that were caused by the guest.

As we are about to add another location that survives unexpected exceptions, generalise this code to make it behave like the host's extable.

KVM's version has to be mapped to EL2 to be accessible on nVHE systems.

The SError vaxorcism code is a one instruction window, so has two entries in the extable. Because the KVM code is copied for VHE and nVHE, we end up with four entries, half of which correspond with code that isn't mapped.

Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara andre.przywara@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 15 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 ++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 16 +++++++----- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h @@ -111,6 +111,21 @@ extern u32 __init_stage2_translation(voi kern_hyp_va \vcpu .endm

+/* + * KVM extable for unexpected exceptions. + * In the same format _asm_extable, but output to a different section so that + * it can be mapped to EL2. The KVM version is not sorted. The caller must + * ensure: + * x18 has the hypervisor value to allow any Shadow-Call-Stack instrumented + * code to write to it, and that SPSR_EL2 and ELR_EL2 are restored by the fixup. + */ +.macro _kvm_extable, from, to + .pushsection __kvm_ex_table, "a" + .align 3 + .long (\from - .), (\to - .) + .popsection +.endm + #endif

#endif /* __ARM_KVM_ASM_H__ */ --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ ENTRY(_text)

jiffies = jiffies_64;

+ +#define HYPERVISOR_EXTABLE \ + . = ALIGN(SZ_8); \ + __start___kvm_ex_table = .; \ + *(__kvm_ex_table) \ + __stop___kvm_ex_table = .; + #define HYPERVISOR_TEXT \ /* \ * Align to 4 KB so that \ @@ -39,6 +46,7 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64; __hyp_idmap_text_end = .; \ __hyp_text_start = .; \ *(.hyp.text) \ + HYPERVISOR_EXTABLE \ __hyp_text_end = .;

#define IDMAP_TEXT \ --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S @@ -148,18 +148,22 @@ alternative_endif // This is our single instruction exception window. A pending // SError is guaranteed to occur at the earliest when we unmask // it, and at the latest just after the ISB. - .global abort_guest_exit_start abort_guest_exit_start:

isb

- .global abort_guest_exit_end abort_guest_exit_end: + msr daifset, #4 // Mask aborts + ret

- // If the exception took place, restore the EL1 exception - // context so that we can report some information. - // Merge the exception code with the SError pending bit. - tbz x0, #ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT, 1f + _kvm_extable abort_guest_exit_start, 9997f + _kvm_extable abort_guest_exit_end, 9997f +9997: + msr daifset, #4 // Mask aborts + mov x0, #(1 << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT) + + // restore the EL1 exception context so that we can report some + // information. Merge the exception code with the SError pending bit. msr elr_el2, x2 msr esr_el2, x3 msr spsr_el2, x4 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -26,6 +26,30 @@ #include <asm/kvm_mmu.h> #include <asm/mmu.h>

+.macro save_caller_saved_regs_vect + /* x0 and x1 were saved in the vector entry */ + stp x2, x3, [sp, #-16]! + stp x4, x5, [sp, #-16]! + stp x6, x7, [sp, #-16]! + stp x8, x9, [sp, #-16]! + stp x10, x11, [sp, #-16]! + stp x12, x13, [sp, #-16]! + stp x14, x15, [sp, #-16]! + stp x16, x17, [sp, #-16]! +.endm + +.macro restore_caller_saved_regs_vect + ldp x16, x17, [sp], #16 + ldp x14, x15, [sp], #16 + ldp x12, x13, [sp], #16 + ldp x10, x11, [sp], #16 + ldp x8, x9, [sp], #16 + ldp x6, x7, [sp], #16 + ldp x4, x5, [sp], #16 + ldp x2, x3, [sp], #16 + ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16 +.endm + .text .pushsection .hyp.text, "ax"

@@ -163,27 +187,14 @@ el1_error: b __guest_exit

el2_error: - ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16 + save_caller_saved_regs_vect + stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! + + bl kvm_unexpected_el2_exception + + ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 + restore_caller_saved_regs_vect

- /* - * Only two possibilities: - * 1) Either we come from the exit path, having just unmasked - * PSTATE.A: change the return code to an EL2 fault, and - * carry on, as we're already in a sane state to handle it. - * 2) Or we come from anywhere else, and that's a bug: we panic. - * - * For (1), x0 contains the original return code and x1 doesn't - * contain anything meaningful at that stage. We can reuse them - * as temp registers. - * For (2), who cares? - */ - mrs x0, elr_el2 - adr x1, abort_guest_exit_start - cmp x0, x1 - adr x1, abort_guest_exit_end - ccmp x0, x1, #4, ne - b.ne __hyp_panic - mov x0, #(1 << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT) eret

ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic) --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <kvm/arm_psci.h>

#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/extable.h> #include <asm/kprobes.h> #include <asm/kvm_asm.h> #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> @@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h>

+extern struct exception_table_entry __start___kvm_ex_table; +extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___kvm_ex_table; + /* Check whether the FP regs were dirtied while in the host-side run loop: */ static bool __hyp_text update_fp_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { @@ -663,3 +667,30 @@ void __hyp_text __noreturn hyp_panic(str

unreachable(); } + +asmlinkage void __hyp_text kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void) +{ + unsigned long addr, fixup; + struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt; + struct exception_table_entry *entry, *end; + unsigned long elr_el2 = read_sysreg(elr_el2); + + entry = hyp_symbol_addr(__start___kvm_ex_table); + end = hyp_symbol_addr(__stop___kvm_ex_table); + host_ctxt = __hyp_this_cpu_ptr(kvm_host_cpu_state); + + while (entry < end) { + addr = (unsigned long)&entry->insn + entry->insn; + fixup = (unsigned long)&entry->fixup + entry->fixup; + + if (addr != elr_el2) { + entry++; + continue; + } + + write_sysreg(fixup, elr_el2); + return; + } + + hyp_panic(host_ctxt); +}

From: James Morse james.morse@arm.com

commit 88a84ccccb3966bcc3f309cdb76092a9892c0260 upstream.

KVM doesn't expect any synchronous exceptions when executing, any such exception leads to a panic(). AT instructions access the guest page tables, and can cause a synchronous external abort to be taken.

The arm-arm is unclear on what should happen if the guest has configured the hardware update of the access-flag, and a memory type in TCR_EL1 that does not support atomic operations. B2.2.6 "Possible implementation restrictions on using atomic instructions" from DDI0487F.a lists synchronous external abort as a possible behaviour of atomic instructions that target memory that isn't writeback cacheable, but the page table walker may behave differently.

Make KVM robust to synchronous exceptions caused by AT instructions. Add a get_user() style helper for AT instructions that returns -EFAULT if an exception was generated.

While KVM's version of the exception table mixes synchronous and asynchronous exceptions, only one of these can occur at each location.

Re-enter the guest when the AT instructions take an exception on the assumption the guest will take the same exception. This isn't guaranteed to make forward progress, as the AT instructions may always walk the page tables, but guest execution may use the translation cached in the TLB.

This isn't a problem, as since commit 5dcd0fdbb492 ("KVM: arm64: Defer guest entry when an asynchronous exception is pending"), KVM will return to the host to process IRQs allowing the rest of the system to keep running.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19 Signed-off-by: James Morse james.morse@arm.com Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara andre.przywara@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 12 ++++++++++-- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h @@ -87,6 +87,34 @@ extern u32 __init_stage2_translation(voi *__hyp_this_cpu_ptr(sym); \ })

+#define __KVM_EXTABLE(from, to) \ + " .pushsection __kvm_ex_table, "a"\n" \ + " .align 3\n" \ + " .long (" #from " - .), (" #to " - .)\n" \ + " .popsection\n" + + +#define __kvm_at(at_op, addr) \ +( { \ + int __kvm_at_err = 0; \ + u64 spsr, elr; \ + asm volatile( \ + " mrs %1, spsr_el2\n" \ + " mrs %2, elr_el2\n" \ + "1: at "at_op", %3\n" \ + " isb\n" \ + " b 9f\n" \ + "2: msr spsr_el2, %1\n" \ + " msr elr_el2, %2\n" \ + " mov %w0, %4\n" \ + "9:\n" \ + __KVM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b) \ + : "+r" (__kvm_at_err), "=&r" (spsr), "=&r" (elr) \ + : "r" (addr), "i" (-EFAULT)); \ + __kvm_at_err; \ +} ) + + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */

.macro hyp_adr_this_cpu reg, sym, tmp --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S @@ -186,6 +186,15 @@ el1_error: mov x0, #ARM_EXCEPTION_EL1_SERROR b __guest_exit

+el2_sync: + save_caller_saved_regs_vect + stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! + bl kvm_unexpected_el2_exception + ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 + restore_caller_saved_regs_vect + + eret + el2_error: save_caller_saved_regs_vect stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! @@ -223,7 +232,6 @@ ENDPROC(\label) invalid_vector el2t_irq_invalid invalid_vector el2t_fiq_invalid invalid_vector el2t_error_invalid - invalid_vector el2h_sync_invalid invalid_vector el2h_irq_invalid invalid_vector el2h_fiq_invalid invalid_vector el1_fiq_invalid @@ -251,7 +259,7 @@ ENTRY(__kvm_hyp_vector) invalid_vect el2t_fiq_invalid // FIQ EL2t invalid_vect el2t_error_invalid // Error EL2t

- invalid_vect el2h_sync_invalid // Synchronous EL2h + valid_vect el2_sync // Synchronous EL2h invalid_vect el2h_irq_invalid // IRQ EL2h invalid_vect el2h_fiq_invalid // FIQ EL2h valid_vect el2_error // Error EL2h --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c @@ -268,10 +268,10 @@ static bool __hyp_text __translate_far_t * saved the guest context yet, and we may return early... */ par = read_sysreg(par_el1); - asm volatile("at s1e1r, %0" : : "r" (far)); - isb(); - - tmp = read_sysreg(par_el1); + if (!__kvm_at("s1e1r", far)) + tmp = read_sysreg(par_el1); + else + tmp = 1; /* back to the guest */ write_sysreg(par, par_el1);

if (unlikely(tmp & 1))

From: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com

commit ebfa440ce38b7e2e04c3124aa89c8a9f4094cf21 upstream.

SR-IOV VFs do not implement the memory enable bit of the command register, therefore this bit is not set in config space after pci_enable_device(). This leads to an unintended difference between PF and VF in hand-off state to the user. We can correct this by setting the initial value of the memory enable bit in our virtualized config space. There's really no need however to ever fault a user on a VF though as this would only indicate an error in the user's management of the enable bit, versus a PF where the same access could trigger hardware faults.

Fixes: abafbc551fdd ("vfio-pci: Invalidate mmaps and block MMIO access on disabled memory") Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c @@ -401,9 +401,15 @@ static inline void p_setd(struct perm_bi /* Caller should hold memory_lock semaphore */ bool __vfio_pci_memory_enabled(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) { + struct pci_dev *pdev = vdev->pdev; u16 cmd = le16_to_cpu(*(__le16 *)&vdev->vconfig[PCI_COMMAND]);

- return cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY; + /* + * SR-IOV VF memory enable is handled by the MSE bit in the + * PF SR-IOV capability, there's therefore no need to trigger + * faults based on the virtual value. + */ + return pdev->is_virtfn || (cmd & PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); }

/* @@ -1732,6 +1738,15 @@ int vfio_config_init(struct vfio_pci_dev vconfig[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN]);

vconfig[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0; /* Gratuitous for good VFs */ + + /* + * VFs do no implement the memory enable bit of the COMMAND + * register therefore we'll not have it set in our initial + * copy of config space after pci_enable_device(). For + * consistency with PFs, set the virtual enable bit here. + */ + *(__le16 *)&vconfig[PCI_COMMAND] |= + cpu_to_le16(PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY); }

if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_INTX) || vdev->nointx)

From: Muchun Song songmuchun@bytedance.com

commit 17743798d81238ab13050e8e2833699b54e15467 upstream.

There is a race between the assignment of `table->data` and write value to the pointer of `table->data` in the __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() on the other thread.

CPU0: CPU1: proc_sys_write hugetlb_sysctl_handler proc_sys_call_handler hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common hugetlb_sysctl_handler table->data = &tmp; hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common table->data = &tmp; proc_doulongvec_minmax do_proc_doulongvec_minmax sysctl_head_finish __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax unuse_table i = table->data; *i = val; // corrupt CPU1's stack

Fix this by duplicating the `table`, and only update the duplicate of it. And introduce a helper of proc_hugetlb_doulongvec_minmax() to simplify the code.

The following oops was seen:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page Code: Bad RIP value. ... Call Trace: ? set_max_huge_pages+0x3da/0x4f0 ? alloc_pool_huge_page+0x150/0x150 ? proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x46/0x60 ? hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0x1c7/0x200 ? nr_hugepages_store+0x20/0x20 ? copy_fd_bitmaps+0x170/0x170 ? hugetlb_sysctl_handler+0x1e/0x20 ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x2f1/0x300 ? unregister_sysctl_table+0xb0/0xb0 ? __fd_install+0x78/0x100 ? proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20 ? __vfs_write+0x4d/0x90 ? vfs_write+0xef/0x240 ? ksys_write+0xc0/0x160 ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50 ? __close_fd+0x129/0x150 ? __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x200 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: e5ff215941d5 ("hugetlb: multiple hstates for multiple page sizes") Signed-off-by: Muchun Song songmuchun@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz mike.kravetz@oracle.com Cc: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200828031146.43035-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- mm/hugetlb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -2918,6 +2918,22 @@ static unsigned int cpuset_mems_nr(unsig }

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static int proc_hugetlb_doulongvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *length, + loff_t *ppos, unsigned long *out) +{ + struct ctl_table dup_table; + + /* + * In order to avoid races with __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(), we + * can duplicate the @table and alter the duplicate of it. + */ + dup_table = *table; + dup_table.data = out; + + return proc_doulongvec_minmax(&dup_table, write, buffer, length, ppos); +} + static int hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common(bool obey_mempolicy, struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *length, loff_t *ppos) @@ -2929,9 +2945,8 @@ static int hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common if (!hugepages_supported()) return -EOPNOTSUPP;

- table->data = &tmp; - table->maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long); - ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos); + ret = proc_hugetlb_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos, + &tmp); if (ret) goto out;

@@ -2975,9 +2990,8 @@ int hugetlb_overcommit_handler(struct ct if (write && hstate_is_gigantic(h)) return -EINVAL;

- table->data = &tmp; - table->maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long); - ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos); + ret = proc_hugetlb_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos, + &tmp); if (ret) goto out;

From: Himadri Pandya himadrispandya@gmail.com

commit a092b7233f0e000cc6f2c71a49e2ecc6f917a5fc upstream.

The buffer size is 2 Bytes and we expect to receive the same amount of data. But sometimes we receive less data and run into uninit-was-stored issue upon read. Hence modify the error check on the return value to match with the buffer size as a prevention.

Reported-and-tested by: syzbot+a7e220df5a81d1ab400e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Himadri Pandya himadrispandya@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c @@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ int asix_read_phy_addr(struct usbnet *de

netdev_dbg(dev->net, "asix_get_phy_addr()\n");

- if (ret < 0) { + if (ret < 2) { netdev_err(dev->net, "Error reading PHYID register: %02x\n", ret); goto out; }