From: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org
[ Upstream commit bfcc8ba45eb87bfaaff900bbad2b87b204899d41 ]
The memcpy() in ath_key_config() was attempting to write across neighboring struct members in struct ath_keyval. Introduce a wrapping struct_group, kv_values, to be the addressable target of the memcpy without overflowing an individual member. Silences the false positive run-time warning:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 32) of single field "hk.kv_val" at drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c:506 (size 16)
Link: https://bbs.archlinux.org/viewtopic.php?id=282254 Cc: Kalle Valo kvalo@kernel.org Cc: "David S. Miller" davem@davemloft.net Cc: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Cc: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Cc: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo quic_kvalo@quicinc.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210054310.never.554-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath.h | 12 +++++++----- drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath.h b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath.h index f083fb9038c36..f02a308a9ffc5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath.h @@ -96,11 +96,13 @@ struct ath_keyval { u8 kv_type; u8 kv_pad; u16 kv_len; - u8 kv_val[16]; /* TK */ - u8 kv_mic[8]; /* Michael MIC key */ - u8 kv_txmic[8]; /* Michael MIC TX key (used only if the hardware - * supports both MIC keys in the same key cache entry; - * in that case, kv_mic is the RX key) */ + struct_group(kv_values, + u8 kv_val[16]; /* TK */ + u8 kv_mic[8]; /* Michael MIC key */ + u8 kv_txmic[8]; /* Michael MIC TX key (used only if the hardware + * supports both MIC keys in the same key cache entry; + * in that case, kv_mic is the RX key) */ + ); };
enum ath_cipher { diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c index 61b59a804e308..b7b61d4f02bae 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c @@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ int ath_key_config(struct ath_common *common,
hk.kv_len = key->keylen; if (key->keylen) - memcpy(hk.kv_val, key->key, key->keylen); + memcpy(&hk.kv_values, key->key, key->keylen);
if (!(key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { switch (vif->type) {
From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi memxor@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 0a09a2f933c73dc76ab0b72da6855f44342a8903 ]
There are a few cases where hlist_node is checked to be unhashed without holding the lock protecting its modification. In this case, one must use hlist_unhashed_lockless to avoid load tearing and KCSAN reports. Fix this by using lockless variant in places not protected by the lock.
Since this is not prompted by any actual KCSAN reports but only from code review, I have not included a fixes tag.
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau martin.lau@kernel.org Cc: KP Singh kpsingh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi memxor@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221200646.2500777-4-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c index 6c2d39a3d5581..5ef8eaf4985ed 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c @@ -48,11 +48,21 @@ owner_storage(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, void *owner) return map->ops->map_owner_storage_ptr(owner); }
+static bool selem_linked_to_storage_lockless(const struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem) +{ + return !hlist_unhashed_lockless(&selem->snode); +} + static bool selem_linked_to_storage(const struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem) { return !hlist_unhashed(&selem->snode); }
+static bool selem_linked_to_map_lockless(const struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem) +{ + return !hlist_unhashed_lockless(&selem->map_node); +} + static bool selem_linked_to_map(const struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem) { return !hlist_unhashed(&selem->map_node); @@ -142,7 +152,7 @@ static void __bpf_selem_unlink_storage(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem) bool free_local_storage = false; unsigned long flags;
- if (unlikely(!selem_linked_to_storage(selem))) + if (unlikely(!selem_linked_to_storage_lockless(selem))) /* selem has already been unlinked from sk */ return;
@@ -170,7 +180,7 @@ void bpf_selem_unlink_map(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem) struct bpf_local_storage_map_bucket *b; unsigned long flags;
- if (unlikely(!selem_linked_to_map(selem))) + if (unlikely(!selem_linked_to_map_lockless(selem))) /* selem has already be unlinked from smap */ return;
@@ -373,7 +383,7 @@ bpf_local_storage_update(void *owner, struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, err = check_flags(old_sdata, map_flags); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); - if (old_sdata && selem_linked_to_storage(SELEM(old_sdata))) { + if (old_sdata && selem_linked_to_storage_lockless(SELEM(old_sdata))) { copy_map_value_locked(&smap->map, old_sdata->data, value, false); return old_sdata;
From: Hector Martin marcan@marcan.st
[ Upstream commit 89b89e52153fda2733562776c7c9d9d3ebf8dd6d ]
Apparently the hex passphrase mechanism does not work on newer chips/firmware (e.g. BCM4387). It seems there was a simple way of passing it in binary all along, so use that and avoid the hexification.
OpenBSD has been doing it like this from the beginning, so this should work on all chips.
Also clear the structure before setting the PMK. This was leaking uninitialized stack contents to the device.
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Arend van Spriel arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Hector Martin marcan@marcan.st Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214092423.15175-6-marcan@marcan.st Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- .../wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c index fc622e6b329a3..5f55abf3bb6df 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c @@ -1350,13 +1350,14 @@ static int brcmf_set_pmk(struct brcmf_if *ifp, const u8 *pmk_data, u16 pmk_len) { struct brcmf_pub *drvr = ifp->drvr; struct brcmf_wsec_pmk_le pmk; - int i, err; + int err; + + memset(&pmk, 0, sizeof(pmk));
- /* convert to firmware key format */ - pmk.key_len = cpu_to_le16(pmk_len << 1); - pmk.flags = cpu_to_le16(BRCMF_WSEC_PASSPHRASE); - for (i = 0; i < pmk_len; i++) - snprintf(&pmk.key[2 * i], 3, "%02x", pmk_data[i]); + /* pass pmk directly */ + pmk.key_len = cpu_to_le16(pmk_len); + pmk.flags = cpu_to_le16(0); + memcpy(pmk.key, pmk_data, pmk_len);
/* store psk in firmware */ err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_WSEC_PMK,
From: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz
[ Upstream commit 62aeb94433fcec80241754b70d0d1836d5926b0a ]
Check that log of block size stored in the superblock has sensible value. Otherwise the shift computing the block size can overflow leading to undefined behavior.
Reported-by: syzbot+4fec412f59eba8c01b77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext2/ext2.h | 1 + fs/ext2/super.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ext2/ext2.h b/fs/ext2/ext2.h index 3be9dd6412b78..a610c096f3a9d 100644 --- a/fs/ext2/ext2.h +++ b/fs/ext2/ext2.h @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static inline struct ext2_sb_info *EXT2_SB(struct super_block *sb) #define EXT2_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE 1024 #define EXT2_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 4096 #define EXT2_MIN_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE 10 +#define EXT2_MAX_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE 16 #define EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE(s) ((s)->s_blocksize) #define EXT2_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(s) (EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE(s) / sizeof (__u32)) #define EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(s) ((s)->s_blocksize_bits) diff --git a/fs/ext2/super.c b/fs/ext2/super.c index 02d82f8fe85d9..486a43e347950 100644 --- a/fs/ext2/super.c +++ b/fs/ext2/super.c @@ -947,6 +947,13 @@ static int ext2_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto failed_mount; }
+ if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size) > + (EXT2_MAX_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE - BLOCK_SIZE_BITS)) { + ext2_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, + "Invalid log block size: %u", + le32_to_cpu(es->s_log_block_size)); + goto failed_mount; + } blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_log_block_size);
if (test_opt(sb, DAX)) {
From: Justin Tee justin.tee@broadcom.com
[ Upstream commit c6087b82a9146826564a55c5ca0164cac40348f5 ]
A static code analysis tool flagged the possibility of buffer overflow when using copy_from_user() for a debugfs entry.
Currently, it is possible that copy_from_user() copies more bytes than what would fit in the mybuf char array. Add a min() restriction check between sizeof(mybuf) - 1 and nbytes passed from the userspace buffer to protect against buffer overflow.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230301231626.9621-2-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Justin Tee justin.tee@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c index 8e8bbe734e875..560b2504e674d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c @@ -2157,10 +2157,13 @@ lpfc_debugfs_lockstat_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char mybuf[64]; char *pbuf; int i; + size_t bsize;
memset(mybuf, 0, sizeof(mybuf));
- if (copy_from_user(mybuf, buf, nbytes)) + bsize = min(nbytes, (sizeof(mybuf) - 1)); + + if (copy_from_user(mybuf, buf, bsize)) return -EFAULT; pbuf = &mybuf[0];
@@ -2181,7 +2184,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_lockstat_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, qp->lock_conflict.wq_access = 0; } } - return nbytes; + return bsize; } #endif
From: Jisoo Jang jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr
[ Upstream commit 0da40e018fd034d87c9460123fa7f897b69fdee7 ]
Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in kmemdup() called from brcmf_get_assoc_ies(). The bug could occur when assoc_info->req_len, data from a URB provided by a USB device, is bigger than the size of buffer which is defined as WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX.
Add the size check for req_len/resp_len of assoc_info.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
[ 46.592467][ T7] ================================================================== [ 46.594687][ T7] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.596572][ T7] Read of size 3014656 at addr ffff888019442000 by task kworker/0:1/7 [ 46.598575][ T7] [ 46.599157][ T7] CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #145 [ 46.601333][ T7] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 46.604360][ T7] Workqueue: events brcmf_fweh_event_worker [ 46.605943][ T7] Call Trace: [ 46.606584][ T7] dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1 [ 46.607446][ T7] print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x93/0x334 [ 46.608610][ T7] ? kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.609341][ T7] kasan_report.cold+0x79/0xd5 [ 46.610151][ T7] ? kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.610796][ T7] kasan_check_range+0x14e/0x1b0 [ 46.611691][ T7] memcpy+0x20/0x60 [ 46.612323][ T7] kmemdup+0x3e/0x50 [ 46.612987][ T7] brcmf_get_assoc_ies+0x967/0xf60 [ 46.613904][ T7] ? brcmf_notify_vif_event+0x3d0/0x3d0 [ 46.614831][ T7] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [ 46.615683][ T7] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xfc/0x2770 [ 46.616552][ T7] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [ 46.617409][ T7] ? mark_lock.part.0+0xfc/0x2770 [ 46.618244][ T7] ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 [ 46.619024][ T7] brcmf_bss_connect_done.constprop.0+0x241/0x2e0 [ 46.620019][ T7] ? brcmf_parse_configure_security.isra.0+0x2a0/0x2a0 [ 46.620818][ T7] ? __lock_acquire+0x181f/0x5790 [ 46.621462][ T7] brcmf_notify_connect_status+0x448/0x1950 [ 46.622134][ T7] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 [ 46.622736][ T7] ? brcmf_cfg80211_join_ibss+0x7b0/0x7b0 [ 46.623390][ T7] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 [ 46.623962][ T7] ? brcmf_fweh_event_worker+0x19f/0xc60 [ 46.624603][ T7] ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 [ 46.625145][ T7] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 46.625871][ T7] ? brcmf_cfg80211_join_ibss+0x7b0/0x7b0 [ 46.626545][ T7] brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x90/0x100 [ 46.627338][ T7] brcmf_fweh_event_worker+0x557/0xc60 [ 46.627962][ T7] ? brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x100/0x100 [ 46.628736][ T7] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 [ 46.629396][ T7] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 [ 46.629970][ T7] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 [ 46.630649][ T7] process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460 [ 46.631205][ T7] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x330/0x330 [ 46.631821][ T7] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [ 46.632347][ T7] worker_thread+0x95/0xe00 [ 46.632832][ T7] ? __kthread_parkme+0x115/0x1e0 [ 46.633393][ T7] ? process_one_work+0x1460/0x1460 [ 46.633957][ T7] kthread+0x3a1/0x480 [ 46.634369][ T7] ? set_kthread_struct+0x120/0x120 [ 46.634933][ T7] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 46.635431][ T7] [ 46.635687][ T7] Allocated by task 7: [ 46.636151][ T7] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 46.636628][ T7] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [ 46.637108][ T7] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x19e/0x330 [ 46.637696][ T7] brcmf_cfg80211_attach+0x4a0/0x4040 [ 46.638275][ T7] brcmf_attach+0x389/0xd40 [ 46.638739][ T7] brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 [ 46.639279][ T7] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760 [ 46.639820][ T7] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 46.640342][ T7] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 46.640876][ T7] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 46.641445][ T7] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 46.642000][ T7] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 46.642543][ T7] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0 [ 46.643065][ T7] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290 [ 46.643644][ T7] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0 [ 46.644130][ T7] usb_set_configuration+0xf59/0x16f0 [ 46.644720][ T7] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x82/0xa0 [ 46.645295][ T7] usb_probe_device+0xbb/0x250 [ 46.645786][ T7] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 46.646258][ T7] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 46.646804][ T7] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 46.647387][ T7] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 46.647926][ T7] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 46.648454][ T7] __device_attach+0x23f/0x3a0 [ 46.648939][ T7] bus_probe_device+0x1da/0x290 [ 46.649478][ T7] device_add+0xb7b/0x1eb0 [ 46.649936][ T7] usb_new_device.cold+0x49c/0x1029 [ 46.650526][ T7] hub_event+0x1c98/0x3950 [ 46.650975][ T7] process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460 [ 46.651535][ T7] worker_thread+0x95/0xe00 [ 46.651991][ T7] kthread+0x3a1/0x480 [ 46.652413][ T7] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 46.652885][ T7] [ 46.653131][ T7] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888019442000 [ 46.653131][ T7] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 [ 46.654669][ T7] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of [ 46.654669][ T7] 2048-byte region [ffff888019442000, ffff888019442800) [ 46.656137][ T7] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 46.656720][ T7] page:ffffea0000651000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x19440 [ 46.657792][ T7] head:ffffea0000651000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 46.658673][ T7] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) [ 46.659422][ T7] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888100042000 [ 46.660363][ T7] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 46.661236][ T7] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 46.661956][ T7] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 46.662588][ T7] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52a20(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP), pid 7, ts 31136961085, free_ts 0 [ 46.664271][ T7] prep_new_page+0x1aa/0x240 [ 46.664763][ T7] get_page_from_freelist+0x159a/0x27c0 [ 46.665340][ T7] __alloc_pages+0x2da/0x6a0 [ 46.665847][ T7] alloc_pages+0xec/0x1e0 [ 46.666308][ T7] allocate_slab+0x380/0x4e0 [ 46.666770][ T7] ___slab_alloc+0x5bc/0x940 [ 46.667264][ T7] __slab_alloc+0x6d/0x80 [ 46.667712][ T7] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x30a/0x330 [ 46.668299][ T7] brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x50/0x470 [ 46.668885][ T7] brcmf_usb_probe+0xc97/0x1690 [ 46.669438][ T7] usb_probe_interface+0x2aa/0x760 [ 46.669988][ T7] really_probe+0x205/0xb70 [ 46.670487][ T7] __driver_probe_device+0x311/0x4b0 [ 46.671031][ T7] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x150 [ 46.671604][ T7] __device_attach_driver+0x1cc/0x2a0 [ 46.672192][ T7] bus_for_each_drv+0x156/0x1d0 [ 46.672739][ T7] page_owner free stack trace missing [ 46.673335][ T7] [ 46.673620][ T7] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 46.674213][ T7] ffff888019442700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 46.675083][ T7] ffff888019442780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 46.675994][ T7] >ffff888019442800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 46.676875][ T7] ^ [ 46.677323][ T7] ffff888019442880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 46.678190][ T7] ffff888019442900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 46.679052][ T7] ================================================================== [ 46.679945][ T7] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 46.680725][ T7] Kernel panic - not syncing:
Reviewed-by: Arend van Spriel arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jisoo Jang jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230309104457.22628-1-jisoo.jang@yonsei.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c index 5f55abf3bb6df..15b5214ccb753 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c @@ -5891,6 +5891,11 @@ static s32 brcmf_get_assoc_ies(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg, (struct brcmf_cfg80211_assoc_ielen_le *)cfg->extra_buf; req_len = le32_to_cpu(assoc_info->req_len); resp_len = le32_to_cpu(assoc_info->resp_len); + if (req_len > WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX || resp_len > WL_EXTRA_BUF_MAX) { + bphy_err(drvr, "invalid lengths in assoc info: req %u resp %u\n", + req_len, resp_len); + return -EINVAL; + } if (req_len) { err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_get(ifp, "assoc_req_ies", cfg->extra_buf,
From: Maxim Korotkov korotkov.maxim.s@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 7c6dddc239abe660598c49ec95ea0ed6399a4b2a ]
The value of an arithmetic expression is subject of possible overflow due to a failure to cast operands to a larger data type before performing arithmetic. Used macro for multiplication instead operator for avoiding overflow.
Found by Security Code and Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Korotkov korotkov.maxim.s@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230309174347.3515-1-korotkov.maxim.s@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c index bc9812a0a91c3..3c9ba116d5aff 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c @@ -2709,7 +2709,7 @@ static int bnxt_get_nvram_directory(struct net_device *dev, u32 len, u8 *data) if (rc) return rc;
- buflen = dir_entries * entry_length; + buflen = mul_u32_u32(dir_entries, entry_length); buf = hwrm_req_dma_slice(bp, req, buflen, &dma_handle); if (!buf) { hwrm_req_drop(bp, req);
From: Nathan Chancellor nathan@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit c8384d4a51e7cb0e6587f3143f29099f202c5de1 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/net/ethernet/pasemi/pasemi_mac.c:1665:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict] .ndo_start_xmit = pasemi_mac_start_tx, ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1 error generated.
->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of pasemi_mac_start_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning. While PowerPC does not currently implement support for kCFI, it could in the future, which means this warning becomes a fatal CFI failure at run time.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1750 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor nathan@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Horatiu Vultur horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230319-pasemi-incompatible-pointer-types-strict-... Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/pasemi/pasemi_mac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/pasemi/pasemi_mac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/pasemi/pasemi_mac.c index 7e096b2888b92..b223488318ad7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/pasemi/pasemi_mac.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/pasemi/pasemi_mac.c @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ static void pasemi_mac_queue_csdesc(const struct sk_buff *skb, write_dma_reg(PAS_DMA_TXCHAN_INCR(txring->chan.chno), 2); }
-static int pasemi_mac_start_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t pasemi_mac_start_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { struct pasemi_mac * const mac = netdev_priv(dev); struct pasemi_mac_txring * const txring = tx_ring(mac);
From: Nick Child nnac123@linux.ibm.com
[ Upstream commit 5dd0dfd55baec0742ba8f5625a0dd064aca7db16 ]
When setting the XPS value of a TX queue, warn the user once if the index of the queue is greater than the number of allocated TX queues.
Previously, this scenario went uncaught. In the best case, it resulted in unnecessary allocations. In the worst case, it resulted in out-of-bounds memory references through calls to `netdev_get_tx_queue( dev, index)`. Therefore, it is important to inform the user but not worth returning an error and risk downing the netdevice.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child nnac123@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Piotr Raczynski piotr.raczynski@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230321150725.127229-1-nnac123@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/core/dev.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 7fc8ae7f3cd5b..5c1cd25e851c7 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -2574,6 +2574,8 @@ int __netif_set_xps_queue(struct net_device *dev, const unsigned long *mask, struct xps_map *map, *new_map; unsigned int nr_ids;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= dev->num_tx_queues); + if (dev->num_tc) { /* Do not allow XPS on subordinate device directly */ num_tc = dev->num_tc;
From: Dmitry Bogdanov d.bogdanov@yadro.com
[ Upstream commit d8990b5a4d065f38f35d69bcd627ec5a7f8330ca ]
Commands from recovery entries are freed after session has been closed. That leads to use-after-free at command free or NPE with such call trace:
Time2Retain timer expired for SID: 1, cleaning up iSCSI session. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000140 RIP: 0010:sbitmap_queue_clear+0x3a/0xa0 Call Trace: target_release_cmd_kref+0xd1/0x1f0 [target_core_mod] transport_generic_free_cmd+0xd1/0x180 [target_core_mod] iscsit_free_cmd+0x53/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsit_free_connection_recovery_entries+0x29d/0x320 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsit_close_session+0x13a/0x140 [iscsi_target_mod] iscsit_check_post_dataout+0x440/0x440 [iscsi_target_mod] call_timer_fn+0x24/0x140
Move cleanup of recovery enrties to before session freeing.
Reported-by: Forza forza@tnonline.net Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov d.bogdanov@yadro.com Signed-off-by: Mike Christie michael.christie@oracle.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230319015620.96006-7-michael.christie@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Maurizio Lombardi mlombard@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c index 2c54c5d8412d8..2142ee8c49978 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c @@ -4385,6 +4385,9 @@ int iscsit_close_session(struct iscsi_session *sess, bool can_sleep) iscsit_stop_time2retain_timer(sess); spin_unlock_bh(&se_tpg->session_lock);
+ if (sess->sess_ops->ErrorRecoveryLevel == 2) + iscsit_free_connection_recovery_entries(sess); + /* * transport_deregister_session_configfs() will clear the * struct se_node_acl->nacl_sess pointer now as a iscsi_np process context @@ -4408,9 +4411,6 @@ int iscsit_close_session(struct iscsi_session *sess, bool can_sleep)
transport_deregister_session(sess->se_sess);
- if (sess->sess_ops->ErrorRecoveryLevel == 2) - iscsit_free_connection_recovery_entries(sess); - iscsit_free_all_ooo_cmdsns(sess);
spin_lock_bh(&se_tpg->session_lock);
From: Eli Cohen elic@nvidia.com
[ Upstream commit 4e0473f1060aa49621d40a113afde24818101d37 ]
When calling irq_set_affinity_notifier() with NULL at the notify argument, it will cause freeing of the glue pointer in the corresponding array entry but will leave the pointer in the array. A subsequent call to free_irq_cpu_rmap() will try to free this entry again leading to possible use after free.
Fix that by setting NULL to the array entry and checking that we have non-zero at the array entry when iterating over the array in free_irq_cpu_rmap().
The current code does not suffer from this since there are no cases where irq_set_affinity_notifier(irq, NULL) (note the NULL passed for the notify arg) is called, followed by a call to free_irq_cpu_rmap() so we don't hit and issue. Subsequent patches in this series excersize this flow, hence the required fix.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen elic@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed saeedm@nvidia.com Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- lib/cpu_rmap.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/cpu_rmap.c b/lib/cpu_rmap.c index f08d9c56f712e..e77f12bb3c774 100644 --- a/lib/cpu_rmap.c +++ b/lib/cpu_rmap.c @@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ void free_irq_cpu_rmap(struct cpu_rmap *rmap)
for (index = 0; index < rmap->used; index++) { glue = rmap->obj[index]; - irq_set_affinity_notifier(glue->notify.irq, NULL); + if (glue) + irq_set_affinity_notifier(glue->notify.irq, NULL); }
cpu_rmap_put(rmap); @@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ static void irq_cpu_rmap_release(struct kref *ref) container_of(ref, struct irq_glue, notify.kref);
cpu_rmap_put(glue->rmap); + glue->rmap->obj[glue->index] = NULL; kfree(glue); }
@@ -297,6 +299,7 @@ int irq_cpu_rmap_add(struct cpu_rmap *rmap, int irq) rc = irq_set_affinity_notifier(irq, &glue->notify); if (rc) { cpu_rmap_put(glue->rmap); + rmap->obj[glue->index] = NULL; kfree(glue); } return rc;
From: Zheng Wang zyytlz.wz@163.com
[ Upstream commit f486893288f3e9b171b836f43853a6426515d800 ]
mptlan_probe() calls mpt_register_lan_device() which initializes the &priv->post_buckets_task workqueue. A call to mpt_lan_wake_post_buckets_task() will subsequently start the work.
During driver unload in mptlan_remove() the following race may occur:
CPU0 CPU1
|mpt_lan_post_receive_buckets_work() mptlan_remove() | free_netdev() | kfree(dev); | | | dev->mtu | //use
Fix this by finishing the work prior to cleaning up in mptlan_remove().
[mkp: we really should remove mptlan instead of attempting to fix it]
Signed-off-by: Zheng Wang zyytlz.wz@163.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230318081635.796479-1-zyytlz.wz@163.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c b/drivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c index 3261cac762def..ec3ee356078db 100644 --- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c +++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptlan.c @@ -1427,7 +1427,9 @@ mptlan_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) { MPT_ADAPTER *ioc = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); struct net_device *dev = ioc->netdev; + struct mpt_lan_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->post_buckets_task); if(dev != NULL) { unregister_netdev(dev); free_netdev(dev);
From: Andreas Gruenbacher agruenba@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit cfcdb5bad34f600aed7613c3c1a5e618111f77b7 ]
The maximum allowed height of an inode's metadata tree depends on the filesystem block size; it is lower for bigger-block filesystems. When reading in an inode, make sure that the height doesn't exceed the maximum allowed height.
Arrays like sd_heightsize are sized to be big enough for any filesystem block size; they will often be slightly bigger than what's needed for a specific filesystem.
Reported-by: syzbot+45d4691b1ed3c48eba05@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher agruenba@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/gfs2/glops.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glops.c b/fs/gfs2/glops.c index 450032b4c886e..558932ad89d5d 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glops.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/glops.c @@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ static int inode_go_demote_ok(const struct gfs2_glock *gl)
static int gfs2_dinode_in(struct gfs2_inode *ip, const void *buf) { + struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(&ip->i_inode); const struct gfs2_dinode *str = buf; struct timespec64 atime; u16 height, depth; @@ -440,7 +441,7 @@ static int gfs2_dinode_in(struct gfs2_inode *ip, const void *buf) /* i_diskflags and i_eattr must be set before gfs2_set_inode_flags() */ gfs2_set_inode_flags(inode); height = be16_to_cpu(str->di_height); - if (unlikely(height > GFS2_MAX_META_HEIGHT)) + if (unlikely(height > sdp->sd_max_height)) goto corrupt; ip->i_height = (u8)height;
From: Adrian Hunter adrian.hunter@intel.com
[ Upstream commit 0a07d3c7a1d205b47d9f3608ff4e9d1065d63b6d ]
Add PCI ID to support Intel Lunar Lake, same as MTL.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter adrian.hunter@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230328105832.3495-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c index e892b9feffb11..0920530a72d28 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c @@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ufshcd_pci_tbl[] = { { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x51FF), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_adl_hba_vops }, { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x54FF), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_adl_hba_vops }, { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x7E47), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_mtl_hba_vops }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0xA847), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_mtl_hba_vops }, { } /* terminate list */ };
From: Kemeng Shi shikemeng@huaweicloud.com
[ Upstream commit b07ffe6927c75d99af534d685282ea188d9f71a6 ]
We need to set ac_g_ex to notify the goal start used in ext4_mb_find_by_goal. Set ac_g_ex instead of ac_f_ex in ext4_mb_normalize_request. Besides we should assure goal start is in range [first_data_block, blocks_count) as ext4_mb_initialize_context does.
[ Added a check to make sure size is less than ar->pright; otherwise we could end up passing an underflowed value of ar->pright - size to ext4_get_group_no_and_offset(), which will trigger a BUG_ON later on. - TYT ]
Signed-off-by: Kemeng Shi shikemeng@huaweicloud.com Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) ritesh.list@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230303172120.3800725-2-shikemeng@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index e6718bfc6c55b..b737437618047 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -4020,6 +4020,7 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, struct ext4_allocation_request *ar) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(ac->ac_sb); + struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es; int bsbits, max; ext4_lblk_t end; loff_t size, start_off; @@ -4200,18 +4201,21 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len = EXT4_NUM_B2C(sbi, size);
/* define goal start in order to merge */ - if (ar->pright && (ar->lright == (start + size))) { + if (ar->pright && (ar->lright == (start + size)) && + ar->pright >= size && + ar->pright - size >= le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block)) { /* merge to the right */ ext4_get_group_no_and_offset(ac->ac_sb, ar->pright - size, - &ac->ac_f_ex.fe_group, - &ac->ac_f_ex.fe_start); + &ac->ac_g_ex.fe_group, + &ac->ac_g_ex.fe_start); ac->ac_flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL; } - if (ar->pleft && (ar->lleft + 1 == start)) { + if (ar->pleft && (ar->lleft + 1 == start) && + ar->pleft + 1 < ext4_blocks_count(es)) { /* merge to the left */ ext4_get_group_no_and_offset(ac->ac_sb, ar->pleft + 1, - &ac->ac_f_ex.fe_group, - &ac->ac_f_ex.fe_start); + &ac->ac_g_ex.fe_group, + &ac->ac_g_ex.fe_start); ac->ac_flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL; }
From: Ojaswin Mujoo ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
[ Upstream commit 93cdf49f6eca5e23f6546b8f28457b2e6a6961d9 ]
When the length of best extent found is less than the length of goal extent we need to make sure that the best extent atleast covers the start of the original request. This is done by adjusting the ac_b_ex.fe_logical (logical start) of the extent.
While doing so, the current logic sometimes results in the best extent's logical range overflowing the goal extent. Since this best extent is later added to the inode preallocation list, we have a possibility of introducing overlapping preallocations. This is discussed in detail here [1].
As per Jan's suggestion, to fix this, replace the existing logic with the below logic for adjusting best extent as it keeps fragmentation in check while ensuring logical range of best extent doesn't overflow out of goal extent:
1. Check if best extent can be kept at end of goal range and still cover original start. 2. Else, check if best extent can be kept at start of goal range and still cover original start. 3. Else, keep the best extent at start of original request.
Also, add a few extra BUG_ONs that might help catch errors faster.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y+OGkVvzPN0RMv0O@li-bb2b2a4c-3307-11b2-a85c-8fa5c3...
Suggested-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Ojaswin Mujoo ojaswin@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) ritesh.list@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f96aca6d415b36d1f90db86c1a8cd7e2e9d7ab0e.167973181... Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index b737437618047..c8dfea7c4ba43 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -4308,6 +4308,7 @@ static void ext4_mb_use_inode_pa(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, BUG_ON(start < pa->pa_pstart); BUG_ON(end > pa->pa_pstart + EXT4_C2B(sbi, pa->pa_len)); BUG_ON(pa->pa_free < len); + BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0); pa->pa_free -= len;
mb_debug(ac->ac_sb, "use %llu/%d from inode pa %p\n", start, len, pa); @@ -4632,10 +4633,8 @@ ext4_mb_new_inode_pa(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac) pa = ac->ac_pa;
if (ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len < ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len) { - int winl; - int wins; - int win; - int offs; + int new_bex_start; + int new_bex_end;
/* we can't allocate as much as normalizer wants. * so, found space must get proper lstart @@ -4643,26 +4642,40 @@ ext4_mb_new_inode_pa(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac) BUG_ON(ac->ac_g_ex.fe_logical > ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical); BUG_ON(ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len < ac->ac_o_ex.fe_len);
- /* we're limited by original request in that - * logical block must be covered any way - * winl is window we can move our chunk within */ - winl = ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical - ac->ac_g_ex.fe_logical; + /* + * Use the below logic for adjusting best extent as it keeps + * fragmentation in check while ensuring logical range of best + * extent doesn't overflow out of goal extent: + * + * 1. Check if best ex can be kept at end of goal and still + * cover original start + * 2. Else, check if best ex can be kept at start of goal and + * still cover original start + * 3. Else, keep the best ex at start of original request. + */ + new_bex_end = ac->ac_g_ex.fe_logical + + EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len); + new_bex_start = new_bex_end - EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); + if (ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical >= new_bex_start) + goto adjust_bex;
- /* also, we should cover whole original request */ - wins = EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len - ac->ac_o_ex.fe_len); + new_bex_start = ac->ac_g_ex.fe_logical; + new_bex_end = + new_bex_start + EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); + if (ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical < new_bex_end) + goto adjust_bex;
- /* the smallest one defines real window */ - win = min(winl, wins); + new_bex_start = ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical; + new_bex_end = + new_bex_start + EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len);
- offs = ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical % - EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); - if (offs && offs < win) - win = offs; +adjust_bex: + ac->ac_b_ex.fe_logical = new_bex_start;
- ac->ac_b_ex.fe_logical = ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical - - EXT4_NUM_B2C(sbi, win); BUG_ON(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical < ac->ac_b_ex.fe_logical); BUG_ON(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_len > ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); + BUG_ON(new_bex_end > (ac->ac_g_ex.fe_logical + + EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_g_ex.fe_len))); }
/* preallocation can change ac_b_ex, thus we store actually
From: Chao Yu chao@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit c9b3649a934d131151111354bcbb638076f03a30 ]
xfstest generic/361 reports a bug as below:
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, sbi->fsync_node_num);
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/super.c:1627! RIP: 0010:f2fs_put_super+0x3a8/0x3b0 Call Trace: generic_shutdown_super+0x8c/0x1b0 kill_block_super+0x2b/0x60 kill_f2fs_super+0x87/0x110 deactivate_locked_super+0x39/0x80 deactivate_super+0x46/0x50 cleanup_mnt+0x109/0x170 __cleanup_mnt+0x16/0x20 task_work_run+0x65/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x175/0x190 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
During umount(), if cp_error is set, f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() should not stop waiting all F2FS_WB_CP_DATA pages to be writebacked, otherwise, fsync_node_num can be non-zero after f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() causing this bug.
In this case, to avoid deadloop in f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(), it needs to drop all dirty pages rather than redirtying them.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu chao@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 12 ++++++++++-- fs/f2fs/data.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c index c68f1f8000f17..d6ae6de35af20 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c @@ -312,8 +312,15 @@ static int __f2fs_write_meta_page(struct page *page,
trace_f2fs_writepage(page, META);
- if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) + if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) { + if (is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_IS_CLOSE)) { + ClearPageUptodate(page); + dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_META); + unlock_page(page); + return 0; + } goto redirty_out; + } if (unlikely(is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING))) goto redirty_out; if (wbc->for_reclaim && page->index < GET_SUM_BLOCK(sbi, 0)) @@ -1298,7 +1305,8 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type) if (!get_pages(sbi, type)) break;
- if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) + if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi) && + !is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_IS_CLOSE))) break;
if (type == F2FS_DIRTY_META) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index 524d4b49a5209..6ac979c10883a 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -2762,7 +2762,8 @@ int f2fs_write_single_data_page(struct page *page, int *submitted, * don't drop any dirty dentry pages for keeping lastest * directory structure. */ - if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) + if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && + !is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_IS_CLOSE)) goto redirty_out; goto out; }
From: Chao Yu chao@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit d78dfefcde9d311284434560d69c0478c55a657e ]
With below case, it can mount multi-device image w/ rw option, however one of secondary device is set as ro, later update will cause panic, so let's introduce f2fs_dev_is_readonly(), and check multi-devices rw status in f2fs_remount() w/ it in order to avoid such inconsistent mount status.
mkfs.f2fs -c /dev/zram1 /dev/zram0 -f blockdev --setro /dev/zram1 mount -t f2fs dev/zram0 /mnt/f2fs mount: /mnt/f2fs: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only. mount -t f2fs -o remount,rw mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=1M count=8192
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inline.c:258! RIP: 0010:f2fs_write_inline_data+0x23e/0x2d0 [f2fs] Call Trace: f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x26b/0x9f0 [f2fs] f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x389/0xa60 [f2fs] __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x26b/0x2d0 [f2fs] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x2e/0x40 [f2fs] do_writepages+0xd3/0x1b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x5b/0x420 writeback_sb_inodes+0x236/0x5a0 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x56/0xf0 wb_writeback+0x2a3/0x490 wb_do_writeback+0x2b2/0x330 wb_workfn+0x6a/0x260 process_one_work+0x270/0x5e0 worker_thread+0x52/0x3e0 kthread+0xf4/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu chao@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 5 +++++ fs/f2fs/super.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 80e4f9afe86f7..1b450dcad1980 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -4284,6 +4284,11 @@ static inline bool f2fs_hw_is_readonly(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) return false; }
+static inline bool f2fs_dev_is_readonly(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +{ + return f2fs_sb_has_readonly(sbi) || f2fs_hw_is_readonly(sbi); +} + static inline bool f2fs_lfs_mode(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) { return F2FS_OPTION(sbi).fs_mode == FS_MODE_LFS; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index ae72211e422e7..4628efbfea76f 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -2226,7 +2226,7 @@ static int f2fs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) if (f2fs_readonly(sb) && (*flags & SB_RDONLY)) goto skip;
- if (f2fs_sb_has_readonly(sbi) && !(*flags & SB_RDONLY)) { + if (f2fs_dev_is_readonly(sbi) && !(*flags & SB_RDONLY)) { err = -EROFS; goto restore_opts; }
From: Hao Zeng zenghao@kylinos.cn
[ Upstream commit 23acb14af1914010dd0aae1bbb7fab28bf518b8e ]
Fix fout being fopen'ed but then not subsequently fclose'd. In the affected branch, fout is otherwise going out of scope.
Signed-off-by: Hao Zeng zenghao@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230411084349.1999628-1-zenghao@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- samples/bpf/hbm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/samples/bpf/hbm.c b/samples/bpf/hbm.c index b0c18efe7928e..a271099603feb 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/hbm.c +++ b/samples/bpf/hbm.c @@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ static int run_bpf_prog(char *prog, int cg_id) fout = fopen(fname, "w"); fprintf(fout, "id:%d\n", cg_id); fprintf(fout, "ERROR: Could not lookup queue_stats\n"); + fclose(fout); } else if (stats_flag && qstats.lastPacketTime > qstats.firstPacketTime) { long long delta_us = (qstats.lastPacketTime -
From: Yafang laoar.shao@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit c11bd046485d7bf1ca200db0e7d0bdc4bafdd395 ]
The recursion check in __bpf_prog_enter* and __bpf_prog_exit* leave preempt_count_{sub,add} unprotected. When attaching trampoline to them we get panic as follows,
[ 867.843050] BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 0000000009d325cf (stack is 0000000046a46a15..00000000537e7b28) [ 867.843064] stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 867.843067] CPU: 8 PID: 11009 Comm: trace Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.2.0+ #4 [ 867.843100] Call Trace: [ 867.843101] <TASK> [ 867.843104] asm_exc_int3+0x3a/0x40 [ 867.843108] RIP: 0010:preempt_count_sub+0x1/0xa0 [ 867.843135] __bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x17/0x90 [ 867.843148] bpf_trampoline_6442468108_0+0x2e/0x1000 [ 867.843154] ? preempt_count_sub+0x1/0xa0 [ 867.843157] preempt_count_sub+0x5/0xa0 [ 867.843159] ? migrate_enable+0xac/0xf0 [ 867.843164] __bpf_prog_exit_recur+0x2d/0x40 [ 867.843168] bpf_trampoline_6442468108_0+0x55/0x1000 ... [ 867.843788] preempt_count_sub+0x5/0xa0 [ 867.843793] ? migrate_enable+0xac/0xf0 [ 867.843829] __bpf_prog_exit_recur+0x2d/0x40 [ 867.843837] BUG: IRQ stack guard page was hit at 0000000099bd8228 (stack is 00000000b23e2bc4..000000006d95af35) [ 867.843841] BUG: IRQ stack guard page was hit at 000000005ae07924 (stack is 00000000ffd69623..0000000014eb594c) [ 867.843843] BUG: IRQ stack guard page was hit at 00000000028320f0 (stack is 00000000034b6438..0000000078d1bcec) [ 867.843842] bpf_trampoline_6442468108_0+0x55/0x1000 ...
That is because in __bpf_prog_exit_recur, the preempt_count_{sub,add} are called after prog->active is decreased.
Fixing this by adding these two functions into btf ids deny list.
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt rostedt@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Yafang laoar.shao@gmail.com Cc: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Cc: Steven Rostedt rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: Jiri Olsa olsajiri@gmail.com Acked-by: Hao Luo haoluo@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230413025248.79764-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 1c95d97e7aa53..d37ecd76cc5a1 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -13632,6 +13632,10 @@ BTF_ID(func, migrate_enable) #if !defined CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU && !defined CONFIG_TINY_RCU BTF_ID(func, rcu_read_unlock_strict) #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) || defined(CONFIG_TRACE_PREEMPT_TOGGLE) +BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_add) +BTF_ID(func, preempt_count_sub) +#endif BTF_SET_END(btf_id_deny)
static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
From: Daniel Gabay daniel.gabay@intel.com
[ Upstream commit b655b9a9f8467684cfa8906713d33b71ea8c8f54 ]
It is possible that iwl_pci_probe() will fail and free the trans, then afterwards iwl_pci_remove() will be called and crash by trying to access trans which is already freed, fix it.
iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: Detected crf-id 0xa5a5a5a2, cnv-id 0xa5a5a5a2 wfpm id 0xa5a5a5a2 iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: Can't find a correct rfid for crf id 0x5a2 ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 ... RIP: 0010:iwl_pci_remove+0x12/0x30 [iwlwifi] pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0 driver_detach+0x4c/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x5c/0xd0 driver_unregister+0x31/0x50 pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90 iwl_pci_unregister_driver+0x15/0x20 [iwlwifi] __exit_compat+0x9/0x98 [iwlwifi] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x147/0x260
Signed-off-by: Daniel Gabay daniel.gabay@intel.com Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman gregory.greenman@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230413213309.082f6e21341b.I0db21d7fa9a828d571ca8... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c index 3b974388d834d..5d324d64c8799 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c @@ -1380,6 +1380,9 @@ static void iwl_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct iwl_trans *trans = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
+ if (!trans) + return; + iwl_drv_stop(trans->drv);
iwl_trans_pcie_free(trans);
From: Hyunwoo Kim imv4bel@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 58d1b717879bfeabe09b35e41ad667c79933eb2e ]
An integer overflow occurs in the iwl_write_to_user_buf() function, which is called by the iwl_dbgfs_monitor_data_read() function.
static bool iwl_write_to_user_buf(char __user *user_buf, ssize_t count, void *buf, ssize_t *size, ssize_t *bytes_copied) { int buf_size_left = count - *bytes_copied;
buf_size_left = buf_size_left - (buf_size_left % sizeof(u32)); if (*size > buf_size_left) *size = buf_size_left;
If the user passes a SIZE_MAX value to the "ssize_t count" parameter, the ssize_t count parameter is assigned to "int buf_size_left". Then compare "*size" with "buf_size_left" . Here, "buf_size_left" is a negative number, so "*size" is assigned "buf_size_left" and goes into the third argument of the copy_to_user function, causing a heap overflow.
This is not a security vulnerability because iwl_dbgfs_monitor_data_read() is a debugfs operation with 0400 privileges.
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim imv4bel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman gregory.greenman@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230414130637.2d80ace81532.Iecfba549e0e0be21bbb03... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c index 02da9cc8646cf..3a6b25997dfcc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/trans.c @@ -2777,7 +2777,7 @@ static bool iwl_write_to_user_buf(char __user *user_buf, ssize_t count, void *buf, ssize_t *size, ssize_t *bytes_copied) { - int buf_size_left = count - *bytes_copied; + ssize_t buf_size_left = count - *bytes_copied;
buf_size_left = buf_size_left - (buf_size_left % sizeof(u32)); if (*size > buf_size_left)
From: Chaitanya Kulkarni kch@nvidia.com
[ Upstream commit 63f8793ee60513a09f110ea460a6ff2c33811cdb ]
Make sure to check device queue mode in the null_validate_conf() and return error for NULL_Q_RQ as we don't allow legacy I/O path, without this patch we get OOPs when queue mode is set to 1 from configfs, following are repro steps :-
modprobe null_blk nr_devices=0 mkdir config/nullb/nullb0 echo 1 > config/nullb/nullb0/memory_backed echo 4096 > config/nullb/nullb0/blocksize echo 20480 > config/nullb/nullb0/size echo 1 > config/nullb/nullb0/queue_mode echo 1 > config/nullb/nullb0/power
Entering kdb (current=0xffff88810acdd080, pid 2372) on processor 42 Oops: (null) due to oops @ 0xffffffffc041c329 CPU: 42 PID: 2372 Comm: sh Tainted: G O N 6.3.0-rc5lblk+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:null_add_dev.part.0+0xd9/0x720 [null_blk] Code: 01 00 00 85 d2 0f 85 a1 03 00 00 48 83 bb 08 01 00 00 00 0f 85 f7 03 00 00 80 bb 62 01 00 00 00 48 8b 75 20 0f 85 6d 02 00 00 <48> 89 6e 60 48 8b 75 20 bf 06 00 00 00 e8 f5 37 2c c1 48 8b 75 20 RSP: 0018:ffffc900052cbde0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88811084d800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888100042e00 RBP: ffff8881053d8200 R08: ffffc900052cbd68 R09: ffff888105db2000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffff888104765200 R14: ffff88810eec1748 R15: ffff88810eec1740 FS: 00007fd445fd1740(0000) GS:ffff8897dfc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 0000000166a00000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 DR0: ffffffff8437a488 DR1: ffffffff8437a489 DR2: ffffffff8437a48a DR3: ffffffff8437a48b DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> nullb_device_power_store+0xd1/0x120 [null_blk] configfs_write_iter+0xb4/0x120 vfs_write+0x2ba/0x3c0 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fd4460c57a7 Code: 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffd3792a4a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007fd4460c57a7 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000055b43c02e4c0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055b43c02e4c0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00007fd44615b4e0 R10: 00007fd44615b3e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 00007fd446198520 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 00007fd446198700 </TASK>
Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni kch@nvidia.com Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal dlemoal@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ming Lei ming.lei@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Nitesh Shetty nj.shetty@samsung.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230416220339.43845-1-kch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/block/null_blk/main.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c index 033b0f64f2b9b..686ec6bcdef3d 100644 --- a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c +++ b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c @@ -1744,6 +1744,11 @@ static int null_init_tag_set(struct nullb *nullb, struct blk_mq_tag_set *set)
static int null_validate_conf(struct nullb_device *dev) { + if (dev->queue_mode == NULL_Q_RQ) { + pr_err("legacy IO path is no longer available\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + dev->blocksize = round_down(dev->blocksize, 512); dev->blocksize = clamp_t(unsigned int, dev->blocksize, 512, 4096);
From: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit ef16799640865f937719f0771c93be5dca18adc6 ]
A received TKIP key may be up to 32 bytes because it may contain MIC rx/tx keys too. These are not used by iwl and copying these over overflows the iwl_keyinfo.key field.
Add a check to not copy more data to iwl_keyinfo.key then will fit.
This fixes backtraces like this one:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 32) of single field "sta_cmd.key.key" at drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c:1103 (size 16) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 946 at drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c:1103 iwlagn_send_sta_key+0x375/0x390 [iwldvm] <snip> Hardware name: Dell Inc. Latitude E6430/0H3MT5, BIOS A21 05/08/2017 RIP: 0010:iwlagn_send_sta_key+0x375/0x390 [iwldvm] <snip> Call Trace: <TASK> iwl_set_dynamic_key+0x1f0/0x220 [iwldvm] iwlagn_mac_set_key+0x1e4/0x280 [iwldvm] drv_set_key+0xa4/0x1b0 [mac80211] ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel+0xa8/0x2d0 [mac80211] ieee80211_key_replace+0x22d/0x8e0 [mac80211] <snip>
Link: https://www.alionet.org/index.php?topic=1469.0 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20230218191056.never.374-kees@kernel.... Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/68760035-7f75-1b23-e355-bfb758a87d83@... Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Suggested-by: Johannes Berg johannes@sipsolutions.net Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c index ddc14059b07d1..7c3168145e58a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/dvm/sta.c @@ -1086,6 +1086,7 @@ static int iwlagn_send_sta_key(struct iwl_priv *priv, { __le16 key_flags; struct iwl_addsta_cmd sta_cmd; + size_t to_copy; int i;
spin_lock_bh(&priv->sta_lock); @@ -1105,7 +1106,9 @@ static int iwlagn_send_sta_key(struct iwl_priv *priv, sta_cmd.key.tkip_rx_tsc_byte2 = tkip_iv32; for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) sta_cmd.key.tkip_rx_ttak[i] = cpu_to_le16(tkip_p1k[i]); - memcpy(sta_cmd.key.key, keyconf->key, keyconf->keylen); + /* keyconf may contain MIC rx/tx keys which iwl does not use */ + to_copy = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sta_cmd.key.key), keyconf->keylen); + memcpy(sta_cmd.key.key, keyconf->key, to_copy); break; case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: key_flags |= STA_KEY_FLG_KEY_SIZE_MSK;
From: Nagarajan Maran quic_nmaran@quicinc.com
[ Upstream commit f9fff67d2d7ca6fa8066132003a3deef654c55b1 ]
While running traffics for a long time, randomly an RX descriptor filled with value "0" from REO destination ring is received. This descriptor which is invalid causes the wrong SKB (SKB stored in the IDR lookup with buffer id "0") to be fetched which in turn causes SKB memory corruption issue and the same leads to crash after some time.
Changed the start id for idr allocation to "1" and the buffer id "0" is reserved for error validation. Introduced Sanity check to validate the descriptor, before processing the SKB.
Crash Signature :
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 3f004900 PC points to "b15_dma_inv_range+0x30/0x50" LR points to "dma_cache_maint_page+0x8c/0x128". The Backtrace obtained is as follows: [<8031716c>] (b15_dma_inv_range) from [<80313a4c>] (dma_cache_maint_page+0x8c/0x128) [<80313a4c>] (dma_cache_maint_page) from [<80313b90>] (__dma_page_dev_to_cpu+0x28/0xcc) [<80313b90>] (__dma_page_dev_to_cpu) from [<7fb5dd68>] (ath11k_dp_process_rx+0x1e8/0x4a4 [ath11k]) [<7fb5dd68>] (ath11k_dp_process_rx [ath11k]) from [<7fb53c20>] (ath11k_dp_service_srng+0xb0/0x2ac [ath11k]) [<7fb53c20>] (ath11k_dp_service_srng [ath11k]) from [<7f67bba4>] (ath11k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x1c/0x78 [ath11k_pci]) [<7f67bba4>] (ath11k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll [ath11k_pci]) from [<807d5cf4>] (__napi_poll+0x28/0xb8) [<807d5cf4>] (__napi_poll) from [<807d5f28>] (net_rx_action+0xf0/0x280) [<807d5f28>] (net_rx_action) from [<80302148>] (__do_softirq+0xd0/0x280) [<80302148>] (__do_softirq) from [<80320408>] (irq_exit+0x74/0xd4) [<80320408>] (irq_exit) from [<803638a4>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x90/0xb4) [<803638a4>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<805bedec>] (gic_handle_irq+0x58/0x90) [<805bedec>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80301a78>] (__irq_svc+0x58/0x8c)
Tested-on: IPQ8074 hw2.0 AHB WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Signed-off-by: Nagarajan Maran quic_nmaran@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo quic_kvalo@quicinc.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403191533.28114-1-quic_nmaran@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp_rx.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp_rx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp_rx.c index 3c64d33d0133b..357abd87d5491 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp_rx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp_rx.c @@ -354,10 +354,10 @@ int ath11k_dp_rxbufs_replenish(struct ath11k_base *ab, int mac_id, goto fail_free_skb;
spin_lock_bh(&rx_ring->idr_lock); - buf_id = idr_alloc(&rx_ring->bufs_idr, skb, 0, - rx_ring->bufs_max * 3, GFP_ATOMIC); + buf_id = idr_alloc(&rx_ring->bufs_idr, skb, 1, + (rx_ring->bufs_max * 3) + 1, GFP_ATOMIC); spin_unlock_bh(&rx_ring->idr_lock); - if (buf_id < 0) + if (buf_id <= 0) goto fail_dma_unmap;
desc = ath11k_hal_srng_src_get_next_entry(ab, srng); @@ -2602,6 +2602,9 @@ int ath11k_dp_process_rx(struct ath11k_base *ab, int ring_id, cookie); mac_id = FIELD_GET(DP_RXDMA_BUF_COOKIE_PDEV_ID, cookie);
+ if (unlikely(buf_id == 0)) + continue; + ar = ab->pdevs[mac_id].ar; rx_ring = &ar->dp.rx_refill_buf_ring; spin_lock_bh(&rx_ring->idr_lock);
From: Zhong Jinghua zhongjinghua@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 55793ea54d77719a071b1ccc05a05056e3b5e009 ]
We tested and found an alarm caused by nbd_ioctl arg without verification. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/buffer.c:1709:35 signed integer overflow: -9223372036854775808 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'long long int' CPU: 3 PID: 2523 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3f0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:78 show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:158 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x170/0x1dc lib/dump_stack.c:118 ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0xb4 lib/ubsan.c:161 handle_overflow+0x188/0x1dc lib/ubsan.c:192 __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow+0x34/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:206 __block_write_full_page+0x94c/0xa20 fs/buffer.c:1709 block_write_full_page+0x1f0/0x280 fs/buffer.c:2934 blkdev_writepage+0x34/0x40 fs/block_dev.c:607 __writepage+0x68/0xe8 mm/page-writeback.c:2305 write_cache_pages+0x44c/0xc70 mm/page-writeback.c:2240 generic_writepages+0xdc/0x148 mm/page-writeback.c:2329 blkdev_writepages+0x2c/0x38 fs/block_dev.c:2114 do_writepages+0xd4/0x250 mm/page-writeback.c:2344
The reason for triggering this warning is __block_write_full_page() -> i_size_read(inode) - 1 overflow. inode->i_size is assigned in __nbd_ioctl() -> nbd_set_size() -> bytesize. We think it is necessary to limit the size of arg to prevent errors.
Moreover, __nbd_ioctl() -> nbd_add_socket(), arg will be cast to int. Assuming the value of arg is 0x80000000000000001) (on a 64-bit machine), it will become 1 after the coercion, which will return unexpected results.
Fix it by adding checks to prevent passing in too large numbers.
Signed-off-by: Zhong Jinghua zhongjinghua@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai yukuai3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230206145805.2645671-1-zhongjinghua@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index ade8b839e4458..394355f12d4e0 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -326,6 +326,9 @@ static int nbd_set_size(struct nbd_device *nbd, loff_t bytesize, if (blksize < 512 || blksize > PAGE_SIZE || !is_power_of_2(blksize)) return -EINVAL;
+ if (bytesize < 0) + return -EINVAL; + nbd->config->bytesize = bytesize; nbd->config->blksize_bits = __ffs(blksize);
@@ -1048,6 +1051,9 @@ static int nbd_add_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg, struct nbd_sock *nsock; int err;
+ /* Arg will be cast to int, check it to avoid overflow */ + if (arg > INT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; sock = nbd_get_socket(nbd, arg, &err); if (!sock) return err;
From: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org
[ Upstream commit e3478c68f6704638d08f437cbc552ca5970c151a ]
In ip_vs_sync_conn_v0() copy is made to struct ip_vs_sync_conn_options. That structure looks like this:
struct ip_vs_sync_conn_options { struct ip_vs_seq in_seq; struct ip_vs_seq out_seq; };
The source of the copy is the in_seq field of struct ip_vs_conn. Whose type is struct ip_vs_seq. Thus we can see that the source - is not as wide as the amount of data copied, which is the width of struct ip_vs_sync_conn_option.
The copy is safe because the next field in is another struct ip_vs_seq. Make use of struct_group() to annotate this.
Flagged by gcc-13 as:
In file included from ./include/linux/string.h:254, from ./include/linux/bitmap.h:11, from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:12, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:17, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h:62, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:19, from ./arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h:5, from ./include/linux/timex.h:67, from ./include/linux/time32.h:13, from ./include/linux/time.h:60, from ./include/linux/stat.h:19, from ./include/linux/module.h:13, from net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:38: In function 'fortify_memcpy_chk', inlined from 'ip_vs_sync_conn_v0' at net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c:606:3: ./include/linux/fortify-string.h:529:25: error: call to '__read_overflow2_field' declared with attribute warning: detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror=attribute-warning] 529 | __read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size); |
Compile tested only.
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Horatiu Vultur horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/net/ip_vs.h | 6 ++++-- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/ip_vs.h b/include/net/ip_vs.h index 7cb5a1aace40d..59f8412de45ac 100644 --- a/include/net/ip_vs.h +++ b/include/net/ip_vs.h @@ -549,8 +549,10 @@ struct ip_vs_conn { */ struct ip_vs_app *app; /* bound ip_vs_app object */ void *app_data; /* Application private data */ - struct ip_vs_seq in_seq; /* incoming seq. struct */ - struct ip_vs_seq out_seq; /* outgoing seq. struct */ + struct_group(sync_conn_opt, + struct ip_vs_seq in_seq; /* incoming seq. struct */ + struct ip_vs_seq out_seq; /* outgoing seq. struct */ + );
const struct ip_vs_pe *pe; char *pe_data; diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c index a56fd0b5a430a..0d89e68dc9d18 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sync.c @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static void ip_vs_sync_conn_v0(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, if (cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_SEQ_MASK) { struct ip_vs_sync_conn_options *opt = (struct ip_vs_sync_conn_options *)&s[1]; - memcpy(opt, &cp->in_seq, sizeof(*opt)); + memcpy(opt, &cp->sync_conn_opt, sizeof(*opt)); }
m->nr_conns++;
From: Chethan T N chethan.tumkur.narayan@intel.com
[ Upstream commit 77f542b10c535c9a93bf8afdd2665524935807c2 ]
Basically all Intel controllers support both Central/Peripheral LE states.
This patch enables the LE States quirk by default on all Solar and Magnertor Intel controllers.
Signed-off-by: Chethan T N chethan.tumkur.narayan@intel.com Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c index d707aa63e9441..2a4cc5d8c2d40 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c @@ -2381,9 +2381,8 @@ static int btintel_setup_combined(struct hci_dev *hdev) */ set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_WIDEBAND_SPEECH_SUPPORTED, &hdev->quirks);
- /* Valid LE States quirk for GfP */ - if (INTEL_HW_VARIANT(ver_tlv.cnvi_bt) == 0x18) - set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_VALID_LE_STATES, &hdev->quirks); + /* Apply LE States quirk from solar onwards */ + set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_VALID_LE_STATES, &hdev->quirks);
/* Setup MSFT Extension support */ btintel_set_msft_opcode(hdev,
From: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit 0d218c3642b9ccf71f44987cd03c19320f3bd918 ]
On some devices the BCM Bluetooth adapter does not have a valid bdaddr set.
btbcm.c currently sets HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR to indicate when this is the case. But this requires users to manual setup a btaddr, by doing e.g.:
btmgmt -i hci0 public-addr 'B0:F1:EC:82:1D:B3'
Which means that Bluetooth will not work out of the box on such devices. To avoid this (where possible) hci_bcm sets: HCI_QUIRK_USE_BDADDR_PROPERTY which tries to get the bdaddr from devicetree.
But this only works on devicetree platforms. On UEFI based platforms there is a special Broadcom UEFI variable which when present contains the devices bdaddr, just like how there is another UEFI variable which contains wifi nvram contents including the wifi MAC address.
Add support for getting the bdaddr from this Broadcom UEFI variable, so that Bluetooth will work OOTB for users on devices where this UEFI variable is present.
This fixes Bluetooth not working on for example Asus T100HA 2-in-1s.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c index a18f289d73466..f228cdbccaee3 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btbcm.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation */
+#include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/dmi.h> @@ -33,6 +34,43 @@ /* For kmalloc-ing the fw-name array instead of putting it on the stack */ typedef char bcm_fw_name[BCM_FW_NAME_LEN];
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI +static int btbcm_set_bdaddr_from_efi(struct hci_dev *hdev) +{ + efi_guid_t guid = EFI_GUID(0x74b00bd9, 0x805a, 0x4d61, 0xb5, 0x1f, + 0x43, 0x26, 0x81, 0x23, 0xd1, 0x13); + bdaddr_t efi_bdaddr, bdaddr; + efi_status_t status; + unsigned long len; + int ret; + + if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + len = sizeof(efi_bdaddr); + status = efi.get_variable(L"BDADDR", &guid, NULL, &len, &efi_bdaddr); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + return -ENXIO; + + if (len != sizeof(efi_bdaddr)) + return -EIO; + + baswap(&bdaddr, &efi_bdaddr); + + ret = btbcm_set_bdaddr(hdev, &bdaddr); + if (ret) + return ret; + + bt_dev_info(hdev, "BCM: Using EFI device address (%pMR)", &bdaddr); + return 0; +} +#else +static int btbcm_set_bdaddr_from_efi(struct hci_dev *hdev) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif + int btbcm_check_bdaddr(struct hci_dev *hdev) { struct hci_rp_read_bd_addr *bda; @@ -86,9 +124,12 @@ int btbcm_check_bdaddr(struct hci_dev *hdev) !bacmp(&bda->bdaddr, BDADDR_BCM4345C5) || !bacmp(&bda->bdaddr, BDADDR_BCM43430A0) || !bacmp(&bda->bdaddr, BDADDR_BCM43341B)) { - bt_dev_info(hdev, "BCM: Using default device address (%pMR)", - &bda->bdaddr); - set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR, &hdev->quirks); + /* Try falling back to BDADDR EFI variable */ + if (btbcm_set_bdaddr_from_efi(hdev) != 0) { + bt_dev_info(hdev, "BCM: Using default device address (%pMR)", + &bda->bdaddr); + set_bit(HCI_QUIRK_INVALID_BDADDR, &hdev->quirks); + } }
kfree_skb(skb);
From: Min Li lm0963hack@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 25e97f7b1866e6b8503be349eeea44bb52d661ce ]
conn->chan_lock isn't acquired before l2cap_get_chan_by_scid, if l2cap_get_chan_by_scid returns NULL, then 'bad unlock balance' is triggered.
Reported-by: syzbot+9519d6b5b79cf7787cf3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000894f5f05f95e9f4d@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Min Li lm0963hack@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 446343348329f..f01b77b037878 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -4694,7 +4694,6 @@ static inline int l2cap_disconnect_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
chan = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(conn, scid); if (!chan) { - mutex_unlock(&conn->chan_lock); return 0; }
linux-stable-mirror@lists.linaro.org
-
Sasha Levin