From: Martin KaFai Lau kafai@fb.com

[ Upstream commit 886b7a50100a50f1cbd08a6f8ec5884dfbe082dc ]

It is a followup after the fix in commit 9c69a1320515 ("route: Avoid crash from dereferencing NULL rt->from")

rt6_do_redirect(): 1. NULL checking is needed on rt->from because a parallel fib6_info delete could happen that sets rt->from to NULL. (e.g. rt6_remove_exception() and fib6_drop_pcpu_from()).

2. fib6_info_hold() is not enough. Same reason as (1). Meaning, holding dst->__refcnt cannot ensure rt->from is not NULL or rt->from->fib6_ref is not 0.

Instead of using fib6_info_hold_safe() which ip6_rt_cache_alloc() is already doing, this patch chooses to extend the rcu section to keep "from" dereference-able after checking for NULL.

inet6_rtm_getroute(): 1. NULL checking is also needed on rt->from for a similar reason. Note that inet6_rtm_getroute() is using RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED.

Fixes: a68886a69180 ("net/ipv6: Make from in rt6_info rcu protected") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau kafai@fb.com Acked-by: Wei Wang weiwan@google.com Reviewed-by: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv6/route.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -3403,11 +3403,8 @@ static void rt6_do_redirect(struct dst_e

rcu_read_lock(); from = rcu_dereference(rt->from); - /* This fib6_info_hold() is safe here because we hold reference to rt - * and rt already holds reference to fib6_info. - */ - fib6_info_hold(from); - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!from) + goto out;

nrt = ip6_rt_cache_alloc(from, &msg->dest, NULL); if (!nrt) @@ -3419,10 +3416,7 @@ static void rt6_do_redirect(struct dst_e

nrt->rt6i_gateway = *(struct in6_addr *)neigh->primary_key;

- /* No need to remove rt from the exception table if rt is - * a cached route because rt6_insert_exception() will - * takes care of it - */ + /* rt6_insert_exception() will take care of duplicated exceptions */ if (rt6_insert_exception(nrt, from)) { dst_release_immediate(&nrt->dst); goto out; @@ -3435,7 +3429,7 @@ static void rt6_do_redirect(struct dst_e call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_REDIRECT, &netevent);

out: - fib6_info_release(from); + rcu_read_unlock(); neigh_release(neigh); }

@@ -4957,16 +4951,20 @@ static int inet6_rtm_getroute(struct sk_

rcu_read_lock(); from = rcu_dereference(rt->from); - - if (fibmatch) - err = rt6_fill_node(net, skb, from, NULL, NULL, NULL, iif, - RTM_NEWROUTE, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, - nlh->nlmsg_seq, 0); - else - err = rt6_fill_node(net, skb, from, dst, &fl6.daddr, - &fl6.saddr, iif, RTM_NEWROUTE, - NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq, - 0); + if (from) { + if (fibmatch) + err = rt6_fill_node(net, skb, from, NULL, NULL, NULL, + iif, RTM_NEWROUTE, + NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, + nlh->nlmsg_seq, 0); + else + err = rt6_fill_node(net, skb, from, dst, &fl6.daddr, + &fl6.saddr, iif, RTM_NEWROUTE, + NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, + nlh->nlmsg_seq, 0); + } else { + err = -ENETUNREACH; + } rcu_read_unlock();

if (err < 0) {

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

[ Upstream commit 6c0afef5fb0c27758f4d52b2210c61b6bd8b4470 ]

syzbot was able to catch a use-after-free read in pid_nr_ns() [1]

ip6fl_seq_show() seems to use RCU protection, dereferencing fl->owner.pid but fl_free() releases fl->owner.pid before rcu grace period is started.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888094012a04 by task syz-executor.0/18087

CPU: 0 PID: 18087 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #89 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:187 kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317 __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:131 pid_nr_ns+0x128/0x140 kernel/pid.c:407 ip6fl_seq_show+0x2f8/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:794 seq_read+0xad3/0x1130 fs/seq_file.c:268 proc_reg_read+0x1fe/0x2c0 fs/proc/inode.c:227 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:701 [inline] do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:688 [inline] do_iter_read+0x4a9/0x660 fs/read_write.c:922 vfs_readv+0xf0/0x160 fs/read_write.c:984 kernel_readv fs/splice.c:358 [inline] default_file_splice_read+0x475/0x890 fs/splice.c:413 do_splice_to+0x12a/0x190 fs/splice.c:876 splice_direct_to_actor+0x2d2/0x970 fs/splice.c:953 do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1062 do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1443 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1498 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1490 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x15a/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1490 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x458da9 Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f300d24bc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000458da9 RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000000000005a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f300d24c6d4 R13: 00000000004c5fa3 R14: 00000000004da748 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Allocated by task 17543: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:497 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:505 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:437 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3393 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x11a/0x6f0 mm/slab.c:3555 alloc_pid+0x55/0x8f0 kernel/pid.c:168 copy_process.part.0+0x3b08/0x7980 kernel/fork.c:1932 copy_process kernel/fork.c:1709 [inline] _do_fork+0x257/0xfd0 kernel/fork.c:2226 __do_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2333 [inline] __se_sys_clone kernel/fork.c:2327 [inline] __x64_sys_clone+0xbf/0x150 kernel/fork.c:2327 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 7789: save_stack+0x45/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:75 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:459 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:467 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3499 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x260 mm/slab.c:3765 put_pid.part.0+0x111/0x150 kernel/pid.c:111 put_pid+0x20/0x30 kernel/pid.c:105 fl_free+0xbe/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:102 ip6_fl_gc+0x295/0x3e0 net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c:152 call_timer_fn+0x190/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1325 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1362 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1681 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1649 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x652/0x1700 kernel/time/timer.c:1694 __do_softirq+0x266/0x95a kernel/softirq.c:293

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888094012a00 which belongs to the cache pid_2 of size 88 The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of 88-byte region [ffff888094012a00, ffff888094012a58) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002500480 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88809a483080 index:0xffff888094012980 flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab) raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea00018a3508 ffffea0002524a88 ffff88809a483080 raw: ffff888094012980 ffff888094012000 000000010000001b 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888094012900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc ffff888094012980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc

ffff888094012a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc

^ ffff888094012a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc ffff888094012b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 4f82f45730c6 ("net ip6 flowlabel: Make owner a union of struct pid * and kuid_t") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Cc: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c @@ -94,15 +94,21 @@ static struct ip6_flowlabel *fl_lookup(s return fl; }

+static void fl_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) +{ + struct ip6_flowlabel *fl = container_of(head, struct ip6_flowlabel, rcu); + + if (fl->share == IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS) + put_pid(fl->owner.pid); + kfree(fl->opt); + kfree(fl); +} +

static void fl_free(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl) { - if (fl) { - if (fl->share == IPV6_FL_S_PROCESS) - put_pid(fl->owner.pid); - kfree(fl->opt); - kfree_rcu(fl, rcu); - } + if (fl) + call_rcu(&fl->rcu, fl_free_rcu); }

static void fl_release(struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

[ Upstream commit a622b40035d16196bf19b2b33b854862595245fc ]

Before taking a refcount on a rcu protected structure, we need to make sure the refcount is not zero.

syzbot reported :

refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 23533 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Code: 1d 98 2b 2a 06 31 ff 89 de e8 db 2c 40 fe 84 db 75 dd e8 92 2b 40 fe 48 c7 c7 20 7a a1 87 c6 05 78 2b 2a 06 01 e8 7d d9 12 fe <0f> 0b eb c1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 RSP: 0018:ffff888069f0fba8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000f353 RSI: ffffffff815afcb6 RDI: ffffed100d3e1f67 RBP: ffff888069f0fbb8 R08: ffff88809b1845c0 R09: ffffed1015d23ef1 R10: ffffed1015d23ef0 R11: ffff8880ae91f787 R12: ffff8880a8f26968 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880a49a6440 l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h:240 [inline] l2tp_tunnel_get+0x250/0x580 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:173 pppol2tp_connect+0xc00/0x1c70 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:702 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1808 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1819 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1816 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1816

Fixes: 54652eb12c1b ("l2tp: hold tunnel while looking up sessions in l2tp_netlink") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Cc: Guillaume Nault g.nault@alphalink.fr Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get(cons

rcu_read_lock_bh(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) { - if (tunnel->tunnel_id == tunnel_id) { - l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(tunnel); + if (tunnel->tunnel_id == tunnel_id && + refcount_inc_not_zero(&tunnel->ref_count)) { rcu_read_unlock_bh();

return tunnel; @@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(

rcu_read_lock_bh(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) { - if (++count > nth) { - l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(tunnel); + if (++count > nth && + refcount_inc_not_zero(&tunnel->ref_count)) { rcu_read_unlock_bh(); return tunnel; }

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit f949a12fd697479f68d99dc65e9bbab68ee49043 ]

The "fs->location" is a u32 that comes from the user in ethtool_set_rxnfc(). We can't pass unclamped values to test_bit() or it results in an out of bounds access beyond the end of the bitmap.

Fixes: 7318166cacad ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Add support for ethtool::rxnfc") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c @@ -854,6 +854,9 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set(struct d fs->m_ext.data[1])) return -EINVAL;

+ if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && fs->location >= CFP_NUM_RULES) + return -EINVAL; + if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && test_bit(fs->location, priv->cfp.used)) return -EBUSY; @@ -942,6 +945,9 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del(struct b struct cfp_rule *rule; int ret;

+ if (loc >= CFP_NUM_RULES) + return -EINVAL; + /* Refuse deleting unused rules, and those that are not unique since * that could leave IPv6 rules with one of the chained rule in the * table.

From: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com

[ Upstream commit 2dcb003314032c6efb13a065ffae60d164b2dd35 ]

update_chksum() accesses nskb->sk before it has been set by complete_skb(), move the init up.

Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Reviewed-by: Simon Horman simon.horman@netronome.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device_fallback.c @@ -200,13 +200,14 @@ static void complete_skb(struct sk_buff

skb_put(nskb, skb->len); memcpy(nskb->data, skb->data, headln); - update_chksum(nskb, headln);

nskb->destructor = skb->destructor; nskb->sk = sk; skb->destructor = NULL; skb->sk = NULL;

+ update_chksum(nskb, headln); + delta = nskb->truesize - skb->truesize; if (likely(delta < 0)) WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_sub_and_test(-delta, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc));

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit fbd019737d71e405f86549fd738f81e2ff3dd073 ]

Ying triggered a call trace when doing an asconf testing:

BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/12/0/0x10000100 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa4375904>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffffa436fcaf>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x72 [<ffffffffa437b93a>] __schedule+0x9ba/0xa00 [<ffffffffa3cd5326>] __cond_resched+0x26/0x30 [<ffffffffa437bc4a>] _cond_resched+0x3a/0x50 [<ffffffffa3e22be8>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x38/0x200 [<ffffffffa423512d>] __alloc_skb+0x5d/0x2d0 [<ffffffffc0995320>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x610/0xa20 [sctp] [<ffffffffc098510e>] sctp_outq_flush+0x2ce/0xc00 [sctp] [<ffffffffc098646c>] sctp_outq_uncork+0x1c/0x20 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0977338>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0xc8/0x1460 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp] [<ffffffffc099443d>] sctp_primitive_ASCONF+0x3d/0x50 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0977384>] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x114/0x1460 [sctp] [<ffffffffc0976ad1>] sctp_do_sm+0xe1/0x350 [sctp] [<ffffffffc097b3a4>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xf4/0x1b0 [sctp] [<ffffffffc09840f1>] sctp_inq_push+0x51/0x70 [sctp] [<ffffffffc099732b>] sctp_rcv+0xa8b/0xbd0 [sctp]

As it shows, the first sctp_do_sm() running under atomic context (NET_RX softirq) invoked sctp_primitive_ASCONF() that uses GFP_KERNEL flag later, and this flag is supposed to be used in non-atomic context only. Besides, sctp_do_sm() was called recursively, which is not expected.

Vlad tried to fix this recursive call in Commit c0786693404c ("sctp: Fix oops when sending queued ASCONF chunks") by introducing a new command SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF. But it didn't work as this command is still used in the first sctp_do_sm() call, and sctp_primitive_ASCONF() will be called in this command again.

To avoid calling sctp_do_sm() recursively, we send the next queued ASCONF not by sctp_primitive_ASCONF(), but by sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf() in the 1st sctp_do_sm() directly.

Reported-by: Ying Xu yinxu@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Acked-by: Neil Horman nhorman@tuxdriver.com Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/net/sctp/command.h | 1 - net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 29 ----------------------------- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/sctp/command.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/command.h @@ -105,7 +105,6 @@ enum sctp_verb { SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN, /* Mark for retransmission after T1 timeout */ SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_INITTAG, /* Update peer inittag */ SCTP_CMD_SEND_MSG, /* Send the whole use message */ - SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF, /* Send the next ASCONF after ACK */ SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE, /* Purge all asconf queues.*/ SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC, /* Restore association context */ SCTP_CMD_LAST --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -1112,32 +1112,6 @@ static void sctp_cmd_send_msg(struct sct }

-/* Sent the next ASCONF packet currently stored in the association. - * This happens after the ASCONF_ACK was succeffully processed. - */ -static void sctp_cmd_send_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc) -{ - struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk); - - /* Send the next asconf chunk from the addip chunk - * queue. - */ - if (!list_empty(&asoc->addip_chunk_list)) { - struct list_head *entry = asoc->addip_chunk_list.next; - struct sctp_chunk *asconf = list_entry(entry, - struct sctp_chunk, list); - list_del_init(entry); - - /* Hold the chunk until an ASCONF_ACK is received. */ - sctp_chunk_hold(asconf); - if (sctp_primitive_ASCONF(net, asoc, asconf)) - sctp_chunk_free(asconf); - else - asoc->addip_last_asconf = asconf; - } -} - - /* These three macros allow us to pull the debugging code out of the * main flow of sctp_do_sm() to keep attention focused on the real * functionality there. @@ -1783,9 +1757,6 @@ static int sctp_cmd_interpreter(enum sct } sctp_cmd_send_msg(asoc, cmd->obj.msg, gfp); break; - case SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF: - sctp_cmd_send_asconf(asoc); - break; case SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE: sctp_asconf_queue_teardown(asoc); break; --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3824,6 +3824,29 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf( return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME; }

+static enum sctp_disposition sctp_send_next_asconf( + struct net *net, + const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ + struct sctp_chunk *asconf; + struct list_head *entry; + + if (list_empty(&asoc->addip_chunk_list)) + return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME; + + entry = asoc->addip_chunk_list.next; + asconf = list_entry(entry, struct sctp_chunk, list); + + list_del_init(entry); + sctp_chunk_hold(asconf); + asoc->addip_last_asconf = asconf; + + return sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf(net, ep, asoc, type, asconf, commands); +} + /* * ADDIP Section 4.3 General rules for address manipulation * When building TLV parameters for the ASCONF Chunk that will add or @@ -3915,14 +3938,10 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));

if (!sctp_process_asconf_ack((struct sctp_association *)asoc, - asconf_ack)) { - /* Successfully processed ASCONF_ACK. We can - * release the next asconf if we have one. - */ - sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF, - SCTP_NULL()); - return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME; - } + asconf_ack)) + return sctp_send_next_asconf(net, ep, + (struct sctp_association *)asoc, + type, commands);

abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack, sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr));

From: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com

[ Upstream commit 486efdc8f6ce802b27e15921d2353cc740c55451 ]

Packet sockets in datagram mode take a destination address. Verify its length before passing to dev_hard_header.

Prior to 2.6.14-rc3, the send code ignored sll_halen. This is established behavior. Directly compare msg_namelen to dev->addr_len.

Change v1->v2: initialize addr in all paths

Fixes: 6b8d95f1795c4 ("packet: validate address length if non-zero") Suggested-by: David Laight David.Laight@aculab.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2603,8 +2603,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc void *ph; DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, saddr, msg->msg_name); bool need_wait = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); + unsigned char *addr = NULL; int tp_len, size_max; - unsigned char *addr; void *data; int len_sum = 0; int status = TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE; @@ -2615,7 +2615,6 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc if (likely(saddr == NULL)) { dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po); proto = po->num; - addr = NULL; } else { err = -EINVAL; if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)) @@ -2625,10 +2624,13 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc sll_addr))) goto out; proto = saddr->sll_protocol; - addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL; dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); - if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) - goto out_put; + if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_DGRAM) { + if (dev && msg->msg_namelen < dev->addr_len + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr)) + goto out_put; + addr = saddr->sll_addr; + } }

err = -ENXIO; @@ -2800,7 +2802,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc struct sk_buff *skb; struct net_device *dev; __be16 proto; - unsigned char *addr; + unsigned char *addr = NULL; int err, reserve = 0; struct sockcm_cookie sockc; struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 }; @@ -2817,7 +2819,6 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc if (likely(saddr == NULL)) { dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po); proto = po->num; - addr = NULL; } else { err = -EINVAL; if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll)) @@ -2825,10 +2826,13 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc if (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr))) goto out; proto = saddr->sll_protocol; - addr = saddr->sll_halen ? saddr->sll_addr : NULL; dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), saddr->sll_ifindex); - if (addr && dev && saddr->sll_halen < dev->addr_len) - goto out_unlock; + if (sock->type == SOCK_DGRAM) { + if (dev && msg->msg_namelen < dev->addr_len + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr)) + goto out_unlock; + addr = saddr->sll_addr; + } }

err = -ENXIO;

From: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 15d55bae4e3c43cd9f87fd93c73a263e172d34e1 ]

A recent commit returns an error if icmp is used as the ip-proto for IPv6 fib rules. Update fib_rule_tests to send ipv6-icmp instead of icmp.

Fixes: 5e1a99eae8499 ("ipv4: Add ICMPv6 support when parse route ipproto") Signed-off-by: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_rule_tests.sh | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_rule_tests.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib_rule_tests.sh @@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ fib_rule6_test()

fib_check_iproute_support "ipproto" "ipproto" if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then - match="ipproto icmp" - fib_rule6_test_match_n_redirect "$match" "$match" "ipproto icmp match" + match="ipproto ipv6-icmp" + fib_rule6_test_match_n_redirect "$match" "$match" "ipproto ipv6-icmp match" fi }

From: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 21f1b8a6636c4dbde4aa1ec0343f42eaf653ffcc ]

Currently, the UDP GRO code path does bad things on some edge conditions - Aggregation can happen even on packet with different lengths.

Fix the above by rewriting the 'complete' condition for GRO packets. While at it, note explicitly that we allow merging the first packet per burst below gso_size.

Reported-by: Sean Tong seantong114@gmail.com Fixes: e20cf8d3f1f7 ("udp: implement GRO for plain UDP sockets.") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -377,13 +377,14 @@ static struct sk_buff *udp_gro_receive_s

/* Terminate the flow on len mismatch or if it grow "too much". * Under small packet flood GRO count could elsewhere grow a lot - * leading to execessive truesize values + * leading to execessive truesize values. + * On len mismatch merge the first packet shorter than gso_size, + * otherwise complete the GRO packet. */ - if (!skb_gro_receive(p, skb) && + if (uh->len > uh2->len || skb_gro_receive(p, skb) || + uh->len != uh2->len || NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->count >= UDP_GRO_CNT_MAX) pp = p; - else if (uh->len != uh2->len) - pp = p;

return pp; }

From: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit b4e30e8e7ea1d1e35ffd64ca46f7d9a7f227b4bf ]

The driver builds a list of multicast addresses and sends it to the firmware when the driver's ndo_set_rx_mode() is called. In rare cases, the firmware can fail this call if internal resources to add multicast addresses are exhausted. In that case, we should try the call again by setting the ALL_MCAST flag which is more guaranteed to succeed.

Fixes: c0c050c58d84 ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Signed-off-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -8889,8 +8889,15 @@ static int bnxt_cfg_rx_mode(struct bnxt

skip_uc: rc = bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask(bp, 0); + if (rc && vnic->mc_list_count) { + netdev_info(bp->dev, "Failed setting MC filters rc: %d, turning on ALL_MCAST mode\n", + rc); + vnic->rx_mask |= CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_REQ_MASK_ALL_MCAST; + vnic->mc_list_count = 0; + rc = bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask(bp, 0); + } if (rc) - netdev_err(bp->dev, "HWRM cfa l2 rx mask failure rc: %x\n", + netdev_err(bp->dev, "HWRM cfa l2 rx mask failure rc: %d\n", rc);

return rc;

From: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit 1f83391bd6fc48f92f627b0ec0bce686d100c6a5 ]

If we encounter errors during open and proceed to clean up, bnxt_hwrm_ring_free() may crash if the rings we try to free have never been allocated. bnxt_cp_ring_for_rx() or bnxt_cp_ring_for_tx() may reference pointers that have not been allocated.

Fix it by checking for valid fw_ring_id first before calling bnxt_cp_ring_for_rx() or bnxt_cp_ring_for_tx().

Fixes: 2c61d2117ecb ("bnxt_en: Add helper functions to get firmware CP ring ID.") Signed-off-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -5131,10 +5131,10 @@ static void bnxt_hwrm_ring_free(struct b for (i = 0; i < bp->tx_nr_rings; i++) { struct bnxt_tx_ring_info *txr = &bp->tx_ring[i]; struct bnxt_ring_struct *ring = &txr->tx_ring_struct; - u32 cmpl_ring_id;

- cmpl_ring_id = bnxt_cp_ring_for_tx(bp, txr); if (ring->fw_ring_id != INVALID_HW_RING_ID) { + u32 cmpl_ring_id = bnxt_cp_ring_for_tx(bp, txr); + hwrm_ring_free_send_msg(bp, ring, RING_FREE_REQ_RING_TYPE_TX, close_path ? cmpl_ring_id : @@ -5147,10 +5147,10 @@ static void bnxt_hwrm_ring_free(struct b struct bnxt_rx_ring_info *rxr = &bp->rx_ring[i]; struct bnxt_ring_struct *ring = &rxr->rx_ring_struct; u32 grp_idx = rxr->bnapi->index; - u32 cmpl_ring_id;

- cmpl_ring_id = bnxt_cp_ring_for_rx(bp, rxr); if (ring->fw_ring_id != INVALID_HW_RING_ID) { + u32 cmpl_ring_id = bnxt_cp_ring_for_rx(bp, rxr); + hwrm_ring_free_send_msg(bp, ring, RING_FREE_REQ_RING_TYPE_RX, close_path ? cmpl_ring_id : @@ -5169,10 +5169,10 @@ static void bnxt_hwrm_ring_free(struct b struct bnxt_rx_ring_info *rxr = &bp->rx_ring[i]; struct bnxt_ring_struct *ring = &rxr->rx_agg_ring_struct; u32 grp_idx = rxr->bnapi->index; - u32 cmpl_ring_id;

- cmpl_ring_id = bnxt_cp_ring_for_rx(bp, rxr); if (ring->fw_ring_id != INVALID_HW_RING_ID) { + u32 cmpl_ring_id = bnxt_cp_ring_for_rx(bp, rxr); + hwrm_ring_free_send_msg(bp, ring, type, close_path ? cmpl_ring_id : INVALID_HW_RING_ID);

From: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com

[ Upstream commit 3f93cd3f098e284c851acb89265ebe35b994a5c8 ]

In an earlier commit that fixes the number of stats contexts to reserve for the RDMA driver, we added a function parameter to pass in the number of stats contexts to all the relevant functions. The passed in parameter should have been used to set the enables field of the firmware message.

Fixes: 780baad44f0f ("bnxt_en: Reserve 1 stat_ctx for RDMA driver.") Signed-off-by: Michael Chan michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c @@ -5311,17 +5311,16 @@ __bnxt_hwrm_reserve_pf_rings(struct bnxt req->num_tx_rings = cpu_to_le16(tx_rings); if (BNXT_NEW_RM(bp)) { enables |= rx_rings ? FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_RX_RINGS : 0; + enables |= stats ? FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_STAT_CTXS : 0; if (bp->flags & BNXT_FLAG_CHIP_P5) { enables |= cp_rings ? FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_MSIX : 0; enables |= tx_rings + ring_grps ? - FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS | - FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_STAT_CTXS : 0; + FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS : 0; enables |= rx_rings ? FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_RSSCOS_CTXS : 0; } else { enables |= cp_rings ? - FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS | - FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_STAT_CTXS : 0; + FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS : 0; enables |= ring_grps ? FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_HW_RING_GRPS | FUNC_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_RSSCOS_CTXS : 0; @@ -5361,14 +5360,13 @@ __bnxt_hwrm_reserve_vf_rings(struct bnxt enables |= tx_rings ? FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_TX_RINGS : 0; enables |= rx_rings ? FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_RX_RINGS | FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_RSSCOS_CTXS : 0; + enables |= stats ? FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_STAT_CTXS : 0; if (bp->flags & BNXT_FLAG_CHIP_P5) { enables |= tx_rings + ring_grps ? - FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS | - FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_STAT_CTXS : 0; + FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS : 0; } else { enables |= cp_rings ? - FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS | - FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_STAT_CTXS : 0; + FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_CMPL_RINGS : 0; enables |= ring_grps ? FUNC_VF_CFG_REQ_ENABLES_NUM_HW_RING_GRPS : 0; }

From: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com

[ Upstream commit 97e1caa517e22d62a283b876fb8aa5f4672c83dd ]

There is no guarantee the record starts before the skb frags. If we don't check for this condition copy amount will get negative, leading to reads and writes to random memory locations. Familiar hilarity ensues.

Fixes: 4799ac81e52a ("tls: Add rx inline crypto offload") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Reviewed-by: John Hurley john.hurley@netronome.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/tls/tls_device.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c @@ -610,14 +610,16 @@ static int tls_device_reencrypt(struct s else err = 0;

- copy = min_t(int, skb_pagelen(skb) - offset, - rxm->full_len - TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE); + if (skb_pagelen(skb) > offset) { + copy = min_t(int, skb_pagelen(skb) - offset, + rxm->full_len - TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE);

- if (skb->decrypted) - skb_store_bits(skb, offset, buf, copy); + if (skb->decrypted) + skb_store_bits(skb, offset, buf, copy);

- offset += copy; - buf += copy; + offset += copy; + buf += copy; + }

skb_walk_frags(skb, skb_iter) { copy = min_t(int, skb_iter->len,

From: Sean Christopherson sean.j.christopherson@intel.com

commit 8764ed55c9705e426d889ff16c26f398bba70b9b upstream.

KVM's recent bug fix to update %rip after emulating I/O broke userspace that relied on the previous behavior of incrementing %rip prior to exiting to userspace. When running a Windows XP guest on AMD hardware, Qemu may patch "OUT 0x7E" instructions in reaction to the OUT itself. Because KVM's old behavior was to increment %rip before exiting to userspace to handle the I/O, Qemu manually adjusted %rip to account for the OUT instruction.

Arguably this is a userspace bug as KVM requires userspace to re-enter the kernel to complete instruction emulation before taking any other actions. That being said, this is a bit of a grey area and breaking userspace that has worked for many years is bad.

Pre-increment %rip on OUT to port 0x7e before exiting to userspace to hack around the issue.

Fixes: 45def77ebf79e ("KVM: x86: update %rip after emulating IO") Reported-by: Simon Becherer simon@becherer.de Reported-and-tested-by: Iakov Karpov srid@rkmail.ru Reported-by: Gabriele Balducci balducci@units.it Reported-by: Antti Antinoja reader@fennosys.fi Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.com Cc: Jiri Slaby jslaby@suse.com Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson sean.j.christopherson@intel.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ struct kvm_sync_regs { #define KVM_X86_QUIRK_LINT0_REENABLED (1 << 0) #define KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED (1 << 1) #define KVM_X86_QUIRK_LAPIC_MMIO_HOLE (1 << 2) +#define KVM_X86_QUIRK_OUT_7E_INC_RIP (1 << 3)

#define KVM_STATE_NESTED_GUEST_MODE 0x00000001 #define KVM_STATE_NESTED_RUN_PENDING 0x00000002 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -6536,6 +6536,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer( } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer);

+static int complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0; + return 1; +} + static int complete_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0; @@ -6552,12 +6558,23 @@ static int kvm_fast_pio_out(struct kvm_v unsigned long val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX); int ret = emulator_pio_out_emulated(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, size, port, &val, 1); + if (ret) + return ret;

- if (!ret) { + /* + * Workaround userspace that relies on old KVM behavior of %rip being + * incremented prior to exiting to userspace to handle "OUT 0x7e". + */ + if (port == 0x7e && + kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_OUT_7E_INC_RIP)) { + vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = + complete_fast_pio_out_port_0x7e; + kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); + } else { vcpu->arch.pio.linear_rip = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu); vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_fast_pio_out; } - return ret; + return 0; }

static int complete_fast_pio_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

commit e5c812e84f0dece3400d5caf42522287e6ef139f upstream.

The line6 driver uses a lot of USB buffers off of the stack, which is not allowed on many systems, causing the driver to crash on some of them. Fix this up by dynamically allocating the buffers with kmalloc() which allows for proper DMA-able memory.

Reported-by: Christo Gouws gouws.christo@gmail.com Reported-by: Alan Stern stern@rowland.harvard.edu Tested-by: Christo Gouws gouws.christo@gmail.com Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- sound/usb/line6/driver.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- sound/usb/line6/podhd.c | 21 +++++++++------ sound/usb/line6/toneport.c | 24 +++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/usb/line6/driver.c +++ b/sound/usb/line6/driver.c @@ -351,12 +351,16 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li { struct usb_device *usbdev = line6->usbdev; int ret; - unsigned char len; + unsigned char *len; unsigned count;

if (address > 0xffff || datalen > 0xff) return -EINVAL;

+ len = kmalloc(sizeof(*len), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!len) + return -ENOMEM; + /* query the serial number: */ ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT, @@ -365,7 +369,7 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li

if (ret < 0) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "read request failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; + goto exit; }

/* Wait for data length. We'll get 0xff until length arrives. */ @@ -375,28 +379,29 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN, - 0x0012, 0x0000, &len, 1, + 0x0012, 0x0000, len, 1, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "receive length failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; + goto exit; }

- if (len != 0xff) + if (*len != 0xff) break; }

- if (len == 0xff) { + ret = -EIO; + if (*len == 0xff) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "read failed after %d retries\n", count); - return -EIO; - } else if (len != datalen) { + goto exit; + } else if (*len != datalen) { /* should be equal or something went wrong */ dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "length mismatch (expected %d, got %d)\n", - (int)datalen, (int)len); - return -EIO; + (int)datalen, (int)*len); + goto exit; }

/* receive the result: */ @@ -405,12 +410,12 @@ int line6_read_data(struct usb_line6 *li 0x0013, 0x0000, data, datalen, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ);

- if (ret < 0) { + if (ret < 0) dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "read failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; - }

- return 0; +exit: + kfree(len); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(line6_read_data);

@@ -422,12 +427,16 @@ int line6_write_data(struct usb_line6 *l { struct usb_device *usbdev = line6->usbdev; int ret; - unsigned char status; + unsigned char *status; int count;

if (address > 0xffff || datalen > 0xffff) return -EINVAL;

+ status = kmalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!status) + return -ENOMEM; + ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT, 0x0022, address, data, datalen, @@ -436,7 +445,7 @@ int line6_write_data(struct usb_line6 *l if (ret < 0) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "write request failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; + goto exit; }

for (count = 0; count < LINE6_READ_WRITE_MAX_RETRIES; count++) { @@ -447,28 +456,29 @@ int line6_write_data(struct usb_line6 *l USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN, 0x0012, 0x0000, - &status, 1, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); + status, 1, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ);

if (ret < 0) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "receiving status failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; + goto exit; }

- if (status != 0xff) + if (*status != 0xff) break; }

- if (status == 0xff) { + if (*status == 0xff) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "write failed after %d retries\n", count); - return -EIO; - } else if (status != 0) { + ret = -EIO; + } else if (*status != 0) { dev_err(line6->ifcdev, "write failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return -EIO; + ret = -EIO; } - - return 0; +exit: + kfree(status); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(line6_write_data);

--- a/sound/usb/line6/podhd.c +++ b/sound/usb/line6/podhd.c @@ -225,28 +225,32 @@ static void podhd_startup_start_workqueu static int podhd_dev_start(struct usb_line6_podhd *pod) { int ret; - u8 init_bytes[8]; + u8 *init_bytes; int i; struct usb_device *usbdev = pod->line6.usbdev;

+ init_bytes = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!init_bytes) + return -ENOMEM; + ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT, 0x11, 0, NULL, 0, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(pod->line6.ifcdev, "read request failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; + goto exit; }

/* NOTE: looks like some kind of ping message */ ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), 0x67, USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN, 0x11, 0x0, - &init_bytes, 3, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); + init_bytes, 3, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(pod->line6.ifcdev, "receive length failed (error %d)\n", ret); - return ret; + goto exit; }

pod->firmware_version = @@ -255,7 +259,7 @@ static int podhd_dev_start(struct usb_li for (i = 0; i <= 16; i++) { ret = line6_read_data(&pod->line6, 0xf000 + 0x08 * i, init_bytes, 8); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto exit; }

ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), @@ -263,10 +267,9 @@ static int podhd_dev_start(struct usb_li USB_TYPE_STANDARD | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT, 1, 0, NULL, 0, LINE6_TIMEOUT * HZ); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - return 0; +exit: + kfree(init_bytes); + return ret; }

static void podhd_startup_workqueue(struct work_struct *work) --- a/sound/usb/line6/toneport.c +++ b/sound/usb/line6/toneport.c @@ -365,16 +365,21 @@ static bool toneport_has_source_select(s /* Setup Toneport device. */ -static void toneport_setup(struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport) +static int toneport_setup(struct usb_line6_toneport *toneport) { - u32 ticks; + u32 *ticks; struct usb_line6 *line6 = &toneport->line6; struct usb_device *usbdev = line6->usbdev;

+ ticks = kmalloc(sizeof(*ticks), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ticks) + return -ENOMEM; + /* sync time on device with host: */ /* note: 32-bit timestamps overflow in year 2106 */ - ticks = (u32)ktime_get_real_seconds(); - line6_write_data(line6, 0x80c6, &ticks, 4); + *ticks = (u32)ktime_get_real_seconds(); + line6_write_data(line6, 0x80c6, ticks, 4); + kfree(ticks);

/* enable device: */ toneport_send_cmd(usbdev, 0x0301, 0x0000); @@ -389,6 +394,7 @@ static void toneport_setup(struct usb_li toneport_update_led(toneport);

mod_timer(&toneport->timer, jiffies + TONEPORT_PCM_DELAY * HZ); + return 0; }

/* @@ -451,7 +457,9 @@ static int toneport_init(struct usb_line return err; }

- toneport_setup(toneport); + err = toneport_setup(toneport); + if (err) + return err;

/* register audio system: */ return snd_card_register(line6->card); @@ -463,7 +471,11 @@ static int toneport_init(struct usb_line */ static int toneport_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *interface) { - toneport_setup(usb_get_intfdata(interface)); + int err; + + err = toneport_setup(usb_get_intfdata(interface)); + if (err) + return err; return line6_resume(interface); } #endif

From: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com

commit 9e80ad37f6788ed52b89a3cfcd593e0aa69b216d upstream.

ath10k_mac_vif_chan() always returns an error for the given vif during system-wide resume which reliably triggers two WARN_ON()s in ath10k_bss_info_changed() and they are not particularly useful in that code path, so drop them.

Tested: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI with WLAN.RM.2.0-00180-QCARMSWPZ-1 Tested: QCA6174 hw3.2 SDIO with WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00007-QCARMSWP-1

Fixes: cd93b83ad927 ("ath10k: support for multicast rate control") Fixes: f279294e9ee2 ("ath10k: add support for configuring management packet rate") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Brian Norris briannorris@chromium.org Tested-by: Brian Norris briannorris@chromium.org Tested-by: Claire Chang tientzu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c @@ -5705,7 +5705,7 @@ static void ath10k_bss_info_changed(stru }

if (changed & BSS_CHANGED_MCAST_RATE && - !WARN_ON(ath10k_mac_vif_chan(arvif->vif, &def))) { + !ath10k_mac_vif_chan(arvif->vif, &def)) { band = def.chan->band; rateidx = vif->bss_conf.mcast_rate[band] - 1;

@@ -5743,7 +5743,7 @@ static void ath10k_bss_info_changed(stru }

if (changed & BSS_CHANGED_BASIC_RATES) { - if (WARN_ON(ath10k_mac_vif_chan(vif, &def))) { + if (ath10k_mac_vif_chan(vif, &def)) { mutex_unlock(&ar->conf_mutex); return; }