On 11/27/2017 06:25 AM, Leon Romanovsky wrote:

From: Daniel Jurgens danielj@mellanox.com

For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types. This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL.

Cc: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Cc: Don Dutile ddutile@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja bharat@chelsio.com Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs") Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams") Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens danielj@mellanox.com Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit parav@mellanox.com Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja bharat@chelsio.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky leon@kernel.org

---

Changelog: v1->v2: Fixed build errors v0->v1: Added proper SElinux patch

---

drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c index 23278ed5be45..06c608c07b65 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c @@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec)

int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev) {

• u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev);

• bool is_ib = false; int ret;

• while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib)

• is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++);
  

• /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */

• if (!is_ib)

• return 0;
  

• qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!qp->qp_sec) return -ENOMEM;

@@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security);

void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec) {

• /* Return if not IB */

• if (!sec)

• return;
  

• mutex_lock(&sec->mutex);

  /* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to

@@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec) int ret; int i;

• /* Return if not IB */
• if (!sec)

• return;
  

• /* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this
  • QP security could be marked for an error state
  • transition. Wait for this to complete.

@@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec) { int i;

• /* Return if not IB */
• if (!sec)

• return;
  

• /* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must
  • wait until this QP security structure is processed
  • in the QP to error flow before destroying it because

@@ -565,13 +586,19 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp, bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) || (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH));

• WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT &&

•    rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) &&
  

•    !real_qp->qp_sec),
  

•    "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n",
  

•    __func__, real_qp->qp_num);
  

• /* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open
  • handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When
  • enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be
  • checked as well.
  */

• if (pps_change && !special_qp) {

• if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex); new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp, qp_attr,

@@ -600,7 +627,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp, qp_attr_mask, udata);

• if (pps_change && !special_qp) {

• if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate
  • ports_pkeys structure.
  */

@@ -631,6 +658,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev, u16 pkey; int ret;

• if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num))

• return 0;
  

• ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey); if (ret) return ret;

@@ -665,6 +695,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, { int ret;

• if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))

• return 0;
  

• ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security); if (ret) return ret;

@@ -690,6 +723,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent,

void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) {

• if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num))

• return;
  

• security_ib_free_security(agent->security); if (agent->lsm_nb_reg) unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb);

@@ -697,6 +733,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent)

int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index) {

• if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num))

• return 0;
  

• if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed) return -EACCES;

-- 2.15.0

This patch breaks the kernel build on RHEL b/c it generates a warning in the second if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) {} that new_pps may not be assigned. ... build warnings in RHEL kernel == build failure (on x86).

That's b/c the patch adds real_qp->qp_sec to if's conditions, and the compiler cannot determine if real_qp->qp_sec cannot be modified between the first check like it, above, which sets the value of new_pps, and the second check that uses it, because real_qp is passed into the device->modify() function call btwn those two if() check's.

The code needs to do something like this in the first if-check: ..... bool new_pps_gotten = false; ....

if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex); new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp, qp_attr, qp_attr_mask); new_pps_gotten = true; .... } ....

and change the second if check to be:

if (new_pps_gotten) { * Clean up the lists and free the appropriate .....