4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Aring aring@mojatatu.com

commit ac74f87c789af40936a80131c4759f3e72579c3a upstream.

This patch fixes patch add handling to take care tail and headroom for single 6lowpan frames. We need to be sure we have a skb with the right head and tailroom for single frames. This patch do it by using skb_copy_expand() if head and tailroom is not enough allocated by upper layer.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195059 Reported-by: David Palma david.palma@ntnu.no Reported-by: Rabi Narayan Sahoo rabinarayans0828@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring aring@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt stefan@datenfreihafen.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/ieee802154/6lowpan/tx.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ieee802154/6lowpan/tx.c +++ b/net/ieee802154/6lowpan/tx.c @@ -266,9 +266,24 @@ netdev_tx_t lowpan_xmit(struct sk_buff * /* We must take a copy of the skb before we modify/replace the ipv6 * header as the header could be used elsewhere */ - skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!skb) - return NET_XMIT_DROP; + if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < ldev->needed_headroom || + skb_tailroom(skb) < ldev->needed_tailroom)) { + struct sk_buff *nskb; + + nskb = skb_copy_expand(skb, ldev->needed_headroom, + ldev->needed_tailroom, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (likely(nskb)) { + consume_skb(skb); + skb = nskb; + } else { + kfree_skb(skb); + return NET_XMIT_DROP; + } + } else { + skb = skb_unshare(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!skb) + return NET_XMIT_DROP; + }

ret = lowpan_header(skb, ldev, &dgram_size, &dgram_offset); if (ret < 0) {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chirantan Ekbote chirantan@chromium.org

commit d28c756caee6e414d9ba367d0b92da24145af2a8 upstream.

The zero-copy optimization when reading or writing large chunks of data is quite useful. However, the 9p messages created through the zero-copy write path have an incorrect message size: it should be the size of the header + size of the data being written but instead it's just the size of the header.

This only works if the server ignores the size field of the message and otherwise breaks the framing of the protocol. Fix this by re-writing the message size field with the correct value.

Tested by running `dd if=/dev/zero of=out bs=4k count=1` inside a virtio-9p mount.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180717003529.114368-1-chirantan@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Chirantan Ekbote chirantan@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz groug@kaod.org Tested-by: Greg Kurz groug@kaod.org Cc: Dylan Reid dgreid@chromium.org Cc: Guenter Roeck groeck@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet dominique.martinet@cea.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c @@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ p9_virtio_zc_request(struct p9_client *c p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "virtio request\n");

if (uodata) { + __le32 sz; int n = p9_get_mapped_pages(chan, &out_pages, uodata, outlen, &offs, &need_drop); if (n < 0) @@ -416,6 +417,12 @@ p9_virtio_zc_request(struct p9_client *c memcpy(&req->tc->sdata[req->tc->size - 4], &v, 4); outlen = n; } + /* The size field of the message must include the length of the + * header and the length of the data. We didn't actually know + * the length of the data until this point so add it in now. + */ + sz = cpu_to_le32(req->tc->size + outlen); + memcpy(&req->tc->sdata[0], &sz, sizeof(sz)); } else if (uidata) { int n = p9_get_mapped_pages(chan, &in_pages, uidata, inlen, &offs, &need_drop);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzk@kernel.org

commit d8ffee2f551a627ffb7b216e2da322cb9a037f77 upstream.

Registers of DSPI should not be accessed before enabling its clock. On Toradex Colibri VF50 on Iris carrier board this could be seen during bootup as imprecise abort:

Unhandled fault: imprecise external abort (0x1c06) at 0x00000000 Internal error: : 1c06 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.14.39-dirty #97 Hardware name: Freescale Vybrid VF5xx/VF6xx (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<804166a8>] (regmap_write) from [<80466b5c>] (dspi_probe+0x1f0/0x8dc) [<8046696c>] (dspi_probe) from [<8040107c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xb8) [<80401028>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<803ff53c>] (driver_probe_device+0x280/0x2f8) [<803ff2bc>] (driver_probe_device) from [<803ff674>] (__driver_attach+0xc0/0xc4) [<803ff5b4>] (__driver_attach) from [<803fd818>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xa4) [<803fd7a8>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<803fee74>] (driver_attach+0x24/0x28) [<803fee50>] (driver_attach) from [<803fe980>] (bus_add_driver+0x1a0/0x218) [<803fe7e0>] (bus_add_driver) from [<803fffe8>] (driver_register+0x80/0x100) [<803fff68>] (driver_register) from [<80400fdc>] (__platform_driver_register+0x48/0x50) [<80400f94>] (__platform_driver_register) from [<8091cf7c>] (fsl_dspi_driver_init+0x1c/0x20) [<8091cf60>] (fsl_dspi_driver_init) from [<8010195c>] (do_one_initcall+0x4c/0x174) [<80101910>] (do_one_initcall) from [<80900e8c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x144/0x1d8) [<80900d48>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<805ff6a8>] (kernel_init+0x10/0x114) [<805ff698>] (kernel_init) from [<80107be8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5ee67b587a2b ("spi: dspi: clear SPI_SR before enable interrupt") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-dspi.c @@ -715,31 +715,31 @@ static int dspi_probe(struct platform_de return PTR_ERR(dspi->regmap); }

+ dspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "dspi"); + if (IS_ERR(dspi->clk)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dspi->clk); + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to get clock\n"); + goto out_master_put; + } + ret = clk_prepare_enable(dspi->clk); + if (ret) + goto out_master_put; + dspi_init(dspi); dspi->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); if (dspi->irq < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can't get platform irq\n"); ret = dspi->irq; - goto out_master_put; + goto out_clk_put; }

ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, dspi->irq, dspi_interrupt, 0, pdev->name, dspi); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unable to attach DSPI interrupt\n"); - goto out_master_put; + goto out_clk_put; }

- dspi->clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "dspi"); - if (IS_ERR(dspi->clk)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(dspi->clk); - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "unable to get clock\n"); - goto out_master_put; - } - ret = clk_prepare_enable(dspi->clk); - if (ret) - goto out_master_put; - master->max_speed_hz = clk_get_rate(dspi->clk) / dspi->devtype_data->max_clock_factor;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Mack daniel@zonque.org

commit 7444a8092906ed44c09459780c56ba57043e39b1 upstream.

Prior to commit 573185cc7e64 ("mmc: core: Invoke sdio func driver's PM callbacks from the sdio bus"), the MMC core used to call into the power management functions of SDIO clients itself and removed the card if the return code was non-zero. IOW, the mmc handled errors gracefully and didn't upchain them to the pm core.

Since this change, the mmc core relies on generic power management functions which treat all errors as a reason to cancel the suspend immediately. This causes suspend attempts to fail when the libertas driver is loaded.

To fix this, power down the card explicitly in if_sdio_suspend() when we know we're about to lose power and return success. Also set a flag in these cases, and power up the card again in if_sdio_resume().

Fixes: 573185cc7e64 ("mmc: core: Invoke sdio func driver's PM callbacks from the sdio bus") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack daniel@zonque.org Reviewed-by: Chris Ball chris@printf.net Reviewed-by: Ulf Hansson ulf.hansson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/dev.h | 1 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/if_sdio.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/dev.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/dev.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ struct lbs_private { u8 fw_ready; u8 surpriseremoved; u8 setup_fw_on_resume; + u8 power_up_on_resume; int (*hw_host_to_card) (struct lbs_private *priv, u8 type, u8 *payload, u16 nb); void (*reset_card) (struct lbs_private *priv); int (*power_save) (struct lbs_private *priv); --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/if_sdio.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/if_sdio.c @@ -1341,15 +1341,23 @@ static void if_sdio_remove(struct sdio_f static int if_sdio_suspend(struct device *dev) { struct sdio_func *func = dev_to_sdio_func(dev); - int ret; struct if_sdio_card *card = sdio_get_drvdata(func); + struct lbs_private *priv = card->priv; + int ret;

mmc_pm_flag_t flags = sdio_get_host_pm_caps(func); + priv->power_up_on_resume = false;

/* If we're powered off anyway, just let the mmc layer remove the * card. */ - if (!lbs_iface_active(card->priv)) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!lbs_iface_active(priv)) { + if (priv->fw_ready) { + priv->power_up_on_resume = true; + if_sdio_power_off(card); + } + + return 0; + }

dev_info(dev, "%s: suspend: PM flags = 0x%x\n", sdio_func_id(func), flags); @@ -1357,9 +1365,14 @@ static int if_sdio_suspend(struct device /* If we aren't being asked to wake on anything, we should bail out * and let the SD stack power down the card. */ - if (card->priv->wol_criteria == EHS_REMOVE_WAKEUP) { + if (priv->wol_criteria == EHS_REMOVE_WAKEUP) { dev_info(dev, "Suspend without wake params -- powering down card\n"); - return -ENOSYS; + if (priv->fw_ready) { + priv->power_up_on_resume = true; + if_sdio_power_off(card); + } + + return 0; }

if (!(flags & MMC_PM_KEEP_POWER)) { @@ -1372,7 +1385,7 @@ static int if_sdio_suspend(struct device if (ret) return ret;

- ret = lbs_suspend(card->priv); + ret = lbs_suspend(priv); if (ret) return ret;

@@ -1387,6 +1400,11 @@ static int if_sdio_resume(struct device

dev_info(dev, "%s: resume: we're back\n", sdio_func_id(func));

+ if (card->priv->power_up_on_resume) { + if_sdio_power_on(card); + wait_event(card->pwron_waitq, card->priv->fw_ready); + } + ret = lbs_resume(card->priv);

return ret;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hari Bathini hbathini@linux.ibm.com

commit 1bd6a1c4b80a28d975287630644e6b47d0f977a5 upstream.

Crash memory ranges is an array of memory ranges of the crashing kernel to be exported as a dump via /proc/vmcore file. The size of the array is set based on INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS, which works alright in most cases where memblock memory regions count is less than INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS value. But this count can grow beyond INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS value since commit 142b45a72e22 ("memblock: Add array resizing support").

On large memory systems with a few DLPAR operations, the memblock memory regions count could be larger than INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS value. On such systems, registering fadump results in crash or other system failures like below:

task: c00007f39a290010 ti: c00000000b738000 task.ti: c00000000b738000 NIP: c000000000047df4 LR: c0000000000f9e58 CTR: c00000000010f180 REGS: c00000000b73b570 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G L X (4.4.140+) MSR: 8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 22004484 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c000000000008500 DAR: 000007a450000000 DSISR: 40000000 SOFTE: 0 ... NIP [c000000000047df4] smp_send_reschedule+0x24/0x80 LR [c0000000000f9e58] resched_curr+0x138/0x160 Call Trace: resched_curr+0x138/0x160 (unreliable) check_preempt_curr+0xc8/0xf0 ttwu_do_wakeup+0x38/0x150 try_to_wake_up+0x224/0x4d0 __wake_up_common+0x94/0x100 ep_poll_callback+0xac/0x1c0 __wake_up_common+0x94/0x100 __wake_up_sync_key+0x70/0xa0 sock_def_readable+0x58/0xa0 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2dc/0x4c0 sock_sendmsg+0x68/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2cc/0x2e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x5c/0xc0 SyS_socketcall+0x36c/0x3f0 system_call+0x3c/0x100

as array index overflow is not checked for while setting up crash memory ranges causing memory corruption. To resolve this issue, dynamically allocate memory for crash memory ranges and resize it incrementally, in units of pagesize, on hitting array size limit.

Fixes: 2df173d9e85d ("fadump: Initialize elfcore header and add PT_LOAD program headers.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.4+ Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini hbathini@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com [mpe: Just use PAGE_SIZE directly, fixup variable placement] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h | 3 - arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/fadump.h @@ -190,9 +190,6 @@ struct fadump_crash_info_header { struct cpumask online_mask; };

-/* Crash memory ranges */ -#define INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES (INIT_MEMBLOCK_REGIONS + 2) - struct fad_crash_memory_ranges { unsigned long long base; unsigned long long size; --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fadump.c @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ static struct fadump_mem_struct fdm; static const struct fadump_mem_struct *fdm_active;

static DEFINE_MUTEX(fadump_mutex); -struct fad_crash_memory_ranges crash_memory_ranges[INIT_CRASHMEM_RANGES]; +struct fad_crash_memory_ranges *crash_memory_ranges; +int crash_memory_ranges_size; int crash_mem_ranges; +int max_crash_mem_ranges;

/* Scan the Firmware Assisted dump configuration details. */ int __init early_init_dt_scan_fw_dump(unsigned long node, @@ -731,38 +733,88 @@ static int __init process_fadump(const s return 0; }

-static inline void fadump_add_crash_memory(unsigned long long base, - unsigned long long end) +static void free_crash_memory_ranges(void) +{ + kfree(crash_memory_ranges); + crash_memory_ranges = NULL; + crash_memory_ranges_size = 0; + max_crash_mem_ranges = 0; +} + +/* + * Allocate or reallocate crash memory ranges array in incremental units + * of PAGE_SIZE. + */ +static int allocate_crash_memory_ranges(void) +{ + struct fad_crash_memory_ranges *new_array; + u64 new_size; + + new_size = crash_memory_ranges_size + PAGE_SIZE; + pr_debug("Allocating %llu bytes of memory for crash memory ranges\n", + new_size); + + new_array = krealloc(crash_memory_ranges, new_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (new_array == NULL) { + pr_err("Insufficient memory for setting up crash memory ranges\n"); + free_crash_memory_ranges(); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + crash_memory_ranges = new_array; + crash_memory_ranges_size = new_size; + max_crash_mem_ranges = (new_size / + sizeof(struct fad_crash_memory_ranges)); + return 0; +} + +static inline int fadump_add_crash_memory(unsigned long long base, + unsigned long long end) { if (base == end) - return; + return 0; + + if (crash_mem_ranges == max_crash_mem_ranges) { + int ret; + + ret = allocate_crash_memory_ranges(); + if (ret) + return ret; + }

pr_debug("crash_memory_range[%d] [%#016llx-%#016llx], %#llx bytes\n", crash_mem_ranges, base, end - 1, (end - base)); crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges].base = base; crash_memory_ranges[crash_mem_ranges].size = end - base; crash_mem_ranges++; + return 0; }

-static void fadump_exclude_reserved_area(unsigned long long start, +static int fadump_exclude_reserved_area(unsigned long long start, unsigned long long end) { unsigned long long ra_start, ra_end; + int ret = 0;

ra_start = fw_dump.reserve_dump_area_start; ra_end = ra_start + fw_dump.reserve_dump_area_size;

if ((ra_start < end) && (ra_end > start)) { if ((start < ra_start) && (end > ra_end)) { - fadump_add_crash_memory(start, ra_start); - fadump_add_crash_memory(ra_end, end); + ret = fadump_add_crash_memory(start, ra_start); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = fadump_add_crash_memory(ra_end, end); } else if (start < ra_start) { - fadump_add_crash_memory(start, ra_start); + ret = fadump_add_crash_memory(start, ra_start); } else if (ra_end < end) { - fadump_add_crash_memory(ra_end, end); + ret = fadump_add_crash_memory(ra_end, end); } } else - fadump_add_crash_memory(start, end); + ret = fadump_add_crash_memory(start, end); + + return ret; }

static int fadump_init_elfcore_header(char *bufp) @@ -802,10 +854,11 @@ static int fadump_init_elfcore_header(ch * Traverse through memblock structure and setup crash memory ranges. These * ranges will be used create PT_LOAD program headers in elfcore header. */ -static void fadump_setup_crash_memory_ranges(void) +static int fadump_setup_crash_memory_ranges(void) { struct memblock_region *reg; unsigned long long start, end; + int ret;

pr_debug("Setup crash memory ranges.\n"); crash_mem_ranges = 0; @@ -816,7 +869,9 @@ static void fadump_setup_crash_memory_ra * specified during fadump registration. We need to create a separate * program header for this chunk with the correct offset. */ - fadump_add_crash_memory(RMA_START, fw_dump.boot_memory_size); + ret = fadump_add_crash_memory(RMA_START, fw_dump.boot_memory_size); + if (ret) + return ret;

for_each_memblock(memory, reg) { start = (unsigned long long)reg->base; @@ -825,8 +880,12 @@ static void fadump_setup_crash_memory_ra start = fw_dump.boot_memory_size;

/* add this range excluding the reserved dump area. */ - fadump_exclude_reserved_area(start, end); + ret = fadump_exclude_reserved_area(start, end); + if (ret) + return ret; } + + return 0; }

/* @@ -950,6 +1009,7 @@ static void register_fadump(void) { unsigned long addr; void *vaddr; + int ret;

/* * If no memory is reserved then we can not register for firmware- @@ -958,7 +1018,9 @@ static void register_fadump(void) if (!fw_dump.reserve_dump_area_size) return;

- fadump_setup_crash_memory_ranges(); + ret = fadump_setup_crash_memory_ranges(); + if (ret) + return ret;

addr = be64_to_cpu(fdm.rmr_region.destination_address) + be64_to_cpu(fdm.rmr_region.source_len); /* Initialize fadump crash info header. */ @@ -1036,6 +1098,7 @@ void fadump_cleanup(void) } else if (fw_dump.dump_registered) { /* Un-register Firmware-assisted dump if it was registered. */ fadump_unregister_dump(&fdm); + free_crash_memory_ranges(); } }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Benjamin Herrenschmidt benh@kernel.crashing.org

commit db2173198b9513f7add8009f225afa1f1c79bcc6 upstream.

The generic code is racy when multiple children of a PCI bridge try to enable it simultaneously.

This leads to drivers trying to access a device through a not-yet-enabled bridge, and this EEH errors under various circumstances when using parallel driver probing.

There is work going on to fix that properly in the PCI core but it will take some time.

x86 gets away with it because (outside of hotplug), the BIOS enables all the bridges at boot time.

This patch does the same thing on powernv by enabling all bridges that have child devices at boot time, thus avoiding subsequent races. It's suitable for backporting to stable and distros, while the proper PCI fix will probably be significantly more invasive.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt benh@kernel.crashing.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci-ioda.c @@ -3124,12 +3124,49 @@ static void pnv_pci_ioda_create_dbgfs(vo #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ }

+static void pnv_pci_enable_bridge(struct pci_bus *bus) +{ + struct pci_dev *dev = bus->self; + struct pci_bus *child; + + /* Empty bus ? bail */ + if (list_empty(&bus->devices)) + return; + + /* + * If there's a bridge associated with that bus enable it. This works + * around races in the generic code if the enabling is done during + * parallel probing. This can be removed once those races have been + * fixed. + */ + if (dev) { + int rc = pci_enable_device(dev); + if (rc) + pci_err(dev, "Error enabling bridge (%d)\n", rc); + pci_set_master(dev); + } + + /* Perform the same to child busses */ + list_for_each_entry(child, &bus->children, node) + pnv_pci_enable_bridge(child); +} + +static void pnv_pci_enable_bridges(void) +{ + struct pci_controller *hose; + + list_for_each_entry(hose, &hose_list, list_node) + pnv_pci_enable_bridge(hose->bus); +} + static void pnv_pci_ioda_fixup(void) { pnv_pci_ioda_setup_PEs(); pnv_pci_ioda_setup_iommu_api(); pnv_pci_ioda_create_dbgfs();

+ pnv_pci_enable_bridges(); + #ifdef CONFIG_EEH eeh_init(); eeh_addr_cache_build();

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bart Van Assche bart.vanassche@wdc.com

commit 995250959d22fc341b5424e3343b0ce5df672461 upstream.

Avoid that KASAN reports the following:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in srpt_close_ch+0x4f/0x1b0 [ib_srpt] Read of size 4 at addr ffff880151180cb8 by task check/4681

CPU: 15 PID: 4681 Comm: check Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2-dbg+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa4/0xf5 print_address_description+0x6f/0x270 kasan_report+0x241/0x360 __asan_load4+0x78/0x80 srpt_close_ch+0x4f/0x1b0 [ib_srpt] srpt_set_enabled+0xf7/0x1e0 [ib_srpt] srpt_tpg_enable_store+0xb8/0x120 [ib_srpt] configfs_write_file+0x14e/0x1d0 [configfs] __vfs_write+0xd2/0x3b0 vfs_write+0x101/0x270 ksys_write+0xab/0x120 __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: aaf45bd83eba ("IB/srpt: Detect session shutdown reliably") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche bart.vanassche@wdc.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe jgg@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c @@ -1701,8 +1701,7 @@ static bool srpt_close_ch(struct srpt_rd int ret;

if (!srpt_set_ch_state(ch, CH_DRAINING)) { - pr_debug("%s-%d: already closed\n", ch->sess_name, - ch->qp->qp_num); + pr_debug("%s: already closed\n", ch->sess_name); return false; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: piaojun piaojun@huawei.com

commit 3111784bee81591ea2815011688d28b65df03627 upstream.

In my testing, v9fs_fid_xattr_set will return successfully even if the backend ext4 filesystem has no space to store xattr key-value. That will cause inconsistent behavior between front end and back end. The reason is that lsetxattr will be triggered by p9_client_clunk, and unfortunately we did not catch the error. This patch will catch the error to notify upper caller.

p9_client_clunk (in 9p) p9_client_rpc(clnt, P9_TCLUNK, "d", fid->fid); v9fs_clunk (in qemu) put_fid free_fid v9fs_xattr_fid_clunk v9fs_co_lsetxattr s->ops->lsetxattr ext4_xattr_user_set (in host ext4 filesystem)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5B57EACC.2060900@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jun Piao piaojun@huawei.com Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen ericvh@gmail.com Cc: Ron Minnich rminnich@sandia.gov Cc: Latchesar Ionkov lucho@ionkov.net Cc: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet dominique.martinet@cea.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/9p/xattr.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/9p/xattr.c +++ b/fs/9p/xattr.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int v9fs_fid_xattr_set(struct p9_fid *fi { struct kvec kvec = {.iov_base = (void *)value, .iov_len = value_len}; struct iov_iter from; - int retval; + int retval, err;

iov_iter_kvec(&from, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, &kvec, 1, value_len);

@@ -126,7 +126,9 @@ int v9fs_fid_xattr_set(struct p9_fid *fi retval); else p9_client_write(fid, 0, &from, &retval); - p9_client_clunk(fid); + err = p9_client_clunk(fid); + if (!retval && err) + retval = err; return retval; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tomas Bortoli tomasbortoli@gmail.com

commit 7913690dcc5e18e235769fd87c34143072f5dbea upstream.

The p9_client_version() does not initialize the version pointer. If the call to p9pdu_readf() returns an error and version has not been allocated in p9pdu_readf(), then the program will jump to the "error" label and will try to free the version pointer. If version is not initialized, free() will be called with uninitialized, garbage data and will provoke a crash.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180709222943.19503-1-tomasbortoli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tomas Bortoli tomasbortoli@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+65c6b72f284a39d416b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Jun Piao piaojun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yiwen Jiang jiangyiwen@huawei.com Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen ericvh@gmail.com Cc: Ron Minnich rminnich@sandia.gov Cc: Latchesar Ionkov lucho@ionkov.net Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet dominique.martinet@cea.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/9p/client.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/9p/client.c +++ b/net/9p/client.c @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static int p9_client_version(struct p9_c { int err = 0; struct p9_req_t *req; - char *version; + char *version = NULL; int msize;

p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_9P, ">>> TVERSION msize %d protocol %d\n",

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hou Tao houtao1@huawei.com

commit 75294442d896f2767be34f75aca7cc2b0d01301f upstream.

Now both check_for_space() and do_no_space_timeout() will read & write pool->pf.error_if_no_space. If these functions run concurrently, as shown in the following case, the default setting of "queue_if_no_space" can get lost.

precondition: * error_if_no_space = false (aka "queue_if_no_space") * pool is in Out-of-Data-Space (OODS) mode * no_space_timeout worker has been queued

CPU 0: CPU 1: // delete a thin device process_delete_mesg() // check_for_space() invoked by commit() set_pool_mode(pool, PM_WRITE) pool->pf.error_if_no_space = \ pt->requested_pf.error_if_no_space

// timeout, pool is still in OODS mode do_no_space_timeout // "queue_if_no_space" config is lost pool->pf.error_if_no_space = true pool->pf.mode = new_mode

Fix it by stopping no_space_timeout worker when switching to write mode.

Fixes: bcc696fac11f ("dm thin: stay in out-of-data-space mode once no_space_timeout expires") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hou Tao houtao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer snitzer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c @@ -2518,6 +2518,8 @@ static void set_pool_mode(struct pool *p case PM_WRITE: if (old_mode != new_mode) notify_of_pool_mode_change(pool, "write"); + if (old_mode == PM_OUT_OF_DATA_SPACE) + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&pool->no_space_timeout); pool->out_of_data_space = false; pool->pf.error_if_no_space = pt->requested_pf.error_if_no_space; dm_pool_metadata_read_write(pool->pmd);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lars-Peter Clausen lars@metafoo.de

commit 5a4e33c1c53ae7d4425f7d94e60e4458a37b349e upstream.

Fix the displayed phase for the ad9523 driver. Currently the most significant decimal place is dropped and all other digits are shifted one to the left. This is due to a multiplication by 10, which is not necessary, so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen lars@metafoo.de Signed-off-by: Alexandru Ardelean alexandru.ardelean@analog.com Fixes: cd1678f9632 ("iio: frequency: New driver for AD9523 SPI Low Jitter Clock Generator") Cc: Stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/iio/frequency/ad9523.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/iio/frequency/ad9523.c +++ b/drivers/iio/frequency/ad9523.c @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ static int ad9523_read_raw(struct iio_de code = (AD9523_CLK_DIST_DIV_PHASE_REV(ret) * 3141592) / AD9523_CLK_DIST_DIV_REV(ret); *val = code / 1000000; - *val2 = (code % 1000000) * 10; + *val2 = code % 1000000; return IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_MICRO; default: return -EINVAL;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nadav Amit namit@vmware.com

commit 09755690c6b7c1eabdc4651eb3b276f8feb1e447 upstream.

When balloon batching is not supported by the hypervisor, the guest frame number (GFN) must fit in 32-bit. However, due to a bug, this check was mistakenly ignored. In practice, when total RAM is greater than 16TB, the balloon does not work currently, making this bug unlikely to happen.

Fixes: ef0f8f112984 ("VMware balloon: partially inline vmballoon_reserve_page.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Xavier Deguillard xdeguillard@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int vmballoon_send_lock_page(stru

pfn32 = (u32)pfn; if (pfn32 != pfn) - return -1; + return -EINVAL;

STATS_INC(b->stats.lock[false]);

@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int vmballoon_send_lock_page(stru

pr_debug("%s - ppn %lx, hv returns %ld\n", __func__, pfn, status); STATS_INC(b->stats.lock_fail[false]); - return 1; + return -EIO; }

static int vmballoon_send_batched_lock(struct vmballoon *b, @@ -597,11 +597,12 @@ static int vmballoon_lock_page(struct vm

locked = vmballoon_send_lock_page(b, page_to_pfn(page), &hv_status, target); - if (locked > 0) { + if (locked) { STATS_INC(b->stats.refused_alloc[false]);

- if (hv_status == VMW_BALLOON_ERROR_RESET || - hv_status == VMW_BALLOON_ERROR_PPN_NOTNEEDED) { + if (locked == -EIO && + (hv_status == VMW_BALLOON_ERROR_RESET || + hv_status == VMW_BALLOON_ERROR_PPN_NOTNEEDED)) { vmballoon_free_page(page, false); return -EIO; } @@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int vmballoon_lock_page(struct vm } else { vmballoon_free_page(page, false); } - return -EIO; + return locked; }

/* track allocated page */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nadav Amit namit@vmware.com

commit ce664331b2487a5d244a51cbdd8cb54f866fbe5d upstream.

When vmballoon_vmci_init() sets a doorbell using VMCI_DOORBELL_SET, for some reason it does not consider the status and looks at the result. However, the hypervisor does not update the result - it updates the status. This might cause VMCI doorbell not to be enabled, resulting in degraded performance.

Fixes: 48e3d668b790 ("VMware balloon: Enable notification via VMCI") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Xavier Deguillard xdeguillard@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit namit@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_balloon.c @@ -1036,29 +1036,30 @@ static void vmballoon_vmci_cleanup(struc */ static int vmballoon_vmci_init(struct vmballoon *b) { - int error = 0; + unsigned long error, dummy;

- if ((b->capabilities & VMW_BALLOON_SIGNALLED_WAKEUP_CMD) != 0) { - error = vmci_doorbell_create(&b->vmci_doorbell, - VMCI_FLAG_DELAYED_CB, - VMCI_PRIVILEGE_FLAG_RESTRICTED, - vmballoon_doorbell, b); - - if (error == VMCI_SUCCESS) { - VMWARE_BALLOON_CMD(VMCI_DOORBELL_SET, - b->vmci_doorbell.context, - b->vmci_doorbell.resource, error); - STATS_INC(b->stats.doorbell_set); - } - } + if ((b->capabilities & VMW_BALLOON_SIGNALLED_WAKEUP_CMD) == 0) + return 0;

- if (error != 0) { - vmballoon_vmci_cleanup(b); + error = vmci_doorbell_create(&b->vmci_doorbell, VMCI_FLAG_DELAYED_CB, + VMCI_PRIVILEGE_FLAG_RESTRICTED, + vmballoon_doorbell, b);

- return -EIO; - } + if (error != VMCI_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + error = VMWARE_BALLOON_CMD(VMCI_DOORBELL_SET, b->vmci_doorbell.context, + b->vmci_doorbell.resource, dummy); + + STATS_INC(b->stats.doorbell_set); + + if (error != VMW_BALLOON_SUCCESS) + goto fail;

return 0; +fail: + vmballoon_vmci_cleanup(b); + return -EIO; }

/*

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org

commit 5c8b84f410b3819d14cb1ebf32e4b3714b5a6e0b upstream.

Do not set the system power-off callback and omap power-off rtc pointer until we're done setting up our device to avoid leaving stale pointers around after a late probe error.

Fixes: 97ea1906b3c2 ("rtc: omap: Support ext_wakeup configuration") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9 Cc: Marcin Niestroj m.niestroj@grinn-global.com Cc: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Acked-by: Tony Lindgren tony@atomide.com Reviewed-by: Marcin Niestroj m.niestroj@grinn-global.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/rtc/rtc-omap.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-omap.c +++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-omap.c @@ -817,13 +817,6 @@ static int omap_rtc_probe(struct platfor goto err; }

- if (rtc->is_pmic_controller) { - if (!pm_power_off) { - omap_rtc_power_off_rtc = rtc; - pm_power_off = omap_rtc_power_off; - } - } - /* Support ext_wakeup pinconf */ rtc_pinctrl_desc.name = dev_name(&pdev->dev);

@@ -833,6 +826,13 @@ static int omap_rtc_probe(struct platfor return PTR_ERR(rtc->pctldev); }

+ if (rtc->is_pmic_controller) { + if (!pm_power_off) { + omap_rtc_power_off_rtc = rtc; + pm_power_off = omap_rtc_power_off; + } + } + return 0;

err:

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org

commit 757d9140072054528b13bbe291583d9823cde195 upstream.

Masami Hiramatsu reported:

Current trace-enable attribute in sysfs returns an error if user writes the same setting value as current one, e.g.

# cat /sys/block/sda/trace/enable 0 # echo 0 > /sys/block/sda/trace/enable bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument # echo 1 > /sys/block/sda/trace/enable # echo 1 > /sys/block/sda/trace/enable bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy

But this is not a preferred behavior, it should ignore if new setting is same as current one. This fixes the problem as below.

# cat /sys/block/sda/trace/enable 0 # echo 0 > /sys/block/sda/trace/enable # echo 1 > /sys/block/sda/trace/enable # echo 1 > /sys/block/sda/trace/enable

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180816103802.08678002@gandalf.local.home

Cc: Ingo Molnar mingo@redhat.com Cc: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: cd649b8bb830d ("blktrace: remove sysfs_blk_trace_enable_show/store()") Reported-by: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/trace/blktrace.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c @@ -1720,6 +1720,10 @@ static ssize_t sysfs_blk_trace_attr_stor mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);

if (attr == &dev_attr_enable) { + if (!!value == !!q->blk_trace) { + ret = 0; + goto out_unlock_bdev; + } if (value) ret = blk_trace_setup_queue(q, bdev); else

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rafael David Tinoco rafael.tinoco@linaro.org

commit 6afebb70ee7a4bde106dc1a875e7ac7997248f84 upstream.

Fixes https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3903

LTP Functional tests have caused a bad paging request when triggering the regmap_read_debugfs() logic of the device PMIC Hi6553 (reading regmap/f8000000.pmic/registers file during read_all test):

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0 [ffff00000984e000] pgd=0000000077ffe803, pud=0000000077ffd803,0 Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP ... Hardware name: HiKey Development Board (DT) ... Call trace: regmap_mmio_read8+0x24/0x40 regmap_mmio_read+0x48/0x70 _regmap_bus_reg_read+0x38/0x48 _regmap_read+0x68/0x170 regmap_read+0x50/0x78 regmap_read_debugfs+0x1a0/0x308 regmap_map_read_file+0x48/0x58 full_proxy_read+0x68/0x98 __vfs_read+0x48/0x80 vfs_read+0x94/0x150 SyS_read+0x6c/0xd8 el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 Code: aa1e03e0 d503201f f9400280 8b334000 (39400000)

Investigations have showed that, when triggered by debugfs read() handler, the mmio regmap logic was reading a bigger (16k) register area than the one mapped by devm_ioremap_resource() during hi655x-pmic probe time (4k).

This commit changes hi655x's max register, according to HW specs, to be the same as the one declared in the pmic device in hi6220's dts, fixing the issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v4.9 #v4.14 #v4.16 #v4.17 Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco rafael.tinoco@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones lee.jones@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/mfd/hi655x-pmic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mfd/hi655x-pmic.c +++ b/drivers/mfd/hi655x-pmic.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static struct regmap_config hi655x_regma .reg_bits = 32, .reg_stride = HI655X_STRIDE, .val_bits = 8, - .max_register = HI655X_BUS_ADDR(0xFFF), + .max_register = HI655X_BUS_ADDR(0x400) - HI655X_STRIDE, };

static struct resource pwrkey_resources[] = {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: zhangyi (F) yi.zhang@huawei.com

commit 3df6f61fff49632492490fb6e42646b803a9958a upstream.

Commit ea0212f40c6 (power: auto select CONFIG_SRCU) made the code in drivers/base/power/wakeup.c use SRCU instead of RCU, but it forgot to select CONFIG_SRCU in Kconfig, which leads to the following build error if CONFIG_SRCU is not selected somewhere else:

drivers/built-in.o: In function `wakeup_source_remove': (.text+0x3c6fc): undefined reference to `synchronize_srcu' drivers/built-in.o: In function `pm_print_active_wakeup_sources': (.text+0x3c7a8): undefined reference to `__srcu_read_lock' drivers/built-in.o: In function `pm_print_active_wakeup_sources': (.text+0x3c84c): undefined reference to `__srcu_read_unlock' drivers/built-in.o: In function `device_wakeup_arm_wake_irqs': (.text+0x3d1d8): undefined reference to `__srcu_read_lock' drivers/built-in.o: In function `device_wakeup_arm_wake_irqs': (.text+0x3d228): undefined reference to `__srcu_read_unlock' drivers/built-in.o: In function `device_wakeup_disarm_wake_irqs': (.text+0x3d24c): undefined reference to `__srcu_read_lock' drivers/built-in.o: In function `device_wakeup_disarm_wake_irqs': (.text+0x3d29c): undefined reference to `__srcu_read_unlock' drivers/built-in.o:(.data+0x4158): undefined reference to `process_srcu'

Fix this error by selecting CONFIG_SRCU when PM_SLEEP is enabled.

Fixes: ea0212f40c6 (power: auto select CONFIG_SRCU) Cc: 4.2+ stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+ Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) yi.zhang@huawei.com [ rjw: Minor subject/changelog fixups ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/power/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ config PM_SLEEP def_bool y depends on SUSPEND || HIBERNATE_CALLBACKS select PM + select SRCU

config PM_SLEEP_SMP def_bool y

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Max Filippov jcmvbkbc@gmail.com

commit be75de25251f7cf3e399ca1f584716a95510d24a upstream.

When building kernel for xtensa cores with big cache lines (e.g. 128 bytes or more) __loop_cache_all and __loop_cache_page may generate assembly instructions with immediate fields that are too big. This results in the following build errors:

arch/xtensa/mm/misc.S: Assembler messages: arch/xtensa/mm/misc.S:464: Error: operand 2 of 'diwbi' has invalid value '256' arch/xtensa/mm/misc.S:464: Error: operand 2 of 'diwbi' has invalid value '384' arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S: Assembler messages: arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S:172: Error: operand 2 of 'diu' has invalid value '256' arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S:172: Error: operand 2 of 'diu' has invalid value '384' arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S:176: Error: operand 2 of 'iiu' has invalid value '256' arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S:176: Error: operand 2 of 'iiu' has invalid value '384' arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S:255: Error: operand 2 of 'diwb' has invalid value '256' arch/xtensa/kernel/head.S:255: Error: operand 2 of 'diwb' has invalid value '384'

Add parameter max_immed to these macros and use it to limit values of immediate operands. Extract common code of these macros into the new macro __loop_cache_unroll.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Filippov jcmvbkbc@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/xtensa/include/asm/cacheasm.h | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/cacheasm.h +++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/cacheasm.h @@ -31,16 +31,32 @@ * */

- .macro __loop_cache_all ar at insn size line_width

- movi \ar, 0 + .macro __loop_cache_unroll ar at insn size line_width max_immed + + .if (1 << (\line_width)) > (\max_immed) + .set _reps, 1 + .elseif (2 << (\line_width)) > (\max_immed) + .set _reps, 2 + .else + .set _reps, 4 + .endif + + __loopi \ar, \at, \size, (_reps << (\line_width)) + .set _index, 0 + .rep _reps + \insn \ar, _index << (\line_width) + .set _index, _index + 1 + .endr + __endla \ar, \at, _reps << (\line_width) + + .endm +

- __loopi \ar, \at, \size, (4 << (\line_width)) - \insn \ar, 0 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 1 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 2 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 3 << (\line_width) - __endla \ar, \at, 4 << (\line_width) + .macro __loop_cache_all ar at insn size line_width max_immed + + movi \ar, 0 + __loop_cache_unroll \ar, \at, \insn, \size, \line_width, \max_immed

.endm

@@ -57,14 +73,9 @@ .endm

- .macro __loop_cache_page ar at insn line_width + .macro __loop_cache_page ar at insn line_width max_immed

- __loopi \ar, \at, PAGE_SIZE, 4 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 0 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 1 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 2 << (\line_width) - \insn \ar, 3 << (\line_width) - __endla \ar, \at, 4 << (\line_width) + __loop_cache_unroll \ar, \at, \insn, PAGE_SIZE, \line_width, \max_immed

.endm

@@ -72,7 +83,8 @@ .macro ___unlock_dcache_all ar at

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_LINE_LOCKABLE && XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_all \ar \at diu XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_all \ar \at diu XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE \ + XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 240 #endif

.endm @@ -81,7 +93,8 @@ .macro ___unlock_icache_all ar at

#if XCHAL_ICACHE_LINE_LOCKABLE && XCHAL_ICACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_all \ar \at iiu XCHAL_ICACHE_SIZE XCHAL_ICACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_all \ar \at iiu XCHAL_ICACHE_SIZE \ + XCHAL_ICACHE_LINEWIDTH 240 #endif

.endm @@ -90,7 +103,8 @@ .macro ___flush_invalidate_dcache_all ar at

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_all \ar \at diwbi XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_all \ar \at diwbi XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE \ + XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 240 #endif

.endm @@ -99,7 +113,8 @@ .macro ___flush_dcache_all ar at

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_all \ar \at diwb XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_all \ar \at diwb XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE \ + XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 240 #endif

.endm @@ -109,7 +124,7 @@

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE __loop_cache_all \ar \at dii __stringify(DCACHE_WAY_SIZE) \ - XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 1020 #endif

.endm @@ -119,7 +134,7 @@

#if XCHAL_ICACHE_SIZE __loop_cache_all \ar \at iii __stringify(ICACHE_WAY_SIZE) \ - XCHAL_ICACHE_LINEWIDTH + XCHAL_ICACHE_LINEWIDTH 1020 #endif

.endm @@ -166,7 +181,7 @@ .macro ___flush_invalidate_dcache_page ar as

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_page \ar \as dhwbi XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_page \ar \as dhwbi XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 1020 #endif

.endm @@ -175,7 +190,7 @@ .macro ___flush_dcache_page ar as

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_page \ar \as dhwb XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_page \ar \as dhwb XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 1020 #endif

.endm @@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ .macro ___invalidate_dcache_page ar as

#if XCHAL_DCACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_page \ar \as dhi XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_page \ar \as dhi XCHAL_DCACHE_LINEWIDTH 1020 #endif

.endm @@ -193,7 +208,7 @@ .macro ___invalidate_icache_page ar as

#if XCHAL_ICACHE_SIZE - __loop_cache_page \ar \as ihi XCHAL_ICACHE_LINEWIDTH + __loop_cache_page \ar \as ihi XCHAL_ICACHE_LINEWIDTH 1020 #endif

.endm

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

commit 0914bb965e38a055e9245637aed117efbe976e91 upstream.

"dev->nr_children" is the number of children which were parsed successfully in bl_parse_stripe(). It could be all of them and then, in that case, it is equal to v->stripe.volumes_count. Either way, the > should be >= so that we don't go beyond the end of what we're supposed to.

Fixes: 5c83746a0cf2 ("pnfs/blocklayout: in-kernel GETDEVICEINFO XDR parsing") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+ Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/nfs/blocklayout/dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/blocklayout/dev.c +++ b/fs/nfs/blocklayout/dev.c @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static bool bl_map_stripe(struct pnfs_bl chunk = div_u64(offset, dev->chunk_size); div_u64_rem(chunk, dev->nr_children, &chunk_idx);

- if (chunk_idx > dev->nr_children) { + if (chunk_idx >= dev->nr_children) { dprintk("%s: invalid chunk idx %d (%lld/%lld)\n", __func__, chunk_idx, offset, dev->chunk_size); /* error, should not happen */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jon Hunter jonathanh@nvidia.com

commit 6e1811900b6fe6f2b4665dba6bd6ed32c6b98575 upstream.

On all versions of Tegra30 Cardhu, the reset signal to the NXP PCA9546 I2C mux is connected to the Tegra GPIO BB0. Currently, this pin on the Tegra is not configured as a GPIO but as a special-function IO (SFIO) that is multiplexing the pin to an I2S controller. On exiting system suspend, I2C commands sent to the PCA9546 are failing because there is no ACK. Although it is not possible to see exactly what is happening to the reset during suspend, by ensuring it is configured as a GPIO and driven high, to de-assert the reset, the failures are no longer seen.

Please note that this GPIO is also used to drive the reset signal going to the camera connector on the board. However, given that there is no camera support currently for Cardhu, this should not have any impact.

Fixes: 40431d16ff11 ("ARM: tegra: enable PCA9546 on Cardhu") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter jonathanh@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding treding@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra30-cardhu.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra30-cardhu.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/tegra30-cardhu.dtsi @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ #address-cells = <1>; #size-cells = <0>; reg = <0x70>; + reset-gpio = <&gpio TEGRA_GPIO(BB, 0) GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; }; };

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yannik Sembritzki yannik@sembritzki.me

commit ea93102f32244e3f45c8b26260be77ed0cc1d16c upstream.

The split of .system_keyring into .builtin_trusted_keys and .secondary_trusted_keys broke kexec, thereby preventing kernels signed by keys which are now in the secondary keyring from being kexec'd.

Fix this by passing VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING to verify_pefile_signature().

Fixes: d3bfe84129f6 ("certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically") Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki yannik@sembritzki.me Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loade static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) { return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - NULL, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); } #endif

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jacob Pan jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com

commit 0f725561e168485eff7277d683405c05b192f537 upstream.

When SRIOV VF device IOTLB is invalidated, we need to provide the PF source ID such that IOMMU hardware can gauge the depth of invalidation queue which is shared among VFs. This is needed when device invalidation throttle (DIT) capability is supported.

This patch adds bit definitions for checking and tracking PFSID.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Ashok Raj" ashok.raj@intel.com Cc: "Lu Baolu" baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 1 + include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c @@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ struct device_domain_info { struct list_head global; /* link to global list */ u8 bus; /* PCI bus number */ u8 devfn; /* PCI devfn number */ + u16 pfsid; /* SRIOV physical function source ID */ u8 pasid_supported:3; u8 pasid_enabled:1; u8 pri_supported:1; --- a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h +++ b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static inline void dmar_writeq(void __io * Extended Capability Register */

+#define ecap_dit(e) ((e >> 41) & 0x1) #define ecap_pasid(e) ((e >> 40) & 0x1) #define ecap_pss(e) ((e >> 35) & 0x1f) #define ecap_eafs(e) ((e >> 34) & 0x1) @@ -294,6 +295,7 @@ enum { #define QI_DEV_IOTLB_SID(sid) ((u64)((sid) & 0xffff) << 32) #define QI_DEV_IOTLB_QDEP(qdep) (((qdep) & 0x1f) << 16) #define QI_DEV_IOTLB_ADDR(addr) ((u64)(addr) & VTD_PAGE_MASK) +#define QI_DEV_IOTLB_PFSID(pfsid) (((u64)(pfsid & 0xf) << 12) | ((u64)(pfsid & 0xfff) << 52)) #define QI_DEV_IOTLB_SIZE 1 #define QI_DEV_IOTLB_MAX_INVS 32

@@ -318,6 +320,7 @@ enum { #define QI_DEV_EIOTLB_PASID(p) (((u64)p) << 32) #define QI_DEV_EIOTLB_SID(sid) ((u64)((sid) & 0xffff) << 16) #define QI_DEV_EIOTLB_QDEP(qd) ((u64)((qd) & 0x1f) << 4) +#define QI_DEV_EIOTLB_PFSID(pfsid) (((u64)(pfsid & 0xf) << 12) | ((u64)(pfsid & 0xfff) << 52)) #define QI_DEV_EIOTLB_MAX_INVS 32

#define QI_PGRP_IDX(idx) (((u64)(idx)) << 55)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk

commit 9ba3eb5103cf56f0daaf07de4507df76e7813ed7 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c | 23 +++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c @@ -561,25 +561,20 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getdtablesize) */ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen) { - unsigned len; - int i; + int len, err = 0; + char *kname;

- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen)) - return -EFAULT; - - len = namelen; - if (len > 32) - len = 32; + if (namelen > 32) + namelen = 32;

down_read(&uts_sem); - for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { - __put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i); - if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0') - break; - } + kname = utsname()->domainname; + len = strnlen(kname, namelen); + if (copy_to_user(name, kname, min(len + 1, namelen))) + err = -EFAULT; up_read(&uts_sem);

- return 0; + return err; }

/*

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn jannh@google.com

commit 5820f140edef111a9ea2ef414ab2428b8cb805b1 upstream.

The old code would hold the userns_state_mutex indefinitely if memdup_user_nul stalled due to e.g. a userfault region. Prevent that by moving the memdup_user_nul in front of the mutex_lock().

Note: This changes the error precedence of invalid buf/count/*ppos vs map already written / capabilities missing.

Fixes: 22d917d80e84 ("userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid...") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Acked-by: Christian Brauner christian@brauner.io Acked-by: Serge Hallyn serge@hallyn.com Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/user_namespace.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -649,7 +649,16 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi unsigned idx; struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL; char *kbuf = NULL, *pos, *next_line; - ssize_t ret = -EINVAL; + ssize_t ret; + + /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ + if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Slurp in the user data */ + kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(kbuf)) + return PTR_ERR(kbuf);

/* * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map. @@ -683,19 +692,6 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto out;

- /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ - ret = -EINVAL; - if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) - goto out; - - /* Slurp in the user data */ - kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(kbuf)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(kbuf); - kbuf = NULL; - goto out; - } - /* Parse the user data */ ret = -EINVAL; pos = kbuf;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at

commit 08acbdd6fd736b90f8d725da5a0de4de2dd6de62 upstream.

This reverts commit 353748a359f1821ee934afc579cf04572406b420. It bypassed the linux-mtd review process and fixes the issue not as it should.

Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Silvio Cesare silvio.cesare@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/ubifs/journal.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ubifs/journal.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/journal.c @@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ static int recomp_data_node(const struct int err, len, compr_type, out_len;

out_len = le32_to_cpu(dn->size); - buf = kmalloc_array(out_len, WORST_COMPR_FACTOR, GFP_NOFS); + buf = kmalloc(out_len * WORST_COMPR_FACTOR, GFP_NOFS); if (!buf) return -ENOMEM;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at

commit 59965593205fa4044850d35ee3557cf0b7edcd14 upstream.

In ubifs_jnl_update() we sync parent and child inodes to the flash, in case of xattrs, the parent inode (AKA host inode) has a non-zero data_len. Therefore we need to adjust synced_i_size too.

This issue was reported by ubifs self tests unter a xattr related work load. UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 1896): dbg_check_synced_i_size: ui_size is 4, synced_i_size is 0, but inode is clean UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 1896): dbg_check_synced_i_size: i_ino 65, i_mode 0x81a4, i_size 4

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1e51764a3c2a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system") Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/ubifs/journal.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ubifs/journal.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/journal.c @@ -661,6 +661,11 @@ int ubifs_jnl_update(struct ubifs_info * spin_lock(&ui->ui_lock); ui->synced_i_size = ui->ui_size; spin_unlock(&ui->ui_lock); + if (xent) { + spin_lock(&host_ui->ui_lock); + host_ui->synced_i_size = host_ui->ui_size; + spin_unlock(&host_ui->ui_lock); + } mark_inode_clean(c, ui); mark_inode_clean(c, host_ui); return 0;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com

commit 8c5b044299951acd91e830a688dd920477ea1eda upstream.

I have a USB display adapter using the udlfb driver and I use it on an ARM board that doesn't have any graphics card. When I plug the adapter in, the console is properly displayed, however when I unplug and re-plug the adapter, the console is not displayed and I can't access it until I reboot the board.

The reason is this: When the adapter is unplugged, dlfb_usb_disconnect calls unlink_framebuffer, then it waits until the reference count drops to zero and then it deallocates the framebuffer. However, the console that is attached to the framebuffer device keeps the reference count non-zero, so the framebuffer device is never destroyed. When the USB adapter is plugged again, it creates a new device /dev/fb1 and the console is not attached to it.

This patch fixes the bug by unbinding the console from unlink_framebuffer. The code to unbind the console is moved from do_unregister_framebuffer to a function unbind_console. When the console is unbound, the reference count drops to zero and the udlfb driver frees the framebuffer. When the adapter is plugged back, a new framebuffer is created and the console is attached to it.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka mpatocka@redhat.com Cc: Dave Airlie airlied@redhat.com Cc: Bernie Thompson bernie@plugable.com Cc: Ladislav Michl ladis@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [b.zolnierkie: preserve old behavior for do_unregister_framebuffer()] Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz b.zolnierkie@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1695,12 +1695,12 @@ static int do_register_framebuffer(struc return 0; }

-static int do_unregister_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) +static int unbind_console(struct fb_info *fb_info) { struct fb_event event; - int i, ret = 0; + int ret; + int i = fb_info->node;

- i = fb_info->node; if (i < 0 || i >= FB_MAX || registered_fb[i] != fb_info) return -EINVAL;

@@ -1715,17 +1715,29 @@ static int do_unregister_framebuffer(str unlock_fb_info(fb_info); console_unlock();

+ return ret; +} + +static int __unlink_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info); + +static int do_unregister_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) +{ + struct fb_event event; + int ret; + + ret = unbind_console(fb_info); + if (ret) return -EINVAL;

pm_vt_switch_unregister(fb_info->dev);

- unlink_framebuffer(fb_info); + __unlink_framebuffer(fb_info); if (fb_info->pixmap.addr && (fb_info->pixmap.flags & FB_PIXMAP_DEFAULT)) kfree(fb_info->pixmap.addr); fb_destroy_modelist(&fb_info->modelist); - registered_fb[i] = NULL; + registered_fb[fb_info->node] = NULL; num_registered_fb--; fb_cleanup_device(fb_info); event.info = fb_info; @@ -1738,7 +1750,7 @@ static int do_unregister_framebuffer(str return 0; }

-int unlink_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) +static int __unlink_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) { int i;

@@ -1750,6 +1762,20 @@ int unlink_framebuffer(struct fb_info *f device_destroy(fb_class, MKDEV(FB_MAJOR, i)); fb_info->dev = NULL; } + + return 0; +} + +int unlink_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) +{ + int ret; + + ret = __unlink_framebuffer(fb_info); + if (ret) + return ret; + + unbind_console(fb_info); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(unlink_framebuffer);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner christian@brauner.io

commit 82c9a927bc5df6e06b72d206d24a9d10cced4eb5 upstream.

When running in a container with a user namespace, if you call getxattr with name = "system.posix_acl_access" and size % 8 != 4, then getxattr silently skips the user namespace fixup that it normally does resulting in un-fixed-up data being returned. This is caused by posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() being passed the total buffer size and not the actual size of the xattr as returned by vfs_getxattr(). This commit passes the actual length of the xattr as returned by vfs_getxattr() down.

A reproducer for the issue is:

touch acl_posix

setfacl -m user:0:rwx acl_posix

and the compile:

#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <attr/xattr.h>

/* Run in user namespace with nsuid 0 mapped to uid != 0 on the host. */ int main(int argc, void **argv) { ssize_t ret1, ret2; char buf1[128], buf2[132]; int fret = EXIT_SUCCESS; char *file;

if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Please specify a file with " ""system.posix_acl_access" permissions set\n"); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } file = argv[1];

ret1 = getxattr(file, "system.posix_acl_access", buf1, sizeof(buf1)); if (ret1 < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s - Failed to retrieve " ""system.posix_acl_access" " "from "%s"\n", strerror(errno), file); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

ret2 = getxattr(file, "system.posix_acl_access", buf2, sizeof(buf2)); if (ret2 < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "%s - Failed to retrieve " ""system.posix_acl_access" " "from "%s"\n", strerror(errno), file); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

if (ret1 != ret2) { fprintf(stderr, "The value of "system.posix_acl_" "access" for file "%s" changed " "between two successive calls\n", file); _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

for (ssize_t i = 0; i < ret2; i++) { if (buf1[i] == buf2[i]) continue;

fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected different in byte %zd: " "%02x != %02x\n", i, buf1[i], buf2[i]); fret = EXIT_FAILURE; }

if (fret == EXIT_SUCCESS) fprintf(stderr, "Test passed\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Test failed\n");

_exit(fret); } and run:

./tester acl_posix

On a non-fixed up kernel this should return something like:

root@c1:/# ./t Unexpected different in byte 16: ffffffa0 != 00 Unexpected different in byte 17: ffffff86 != 00 Unexpected different in byte 18: 01 != 00

and on a fixed kernel:

root@c1:~# ./t Test passed

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2f6f0654ab61 ("userns: Convert vfs posix_acl support to use kuids and kgids") Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199945 Reported-by: Colin Watson cjwatson@ubuntu.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner christian@brauner.io Acked-by: Serge Hallyn serge@hallyn.com Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/xattr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ getxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ if (error > 0) { if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) || (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0)) - posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(kvalue, size); + posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(kvalue, error); if (size && copy_to_user(value, kvalue, error)) error = -EFAULT; } else if (error == -ERANGE && size >= XATTR_SIZE_MAX) {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org

commit d1c392c9e2a301f38998a353f467f76414e38725 upstream.

I hit the following splat in my tests:

------------[ cut here ]------------ IRQs not enabled as expected WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at kernel/time/tick-sched.c:982 tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x44/0x8c Modules linked in: ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2-test+ #2 Hardware name: MSI MS-7823/CSM-H87M-G43 (MS-7823), BIOS V1.6 02/22/2014 EIP: tick_nohz_idle_enter+0x44/0x8c Code: ec 05 00 00 00 75 26 83 b8 c0 05 00 00 00 75 1d 80 3d d0 36 3e c1 00 75 14 68 94 63 12 c1 c6 05 d0 36 3e c1 01 e8 04 ee f8 ff <0f> 0b 58 fa bb a0 e5 66 c1 e8 25 0f 04 00 64 03 1d 28 31 52 c1 8b EAX: 0000001c EBX: f26e7f8c ECX: 00000006 EDX: 00000007 ESI: f26dd1c0 EDI: 00000000 EBP: f26e7f40 ESP: f26e7f38 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010296 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 0813c6b0 CR3: 2f342000 CR4: 001406f0 Call Trace: do_idle+0x33/0x202 cpu_startup_entry+0x61/0x63 start_secondary+0x18e/0x1ed startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168 irq event stamp: 18773830 hardirqs last enabled at (18773829): [<c040150c>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10 hardirqs last disabled at (18773830): [<c040151c>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0xc/0x10 softirqs last enabled at (18773824): [<c0ddaa6f>] __do_softirq+0x25f/0x2bf softirqs last disabled at (18773767): [<c0416bbe>] call_on_stack+0x45/0x4b ---[ end trace b7c64aa79e17954a ]---

After a bit of debugging, I found what was happening. This would trigger when performing "perf" with a high NMI interrupt rate, while enabling and disabling function tracer. Ftrace uses breakpoints to convert the nops at the start of functions to calls to the function trampolines. The breakpoint traps disable interrupts and this makes calls into lockdep via the trace_hardirqs_off_thunk in the entry.S code. What happens is the following:

do_idle {

[interrupts enabled]

<interrupt> [interrupts disabled] TRACE_IRQS_OFF [lockdep says irqs off] [...] TRACE_IRQS_IRET test if pt_regs say return to interrupts enabled [yes] TRACE_IRQS_ON [lockdep says irqs are on]

<nmi> nmi_enter() { printk_nmi_enter() [traced by ftrace] [ hit ftrace breakpoint ] <breakpoint exception> TRACE_IRQS_OFF [lockdep says irqs off] [...] TRACE_IRQS_IRET [return from breakpoint] test if pt_regs say interrupts enabled [no] [iret back to interrupt] [iret back to code]

tick_nohz_idle_enter() {

lockdep_assert_irqs_enabled() [lockdep say no!]

Although interrupts are indeed enabled, lockdep thinks it is not, and since we now do asserts via lockdep, it gives a false warning. The issue here is that printk_nmi_enter() is called before lockdep_off(), which disables lockdep (for this reason) in NMIs. By simply not allowing ftrace to see printk_nmi_enter() (via notrace annotation) we keep lockdep from getting confused.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42a0bb3f71383 ("printk/nmi: generic solution for safe printk in NMI") Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Acked-by: Petr Mladek pmladek@suse.com Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/printk/nmi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/printk/nmi.c +++ b/kernel/printk/nmi.c @@ -260,12 +260,12 @@ void __init printk_nmi_init(void) printk_nmi_flush(); }

-void printk_nmi_enter(void) +void notrace printk_nmi_enter(void) { this_cpu_write(printk_func, vprintk_nmi); }

-void printk_nmi_exit(void) +void notrace printk_nmi_exit(void) { this_cpu_write(printk_func, vprintk_default); }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter adrian.hunter@intel.com

commit 99cbbe56eb8bede625f410ab62ba34673ffa7d21 upstream.

When the number of queues grows beyond 32, the array of queues is resized but not all members were being copied. Fix by also copying 'tid', 'cpu' and 'set'.

Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter adrian.hunter@intel.com Cc: Jiri Olsa jolsa@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e502789302a6e ("perf auxtrace: Add helpers for queuing AUX area tracing data") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180814084608.6563-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c @@ -195,6 +195,9 @@ static int auxtrace_queues__grow(struct for (i = 0; i < queues->nr_queues; i++) { list_splice_tail(&queues->queue_array[i].head, &queue_array[i].head); + queue_array[i].tid = queues->queue_array[i].tid; + queue_array[i].cpu = queues->queue_array[i].cpu; + queue_array[i].set = queues->queue_array[i].set; queue_array[i].priv = queues->queue_array[i].priv; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeremy Cline jcline@redhat.com

commit 7b6924d94a60c6b8c1279ca003e8744e6cd9e8b1 upstream.

'type' is user-controlled, so sanitize it after the bounds check to avoid using it in speculative execution. This covers the following potential gadgets detected with the help of smatch:

* fs/ext4/super.c:5741 ext4_quota_read() warn: potential spectre issue 'sb_dqopt(sb)->files' [r] * fs/ext4/super.c:5778 ext4_quota_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'sb_dqopt(sb)->files' [r] * fs/f2fs/super.c:1552 f2fs_quota_read() warn: potential spectre issue 'sb_dqopt(sb)->files' [r] * fs/f2fs/super.c:1608 f2fs_quota_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'sb_dqopt(sb)->files' [r] * fs/quota/dquot.c:412 mark_info_dirty() warn: potential spectre issue 'sb_dqopt(sb)->info' [w] * fs/quota/dquot.c:933 dqinit_needed() warn: potential spectre issue 'dquots' [r] * fs/quota/dquot.c:2112 dquot_commit_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dqopt->ops' [r] * fs/quota/dquot.c:2362 vfs_load_quota_inode() warn: potential spectre issue 'dqopt->files' [w] (local cap) * fs/quota/dquot.c:2369 vfs_load_quota_inode() warn: potential spectre issue 'dqopt->ops' [w] (local cap) * fs/quota/dquot.c:2370 vfs_load_quota_inode() warn: potential spectre issue 'dqopt->info' [w] (local cap) * fs/quota/quota.c:110 quota_getfmt() warn: potential spectre issue 'sb_dqopt(sb)->info' [r] * fs/quota/quota_v2.c:84 v2_check_quota_file() warn: potential spectre issue 'quota_magics' [w] * fs/quota/quota_v2.c:85 v2_check_quota_file() warn: potential spectre issue 'quota_versions' [w] * fs/quota/quota_v2.c:96 v2_read_file_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dqopt->info' [r] * fs/quota/quota_v2.c:172 v2_write_file_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dqopt->info' [r]

Additionally, a quick inspection indicates there are array accesses with 'type' in quota_on() and quota_off() functions which are also addressed by this.

Cc: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline jcline@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/quota/quota.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/quota/quota.c +++ b/fs/quota/quota.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/quotaops.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/writeback.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h>

static int check_quotactl_permission(struct super_block *sb, int type, int cmd, qid_t id) @@ -706,6 +707,7 @@ static int do_quotactl(struct super_bloc

if (type >= (XQM_COMMAND(cmd) ? XQM_MAXQUOTAS : MAXQUOTAS)) return -EINVAL; + type = array_index_nospec(type, MAXQUOTAS); /* * Quota not supported on this fs? Check this before s_quota_types * since they needn't be set if quota is not supported at all.

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 2:54 PM Guenter Roeck groeck@google.com wrote:

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 2:34 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote:

...

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

Do your scripts have a bad hair day ? The subject says 4.18.

Hmm, I suspect it is the gmail UI messing with me. Sorry for the noise.

Guenter

Guenter

...

---

From: Chirantan Ekbote chirantan@chromium.org

commit d28c756caee6e414d9ba367d0b92da24145af2a8 upstream.

The zero-copy optimization when reading or writing large chunks of data is quite useful. However, the 9p messages created through the zero-copy write path have an incorrect message size: it should be the size of the header + size of the data being written but instead it's just the size of the header.

This only works if the server ignores the size field of the message and otherwise breaks the framing of the protocol. Fix this by re-writing the message size field with the correct value.

Tested by running `dd if=/dev/zero of=out bs=4k count=1` inside a virtio-9p mount.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180717003529.114368-1-chirantan@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Chirantan Ekbote chirantan@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz groug@kaod.org Tested-by: Greg Kurz groug@kaod.org Cc: Dylan Reid dgreid@chromium.org Cc: Guenter Roeck groeck@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet dominique.martinet@cea.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

---

net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/net/9p/trans_virtio.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_virtio.c @@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ p9_virtio_zc_request(struct p9_client *c p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_TRANS, "virtio request\n");

    if (uodata) {

•           __le32 sz;
            int n = p9_get_mapped_pages(chan, &out_pages, uodata,
                                        outlen, &offs, &need_drop);
            if (n < 0)
  

@@ -416,6 +417,12 @@ p9_virtio_zc_request(struct p9_client *c memcpy(&req->tc->sdata[req->tc->size - 4], &v, 4); outlen = n; }

•           /* The size field of the message must include the length of the
  

•            * header and the length of the data.  We didn't actually know
  

•            * the length of the data until this point so add it in now.
  

•            */
  

•           sz = cpu_to_le32(req->tc->size + outlen);
  

•           memcpy(&req->tc->sdata[0], &sz, sizeof(sz));
    } else if (uidata) {
            int n = p9_get_mapped_pages(chan, &in_pages, uidata,
                                        inlen, &offs, &need_drop);