4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dennis Wassenberg dennis.wassenberg@secunet.com

commit 22454b79e6de05fa61a2a72d00d2eed798abbb75 upstream.

This will clear the USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION bit in case of a hub port reset only if a device is was attached to the hub port before resetting the hub port.

Using a Lenovo T480s attached to the ultra dock it was not possible to detect some usb-c devices at the dock usb-c ports because the hub_port_reset code will clear the USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION bit after the actual hub port reset. Using this device combo the USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION bit was set between the actual hub port reset and the clear of the USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION bit. This ends up with clearing the USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION bit after the new device was attached such that it was not detected.

This patch will not clear the USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION bit if there is currently no device attached to the port before the hub port reset. This will avoid clearing the connection bit for new attached devices.

Signed-off-by: Dennis Wassenberg dennis.wassenberg@secunet.com Acked-by: Mathias Nyman mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c @@ -2809,7 +2809,9 @@ static int hub_port_reset(struct usb_hub USB_PORT_FEAT_C_BH_PORT_RESET); usb_clear_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1, USB_PORT_FEAT_C_PORT_LINK_STATE); - usb_clear_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1, + + if (udev) + usb_clear_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1, USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION);

/*

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aaron Ma aaron.ma@canonical.com

commit a5baeaeabcca3244782a9b6382ebab6f8a58f583 upstream.

This definition is used by msecs_to_jiffies in milliseconds. According to the comments, max rexit timeout should be 20ms. Align with the comments to properly calculate the delay.

Verified on Sunrise Point-LP and Cannon Lake.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma aaron.ma@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c | 4 ++-- drivers/usb/host/xhci.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static u32 xhci_get_port_status(struct u time_left = wait_for_completion_timeout( &bus_state->rexit_done[wIndex], msecs_to_jiffies( - XHCI_MAX_REXIT_TIMEOUT)); + XHCI_MAX_REXIT_TIMEOUT_MS)); spin_lock_irqsave(&xhci->lock, flags);

if (time_left) { @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static u32 xhci_get_port_status(struct u } else { int port_status = readl(port_array[wIndex]); xhci_warn(xhci, "Port resume took longer than %i msec, port status = 0x%x\n", - XHCI_MAX_REXIT_TIMEOUT, + XHCI_MAX_REXIT_TIMEOUT_MS, port_status); status |= USB_PORT_STAT_SUSPEND; clear_bit(wIndex, &bus_state->rexit_ports); --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h @@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ struct xhci_bus_state { * It can take up to 20 ms to transition from RExit to U0 on the * Intel Lynx Point LP xHCI host. */ -#define XHCI_MAX_REXIT_TIMEOUT (20 * 1000) +#define XHCI_MAX_REXIT_TIMEOUT_MS 20

static inline unsigned int hcd_index(struct usb_hcd *hcd) {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Zapolskiy vz@mleia.com

commit a05a14049999598a3bb6fab12db6b768a0215522 upstream.

The change corrects the error path in gpiochip_add_data_with_key() by avoiding to call ida_simple_remove(), if ida_simple_get() returns an error.

Note that ida_simple_remove()/ida_free() throws a BUG(), if id argument is negative, it allows to easily check the correctness of the fix by fuzzing the return value from ida_simple_get().

Fixes: ff2b13592299 ("gpio: make the gpiochip a real device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy vz@mleia.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ int gpiochip_add_data(struct gpio_chip * gdev->descs = kcalloc(chip->ngpio, sizeof(gdev->descs[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (!gdev->descs) { status = -ENOMEM; - goto err_free_gdev; + goto err_free_ida; }

if (chip->ngpio == 0) { @@ -1285,8 +1285,9 @@ err_free_label: kfree(gdev->label); err_free_descs: kfree(gdev->descs); -err_free_gdev: +err_free_ida: ida_simple_remove(&gpio_ida, gdev->id); +err_free_gdev: /* failures here can mean systems won't boot... */ pr_err("%s: GPIOs %d..%d (%s) failed to register\n", __func__, gdev->base, gdev->base + gdev->ngpio - 1,

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Emmanuel Grumbach emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com

commit 82715ac71e6b94a2c2136e31f3a8e6748e33aa8c upstream.

When the firmware starts, it doesn't have any regulatory information, hence it uses the world wide limitations. The driver can feed the firmware with previous knowledge that was kept in the driver, but the firmware may still not update its internal tables.

This happens when we start a BSS interface, and then the firmware can change the regulatory tables based on our location and it'll use more lenient, location specific rules. Then, if the firmware is shut down (when the interface is brought down), and then an AP interface is created, the firmware will forget the country specific rules.

The host will think that we are in a certain country that may allow channels and will try to teach the firmware about our location, but the firmware may still not allow to drop the world wide limitations and apply country specific rules because it was just re-started.

In this case, the firmware will reply with MCC_RESP_ILLEGAL to the MCC_UPDATE_CMD. In that case, iwlwifi needs to let the upper layers (cfg80211 / hostapd) know that the channel list they know about has been updated.

This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201105

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho luciano.coelho@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c | 8 ++++++-- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c @@ -327,8 +327,12 @@ struct ieee80211_regdomain *iwl_mvm_get_ goto out; }

- if (changed) - *changed = (resp->status == MCC_RESP_NEW_CHAN_PROFILE); + if (changed) { + u32 status = le32_to_cpu(resp->status); + + *changed = (status == MCC_RESP_NEW_CHAN_PROFILE || + status == MCC_RESP_ILLEGAL); + }

regd = iwl_parse_nvm_mcc_info(mvm->trans->dev, mvm->cfg, __le32_to_cpu(resp->n_channels), --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c @@ -739,9 +739,8 @@ iwl_mvm_update_mcc(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, }

IWL_DEBUG_LAR(mvm, - "MCC response status: 0x%x. new MCC: 0x%x ('%c%c') change: %d n_chans: %d\n", - status, mcc, mcc >> 8, mcc & 0xff, - !!(status == MCC_RESP_NEW_CHAN_PROFILE), n_channels); + "MCC response status: 0x%x. new MCC: 0x%x ('%c%c') n_chans: %d\n", + status, mcc, mcc >> 8, mcc & 0xff, n_channels);

exit: iwl_free_resp(&cmd);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konstantin Khlebnikov khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru

commit 9de9aa45e9bd67232e000cca42ceb134b8ae51b6 upstream.

Rename duplicate sysfs_read_file into cpupower_read_sysfs and fix linking.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru Acked-by: Thomas Renninger trenn@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) shuah@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- tools/power/cpupower/bench/Makefile | 2 +- tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpufreq.c | 2 +- tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpuidle.c | 2 +- tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpupower.c | 4 ++-- tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpupower_intern.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/power/cpupower/bench/Makefile +++ b/tools/power/cpupower/bench/Makefile @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ endif ifeq ($(strip $(STATIC)),true) LIBS = -L../ -L$(OUTPUT) -lm OBJS = $(OUTPUT)main.o $(OUTPUT)parse.o $(OUTPUT)system.o $(OUTPUT)benchmark.o \ - $(OUTPUT)../lib/cpufreq.o $(OUTPUT)../lib/sysfs.o + $(OUTPUT)../lib/cpufreq.o $(OUTPUT)../lib/cpupower.o else LIBS = -L../ -L$(OUTPUT) -lm -lcpupower OBJS = $(OUTPUT)main.o $(OUTPUT)parse.o $(OUTPUT)system.o $(OUTPUT)benchmark.o --- a/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpufreq.c +++ b/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpufreq.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static unsigned int sysfs_cpufreq_read_f

snprintf(path, sizeof(path), PATH_TO_CPU "cpu%u/cpufreq/%s", cpu, fname); - return sysfs_read_file(path, buf, buflen); + return cpupower_read_sysfs(path, buf, buflen); }

/* helper function to write a new value to a /sys file */ --- a/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpuidle.c +++ b/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpuidle.c @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static unsigned int sysfs_cpuidle_read_f

snprintf(path, sizeof(path), PATH_TO_CPU "cpuidle/%s", fname);

- return sysfs_read_file(path, buf, buflen); + return cpupower_read_sysfs(path, buf, buflen); }

--- a/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpupower.c +++ b/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpupower.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include "cpupower.h" #include "cpupower_intern.h"

-unsigned int sysfs_read_file(const char *path, char *buf, size_t buflen) +unsigned int cpupower_read_sysfs(const char *path, char *buf, size_t buflen) { int fd; ssize_t numread; @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int sysfs_topology_read_file(unsi

snprintf(path, sizeof(path), PATH_TO_CPU "cpu%u/topology/%s", cpu, fname); - if (sysfs_read_file(path, linebuf, MAX_LINE_LEN) == 0) + if (cpupower_read_sysfs(path, linebuf, MAX_LINE_LEN) == 0) return -1; *result = strtol(linebuf, &endp, 0); if (endp == linebuf || errno == ERANGE) --- a/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpupower_intern.h +++ b/tools/power/cpupower/lib/cpupower_intern.h @@ -2,4 +2,4 @@ #define MAX_LINE_LEN 4096 #define SYSFS_PATH_MAX 255

-unsigned int sysfs_read_file(const char *path, char *buf, size_t buflen); +unsigned int cpupower_read_sysfs(const char *path, char *buf, size_t buflen);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp

commit 4458bba09788e70e8fb39ad003f087cd9dfbd6ac upstream.

syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for this case.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f...

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t f if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)) return -EINVAL;

- str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags); + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!str) return -ENOMEM;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

commit df132eff463873e14e019a07f387b4d577d6d1f9 upstream.

If a transport is removed by asconf but there still are some chunks with this transport queuing on out_chunk_list, later an use-after-free issue will be caused when accessing this transport from these chunks in sctp_outq_flush().

This is an old bug, we fix it by clearing the transport of these chunks in out_chunk_list when removing a transport in sctp_assoc_rm_peer().

Reported-by: syzbot+56a40ceee5fb35932f4d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/sctp/associola.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/associola.c +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c @@ -488,8 +488,9 @@ void sctp_assoc_set_primary(struct sctp_ void sctp_assoc_rm_peer(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sctp_transport *peer) { - struct list_head *pos; - struct sctp_transport *transport; + struct sctp_transport *transport; + struct list_head *pos; + struct sctp_chunk *ch;

pr_debug("%s: association:%p addr:%pISpc\n", __func__, asoc, &peer->ipaddr.sa); @@ -547,7 +548,6 @@ void sctp_assoc_rm_peer(struct sctp_asso */ if (!list_empty(&peer->transmitted)) { struct sctp_transport *active = asoc->peer.active_path; - struct sctp_chunk *ch;

/* Reset the transport of each chunk on this list */ list_for_each_entry(ch, &peer->transmitted, @@ -569,6 +569,10 @@ void sctp_assoc_rm_peer(struct sctp_asso sctp_transport_hold(active); }

+ list_for_each_entry(ch, &asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list, list) + if (ch->transport == peer) + ch->transport = NULL; + asoc->peer.transport_count--;

sctp_transport_free(peer);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit 604d415e2bd642b7e02c80e719e0396b9d4a77a6 upstream.

syzkaller triggered a use-after-free [1], caused by a combination of skb_get() in llc_conn_state_process() and usage of sk_eat_skb()

sk_eat_skb() is assuming the skb about to be freed is only used by the current thread. TCP/DCCP stacks enforce this because current thread holds the socket lock.

llc_conn_state_process() wants to make sure skb does not disappear, and holds a reference on the skb it manipulates. But as soon as this skb is added to socket receive queue, another thread can consume it.

This means that llc must use regular skb_unlink() and kfree_skb() so that both producer and consumer can safely work on the same skb.

[1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801d1f6fba4 by task ksoftirqd/1/18

CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #295 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b6 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267 kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:272 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline] refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline] skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline] kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655 llc_sap_state_process+0x9b/0x550 net/llc/llc_sap.c:224 llc_sap_rcv+0x156/0x1f0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:297 llc_sap_handler+0x65e/0xf80 net/llc/llc_sap.c:438 llc_rcv+0x79e/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:208 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023 process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315 __do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd+0x94/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:653 smpboot_thread_fn+0x68b/0xa00 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x35a/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:413

Allocated by task 18: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x144/0x730 mm/slab.c:3644 __alloc_skb+0x119/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:193 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:995 [inline] llc_alloc_frame+0xbc/0x370 net/llc/llc_sap.c:54 llc_station_ac_send_xid_r net/llc/llc_station.c:52 [inline] llc_station_rcv+0x1dc/0x1420 net/llc/llc_station.c:111 llc_rcv+0xc32/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:220 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023 process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline] net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315 __do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292

Freed by task 16383: save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756 kfree_skbmem+0x154/0x230 net/core/skbuff.c:582 __kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:642 sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2366 [inline] llc_ui_recvmsg+0xec2/0x1610 net/llc/af_llc.c:882 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0xd0/0x110 net/socket.c:801 ___sys_recvmsg+0x2b6/0x680 net/socket.c:2278 __sys_recvmmsg+0x303/0xb90 net/socket.c:2390 do_sys_recvmmsg+0x181/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2466 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2484 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2480 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2480 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801d1f6fac0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 228 bytes inside of 232-byte region [ffff8801d1f6fac0, ffff8801d1f6fba8) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea000747dbc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d9be7680 index:0xffff8801d1f6fe80 flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab) raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0007346e88 ffffea000705b108 ffff8801d9be7680 raw: ffff8801d1f6fe80 ffff8801d1f6f0c0 000000010000000b 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801d1f6fa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8801d1f6fb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

ffff8801d1f6fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

^ ffff8801d1f6fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8801d1f6fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/llc/af_llc.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -726,7 +726,6 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); - unsigned long cpu_flags; size_t copied = 0; u32 peek_seq = 0; u32 *seq, skb_len; @@ -851,9 +850,8 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket goto copy_uaddr;

if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags); - sk_eat_skb(sk, skb); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags); + skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); + kfree_skb(skb); *seq = 0; }

@@ -874,9 +872,8 @@ copy_uaddr: llc_cmsg_rcv(msg, skb);

if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags); - sk_eat_skb(sk, skb); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, cpu_flags); + skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); + kfree_skb(skb); *seq = 0; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Y.C. Chen yc_chen@aspeedtech.com

commit 1a37bd823891568f8721989aed0615835632d81a upstream.

The value of pitches is not correct while calling mode_set. The issue we found so far on following system: - Debian8 with XFCE Desktop - Ubuntu with KDE Desktop - SUSE15 with KDE Desktop

Signed-off-by: Y.C. Chen yc_chen@aspeedtech.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Jean Delvare jdelvare@suse.de Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare jdelvare@suse.de Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie airlied@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_mode.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_mode.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_mode.c @@ -545,6 +545,7 @@ static int ast_crtc_do_set_base(struct d } ast_bo_unreserve(bo);

+ ast_set_offset_reg(crtc); ast_set_start_address_crt1(crtc, (u32)gpu_addr);

return 0;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Zimmermann tzimmermann@suse.de

commit 5478ad10e7850ce3d8b7056db05ddfa3c9ddad9a upstream.

If vesafb attaches to the AST device, it configures the framebuffer memory for uncached access by default. When ast.ko later tries to attach itself to the device, it wants to use write-combining on the framebuffer memory, but vesefb's existing configuration for uncached access takes precedence. This results in reduced performance.

Removing the framebuffer's configuration before loding the AST driver fixes the problem. Other DRM drivers already contain equivalent code.

Link: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1112963 Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann tzimmermann@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Y.C. Chen yc_chen@aspeedtech.com Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare jdelvare@suse.de Tested-by: Jean Delvare jdelvare@suse.de Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie airlied@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_drv.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/ast/ast_drv.c @@ -60,8 +60,29 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pciidl

MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pci, pciidlist);

+static void ast_kick_out_firmware_fb(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + struct apertures_struct *ap; + bool primary = false; + + ap = alloc_apertures(1); + if (!ap) + return; + + ap->ranges[0].base = pci_resource_start(pdev, 0); + ap->ranges[0].size = pci_resource_len(pdev, 0); + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 + primary = pdev->resource[PCI_ROM_RESOURCE].flags & IORESOURCE_ROM_SHADOW; +#endif + drm_fb_helper_remove_conflicting_framebuffers(ap, "astdrmfb", primary); + kfree(ap); +} + static int ast_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) { + ast_kick_out_firmware_fb(pdev); + return drm_get_pci_dev(pdev, ent, &driver); }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de

commit 200f5c49f7a2cd694436bfc6cb0662b794c96736 upstream.

This patch replaces the use of "struct can_frame::can_dlc" by "struct canfd_frame::len" to access the frame's length. As it is ensured that both structures have a compatible memory layout for this member this is no functional change. Futher, this compatibility is documented in a comment.

Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/can/dev.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/dev.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/dev.c @@ -460,11 +460,14 @@ struct sk_buff *__can_get_echo_skb(struc BUG_ON(idx >= priv->echo_skb_max);

if (priv->echo_skb[idx]) { + /* Using "struct canfd_frame::len" for the frame + * length is supported on both CAN and CANFD frames. + */ struct sk_buff *skb = priv->echo_skb[idx]; - struct can_frame *cf = (struct can_frame *)skb->data; - u8 dlc = cf->can_dlc; + struct canfd_frame *cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; + u8 len = cf->len;

- *len_ptr = dlc; + *len_ptr = len; priv->echo_skb[idx] = NULL;

return skb;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de

commit 7da11ba5c5066dadc2e96835a6233d56d7b7764a upstream.

Prior to echoing a successfully transmitted CAN frame (by calling can_get_echo_skb()), CAN drivers have to put the CAN frame (by calling can_put_echo_skb() in the transmit function). These put and get function take an index as parameter, which is used to identify the CAN frame.

A driver calling can_get_echo_skb() with a index not pointing to a skb is a BUG, so add an appropriate error message.

Cc: linux-stable stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/can/dev.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/dev.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/dev.c @@ -456,6 +456,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(can_put_echo_skb); struct sk_buff *__can_get_echo_skb(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int idx, u8 *len_ptr) { struct can_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev); + struct sk_buff *skb = priv->echo_skb[idx]; + struct canfd_frame *cf;

if (idx >= priv->echo_skb_max) { netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! Trying to access can_priv::echo_skb out of bounds (%u/max %u)\n", @@ -463,21 +465,20 @@ struct sk_buff *__can_get_echo_skb(struc return NULL; }

- if (priv->echo_skb[idx]) { - /* Using "struct canfd_frame::len" for the frame - * length is supported on both CAN and CANFD frames. - */ - struct sk_buff *skb = priv->echo_skb[idx]; - struct canfd_frame *cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; - u8 len = cf->len; - - *len_ptr = len; - priv->echo_skb[idx] = NULL; - - return skb; + if (!skb) { + netdev_err(dev, "%s: BUG! Trying to echo non existing skb: can_priv::echo_skb[%u]\n", + __func__, idx); + return NULL; }

- return NULL; + /* Using "struct canfd_frame::len" for the frame + * length is supported on both CAN and CANFD frames. + */ + cf = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data; + *len_ptr = cf->len; + priv->echo_skb[idx] = NULL; + + return skb; }

/*

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Estrin alex.estrin@intel.com

commit e6f9bc34d3779cb7b6a337afed5de8be3f0fab77 upstream.

Build with the latest patches resulted in panic: 11384.486289] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [11384.486293] IP: (null) [11384.486295] PGD 0 [11384.486295] P4D 0 [11384.486296] [11384.486299] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP ......... snip ...... [11384.486401] CPU: 0 PID: 968 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G W O 4.13.0-a-stream-20170825 #1 [11384.486402] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WT2R/S2600WT2R, BIOS SE5C610.86B.01.01.0014.121820151719 12/18/2015 [11384.486418] Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core] [11384.486419] task: ffff880850579680 task.stack: ffffc90007fec000 [11384.486420] RIP: 0010: (null) [11384.486420] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007fef970 EFLAGS: 00010206 [11384.486421] RAX: ffff88084cfe8000 RBX: ffff88084dce4000 RCX: ffffc90007fef978 [11384.486422] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88084cfe8000 [11384.486422] RBP: ffffc90007fefab0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88084dce4080 [11384.486423] R10: ffffffffa02d7f60 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88105af65a00 [11384.486423] R13: ffff88084dce4000 R14: 000000000000c000 R15: 000000000000c000 [11384.486424] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [11384.486425] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [11384.486425] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000001c09000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [11384.486426] Call Trace: [11384.486431] ? is_valid_mcast_lid.isra.21+0xfb/0x110 [ib_core] [11384.486436] ib_attach_mcast+0x6f/0xa0 [ib_core] [11384.486441] ipoib_mcast_attach+0x81/0x190 [ib_ipoib] [11384.486443] ipoib_mcast_join_complete+0x354/0xb40 [ib_ipoib] [11384.486448] mcast_work_handler+0x330/0x6c0 [ib_core] [11384.486452] join_handler+0x101/0x220 [ib_core] [11384.486455] ib_sa_mcmember_rec_callback+0x54/0x80 [ib_core] [11384.486459] recv_handler+0x3a/0x60 [ib_core] [11384.486462] ib_mad_recv_done+0x423/0x9b0 [ib_core] [11384.486466] __ib_process_cq+0x5d/0xb0 [ib_core] [11384.486469] ib_cq_poll_work+0x20/0x60 [ib_core] [11384.486472] process_one_work+0x149/0x360 [11384.486474] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0 [11384.486487] kthread+0x109/0x140 [11384.486488] ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 [11384.486489] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [11384.486490] ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 [11384.486493] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [11384.486493] Code: Bad RIP value. [11384.486493] Code: Bad RIP value. [11384.486496] RIP: (null) RSP: ffffc90007fef970 [11384.486497] CR2: 0000000000000000 [11384.486531] ---[ end trace b1acec6fb4ff6e75 ]--- [11384.532133] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [11384.536541] Kernel Offset: disabled [11384.969491] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [11384.976875] sched: Unexpected reschedule of offline CPU#1! [11384.983646] ------------[ cut here ]------------

Rdma device driver may not have implemented (*get_link_layer)() so it can not be called directly. Should use appropriate helper function.

Reviewed-by: Yuval Shaia yuval.shaia@oracle.com Fixes: 523633359224 ("IB/core: Fix the validations of a multicast LID in attach or detach operations") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.13 Reviewed-by: Dennis Dalessandro dennis.dalessandro@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alex Estrin alex.estrin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Dennis Dalessandro dennis.dalessandro@intel.com Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky leonro@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford dledford@redhat.com Cc: Mike Marciniszyn mike.marciniszyn@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c @@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ static bool is_valid_mcast_lid(struct ib */ if (!ib_query_qp(qp, &attr, IB_QP_STATE | IB_QP_PORT, &init_attr)) { if (attr.qp_state >= IB_QPS_INIT) { - if (qp->device->get_link_layer(qp->device, attr.port_num) != + if (rdma_port_get_link_layer(qp->device, attr.port_num) != IB_LINK_LAYER_INFINIBAND) return true; goto lid_check; @@ -1531,7 +1531,7 @@ static bool is_valid_mcast_lid(struct ib

/* Can't get a quick answer, iterate over all ports */ for (port = 0; port < qp->device->phys_port_cnt; port++) - if (qp->device->get_link_layer(qp->device, port) != + if (rdma_port_get_link_layer(qp->device, port) != IB_LINK_LAYER_INFINIBAND) num_eth_ports++;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathias Nyman mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com

commit 2f31a67f01a8beb22cae754c53522cb61a005750 upstream.

USB3 roothub might autosuspend before a plugged USB3 device is detected, causing USB3 device enumeration failure.

USB3 devices don't show up as connected and enabled until USB3 link trainig completes. On a fast booting platform with a slow USB3 link training the link might reach the connected enabled state just as the bus is suspending.

If this device is discovered first time by the xhci_bus_suspend() routine it will be put to U3 suspended state like the other ports which failed to suspend earlier.

The hub thread will notice the connect change and resume the bus, moving the port back to U0

This U0 -> U3 -> U0 transition right after being connected seems to be too much for some devices, causing them to first go to SS.Inactive state, and finally end up stuck in a polling state with reset asserted

Fix this by failing the bus suspend if a port has a connect change or is in a polling state in xhci_bus_suspend().

Don't do any port changes until all ports are checked, buffer all port changes and only write them in the end if suspend can proceed

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c @@ -1322,13 +1322,16 @@ int xhci_bus_suspend(struct usb_hcd *hcd __le32 __iomem **port_array; struct xhci_bus_state *bus_state; unsigned long flags; + u32 portsc_buf[USB_MAXCHILDREN]; + bool wake_enabled;

max_ports = xhci_get_ports(hcd, &port_array); bus_state = &xhci->bus_state[hcd_index(hcd)]; + wake_enabled = hcd->self.root_hub->do_remote_wakeup;

spin_lock_irqsave(&xhci->lock, flags);

- if (hcd->self.root_hub->do_remote_wakeup) { + if (wake_enabled) { if (bus_state->resuming_ports || /* USB2 */ bus_state->port_remote_wakeup) { /* USB3 */ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); @@ -1336,26 +1339,36 @@ int xhci_bus_suspend(struct usb_hcd *hcd return -EBUSY; } } - - port_index = max_ports; + /* + * Prepare ports for suspend, but don't write anything before all ports + * are checked and we know bus suspend can proceed + */ bus_state->bus_suspended = 0; + port_index = max_ports; while (port_index--) { - /* suspend the port if the port is not suspended */ u32 t1, t2; - int slot_id;

t1 = readl(port_array[port_index]); t2 = xhci_port_state_to_neutral(t1); + portsc_buf[port_index] = 0;

- if ((t1 & PORT_PE) && !(t1 & PORT_PLS_MASK)) { - xhci_dbg(xhci, "port %d not suspended\n", port_index); - slot_id = xhci_find_slot_id_by_port(hcd, xhci, - port_index + 1); - if (slot_id) { + /* Bail out if a USB3 port has a new device in link training */ + if ((t1 & PORT_PLS_MASK) == XDEV_POLLING) { + bus_state->bus_suspended = 0; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); + xhci_dbg(xhci, "Bus suspend bailout, port in polling\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } + + /* suspend ports in U0, or bail out for new connect changes */ + if ((t1 & PORT_PE) && (t1 & PORT_PLS_MASK) == XDEV_U0) { + if ((t1 & PORT_CSC) && wake_enabled) { + bus_state->bus_suspended = 0; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); - xhci_stop_device(xhci, slot_id, 1); - spin_lock_irqsave(&xhci->lock, flags); + xhci_dbg(xhci, "Bus suspend bailout, port connect change\n"); + return -EBUSY; } + xhci_dbg(xhci, "port %d not suspended\n", port_index); t2 &= ~PORT_PLS_MASK; t2 |= PORT_LINK_STROBE | XDEV_U3; set_bit(port_index, &bus_state->bus_suspended); @@ -1364,7 +1377,7 @@ int xhci_bus_suspend(struct usb_hcd *hcd * including the USB 3.0 roothub, but only if CONFIG_PM * is enabled, so also enable remote wake here. */ - if (hcd->self.root_hub->do_remote_wakeup) { + if (wake_enabled) { if (t1 & PORT_CONNECT) { t2 |= PORT_WKOC_E | PORT_WKDISC_E; t2 &= ~PORT_WKCONN_E; @@ -1377,7 +1390,26 @@ int xhci_bus_suspend(struct usb_hcd *hcd

t1 = xhci_port_state_to_neutral(t1); if (t1 != t2) - writel(t2, port_array[port_index]); + portsc_buf[port_index] = t2; + } + + /* write port settings, stopping and suspending ports if needed */ + port_index = max_ports; + while (port_index--) { + if (!portsc_buf[port_index]) + continue; + if (test_bit(port_index, &bus_state->bus_suspended)) { + int slot_id; + + slot_id = xhci_find_slot_id_by_port(hcd, xhci, + port_index + 1); + if (slot_id) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); + xhci_stop_device(xhci, slot_id, 1); + spin_lock_irqsave(&xhci->lock, flags); + } + } + writel(portsc_buf[port_index], port_array[port_index]); } hcd->state = HC_STATE_SUSPENDED; bus_state->next_statechange = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(10);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 28c5bcf74fa07c25d5bd118d1271920f51ce2a98 ]

TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH and TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE are used by <trace/define_trace.h>, so like that #include, they should be outside #ifdef protection.

They also need to be #undefed before defining, in case multiple trace headers are included by the same C file. This became the case on book3e after commit cf4a6085151a ("powerpc/mm: Add missing tracepoint for tlbie"), leading to the following build error:

CC arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.o In file included from arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:51:0: arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h:9:0: error: "TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH" redefined [-Werror] #define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . ^ In file included from arch/powerpc/kvm/../mm/mmu_decl.h:25:0, from arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c:48: ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/trace.h:224:0: note: this is the location of the previous definition #define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH asm ^ cc1: all warnings being treated as errors

Reported-by: Christian Zigotzky chzigotzky@xenosoft.de Signed-off-by: Scott Wood oss@buserror.net Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_booke.h | 9 +++++++-- arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_hv.h | 9 +++++++-- arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_pr.h | 9 +++++++-- 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h index 2e0e67ef3544..e8cedf32345a 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace.h @@ -5,8 +5,6 @@

#undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM kvm -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace

/* * Tracepoint for guest mode entry. @@ -119,4 +117,10 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_check_requests, #endif /* _TRACE_KVM_H */

/* This part must be outside protection */ +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE + +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace + #include <trace/define_trace.h> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_booke.h b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_booke.h index 7ec534d1db9f..7eadbf449a1f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_booke.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_booke.h @@ -5,8 +5,6 @@

#undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM kvm_booke -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace_booke

#define kvm_trace_symbol_exit \ {0, "CRITICAL"}, \ @@ -217,4 +215,11 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_booke_queue_irqprio, #endif

/* This part must be outside protection */ + +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE + +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace_booke + #include <trace/define_trace.h> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_hv.h b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_hv.h index fb21990c0fb4..d9a21a7bd5c9 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_hv.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_hv.h @@ -8,8 +8,6 @@

#undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM kvm_hv -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace_hv

#define kvm_trace_symbol_hcall \ {H_REMOVE, "H_REMOVE"}, \ @@ -496,4 +494,11 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvmppc_run_vcpu_exit, #endif /* _TRACE_KVM_HV_H */

/* This part must be outside protection */ + +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE + +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace_hv + #include <trace/define_trace.h> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_pr.h b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_pr.h index d44f324184fb..e8e2b9ad4ac6 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_pr.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/trace_pr.h @@ -7,8 +7,6 @@

#undef TRACE_SYSTEM #define TRACE_SYSTEM kvm_pr -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . -#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace_pr

TRACE_EVENT(kvm_book3s_reenter, TP_PROTO(int r, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu), @@ -271,4 +269,11 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_unmap_hva, #endif /* _TRACE_KVM_H */

/* This part must be outside protection */ + +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH +#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE + +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH . +#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE trace_pr + #include <trace/define_trace.h>

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 9bde0afb7a906f1dabdba37162551565740b862d ]

pcf2127_i2c_gather_write() allocates memory as local variable for i2c_master_send(), after finishing the master transfer, the allocated memory should be freed. The kmemleak is reported:

unreferenced object 0xffff80231e7dba80 (size 64): comm "hwclock", pid 27762, jiffies 4296880075 (age 356.944s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 03 00 12 03 19 02 11 13 00 80 98 18 00 00 ff ff ................ 00 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .P.............. backtrace: [<ffff000008221398>] create_object+0xf8/0x278 [<ffff000008a96264>] kmemleak_alloc+0x74/0xa0 [<ffff00000821070c>] __kmalloc+0x1ac/0x348 [<ffff0000087ed1dc>] pcf2127_i2c_gather_write+0x54/0xf8 [<ffff0000085fd9d4>] _regmap_raw_write+0x464/0x850 [<ffff0000085fe3f4>] regmap_bulk_write+0x1a4/0x348 [<ffff0000087ed32c>] pcf2127_rtc_set_time+0xac/0xe8 [<ffff0000087eaad8>] rtc_set_time+0x80/0x138 [<ffff0000087ebfb0>] rtc_dev_ioctl+0x398/0x610 [<ffff00000823f2c0>] do_vfs_ioctl+0xb0/0x848 [<ffff00000823fae4>] SyS_ioctl+0x8c/0xa8 [<ffff000008083ac0>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Xulin Sun xulin.sun@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf2127.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf2127.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf2127.c index 2bfdf638b673..8a3667e761dd 100644 --- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf2127.c +++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf2127.c @@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ static int pcf2127_i2c_gather_write(void *context, memcpy(buf + 1, val, val_size);

ret = i2c_master_send(client, buf, val_size + 1); + + kfree(buf); + if (ret != val_size + 1) return ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 43c6494fa1499912c8177e71450c0279041152a6 ]

Back in 2006 Ben added some workarounds for a misbehaviour in the Spider IO bridge used on early Cell machines, see commit 014da7ff47b5 ("[POWERPC] Cell "Spider" MMIO workarounds"). Later these were made to be generic, ie. not tied specifically to Spider.

The code stashes a token in the high bits (59-48) of virtual addresses used for IO (eg. returned from ioremap()). This works fine when using the Hash MMU, but when we're using the Radix MMU the bits used for the token overlap with some of the bits of the virtual address.

This is because the maximum virtual address is larger with Radix, up to c00fffffffffffff, and in fact we use that high part of the address range for ioremap(), see RADIX_KERN_IO_START.

As it happens the bits that are used overlap with the bits that differentiate an IO address vs a linear map address. If the resulting address lies outside the linear mapping we will crash (see below), if not we just corrupt memory.

virtio-pci 0000:00:00.0: Using 64-bit direct DMA at offset 800000000000000 Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xc000000080000014 ... CFAR: c000000000626b98 DAR: c000000080000014 DSISR: 42000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c0000000006c54fc c00000003e523378 c0000000016de600 0000000000000000 GPR04: c00c000080000014 0000000000000007 0fffffff000affff 0000000000000030 ^^^^ ... NIP [c000000000626c5c] .iowrite8+0xec/0x100 LR [c0000000006c992c] .vp_reset+0x2c/0x90 Call Trace: .pci_bus_read_config_dword+0xc4/0x120 (unreliable) .register_virtio_device+0x13c/0x1c0 .virtio_pci_probe+0x148/0x1f0 .local_pci_probe+0x68/0x140 .pci_device_probe+0x164/0x220 .really_probe+0x274/0x3b0 .driver_probe_device+0x80/0x170 .__driver_attach+0x14c/0x150 .bus_for_each_dev+0xb8/0x130 .driver_attach+0x34/0x50 .bus_add_driver+0x178/0x2f0 .driver_register+0x90/0x1a0 .__pci_register_driver+0x6c/0x90 .virtio_pci_driver_init+0x2c/0x40 .do_one_initcall+0x64/0x280 .kernel_init_freeable+0x36c/0x474 .kernel_init+0x24/0x160 .ret_from_kernel_thread+0x58/0x7c

This hasn't been a problem because CONFIG_PPC_IO_WORKAROUNDS which enables this code is usually not enabled. It is only enabled when it's selected by PPC_CELL_NATIVE which is only selected by PPC_IBM_CELL_BLADE and that in turn depends on BIG_ENDIAN. So in order to hit the bug you need to build a big endian kernel, with IBM Cell Blade support enabled, as well as Radix MMU support, and then boot that on Power9 using Radix MMU.

Still we can fix the bug, so let's do that. We simply use fewer bits for the token, taking the union of the restrictions on the address from both Hash and Radix, we end up with 8 bits we can use for the token. The only user of the token is iowa_mem_find_bus() which only supports 8 token values, so 8 bits is plenty for that.

Fixes: 566ca99af026 ("powerpc/mm/radix: Add dummy radix_enabled()") Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h | 20 +++++++------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h index f6fda8482f60..3b10f532c28e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/io.h @@ -333,19 +333,13 @@ extern void _memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *dest, const void *src, * their hooks, a bitfield is reserved for use by the platform near the * top of MMIO addresses (not PIO, those have to cope the hard way). * - * This bit field is 12 bits and is at the top of the IO virtual - * addresses PCI_IO_INDIRECT_TOKEN_MASK. + * The highest address in the kernel virtual space are: * - * The kernel virtual space is thus: + * d0003fffffffffff # with Hash MMU + * c00fffffffffffff # with Radix MMU * - * 0xD000000000000000 : vmalloc - * 0xD000080000000000 : PCI PHB IO space - * 0xD000080080000000 : ioremap - * 0xD0000fffffffffff : end of ioremap region - * - * Since the top 4 bits are reserved as the region ID, we use thus - * the next 12 bits and keep 4 bits available for the future if the - * virtual address space is ever to be extended. + * The top 4 bits are reserved as the region ID on hash, leaving us 8 bits + * that can be used for the field. * * The direct IO mapping operations will then mask off those bits * before doing the actual access, though that only happen when @@ -357,8 +351,8 @@ extern void _memcpy_toio(volatile void __iomem *dest, const void *src, */

#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_INDIRECT_MMIO -#define PCI_IO_IND_TOKEN_MASK 0x0fff000000000000ul -#define PCI_IO_IND_TOKEN_SHIFT 48 +#define PCI_IO_IND_TOKEN_SHIFT 52 +#define PCI_IO_IND_TOKEN_MASK (0xfful << PCI_IO_IND_TOKEN_SHIFT) #define PCI_FIX_ADDR(addr) \ ((PCI_IO_ADDR)(((unsigned long)(addr)) & ~PCI_IO_IND_TOKEN_MASK)) #define PCI_GET_ADDR_TOKEN(addr) \

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit 899a42f836678a595f7d2bc36a5a0c2b03d08cbc ]

Move lookup_processor_type() out of the __init section so it is callable from (eg) the secondary startup code during hotplug.

Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry julien.thierry@arm.com Signed-off-by: Russell King rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm/kernel/head-common.S | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/head-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/head-common.S index 8733012d231f..7e662bdd5cb3 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/head-common.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/head-common.S @@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ __mmap_switched_data: .long init_thread_union + THREAD_START_SP @ sp .size __mmap_switched_data, . - __mmap_switched_data

+ __FINIT + .text + /* * This provides a C-API version of __lookup_processor_type */ @@ -133,9 +136,6 @@ ENTRY(lookup_processor_type) ldmfd sp!, {r4 - r6, r9, pc} ENDPROC(lookup_processor_type)

- __FINIT - .text - /* * Read processor ID register (CP#15, CR0), and look up in the linker-built * supported processor list. Note that we can't use the absolute addresses

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit c2b94c72d93d0929f48157eef128c4f9d2e603ce ]

gcc 8.1.0 warns with:

kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c: In function ‘kallsyms_symbol_next’: kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c:239:4: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound depends on the length of the source argument [-Wstringop-overflow=] strncpy(prefix_name, name, strlen(name)+1); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c:239:31: note: length computed here

Use strscpy() with the destination buffer size, and use ellipses when displaying truncated symbols.

v2: Use strscpy()

Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava prarit@redhat.com Cc: Jonathan Toppins jtoppins@redhat.com Cc: Jason Wessel jason.wessel@windriver.com Cc: Daniel Thompson daniel.thompson@linaro.org Cc: kgdb-bugreport@lists.sourceforge.net Reviewed-by: Daniel Thompson daniel.thompson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson daniel.thompson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c | 15 +++++++++------ kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_private.h | 2 +- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c index 77777d918676..cc892a9e109d 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static char *kdb_read(char *buffer, size_t bufsize) int count; int i; int diag, dtab_count; - int key; + int key, buf_size, ret;

diag = kdbgetintenv("DTABCOUNT", &dtab_count); @@ -335,9 +335,8 @@ poll_again: else p_tmp = tmpbuffer; len = strlen(p_tmp); - count = kallsyms_symbol_complete(p_tmp, - sizeof(tmpbuffer) - - (p_tmp - tmpbuffer)); + buf_size = sizeof(tmpbuffer) - (p_tmp - tmpbuffer); + count = kallsyms_symbol_complete(p_tmp, buf_size); if (tab == 2 && count > 0) { kdb_printf("\n%d symbols are found.", count); if (count > dtab_count) { @@ -349,9 +348,13 @@ poll_again: } kdb_printf("\n"); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - if (WARN_ON(!kallsyms_symbol_next(p_tmp, i))) + ret = kallsyms_symbol_next(p_tmp, i, buf_size); + if (WARN_ON(!ret)) break; - kdb_printf("%s ", p_tmp); + if (ret != -E2BIG) + kdb_printf("%s ", p_tmp); + else + kdb_printf("%s... ", p_tmp); *(p_tmp + len) = '\0'; } if (i >= dtab_count) diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_private.h b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_private.h index 75014d7f4568..533e04e75a9c 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_private.h +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_private.h @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ typedef struct __ksymtab { unsigned long sym_start; unsigned long sym_end; } kdb_symtab_t; -extern int kallsyms_symbol_next(char *prefix_name, int flag); +extern int kallsyms_symbol_next(char *prefix_name, int flag, int buf_size); extern int kallsyms_symbol_complete(char *prefix_name, int max_len);

/* Exported Symbols for kernel loadable modules to use. */ diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c index d35cc2d3a4cc..2aed4a33521b 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_support.c @@ -221,11 +221,13 @@ int kallsyms_symbol_complete(char *prefix_name, int max_len) * Parameters: * prefix_name prefix of a symbol name to lookup * flag 0 means search from the head, 1 means continue search. + * buf_size maximum length that can be written to prefix_name + * buffer * Returns: * 1 if a symbol matches the given prefix. * 0 if no string found */ -int kallsyms_symbol_next(char *prefix_name, int flag) +int kallsyms_symbol_next(char *prefix_name, int flag, int buf_size) { int prefix_len = strlen(prefix_name); static loff_t pos; @@ -235,10 +237,8 @@ int kallsyms_symbol_next(char *prefix_name, int flag) pos = 0;

while ((name = kdb_walk_kallsyms(&pos))) { - if (strncmp(name, prefix_name, prefix_len) == 0) { - strncpy(prefix_name, name, strlen(name)+1); - return 1; - } + if (!strncmp(name, prefix_name, prefix_len)) + return strscpy(prefix_name, name, buf_size); } return 0; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 33412b8673135b18ea42beb7f5117ed0091798b6 ]

Commit:

3ea86495aef2 ("efi/arm: preserve early mapping of UEFI memory map longer for BGRT")

deferred the unmap of the early mapping of the UEFI memory map to accommodate the ACPI BGRT code, which looks up the memory type that backs the BGRT table to validate it against the requirements of the UEFI spec.

Unfortunately, this causes problems on ARM, which does not permit early mappings to persist after paging_init() is called, resulting in a WARN() splat. Since we don't support the BGRT table on ARM anway, let's revert ARM to the old behaviour, which is to take down the early mapping at the end of efi_init().

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3ea86495aef2 ("efi/arm: preserve early mapping of UEFI memory ...") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181114175544.12860-3-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c | 4 ++++ drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c index 1d1c9693ebfb..8ee91777abce 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c @@ -256,6 +256,10 @@ void __init efi_init(void) (params.mmap & ~PAGE_MASK)));

init_screen_info(); + + /* ARM does not permit early mappings to persist across paging_init() */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM)) + efi_memmap_unmap(); }

static int __init register_gop_device(void) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c index 4d788e0debfe..069c5a4479e6 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/arm-runtime.c @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static int __init arm_enable_runtime_services(void) { u64 mapsize;

- if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) || !efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)) { + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { pr_info("EFI services will not be available.\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c index 78686443cb37..3fd2b450c649 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c @@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int __init efi_memmap_init_early(struct efi_memory_map_data *data)

void __init efi_memmap_unmap(void) { + if (!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)) + return; + if (!efi.memmap.late) { unsigned long size;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 1a413646931cb14442065cfc17561e50f5b5bb44 ]

Other filesystems such as ext4, f2fs and ubifs all return ENXIO when lseek (SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE) requests a negative offset.

man 2 lseek says

: EINVAL whence is not valid. Or: the resulting file offset would be : negative, or beyond the end of a seekable device. : : ENXIO whence is SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, and the file offset is beyond : the end of the file.

Make tmpfs return ENXIO under these circumstances as well. After this, tmpfs also passes xfstests's generic/448.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: rewrite changelog] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1540434176-14349-1-git-send-email-yuyufen@huawei.co... Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu yuyufen@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: Hugh Dickins hughd@google.com Cc: William Kucharski william.kucharski@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- mm/shmem.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 4b5cca167baf..358a92be43eb 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -2414,9 +2414,7 @@ static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) inode_lock(inode); /* We're holding i_mutex so we can access i_size directly */

- if (offset < 0) - offset = -EINVAL; - else if (offset >= inode->i_size) + if (offset < 0 || offset >= inode->i_size) offset = -ENXIO; else { start = offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit 5bf59773aaf36dd62117dc83d50e1bbf9ef432da ]

Use the new of_get_compatible_child() helper to lookup the nfc child node instead of using of_find_compatible_node(), which searches the entire tree from a given start node and thus can return an unrelated (i.e. non-child) node.

This also addresses a potential use-after-free (e.g. after probe deferral) as the tree-wide helper drops a reference to its first argument (i.e. the parent node).

Fixes: e097dc624f78 ("NFC: nfcmrvl: add UART driver") Fixes: d8e018c0b321 ("NFC: nfcmrvl: update device tree bindings for Marvell NFC") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2 Cc: Vincent Cuissard cuissard@marvell.com Cc: Samuel Ortiz sameo@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/uart.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/uart.c b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/uart.c index 6c0c301611c4..1b11ded79c4f 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/uart.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/uart.c @@ -73,10 +73,9 @@ static int nfcmrvl_uart_parse_dt(struct device_node *node, struct device_node *matched_node; int ret;

- matched_node = of_find_compatible_node(node, NULL, "marvell,nfc-uart"); + matched_node = of_get_compatible_child(node, "marvell,nfc-uart"); if (!matched_node) { - matched_node = of_find_compatible_node(node, NULL, - "mrvl,nfc-uart"); + matched_node = of_get_compatible_child(node, "mrvl,nfc-uart"); if (!matched_node) return -ENODEV; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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(commit 1a381d4a0a9a0f999a13faaba22bf6b3fc80dcb9 upstream)

Linking the ARM64 defconfig kernel with LLVM lld fails with the error:

ld.lld: error: unknown argument: -p Makefile:1015: recipe for target 'vmlinux' failed

Without this flag, the ARM64 defconfig kernel successfully links with lld and boots on Dragonboard 410c.

After digging through binutils source and changelogs, it turns out that -p is only relevant to ancient binutils installations targeting 32-bit ARM. binutils accepts -p for AArch64 too, but it's always been undocumented and silently ignored. A comment in ld/emultempl/aarch64elf.em explains that it's "Only here for backwards compatibility".

Since this flag is a no-op on ARM64, we can safely drop it.

Acked-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers ndesaulniers@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann ghackmann@google.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers ndesaulniers@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/arm64/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile index 92110c2c6c59..ee94597773fa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ # # Copyright (C) 1995-2001 by Russell King

-LDFLAGS_vmlinux :=-p --no-undefined -X +LDFLAGS_vmlinux :=--no-undefined -X CPPFLAGS_vmlinux.lds = -DTEXT_OFFSET=$(TEXT_OFFSET) GZFLAGS :=-9

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit 599b8c09d974d6e4d85a8f7bc8ed7442977866a8 ]

This is the new gamepad that ships with the Xbox One S which includes Bluetooth functionality.

Signed-off-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index f397a5b6910f..4dc8befc92e4 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x045e, 0x02d1, "Microsoft X-Box One pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x045e, 0x02dd, "Microsoft X-Box One pad (Firmware 2015)", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x045e, 0x02e3, "Microsoft X-Box One Elite pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x045e, 0x02ea, "Microsoft X-Box One S pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x045e, 0x0291, "Xbox 360 Wireless Receiver (XBOX)", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360W }, { 0x045e, 0x0719, "Xbox 360 Wireless Receiver", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360W }, { 0x044f, 0x0f07, "Thrustmaster, Inc. Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX },

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit c02fc1d9e5d9f093296e43e13ec7f35f140784bd ]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Tobias dan.g.tob@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pavel Rojtberg rojtberg@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index b9f48d4e155a..8b7fc47f7ffb 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -321,19 +321,19 @@ static struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = { XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0738), /* Mad Catz FightStick TE 2 */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0e6f), /* 0x0e6f X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0e6f), /* 0x0e6f X-Box One controllers */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ + XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x12ab), /* X-Box 360 dance pads */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1430), /* RedOctane X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x146b), /* BigBen Interactive Controllers */ - XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1bad), /* Harminix Rock Band Guitar and Drums */ - XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ - XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ - XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1689), /* Razer Onza */ - XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x24c6), /* PowerA Controllers */ - XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x24c6), /* PowerA Controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1532), /* Razer Sabertooth */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x1532), /* Razer Wildcat */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x15e4), /* Numark X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x162e), /* Joytech X-Box 360 controllers */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1689), /* Razer Onza */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1bad), /* Harminix Rock Band Guitar and Drums */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x24c6), /* PowerA Controllers */ + XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x24c6), /* PowerA Controllers */ { } };

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit a8c34e27fb1ece928ec728bfe596aa6ca0b1928a ]

Replace first goto with simple returns as we really are just returning one error code.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Rojtberg rojtberg@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index b06f4b0785f7..d837900d609e 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -851,17 +851,15 @@ static int xpad_init_output(struct usb_interface *intf, struct usb_xpad *xpad)

xpad->odata = usb_alloc_coherent(xpad->udev, XPAD_PKT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL, &xpad->odata_dma); - if (!xpad->odata) { - error = -ENOMEM; - goto fail1; - } + if (!xpad->odata) + return -ENOMEM;

spin_lock_init(&xpad->odata_lock);

xpad->irq_out = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL); if (!xpad->irq_out) { error = -ENOMEM; - goto fail2; + goto err_free_coherent; }

/* Xbox One controller has in/out endpoints swapped. */ @@ -877,8 +875,9 @@ static int xpad_init_output(struct usb_interface *intf, struct usb_xpad *xpad)

return 0;

- fail2: usb_free_coherent(xpad->udev, XPAD_PKT_LEN, xpad->odata, xpad->odata_dma); - fail1: return error; +err_free_coherent: + usb_free_coherent(xpad->udev, XPAD_PKT_LEN, xpad->odata, xpad->odata_dma); + return error; }

static void xpad_stop_output(struct usb_xpad *xpad)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit 57b8443d3e5bd046a519ff714ca31c64c7f04309 ]

The Xbox One S requires an ack to its mode button report, otherwise it continuously retransmits the report. This makes the mode button appear to be stuck down after it is pressed for the first time.

Signed-off-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index dd0503562b1c..14da79ead653 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ struct usb_xpad {

static int xpad_init_input(struct usb_xpad *xpad); static void xpad_deinit_input(struct usb_xpad *xpad); +static void xpadone_ack_mode_report(struct usb_xpad *xpad, u8 seq_num);

/* * xpad_process_packet @@ -624,6 +625,14 @@ static void xpadone_process_packet(struct usb_xpad *xpad, u16 cmd, unsigned char

/* the xbox button has its own special report */ if (data[0] == 0X07) { + /* + * The Xbox One S controller requires these reports to be + * acked otherwise it continues sending them forever and + * won't report further mode button events. + */ + if (data[1] == 0x30) + xpadone_ack_mode_report(xpad, data[2]); + input_report_key(dev, BTN_MODE, data[4] & 0x01); input_sync(dev); return; @@ -956,6 +965,30 @@ static int xpad_start_xbox_one(struct usb_xpad *xpad) return retval; }

+static void xpadone_ack_mode_report(struct usb_xpad *xpad, u8 seq_num) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct xpad_output_packet *packet = + &xpad->out_packets[XPAD_OUT_CMD_IDX]; + static const u8 mode_report_ack[] = { + 0x01, 0x20, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x07, 0x20, 0x02, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&xpad->odata_lock, flags); + + packet->len = sizeof(mode_report_ack); + memcpy(packet->data, mode_report_ack, packet->len); + packet->data[2] = seq_num; + packet->pending = true; + + /* Reset the sequence so we send out the ack now */ + xpad->last_out_packet = -1; + xpad_try_sending_next_out_packet(xpad); + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xpad->odata_lock, flags); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_JOYSTICK_XPAD_FF static int xpad_play_effect(struct input_dev *dev, void *data, struct ff_effect *effect) {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 81093c9848a781b85163d06de92ef8f84528cf6a ]

There are several quirky Xbox One pads that depend on initialization packets that the Microsoft pads don't require. To deal with these, I've added a mechanism for issuing device-specific initialization packets using a VID/PID-based quirks list.

For the initial set of init quirks, I have added quirk handling from Valve's Steam Link xpad driver[0] and the 360Controller project[1] for macOS to enable some new pads to work properly.

This should enable full functionality on the following quirky pads: 0x0e6f:0x0165 - Titanfall 2 gamepad (previously fully non-functional) 0x0f0d:0x0067 - Hori Horipad (analog sticks previously non-functional) 0x24c6:0x541a - PowerA Xbox One pad (previously fully non-functional) 0x24c6:0x542a - PowerA Xbox One pad (previously fully non-functional) 0x24c6:0x543a - PowerA Xbox One pad (previously fully non-functional)

[0]: https://github.com/ValveSoftware/steamlink-sdk/blob/master/kernel/drivers/in... [1]: https://github.com/360Controller/360Controller

Signed-off-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 101 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index 153b1ee13e03..df83fdc6c0e7 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -339,6 +339,64 @@ static struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = {

MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, xpad_table);

+struct xboxone_init_packet { + u16 idVendor; + u16 idProduct; + const u8 *data; + u8 len; +}; + +#define XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(_vid, _pid, _data) \ + { \ + .idVendor = (_vid), \ + .idProduct = (_pid), \ + .data = (_data), \ + .len = ARRAY_SIZE(_data), \ + } + + +/* + * This packet is required for all Xbox One pads with 2015 + * or later firmware installed (or present from the factory). + */ +static const u8 xboxone_fw2015_init[] = { + 0x05, 0x20, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 +}; + +/* + * This packet is required for the Titanfall 2 Xbox One pads + * (0x0e6f:0x0165) to finish initialization and for Hori pads + * (0x0f0d:0x0067) to make the analog sticks work. + */ +static const u8 xboxone_hori_init[] = { + 0x01, 0x20, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20, 0x3a, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00 +}; + +/* + * A rumble packet is required for some PowerA pads to start + * sending input reports. One of those pads is (0x24c6:0x543a). + */ +static const u8 xboxone_zerorumble_init[] = { + 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 +}; + +/* + * This specifies the selection of init packets that a gamepad + * will be sent on init *and* the order in which they will be + * sent. The correct sequence number will be added when the + * packet is going to be sent. + */ +static const struct xboxone_init_packet xboxone_init_packets[] = { + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x0165, xboxone_hori_init), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0f0d, 0x0067, xboxone_hori_init), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0000, 0x0000, xboxone_fw2015_init), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x541a, xboxone_zerorumble_init), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x542a, xboxone_zerorumble_init), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x543a, xboxone_zerorumble_init), +}; + struct xpad_output_packet { u8 data[XPAD_PKT_LEN]; u8 len; @@ -375,6 +433,7 @@ struct usb_xpad {

struct xpad_output_packet out_packets[XPAD_NUM_OUT_PACKETS]; int last_out_packet; + int init_seq;

#if defined(CONFIG_JOYSTICK_XPAD_LEDS) struct xpad_led *led; @@ -749,12 +808,48 @@ exit: __func__, retval); }

+/* Callers must hold xpad->odata_lock spinlock */ +static bool xpad_prepare_next_init_packet(struct usb_xpad *xpad) +{ + const struct xboxone_init_packet *init_packet; + + if (xpad->xtype != XTYPE_XBOXONE) + return false; + + /* Perform initialization sequence for Xbox One pads that require it */ + while (xpad->init_seq < ARRAY_SIZE(xboxone_init_packets)) { + init_packet = &xboxone_init_packets[xpad->init_seq++]; + + if (init_packet->idVendor != 0 && + init_packet->idVendor != xpad->dev->id.vendor) + continue; + + if (init_packet->idProduct != 0 && + init_packet->idProduct != xpad->dev->id.product) + continue; + + /* This packet applies to our device, so prepare to send it */ + memcpy(xpad->odata, init_packet->data, init_packet->len); + xpad->irq_out->transfer_buffer_length = init_packet->len; + + /* Update packet with current sequence number */ + xpad->odata[2] = xpad->odata_serial++; + return true; + } + + return false; +} + /* Callers must hold xpad->odata_lock spinlock */ static bool xpad_prepare_next_out_packet(struct usb_xpad *xpad) { struct xpad_output_packet *pkt, *packet = NULL; int i;

+ /* We may have init packets to send before we can send user commands */ + if (xpad_prepare_next_init_packet(xpad)) + return true; + for (i = 0; i < XPAD_NUM_OUT_PACKETS; i++) { if (++xpad->last_out_packet >= XPAD_NUM_OUT_PACKETS) xpad->last_out_packet = 0; @@ -940,24 +1035,17 @@ static int xpad_inquiry_pad_presence(struct usb_xpad *xpad)

static int xpad_start_xbox_one(struct usb_xpad *xpad) { - struct xpad_output_packet *packet = - &xpad->out_packets[XPAD_OUT_CMD_IDX]; unsigned long flags; int retval;

spin_lock_irqsave(&xpad->odata_lock, flags);

- /* Xbox one controller needs to be initialized. */ - packet->data[0] = 0x05; - packet->data[1] = 0x20; - packet->data[2] = xpad->odata_serial++; /* packet serial */ - packet->data[3] = 0x01; /* rumble bit enable? */ - packet->data[4] = 0x00; - packet->len = 5; - packet->pending = true; - - /* Reset the sequence so we send out start packet first */ - xpad->last_out_packet = -1; + /* + * Begin the init sequence by attempting to send a packet. + * We will cycle through the init packet sequence before + * sending any packets from the output ring. + */ + xpad->init_seq = 0; retval = xpad_try_sending_next_out_packet(xpad);

spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xpad->odata_lock, flags);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit 44bc722593201da43862b7200ee0b98155410b07 ]

The userspace xboxdrv driver [0] contains some USB IDs unknown to the kernel driver. I have created a simple script [1] to extract the missing devices and add them to xpad.

A quick google search confirmed that all the new devices called Fightstick/pad are Arcade-type devices [2] where the MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS option should apply.

There are some similar devices in the existing device table where this flag is not set, but I did refrain from changing those.

[0] https://github.com/xboxdrv/xboxdrv/blob/stable/src/xpad_device.cpp [1] http://codepad.org/CHV98BNH [2] https://www.google.com/search?q=SFxT+Fightstick+Pro&tbm=isch

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Valentin benpicco@googlemail.com Reviewed-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index f600f6662063..16338f0b004f 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x046d, 0xc242, "Logitech Chillstream Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x046d, 0xca84, "Logitech Xbox Cordless Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x046d, 0xca88, "Logitech Compact Controller for Xbox", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x056e, 0x2004, "Elecom JC-U3613M", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x05fd, 0x1007, "Mad Catz Controller (unverified)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x05fd, 0x107a, "InterAct 'PowerPad Pro' X-Box pad (Germany)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0738, 0x4516, "Mad Catz Control Pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, @@ -179,6 +180,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0e6f, 0x0006, "Edge wireless Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0105, "HSM3 Xbox360 dancepad", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0113, "Afterglow AX.1 Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x011f, "Rock Candy Gamepad Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0139, "Afterglow Prismatic Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0146, "Rock Candy Wired Controller for Xbox One", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0201, "Pelican PL-3601 'TSZ' Wired Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, @@ -186,6 +188,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0e6f, 0x021f, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0301, "Logic3 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0401, "Logic3 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0413, "Afterglow AX.1 Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e8f, 0x0201, "SmartJoy Frag Xpad/PS2 adaptor", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0e8f, 0x3008, "Generic xbox control (dealextreme)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0f0d, 0x000a, "Hori Co. DOA4 FightStick", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, @@ -212,21 +215,30 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x1bad, 0x0002, "Harmonix Rock Band Guitar", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0x0003, "Harmonix Rock Band Drumkit", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf016, "Mad Catz Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf018, "Mad Catz Street Fighter IV SE Fighting Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf021, "Mad Cats Ghost Recon FS GamePad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf023, "MLG Pro Circuit Controller (Xbox)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf028, "Street Fighter IV FightPad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf02e, "Mad Catz Fightpad", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf038, "Street Fighter IV FightStick TE", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf03a, "Mad Catz SFxT Fightstick Pro", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf900, "Harmonix Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf901, "Gamestop Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf903, "Tron Xbox 360 controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xfa01, "MadCatz GamePad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5000, "Razer Atrox Arcade Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5300, "PowerA MINI PROEX Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5303, "Xbox Airflo wired controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x531a, "PowerA Pro Ex", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x5397, "FUS1ON Tournament Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x541a, "PowerA Xbox One Mini Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x24c6, 0x542a, "Xbox ONE spectra", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x24c6, 0x543a, "PowerA Xbox One wired controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x24c6, 0x5500, "Hori XBOX 360 EX 2 with Turbo", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5501, "Hori Real Arcade Pro VX-SA", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x5503, "Hori Fighting Edge", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5506, "Hori SOULCALIBUR V Stick", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x550d, "Hori GEM Xbox controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5b02, "Thrustmaster, Inc. GPX Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5b03, "Thrustmaster Ferrari 458 Racing Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5d04, "Razer Sabertooth", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, @@ -316,6 +328,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = { XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x045e), /* Microsoft X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x045e), /* Microsoft X-Box One controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x046d), /* Logitech X-Box 360 style controllers */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x056e), /* Elecom JC-U3613M */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0738), /* Mad Catz X-Box 360 controllers */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0738, 0x4540) }, /* Mad Catz Beat Pad */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0738), /* Mad Catz FightStick TE 2 */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit c225370e01b87d3c4ef40d98295ac0bb1e5a3116 ]

360Controller [0] is an OpenSource driver for Xbox/Xbox360/XboxOne controllers on macOS.

It contains a couple device IDs unknown to the Linux driver, so I wrote a small Python script [1] to extract them and feed them into my previous script [2] to compare them with the IDs known to Linux.

For most devices, this information is not really needed as xpad is able to automatically detect the type of an unknown Xbox Controller at run-time. I've therefore stripped all the generic/vague entries.

I've excluded the Logitech G920, it's handled by a HID driver already. I've also excluded the Scene It! Big Button IR, it's handled by an out-of-tree driver. [3]

[0] https://github.com/360Controller/360Controller [1] http://codepad.org/v9GyLKMq [2] http://codepad.org/qh7jclpD [3] https://github.com/micolous/xbox360bb

Reviewed-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Benjamin Valentin benpicco@googlemail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index def96cd2479b..b8d08f2296ff 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -131,8 +131,10 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x045e, 0x0202, "Microsoft X-Box pad v1 (US)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x045e, 0x0285, "Microsoft X-Box pad (Japan)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x045e, 0x0287, "Microsoft Xbox Controller S", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x045e, 0x0288, "Microsoft Xbox Controller S v2", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x045e, 0x0289, "Microsoft X-Box pad v2 (US)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x045e, 0x028e, "Microsoft X-Box 360 pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x045e, 0x028f, "Microsoft X-Box 360 pad v2", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x045e, 0x0291, "Xbox 360 Wireless Receiver (XBOX)", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360W }, { 0x045e, 0x02d1, "Microsoft X-Box One pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x045e, 0x02dd, "Microsoft X-Box One pad (Firmware 2015)", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, @@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x046d, 0xc242, "Logitech Chillstream Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x046d, 0xca84, "Logitech Xbox Cordless Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x046d, 0xca88, "Logitech Compact Controller for Xbox", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x046d, 0xcaa3, "Logitech DriveFx Racing Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x056e, 0x2004, "Elecom JC-U3613M", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x05fd, 0x1007, "Mad Catz Controller (unverified)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x05fd, 0x107a, "InterAct 'PowerPad Pro' X-Box pad (Germany)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, @@ -158,14 +161,19 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0738, 0x4718, "Mad Catz Street Fighter IV FightStick SE", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0x4726, "Mad Catz Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0x4728, "Mad Catz Street Fighter IV FightPad", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0738, 0x4736, "Mad Catz MicroCon Gamepad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0x4738, "Mad Catz Wired Xbox 360 Controller (SFIV)", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0x4740, "Mad Catz Beat Pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0738, 0x4758, "Mad Catz Arcade Game Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0x4a01, "Mad Catz FightStick TE 2", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0738, 0x6040, "Mad Catz Beat Pad Pro", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x0738, 0x9871, "Mad Catz Portable Drum", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0xb726, "Mad Catz Xbox controller - MW2", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0738, 0xb738, "Mad Catz MVC2TE Stick 2", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0xbeef, "Mad Catz JOYTECH NEO SE Advanced GamePad", XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0xcb02, "Saitek Cyborg Rumble Pad - PC/Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0xcb03, "Saitek P3200 Rumble Pad - PC/Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0738, 0xcb29, "Saitek Aviator Stick AV8R02", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0738, 0xf738, "Super SFIV FightStick TE S", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0c12, 0x8802, "Zeroplus Xbox Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0c12, 0x8809, "RedOctane Xbox Dance Pad", DANCEPAD_MAP_CONFIG, XTYPE_XBOX }, @@ -181,30 +189,52 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0e6f, 0x0105, "HSM3 Xbox360 dancepad", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0113, "Afterglow AX.1 Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x011f, "Rock Candy Gamepad Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0131, "PDP EA Sports Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0133, "Xbox 360 Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0139, "Afterglow Prismatic Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x013a, "PDP Xbox One Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0146, "Rock Candy Wired Controller for Xbox One", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0147, "PDP Marvel Xbox One Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x015c, "PDP Xbox One Arcade Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0161, "PDP Xbox One Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0162, "PDP Xbox One Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0163, "PDP Xbox One Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0164, "PDP Battlefield One", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0165, "PDP Titanfall 2", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0201, "Pelican PL-3601 'TSZ' Wired Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0213, "Afterglow Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x021f, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0246, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox One 2015", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0301, "Logic3 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0346, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox One 2016", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0401, "Logic3 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0413, "Afterglow AX.1 Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x0501, "PDP Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0e6f, 0xf900, "PDP Afterglow AX.1", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e8f, 0x0201, "SmartJoy Frag Xpad/PS2 adaptor", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0e8f, 0x3008, "Generic xbox control (dealextreme)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0f0d, 0x000a, "Hori Co. DOA4 FightStick", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0f0d, 0x000c, "Hori PadEX Turbo", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0f0d, 0x000d, "Hori Fighting Stick EX2", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0f0d, 0x0016, "Hori Real Arcade Pro.EX", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0f0d, 0x001b, "Hori Real Arcade Pro VX", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0f0d, 0x0063, "Hori Real Arcade Pro Hayabusa (USA) Xbox One", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0f0d, 0x0067, "HORIPAD ONE", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0f0d, 0x0078, "Hori Real Arcade Pro V Kai Xbox One", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0f30, 0x0202, "Joytech Advanced Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0f30, 0x8888, "BigBen XBMiniPad Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x102c, 0xff0c, "Joytech Wireless Advanced Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x11c9, 0x55f0, "Nacon GC-100XF", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x12ab, 0x0004, "Honey Bee Xbox360 dancepad", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x12ab, 0x0301, "PDP AFTERGLOW AX.1", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x12ab, 0x0303, "Mortal Kombat Klassic FightStick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x12ab, 0x8809, "Xbox DDR dancepad", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x1430, 0x4748, "RedOctane Guitar Hero X-plorer", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1430, 0x8888, "TX6500+ Dance Pad (first generation)", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX }, + { 0x1430, 0xf801, "RedOctane Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x146b, 0x0601, "BigBen Interactive XBOX 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1532, 0x0037, "Razer Sabertooth", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1532, 0x0a00, "Razer Atrox Arcade Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x1532, 0x0a03, "Razer Wildcat", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x15e4, 0x3f00, "Power A Mini Pro Elite", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x15e4, 0x3f0a, "Xbox Airflo wired controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, @@ -215,22 +245,42 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x1689, 0xfe00, "Razer Sabertooth", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0x0002, "Harmonix Rock Band Guitar", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0x0003, "Harmonix Rock Band Drumkit", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0x0130, "Ion Drum Rocker", MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf016, "Mad Catz Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf018, "Mad Catz Street Fighter IV SE Fighting Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf019, "Mad Catz Brawlstick for Xbox 360", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf021, "Mad Cats Ghost Recon FS GamePad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf023, "MLG Pro Circuit Controller (Xbox)", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf025, "Mad Catz Call Of Duty", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf027, "Mad Catz FPS Pro", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf028, "Street Fighter IV FightPad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf02e, "Mad Catz Fightpad", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf038, "Street Fighter IV FightStick TE", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf039, "Mad Catz MvC2 TE", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf03a, "Mad Catz SFxT Fightstick Pro", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf03d, "Street Fighter IV Arcade Stick TE - Chun Li", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf03e, "Mad Catz MLG FightStick TE", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf03f, "Mad Catz FightStick SoulCaliber", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf042, "Mad Catz FightStick TES+", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf080, "Mad Catz FightStick TE2", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf501, "HoriPad EX2 Turbo", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf502, "Hori Real Arcade Pro.VX SA", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf503, "Hori Fighting Stick VX", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf504, "Hori Real Arcade Pro. EX", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf505, "Hori Fighting Stick EX2B", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf506, "Hori Real Arcade Pro.EX Premium VLX", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf900, "Harmonix Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf901, "Gamestop Xbox 360 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xf903, "Tron Xbox 360 controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf904, "PDP Versus Fighting Pad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xf906, "MortalKombat FightStick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x1bad, 0xfa01, "MadCatz GamePad", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xfd00, "Razer Onza TE", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x1bad, 0xfd01, "Razer Onza", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5000, "Razer Atrox Arcade Stick", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5300, "PowerA MINI PROEX Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5303, "Xbox Airflo wired controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x530a, "Xbox 360 Pro EX Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x531a, "PowerA Pro Ex", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5397, "FUS1ON Tournament Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x541a, "PowerA Xbox One Mini Wired Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, @@ -238,12 +288,18 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x24c6, 0x543a, "PowerA Xbox One wired controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x24c6, 0x5500, "Hori XBOX 360 EX 2 with Turbo", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5501, "Hori Real Arcade Pro VX-SA", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x5502, "Hori Fighting Stick VX Alt", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5503, "Hori Fighting Edge", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5506, "Hori SOULCALIBUR V Stick", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x550d, "Hori GEM Xbox controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x550e, "Hori Real Arcade Pro V Kai 360", MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0x551a, "PowerA FUSION Pro Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x24c6, 0x561a, "PowerA FUSION Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x24c6, 0x5b00, "ThrustMaster Ferrari 458 Racing Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5b02, "Thrustmaster, Inc. GPX Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5b03, "Thrustmaster Ferrari 458 Racing Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x24c6, 0x5d04, "Razer Sabertooth", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x24c6, 0xfafe, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0xffff, 0xffff, "Chinese-made Xbox Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x0000, 0x0000, "Generic X-Box pad", 0, XTYPE_UNKNOWN } }; @@ -338,6 +394,7 @@ static struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = { XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0e6f), /* 0x0e6f X-Box One controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(0x0f0d), /* Hori Controllers */ + XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x11c9), /* Nacon GC100XF */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x12ab), /* X-Box 360 dance pads */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x1430), /* RedOctane X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x146b), /* BigBen Interactive Controllers */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit 94aef061c796d3d47f1a2eed41e651ffaaade402 ]

usb_device_id are not supposed to change at runtime. All functions working with usb_device_id provided by <linux/usb.h> work with const usb_device_id. So mark the non-const structs as const.

Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index 298a6ba51411..2578a7677040 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static const signed short xpad_abs_triggers[] = { #define XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR(vend) \ { XPAD_XBOXONE_VENDOR_PROTOCOL(vend, 208) }

-static struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = { +static const struct usb_device_id xpad_table[] = { { USB_INTERFACE_INFO('X', 'B', 0) }, /* X-Box USB-IF not approved class */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x044f), /* Thrustmaster X-Box 360 controllers */ XPAD_XBOX360_VENDOR(0x045e), /* Microsoft X-Box 360 controllers */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit 122d6a347329818419b032c5a1776e6b3866d9b9 ]

We should only see devices with interrupt endpoints. Ignore any other endpoints that we find, so we don't send try to send them interrupt URBs and trigger a WARN down in the USB stack.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov andreyknvl@google.com Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov andreyknvl@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # c01b5e7464f0 Input: xpad - don't depend on endpoint order Signed-off-by: Cameron Gutman aicommander@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index f8e34ef643c7..d86e59515b9c 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -1764,10 +1764,12 @@ static int xpad_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ep = &intf->cur_altsetting->endpoint[i].desc;

- if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(ep)) - ep_irq_in = ep; - else - ep_irq_out = ep; + if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(ep)) { + if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(ep)) + ep_irq_in = ep; + else + ep_irq_out = ep; + } }

if (!ep_irq_in || !ep_irq_out) {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit c6c848572f4da0e34ffe0a35364b4db871e13e42 ]

Adds support for a PDP Xbox One controller with device ID (0x06ef:0x02a4). The Product string for this device is "PDP Wired Controller for Xbox One - Stealth Series | Phantom Black".

Signed-off-by: Francis Therien frtherien@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index d88d3e0f59fb..298581b0f6c1 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { { 0x0e6f, 0x021f, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox 360", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0246, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox One 2015", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x02ab, "PDP Controller for Xbox One", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, + { 0x0e6f, 0x02a4, "PDP Wired Controller for Xbox One - Stealth Series", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0301, "Logic3 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0346, "Rock Candy Gamepad for Xbox One 2016", 0, XTYPE_XBOXONE }, { 0x0e6f, 0x0401, "Logic3 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, @@ -478,7 +479,8 @@ static const u8 xboxone_hori_init[] = {

/* * This packet is required for some of the PDP pads to start - * sending input reports. One of those pads is (0x0e6f:0x02ab). + * sending input reports. These pads include: (0x0e6f:0x02ab), + * (0x0e6f:0x02a4). */ static const u8 xboxone_pdp_init1[] = { 0x0a, 0x20, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x14 @@ -486,7 +488,8 @@ static const u8 xboxone_pdp_init1[] = {

/* * This packet is required for some of the PDP pads to start - * sending input reports. One of those pads is (0x0e6f:0x02ab). + * sending input reports. These pads include: (0x0e6f:0x02ab), + * (0x0e6f:0x02a4). */ static const u8 xboxone_pdp_init2[] = { 0x06, 0x20, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00 @@ -524,6 +527,8 @@ static const struct xboxone_init_packet xboxone_init_packets[] = { XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0000, 0x0000, xboxone_fw2015_init), XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02ab, xboxone_pdp_init1), XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02ab, xboxone_pdp_init2), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02a4, xboxone_pdp_init1), + XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x0e6f, 0x02a4, xboxone_pdp_init2), XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x541a, xboxone_rumblebegin_init), XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x542a, xboxone_rumblebegin_init), XBOXONE_INIT_PKT(0x24c6, 0x543a, xboxone_rumblebegin_init),

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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[ Upstream commit a01308031c2647ed5f1c845104b73a8820a958a9 ]

input_set_capability() and input_set_abs_param() will do it for you.

Signed-off-by: Marcus Folkesson marcus.folkesson@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index b6e172f22c16..5bf85c43e6d9 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -1579,8 +1579,6 @@ static void xpad_set_up_abs(struct input_dev *input_dev, signed short abs) { struct usb_xpad *xpad = input_get_drvdata(input_dev);

- set_bit(abs, input_dev->absbit); - switch (abs) { case ABS_X: case ABS_Y: @@ -1599,6 +1597,9 @@ static void xpad_set_up_abs(struct input_dev *input_dev, signed short abs) case ABS_HAT0Y: /* the d-pad (only if dpad is mapped to axes */ input_set_abs_params(input_dev, abs, -1, 1, 0, 0); break; + default: + input_set_abs_params(input_dev, abs, 0, 0, 0, 0); + break; } }

@@ -1639,10 +1640,7 @@ static int xpad_init_input(struct usb_xpad *xpad) input_dev->close = xpad_close; }

- __set_bit(EV_KEY, input_dev->evbit); - if (!(xpad->mapping & MAP_STICKS_TO_NULL)) { - __set_bit(EV_ABS, input_dev->evbit); /* set up axes */ for (i = 0; xpad_abs[i] >= 0; i++) xpad_set_up_abs(input_dev, xpad_abs[i]); @@ -1650,21 +1648,22 @@ static int xpad_init_input(struct usb_xpad *xpad)

/* set up standard buttons */ for (i = 0; xpad_common_btn[i] >= 0; i++) - __set_bit(xpad_common_btn[i], input_dev->keybit); + input_set_capability(input_dev, EV_KEY, xpad_common_btn[i]);

/* set up model-specific ones */ if (xpad->xtype == XTYPE_XBOX360 || xpad->xtype == XTYPE_XBOX360W || xpad->xtype == XTYPE_XBOXONE) { for (i = 0; xpad360_btn[i] >= 0; i++) - __set_bit(xpad360_btn[i], input_dev->keybit); + input_set_capability(input_dev, EV_KEY, xpad360_btn[i]); } else { for (i = 0; xpad_btn[i] >= 0; i++) - __set_bit(xpad_btn[i], input_dev->keybit); + input_set_capability(input_dev, EV_KEY, xpad_btn[i]); }

if (xpad->mapping & MAP_DPAD_TO_BUTTONS) { for (i = 0; xpad_btn_pad[i] >= 0; i++) - __set_bit(xpad_btn_pad[i], input_dev->keybit); + input_set_capability(input_dev, EV_KEY, + xpad_btn_pad[i]); }

/* @@ -1681,7 +1680,8 @@ static int xpad_init_input(struct usb_xpad *xpad)

if (xpad->mapping & MAP_TRIGGERS_TO_BUTTONS) { for (i = 0; xpad_btn_triggers[i] >= 0; i++) - __set_bit(xpad_btn_triggers[i], input_dev->keybit); + input_set_capability(input_dev, EV_KEY, + xpad_btn_triggers[i]); } else { for (i = 0; xpad_abs_triggers[i] >= 0; i++) xpad_set_up_abs(input_dev, xpad_abs_triggers[i]);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

[ Upstream commit dd6bee81c942c0ea01030da9356026afb88f9d18 ]

This fixes using the controller with SDL2.

SDL2 has a naive algorithm to apply the correct settings to a controller. For X-Box compatible controllers it expects that the controller name contains a variation of a 'XBOX'-string.

This patch changes the identifier to contain "X-Box" as substring. Tested with Steam and C-Dogs-SDL which both detect the controller properly after adding this patch.

Fixes: c1ba08390a8b ("Input: xpad - add GPD Win 2 Controller USB IDs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Enno Boland gottox@voidlinux.eu Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c index 66cc37b41113..69b44aebaf01 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/xpad.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static const struct xpad_device { u8 mapping; u8 xtype; } xpad_device[] = { - { 0x0079, 0x18d4, "GPD Win 2 Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, + { 0x0079, 0x18d4, "GPD Win 2 X-Box Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX360 }, { 0x044f, 0x0f00, "Thrustmaster Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x044f, 0x0f03, "Thrustmaster Wheel", 0, XTYPE_XBOX }, { 0x044f, 0x0f07, "Thrustmaster, Inc. Controller", 0, XTYPE_XBOX },

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de

commit 9afdd6128c39f42398041bb2e017d8df0dcebcd1 upstream.

The call to krealloc() in wsm_buf_reserve() directly assigns the newly returned memory to buf->begin. This is all fine except when krealloc() failes we loose the ability to free the old memory pointed to by buf->begin. If we just create a temporary variable to assign memory to and assign the memory to it we can mitigate the memory leak.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn jthumshirn@suse.de Cc: Johannes Berg johannes@sipsolutions.net Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.c @@ -1805,16 +1805,18 @@ static int wsm_buf_reserve(struct wsm_bu { size_t pos = buf->data - buf->begin; size_t size = pos + extra_size; + u8 *tmp;

size = round_up(size, FWLOAD_BLOCK_SIZE);

- buf->begin = krealloc(buf->begin, size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); - if (buf->begin) { - buf->data = &buf->begin[pos]; - buf->end = &buf->begin[size]; - return 0; - } else { - buf->end = buf->data = buf->begin; + tmp = krealloc(buf->begin, size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!tmp) { + wsm_buf_deinit(buf); return -ENOMEM; } + + buf->begin = tmp; + buf->data = &buf->begin[pos]; + buf->end = &buf->begin[size]; + return 0; }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Amitkumar Karwar akarwar@marvell.com

commit 5190f2e405919cd30ba2f12c58129fb2d71cd6b6 upstream.

When host_sleep_config command fails, we should return an error to PCIe, instead of continuing (and possibly panicking, when we try to keep processing a timed-out ioctl after we return "successfully" from suspend).

Signed-off-by: Amitkumar Karwar akarwar@marvell.com Reviewed-by: Brian Norris briannorris@chromium.org Tested-by: Brian Norris briannorris@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/pcie.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/pcie.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/pcie.c @@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ static int mwifiex_pcie_suspend(struct d { struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter; struct pcie_service_card *card; - int hs_actived; struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);

if (pdev) { @@ -117,7 +116,14 @@ static int mwifiex_pcie_suspend(struct d

adapter = card->adapter;

- hs_actived = mwifiex_enable_hs(adapter); + /* Enable the Host Sleep */ + if (!mwifiex_enable_hs(adapter)) { + mwifiex_dbg(adapter, ERROR, + "cmd: failed to suspend\n"); + adapter->hs_enabling = false; + return -EFAULT; + } + flush_workqueue(adapter->workqueue);

/* Indicate device suspended */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Karthik D A karthida@marvell.com

commit 3d8bd85c2c9e47ed2c82348aa5b6029ed48376ae upstream.

Marvell p2p device disappears from the list of p2p peers on the other p2p device after disconnection.

It happens due to a bug in driver. When interface is changed from p2p to station, certain variables(bss_type, bss_role etc.) aren't correctly updated. This patch corrects them to fix the issue.

Signed-off-by: Karthik D A karthida@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Amitkumar Karwar akarwar@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo kvalo@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/cfg80211.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/cfg80211.c @@ -1209,6 +1209,12 @@ mwifiex_cfg80211_change_virtual_intf(str priv->adapter->curr_iface_comb.p2p_intf--; priv->adapter->curr_iface_comb.sta_intf++; dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype = type; + if (mwifiex_deinit_priv_params(priv)) + return -1; + if (mwifiex_init_new_priv_params(priv, dev, type)) + return -1; + if (mwifiex_sta_init_cmd(priv, false, false)) + return -1; break; case NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC: if (mwifiex_cfg80211_deinit_p2p(priv))

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Venkat Gopalakrishnan venkatg@codeaurora.org

commit f2a785ac23125fa0774327d39e837e45cf28fe92 upstream.

The ungate work turns on the clock before it exits hibern8, if the link was put in hibern8 during clock gating work. There occurs a race condition when clock scaling work calls ufshcd_hold() to make sure low power states cannot be entered, but that returns by checking only whether the clocks are on. This causes the clock scaling work to issue UIC commands when the link is in hibern8 causing failures. Make sure we exit hibern8 state before returning from ufshcd_hold().

Callstacks for race condition:

ufshcd_scale_gear ufshcd_devfreq_scale ufshcd_devfreq_target update_devfreq devfreq_monitor process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork

ufshcd_uic_hibern8_exit ufshcd_ungate_work process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork

Signed-off-by: Venkat Gopalakrishnan venkatg@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Subhash Jadavani subhashj@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -672,6 +672,21 @@ int ufshcd_hold(struct ufs_hba *hba, boo start: switch (hba->clk_gating.state) { case CLKS_ON: + /* + * Wait for the ungate work to complete if in progress. + * Though the clocks may be in ON state, the link could + * still be in hibner8 state if hibern8 is allowed + * during clock gating. + * Make sure we exit hibern8 state also in addition to + * clocks being ON. + */ + if (ufshcd_can_hibern8_during_gating(hba) && + ufshcd_is_link_hibern8(hba)) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(hba->host->host_lock, flags); + flush_work(&hba->clk_gating.ungate_work); + spin_lock_irqsave(hba->host->host_lock, flags); + goto start; + } break; case REQ_CLKS_OFF: if (cancel_delayed_work(&hba->clk_gating.gate_work)) {

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Subhash Jadavani subhashj@codeaurora.org

commit afa3dfd42d205b106787476647735aa1de1a5d02 upstream.

If ufshcd pltfrm/pci driver's probe fails for some reason then ensure that scsi host is released to avoid memory leak but managed memory allocations (via devm_* calls) need not to be freed explicitly on probe failure as memory allocated with these functions is automatically freed on driver detach.

Reviewed-by: Sahitya Tummala stummala@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Subhash Jadavani subhashj@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c | 2 ++ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c | 5 +---- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 3 --- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ static void ufshcd_pci_remove(struct pci pm_runtime_forbid(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_get_noresume(&pdev->dev); ufshcd_remove(hba); + ufshcd_dealloc_host(hba); }

/** @@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ ufshcd_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, c err = ufshcd_init(hba, mmio_base, pdev->irq); if (err) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Initialization failed\n"); + ufshcd_dealloc_host(hba); return err; }

--- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int ufshcd_populate_vreg(struct d if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "%s: unable to find %s err %d\n", __func__, prop_name, ret); - goto out_free; + goto out; }

vreg->min_uA = 0; @@ -185,9 +185,6 @@ static int ufshcd_populate_vreg(struct d

goto out;

-out_free: - devm_kfree(dev, vreg); - vreg = NULL; out: if (!ret) *out_vreg = vreg; --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -6507,8 +6507,6 @@ void ufshcd_remove(struct ufs_hba *hba) ufshcd_disable_intr(hba, hba->intr_mask); ufshcd_hba_stop(hba, true);

- scsi_host_put(hba->host); - ufshcd_exit_clk_gating(hba); if (ufshcd_is_clkscaling_enabled(hba)) devfreq_remove_device(hba->devfreq); @@ -6876,7 +6874,6 @@ exit_gating: ufshcd_exit_clk_gating(hba); out_disable: hba->is_irq_enabled = false; - scsi_host_put(host); ufshcd_hba_exit(hba); out_error: return err;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org

commit c9a8e5fce009e3c601a43c49ea9dbcb25d1ffac5 upstream.

After we are done with the tty buffer, zero it out.

Reported-by: aszlig aszlig@nix.build Tested-by: Milan Broz gmazyland@gmail.com Tested-by: Daniel Zatovic daniel.zatovic@gmail.com Tested-by: aszlig aszlig@nix.build Cc: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c @@ -458,6 +458,8 @@ int tty_ldisc_receive_buf(struct tty_ldi if (count && ld->ops->receive_buf) ld->ops->receive_buf(ld->tty, p, f, count); } + if (count > 0) + memset(p, 0, count); return count; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tty_ldisc_receive_buf);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aaron Ma aaron.ma@canonical.com

commit 958c0bd86075d4ef1c936998deefe1947e539240 upstream.

Realtek USB3.0 Card Reader [0bda:0328] reports wrong port status on Cannon lake PCH USB3.1 xHCI [8086:a36d] after resume from S3, after clear port reset it works fine.

Since this device is registered on USB3 roothub at boot, when port status reports not superspeed, xhci_get_port_status will call an uninitialized completion in bus_state[0]. Kernel will hang because of NULL pointer.

Restrict the USB2 resume status check in USB2 roothub to fix hang issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma aaron.ma@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static u32 xhci_get_port_status(struct u status |= USB_PORT_STAT_SUSPEND; } if ((raw_port_status & PORT_PLS_MASK) == XDEV_RESUME && - !DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(raw_port_status)) { + !DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(raw_port_status) && hcd->speed < HCD_USB3) { if ((raw_port_status & PORT_RESET) || !(raw_port_status & PORT_PE)) return 0xffffffff; --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ static void handle_port_status(struct xh * RExit to a disconnect state). If so, let the the driver know it's * out of the RExit state. */ - if (!DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(temp) && + if (!DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(temp) && hcd->speed < HCD_USB3 && test_and_clear_bit(faked_port_index, &bus_state->rexit_ports)) { complete(&bus_state->rexit_done[faked_port_index]);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Salvatore Mesoraca s.mesoraca16@gmail.com

commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 upstream.

Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's "HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer.

This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:

CVE-2000-1134 CVE-2007-3852 CVE-2008-0525 CVE-2009-0416 CVE-2011-4834 CVE-2015-1838 CVE-2015-7442 CVE-2016-7489

This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite vehicle to exploit them.

[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmai... [keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future] [keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca s.mesoraca16@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Suggested-by: Solar Designer solar@openwall.com Suggested-by: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Loic hackurx@opensec.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/namei.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/fs.h | 2 + kernel/sysctl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt @@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/ - overflowgid - pipe-user-pages-hard - pipe-user-pages-soft +- protected_fifos - protected_hardlinks +- protected_regular - protected_symlinks - suid_dumpable - super-max @@ -182,6 +184,24 @@ applied.

==============================================================

+protected_fifos: + +The intent of this protection is to avoid unintentional writes to +an attacker-controlled FIFO, where a program expected to create a regular +file. + +When set to "0", writing to FIFOs is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on FIFOs that we don't own +in world writable sticky directories, unless they are owned by the +owner of the directory. + +When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall. + +============================================================== + protected_hardlinks:

A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based @@ -202,6 +222,22 @@ This protection is based on the restrict

==============================================================

+protected_regular: + +This protection is similar to protected_fifos, but it +avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file, where a program +expected to create one. + +When set to "0", writing to regular files is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on regular files that we +don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they are +owned by the owner of the directory. + +When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. + +============================================================== + protected_symlinks:

A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -892,6 +892,8 @@ static inline void put_link(struct namei

int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0; int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0; +int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly; +int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly;

/** * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations @@ -1005,6 +1007,45 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link) return -EPERM; }

+/** + * may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory + * should be allowed, or not, on files that already + * exist. + * @dir: the sticky parent directory + * @inode: the inode of the file to open + * + * Block an O_CREAT open of a FIFO (or a regular file) when: + * - sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is enabled + * - the file already exists + * - we are in a sticky directory + * - we don't own the file + * - the owner of the directory doesn't own the file + * - the directory is world writable + * If the sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is set to 2 + * the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will + * be enough. + * + * Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static int may_create_in_sticky(struct dentry * const dir, + struct inode * const inode) +{ + if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || + (!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) || + likely(!(dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX)) || + uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir->d_inode->i_uid) || + uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) + return 0; + + if (likely(dir->d_inode->i_mode & 0002) || + (dir->d_inode->i_mode & 0020 && + ((sysctl_protected_fifos >= 2 && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || + (sysctl_protected_regular >= 2 && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))))) { + return -EACCES; + } + return 0; +} + static __always_inline const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd) { @@ -3356,9 +3397,15 @@ finish_open: if (error) return error; audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0); - error = -EISDIR; - if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) - goto out; + if (open_flag & O_CREAT) { + error = -EISDIR; + if (d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) + goto out; + error = may_create_in_sticky(dir, + d_backing_inode(nd->path.dentry)); + if (unlikely(error)) + goto out; + } error = -ENOTDIR; if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) && !d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry)) goto out; --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ extern struct inodes_stat_t inodes_stat; extern int leases_enable, lease_break_time; extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks; extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks; +extern int sysctl_protected_fifos; +extern int sysctl_protected_regular;

struct buffer_head; typedef int (get_block_t)(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock, --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1795,6 +1795,24 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = { .extra2 = &one, }, { + .procname = "protected_fifos", + .data = &sysctl_protected_fifos, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &two, + }, + { + .procname = "protected_regular", + .data = &sysctl_protected_regular, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &two, + }, + { .procname = "suid_dumpable", .data = &suid_dumpable, .maxlen = sizeof(int),

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Janosch Frank frankja@linux.ibm.com

commit 1843abd03250115af6cec0892683e70cf2297c25 upstream.

Userspace could have munmapped the area before doing unmapping from the gmap. This would leave us with a valid vmaddr, but an invalid vma from which we would try to zap memory.

Let's check before using the vma.

Fixes: 1e133ab296f3 ("s390/mm: split arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c") Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank frankja@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Message-Id: 20180816082432.78828-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank frankja@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ void gmap_discard(struct gmap *gmap, uns vmaddr |= gaddr & ~PMD_MASK; /* Find vma in the parent mm */ vma = find_vma(gmap->mm, vmaddr); + if (!vma) + continue; size = min(to - gaddr, PMD_SIZE - (gaddr & ~PMD_MASK)); zap_page_range(vma, vmaddr, size, NULL); }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric W. Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com

commit 19339c251607a3defc7f089511ce8561936fee45 upstream.

This reverts commit 0b3c9761d1e405514a551ed24d3ea89aea26ce14.

Seth Forshee seth.forshee@canonical.com writes:

All right, I think 0b3c9761d1e405514a551ed24d3ea89aea26ce14 should be reverted then. EVM is a machine-local integrity mechanism, and so it makes sense that the signature would be based on the kernel's notion of the uid and not the filesystem's.

I added a commment explaining why the EVM hmac needs to be in the kernel's notion of uid and gid, not the filesystems to prevent remounting the filesystem and gaining unwaranted trust in files.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee seth.forshee@canonical.com Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: Aditya Kali adityakali@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -152,8 +152,16 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_d memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; - hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, inode->i_uid); - hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, inode->i_gid); + /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user + * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding + * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack + * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount + * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the + * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because + * everything is signed. + */ + hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid); + hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matthew Garrett mjg59@google.com

commit 50b977481fce90aa5fbda55e330b9d722733e358 upstream.

The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so.

Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation.

Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never be transformed into HMACs.

Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett mjg59@google.com Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi viewizard@viewizard.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: Aditya Kali adityakali@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/linux/integrity.h | 1 security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 29 ++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 2 6 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@

enum integrity_status { INTEGRITY_PASS = 0, + INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE, INTEGRITY_FAIL, INTEGRITY_NOLABEL, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS, --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest); int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, char *hmac_val); int evm_init_secfs(void); --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ out: * protection.) */ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, - char *digest) + char type, char *digest) { struct h_misc { unsigned long ino; @@ -150,8 +150,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_d } hmac_misc;

memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); - hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; - hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; + /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable + * signatures + */ + if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; + hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; + } /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack @@ -164,7 +169,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_d hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); - if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) + if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && + type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); @@ -190,6 +196,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct char *xattr_value = NULL; int error; int size; + bool ima_present = false;

if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -200,11 +207,18 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct

error = -ENODATA; for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { + bool is_ima = false; + + if (strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) + is_ima = true; + if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) { error = 0; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len); + if (is_ima) + ima_present = true; continue; } size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname, @@ -219,9 +233,14 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct error = 0; xattr_size = size; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + if (is_ima) + ima_present = true; } - hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest);

+ /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ + if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present) + return -EPERM; out: kfree(xattr_value); kfree(desc); @@ -233,17 +252,45 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, char *digest) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); }

int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char *digest) + char type, char *digest) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, type, digest); +} + +static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + int rc = 0; + + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG)) + return 1; + + /* Do this the hard way */ + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, + GFP_NOFS); + if (rc <= 0) { + if (rc == -ENODATA) + return 0; + return rc; + } + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) + rc = 1; + else + rc = 0; + + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; }

+ /* * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr * @@ -256,6 +303,16 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *d struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; int rc = 0;

+ /* + * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature + * is of an immutable type + */ + rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + if (rc) + return -EPERM; + rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); if (rc == 0) { @@ -281,7 +338,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, c }

crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); - hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val); kfree(desc); return 0; } --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int evm_initialized;

static char *integrity_status_msg[] = { - "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" + "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" }; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_hash = "sha1"; @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_ enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; int rc, xattr_len;

- if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) + if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || + iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status;

/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ @@ -155,22 +156,26 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_ rc = -EINVAL; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, calc.digest); + xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, + calc.digest); if (rc) break; rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (!rc) { - /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and - * not immutable - */ - if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) && - !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + if (iint) + iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG; + evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE; + } else if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) && + !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) { evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + } } break; default: @@ -271,7 +276,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_ * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently - * doesn't exist, to be updated. + * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable. */ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) @@ -339,7 +344,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *de if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; - if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && + xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -416,6 +422,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct d /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * + * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, + * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -214,7 +214,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_ho }

status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); - if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) { + if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && + (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) && + (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) { if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) cause = "missing-HMAC"; --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000 #define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000 +#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x10000000

#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) @@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_XATTR_HMAC, EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, + EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_LAST };

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com

commit e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb upstream.

Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files. This patch re-initializes the new slab iint->atomic_flags field before freeing it.

Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: James Morris jmorris@namei.org Cc: Aditya Kali adityakali@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- security/integrity/iint.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_i iint->ima_hash = NULL; iint->version = 0; iint->flags = 0UL; + iint->atomic_flags = 0UL; iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;