On 1/20/2025 4:46 AM, Denis Arefev wrote:

From: Nick Child nnac123@linux.ibm.com

From: Nick Child nnac123@linux.ibm.com

commit 0983d288caf984de0202c66641577b739caad561 upstream.

Below is a summary of how the driver stores a reference to an skb during transmit: tx_buff[free_map[consumer_index]]->skb = new_skb; free_map[consumer_index] = IBMVNIC_INVALID_MAP; consumer_index ++; Where variable data looks like this: free_map == [4, IBMVNIC_INVALID_MAP, IBMVNIC_INVALID_MAP, 0, 3] consumer_index^ tx_buff == [skb=null, skb=<ptr>, skb=<ptr>, skb=null, skb=null]

The driver has checks to ensure that free_map[consumer_index] pointed to a valid index but there was no check to ensure that this index pointed to an unused/null skb address. So, if, by some chance, our free_map and tx_buff lists become out of sync then we were previously risking an skb memory leak. This could then cause tcp congestion control to stop sending packets, eventually leading to ETIMEDOUT.

Therefore, add a conditional to ensure that the skb address is null. If not then warn the user (because this is still a bug that should be patched) and free the old pointer to prevent memleak/tcp problems.

Signed-off-by: Nick Child nnac123@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com [Denis: minor fix to resolve merge conflict.] Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev arefev@swemel.ru

---

I thought the process asked to have the stable tag, i.e.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.x

Anyways, this looks good to me, and seems like a good candidate for backporting.

Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller jacob.e.keller@intel.com

Thanks, Jake

Backport fix for CVE-2024-41066 Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41066

---

drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c index 84da6ccaf339..439796975cbf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c @@ -1625,6 +1625,18 @@ static netdev_tx_t ibmvnic_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *netdev) (tx_pool->consumer_index + 1) % tx_pool->num_buffers; tx_buff = &tx_pool->tx_buff[index];

• /* Sanity checks on our free map to make sure it points to an index

• * that is not being occupied by another skb. If skb memory is
  

• * not freed then we see congestion control kick in and halt tx.
  

• */
  

• if (unlikely(tx_buff->skb)) {

• dev_warn_ratelimited(dev, "TX free map points to untracked skb (%s %d idx=%d)\n",
  

• 		     skb_is_gso(skb) ? "tso_pool" : "tx_pool",
  

• 		     queue_num, bufidx);
  

• dev_kfree_skb_any(tx_buff->skb);
  

• }
• tx_buff->skb = skb; tx_buff->data_dma[0] = data_dma_addr; tx_buff->data_len[0] = skb->len;