4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Hangbin Liu liuhangbin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 5a2de63fd1a59c30c02526d427bc014b98adf508 ]

Based on RFC 4541, 2.1.1. IGMP Forwarding Rules

The switch supporting IGMP snooping must maintain a list of multicast routers and the ports on which they are attached. This list can be constructed in any combination of the following ways:

a) This list should be built by the snooping switch sending Multicast Router Solicitation messages as described in IGMP Multicast Router Discovery [MRDISC]. It may also snoop Multicast Router Advertisement messages sent by and to other nodes.

b) The arrival port for IGMP Queries (sent by multicast routers) where the source address is not 0.0.0.0.

We should not add the port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0.

Reported-by: Ying Xu yinxu@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu liuhangbin@gmail.com Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu roopa@cumulusnetworks.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -1420,7 +1420,15 @@ static void br_multicast_query_received( return;

br_multicast_update_query_timer(br, query, max_delay); - br_multicast_mark_router(br, port); + + /* Based on RFC4541, section 2.1.1 IGMP Forwarding Rules, + * the arrival port for IGMP Queries where the source address + * is 0.0.0.0 should not be added to router port list. + */ + if ((saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IP) && saddr->u.ip4) || + (saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) && + !ipv6_addr_any(&saddr->u.ip6))) + br_multicast_mark_router(br, port); }

static void br_ip4_multicast_query(struct net_bridge *br,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Stefano Brivio sbrivio@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit ee1abcf689353f36d9322231b4320926096bdee0 ]

Commit a61bbcf28a8c ("[NET]: Store skb->timestamp as offset to a base timestamp") introduces a neighbour control buffer and zeroes it out in ndisc_rcv(), as ndisc_recv_ns() uses it.

Commit f2776ff04722 ("[IPV6]: Fix address/interface handling in UDP and DCCP, according to the scoping architecture.") introduces the usage of the IPv6 control buffer in protocol error handlers (e.g. inet6_iif() in present-day __udp6_lib_err()).

Now, with commit b94f1c0904da ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate redirect, instead of rt6_redirect()."), we call protocol error handlers from ndisc_redirect_rcv(), after the control buffer is already stolen and some parts are already zeroed out. This implies that inet6_iif() on this path will always return zero.

This gives unexpected results on UDP socket lookup in __udp6_lib_err(), as we might actually need to match sockets for a given interface.

Instead of always claiming the control buffer in ndisc_rcv(), do that only when needed.

Fixes: b94f1c0904da ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate redirect, instead of rt6_redirect().") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio sbrivio@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca sd@queasysnail.net Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv6/ndisc.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/ndisc.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ndisc.c @@ -1732,10 +1732,9 @@ int ndisc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; }

- memset(NEIGH_CB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct neighbour_cb)); - switch (msg->icmph.icmp6_type) { case NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_SOLICITATION: + memset(NEIGH_CB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct neighbour_cb)); ndisc_recv_ns(skb); break;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com

[ Upstream commit 38b4f18d56372e1e21771ab7b0357b853330186c ]

gred_change_table_def() takes a pointer to TCA_GRED_DPS attribute, and expects it will be able to interpret its contents as struct tc_gred_sopt. Pass the correct gred attribute, instead of TCA_OPTIONS.

This bug meant the table definition could never be changed after Qdisc was initialized (unless whatever TCA_OPTIONS contained both passed netlink validation and was a valid struct tc_gred_sopt...).

Old behaviour: $ ip link add type dummy $ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \ gred setup vqs 4 default 0 $ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \ gred setup vqs 4 default 0 RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument

Now: $ ip link add type dummy $ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \ gred setup vqs 4 default 0 $ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \ gred setup vqs 4 default 0 $ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \ gred setup vqs 4 default 0

Fixes: f62d6b936df5 ("[PKT_SCHED]: GRED: Use central VQ change procedure") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/sched/sch_gred.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sched/sch_gred.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_gred.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int gred_change(struct Qdisc *sch if (tb[TCA_GRED_PARMS] == NULL && tb[TCA_GRED_STAB] == NULL) { if (tb[TCA_GRED_LIMIT] != NULL) sch->limit = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_GRED_LIMIT]); - return gred_change_table_def(sch, opt); + return gred_change_table_def(sch, tb[TCA_GRED_DPS]); }

if (tb[TCA_GRED_PARMS] == NULL ||

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From: Sean Tranchetti stranche@codeaurora.org

[ Upstream commit db4f1be3ca9b0ef7330763d07bf4ace83ad6f913 ]

Current handling of CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets by the UDP stack is incorrect for any packet that has an incorrect checksum value.

udp4/6_csum_init() will both make a call to __skb_checksum_validate_complete() to initialize/validate the csum field when receiving a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packet. When this packet fails validation, skb->csum will be overwritten with the pseudoheader checksum so the packet can be fully validated by software, but the skb->ip_summed value will be left as CHECKSUM_COMPLETE so that way the stack can later warn the user about their hardware spewing bad checksums. Unfortunately, leaving the SKB in this state can cause problems later on in the checksum calculation.

Since the the packet is still marked as CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, udp_csum_pull_header() will SUBTRACT the checksum of the UDP header from skb->csum instead of adding it, leaving us with a garbage value in that field. Once we try to copy the packet to userspace in the udp4/6_recvmsg(), we'll make a call to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg() to checksum the packet data and add it in the garbage skb->csum value to perform our final validation check.

Since the value we're validating is not the proper checksum, it's possible that the folded value could come out to 0, causing us not to drop the packet. Instead, we believe that the packet was checksummed incorrectly by hardware since skb->ip_summed is still CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, and we attempt to warn the user with netdev_rx_csum_fault(skb->dev);

Unfortunately, since this is the UDP path, skb->dev has been overwritten by skb->dev_scratch and is no longer a valid pointer, so we end up reading invalid memory.

This patch addresses this problem in two ways: 1) Do not use the dev pointer when calling netdev_rx_csum_fault() from skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(). Since this gets called from the UDP path where skb->dev has been overwritten, we have no way of knowing if the pointer is still valid. Also for the sake of consistency with the other uses of netdev_rx_csum_fault(), don't attempt to call it if the packet was checksummed by software.

2) Add better CHECKSUM_COMPLETE handling to udp4/6_csum_init(). If we receive a packet that's CHECKSUM_COMPLETE that fails verification (i.e. skb->csum_valid == 0), check who performed the calculation. It's possible that the checksum was done in software by the network stack earlier (such as Netfilter's CONNTRACK module), and if that says the checksum is bad, we can drop the packet immediately instead of waiting until we try and copy it to userspace. Otherwise, we need to mark the SKB as CHECKSUM_NONE, since the skb->csum field no longer contains the full packet checksum after the call to __skb_checksum_validate_complete().

Fixes: e6afc8ace6dd ("udp: remove headers from UDP packets before queueing") Fixes: c84d949057ca ("udp: copy skb->truesize in the first cache line") Cc: Sam Kumar samanthakumar@google.com Cc: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti stranche@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/core/datagram.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv4/udp.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- net/ipv6/ip6_checksum.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/datagram.c +++ b/net/core/datagram.c @@ -808,8 +808,9 @@ int skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(struc return -EINVAL; }

- if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)) - netdev_rx_csum_fault(skb->dev); + if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) && + !skb->csum_complete_sw) + netdev_rx_csum_fault(NULL); } return 0; fault: --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -2120,8 +2120,24 @@ static inline int udp4_csum_init(struct /* Note, we are only interested in != 0 or == 0, thus the * force to int. */ - return (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check, - inet_compute_pseudo); + err = (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check, + inet_compute_pseudo); + if (err) + return err; + + if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE && !skb->csum_valid) { + /* If SW calculated the value, we know it's bad */ + if (skb->csum_complete_sw) + return 1; + + /* HW says the value is bad. Let's validate that. + * skb->csum is no longer the full packet checksum, + * so don't treat it as such. + */ + skb_checksum_complete_unset(skb); + } + + return 0; }

/* wrapper for udp_queue_rcv_skb tacking care of csum conversion and --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_checksum.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_checksum.c @@ -88,8 +88,24 @@ int udp6_csum_init(struct sk_buff *skb, * Note, we are only interested in != 0 or == 0, thus the * force to int. */ - return (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check, - ip6_compute_pseudo); + err = (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check, + ip6_compute_pseudo); + if (err) + return err; + + if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE && !skb->csum_valid) { + /* If SW calculated the value, we know it's bad */ + if (skb->csum_complete_sw) + return 1; + + /* HW says the value is bad. Let's validate that. + * skb->csum is no longer the full packet checksum, + * so don't treat is as such. + */ + skb_checksum_complete_unset(skb); + } + + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp6_csum_init);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com

[ Upstream commit da71577545a52be3e0e9225a946e5fd79cfab015 ]

When an FDB entry is configured, the address is validated to have the length of an Ethernet address, but the device for which the address is configured can be of any type.

The above can result in the use of uninitialized memory when the address is later compared against existing addresses since 'dev->addr_len' is used and it may be greater than ETH_ALEN, as with ip6tnl devices.

Fix this by making sure that FDB entries are only configured for Ethernet devices.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memcmp+0x11d/0x180 lib/string.c:863 CPU: 1 PID: 4318 Comm: syz-executor998 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #49 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x14b/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x183/0x2b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:956 __msan_warning+0x70/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:645 memcmp+0x11d/0x180 lib/string.c:863 dev_uc_add_excl+0x165/0x7b0 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:464 ndo_dflt_fdb_add net/core/rtnetlink.c:3463 [inline] rtnl_fdb_add+0x1081/0x1270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3558 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa0b/0x1530 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4715 netlink_rcv_skb+0x36e/0x5f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4733 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x1638/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1205/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe70/0x1290 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2152 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2159 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440ee9 Code: e8 cc ab 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 0a fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fff6a93b518 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000440ee9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 000000000000b4b0 R13: 0000000000401ec0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:256 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:181 kmsan_kmalloc+0x98/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:91 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:100 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2718 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x9e7/0x1160 mm/slub.c:4351 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x2f5/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb49/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe70/0x1290 net/socket.c:2114 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2152 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2159 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2159 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7

v2: * Make error message more specific (David)

Fixes: 090096bf3db1 ("net: generic fdb support for drivers without ndo_fdb_<op>") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3a288d5f5530b901310e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d53ab4e92a1db04110ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Vlad Yasevich vyasevich@gmail.com Cc: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com Reviewed-by: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -3530,6 +3530,11 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_add(struct sk_buff * return -EINVAL; }

+ if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "FDB delete only supported for Ethernet devices"); + return -EINVAL; + } + addr = nla_data(tb[NDA_LLADDR]);

err = fdb_vid_parse(tb[NDA_VLAN], &vid, extack); @@ -3634,6 +3639,11 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_del(struct sk_buff * return -EINVAL; }

+ if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "FDB add only supported for Ethernet devices"); + return -EINVAL; + } + addr = nla_data(tb[NDA_LLADDR]);

err = fdb_vid_parse(tb[NDA_VLAN], &vid, extack);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Tobias Jungel tobias.jungel@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 414dd6fb9a1a1b59983aea7bf0f79f0085ecc5b8 ]

The attribute IFLA_BOND_AD_ACTOR_SYSTEM is sent to user space having the length of sizeof(bond->params.ad_actor_system) which is 8 byte. This patch aligns the length to ETH_ALEN to have the same MAC address exposed as using sysfs.

Fixes: f87fda00b6ed2 ("bonding: prevent out of bound accesses") Signed-off-by: Tobias Jungel tobias.jungel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c @@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ static int bond_fill_info(struct sk_buff goto nla_put_failure;

if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_BOND_AD_ACTOR_SYSTEM, - sizeof(bond->params.ad_actor_system), - &bond->params.ad_actor_system)) + ETH_ALEN, &bond->params.ad_actor_system)) goto nla_put_failure; } if (!bond_3ad_get_active_agg_info(bond, &info)) {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 4ed591c8ab44e711e56b8e021ffaf4f407c045f5 ]

The intent of ip6_route_check_nh_onlink is to make sure the gateway given for an onlink route is not actually on a connected route for a different interface (e.g., 2001:db8:1::/64 is on dev eth1 and then an onlink route has a via 2001:db8:1::1 dev eth2). If the gateway lookup hits the default route then it most likely will be a different interface than the onlink route which is ok.

Update ip6_route_check_nh_onlink to disregard the device mismatch if the gateway lookup hits the default route. Turns out the existing onlink tests are passing because there is no default route or it is an unreachable default, so update the onlink tests to have a default route other than unreachable.

Fixes: fc1e64e1092f6 ("net/ipv6: Add support for onlink flag") Signed-off-by: David Ahern dsahern@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 ++ tools/testing/selftests/net/fib-onlink-tests.sh | 14 +++++++------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -2799,6 +2799,8 @@ static int ip6_route_check_nh_onlink(str grt = ip6_nh_lookup_table(net, cfg, gw_addr, tbid, 0); if (grt) { if (!grt->dst.error && + /* ignore match if it is the default route */ + grt->from && !ipv6_addr_any(&grt->from->fib6_dst.addr) && (grt->rt6i_flags & flags || dev != grt->dst.dev)) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Nexthop has invalid gateway or device mismatch"); --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib-onlink-tests.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/fib-onlink-tests.sh @@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ setup() # add vrf table ip li add ${VRF} type vrf table ${VRF_TABLE} ip li set ${VRF} up - ip ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default - ip -6 ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default + ip ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default metric 8192 + ip -6 ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default metric 8192

# create test interfaces ip li add ${NETIFS[p1]} type veth peer name ${NETIFS[p2]} @@ -185,20 +185,20 @@ setup() for n in 1 3 5 7; do ip li set ${NETIFS[p${n}]} up ip addr add ${V4ADDRS[p${n}]}/24 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} - ip addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} + ip addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} nodad done

# move peer interfaces to namespace and add addresses for n in 2 4 6 8; do ip li set ${NETIFS[p${n}]} netns ${PEER_NS} up ip -netns ${PEER_NS} addr add ${V4ADDRS[p${n}]}/24 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} - ip -netns ${PEER_NS} addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} + ip -netns ${PEER_NS} addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} nodad done

- set +e + ip -6 ro add default via ${V6ADDRS[p3]/::[0-9]/::64} + ip -6 ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} default via ${V6ADDRS[p7]/::[0-9]/::64}

- # let DAD complete - assume default of 1 probe - sleep 1 + set +e }

cleanup()

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Petr Machata petrm@mellanox.com

[ Upstream commit ad0b9d94182be8356978d220c82f9837cffeb7a9 ]

Demands to remove FDB entries should be honored even if the FDB entry in question was originally learned, and not added by the user. Therefore ignore the added_by_user datum for SWITCHDEV_FDB_DEL_TO_DEVICE.

Fixes: 816a3bed9549 ("switchdev: Add fdb.added_by_user to switchdev notifications") Signed-off-by: Petr Machata petrm@mellanox.com Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c @@ -2317,8 +2317,6 @@ static void mlxsw_sp_switchdev_event_wor break; case SWITCHDEV_FDB_DEL_TO_DEVICE: fdb_info = &switchdev_work->fdb_info; - if (!fdb_info->added_by_user) - break; mlxsw_sp_port_fdb_set(mlxsw_sp_port, fdb_info, false); break; case SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE: /* fall through */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

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From: Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 7de414a9dd91426318df7b63da024b2b07e53df5 ]

Most callers of pskb_trim_rcsum() simply drop the skb when it fails, however, ip_check_defrag() still continues to pass the skb up to stack. This is suspicious.

In ip_check_defrag(), after we learn the skb is an IP fragment, passing the skb to callers makes no sense, because callers expect fragments are defrag'ed on success. So, dropping the skb when we can't defrag it is reasonable.

Note, prior to commit 88078d98d1bb, this is not a big problem as checksum will be fixed up anyway. After it, the checksum is not correct on failure.

Found this during code review.

Fixes: 88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are friends") Cc: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c @@ -720,10 +720,14 @@ struct sk_buff *ip_check_defrag(struct n if (ip_is_fragment(&iph)) { skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (skb) { - if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, netoff + iph.ihl * 4)) - return skb; - if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, netoff + len)) - return skb; + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, netoff + iph.ihl * 4)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return NULL; + } + if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, netoff + len)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return NULL; + } memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm)); if (ip_defrag(net, skb, user)) return NULL;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiner Kallweit hkallweit1@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 649f0837a8cc2b39329f2de00fa0d04b029291c5 ]

It was reported that WoL from S5 is broken (WoL from S3 works) and the analysis showed that during system shutdown the network interface was brought down already when the actual kernel shutdown started. Therefore netif_running() returned false and as a consequence the PHY was suspended. Obviously WoL wasn't working then. To fix this the original patch needs to be effectively reverted. A side effect is that when normally bringing down the interface and WoL is enabled the PHY will remain powered on (like it was before the original patch).

Fixes: fe87bef01f9b ("r8169: don't check WoL when powering down PHY and interface is down") Reported-by: Neil MacLeod neil@nmacleod.com Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit hkallweit1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c @@ -4175,10 +4175,15 @@ static void rtl_wol_suspend_quirk(struct

static bool rtl_wol_pll_power_down(struct rtl8169_private *tp) { - if (!netif_running(tp->dev) || !__rtl8169_get_wol(tp)) + struct phy_device *phydev; + + if (!__rtl8169_get_wol(tp)) return false;

- phy_speed_down(tp->dev->phydev, false); + /* phydev may not be attached to netdevice */ + phydev = mdiobus_get_phy(tp->mii_bus, 0); + + phy_speed_down(phydev, false); rtl_wol_suspend_quirk(tp);

return true;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 713358369382cebf92f6e98ce2005f94e7344931 ]

When getting pr_assocstatus and pr_streamstatus by sctp_getsockopt, it doesn't correctly process the case when policy is set with SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL | SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK. It even causes a slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus().

This patch fixes it by return -EINVAL for this case.

Fixes: 0ac1077e3a54 ("sctp: get pr_assoc and pr_stream all status with SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL") Reported-by: syzbot+5da0d0a72a9e7d791748@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/sctp/socket.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -7101,14 +7101,15 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatu }

policy = params.sprstat_policy; - if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL))) + if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL)) || + ((policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) && (policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK))) goto out;

asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id); if (!asoc) goto out;

- if (policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) { + if (policy == SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) { params.sprstat_abandoned_unsent = 0; params.sprstat_abandoned_sent = 0; for (policy = 0; policy <= SCTP_PR_INDEX(MAX); policy++) { @@ -7160,7 +7161,8 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstat }

policy = params.sprstat_policy; - if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL))) + if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL)) || + ((policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) && (policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK))) goto out;

asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Miller davem@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 5b4fc3882a649c9411dd0dcad2ddb78e911d340e ]

Right now if we get a corrupted user stack frame we do a do_exit(SIGILL) which is not helpful.

If under a debugger, this behavior causes the inferior process to exit. So the register and other state cannot be examined at the time of the event.

Instead, conditionally log a rate limited kernel log message and then force a SIGSEGV.

With bits and ideas borrowed (as usual) from powerpc.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/sparc/include/asm/switch_to_64.h | 3 ++- arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ arch/sparc/kernel/rtrap_64.S | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 12 ++++++++++-- arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 6 +++++- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/switch_to_64.h +++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/switch_to_64.h @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ do { save_and_clear_fpu(); \ } while(0)

void synchronize_user_stack(void); -void fault_in_user_windows(void); +struct pt_regs; +void fault_in_user_windows(struct pt_regs *);

#endif /* __SPARC64_SWITCH_TO_64_H */ --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include <linux/sysrq.h> #include <linux/nmi.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> +#include <linux/signal.h>

#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/page.h> @@ -521,7 +522,12 @@ static void stack_unaligned(unsigned lon force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *) sp, 0, current); }

-void fault_in_user_windows(void) +static const char uwfault32[] = KERN_INFO \ + "%s[%d]: bad register window fault: SP %08lx (orig_sp %08lx) TPC %08lx O7 %08lx\n"; +static const char uwfault64[] = KERN_INFO \ + "%s[%d]: bad register window fault: SP %016lx (orig_sp %016lx) TPC %08lx O7 %016lx\n"; + +void fault_in_user_windows(struct pt_regs *regs) { struct thread_info *t = current_thread_info(); unsigned long window; @@ -534,9 +540,9 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(void) do { struct reg_window *rwin = &t->reg_window[window]; int winsize = sizeof(struct reg_window); - unsigned long sp; + unsigned long sp, orig_sp;

- sp = t->rwbuf_stkptrs[window]; + orig_sp = sp = t->rwbuf_stkptrs[window];

if (test_thread_64bit_stack(sp)) sp += STACK_BIAS; @@ -547,8 +553,16 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(void) stack_unaligned(sp);

if (unlikely(copy_to_user((char __user *)sp, - rwin, winsize))) + rwin, winsize))) { + if (show_unhandled_signals) + printk_ratelimited(is_compat_task() ? + uwfault32 : uwfault64, + current->comm, current->pid, + sp, orig_sp, + regs->tpc, + regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]); goto barf; + } } while (window--); } set_thread_wsaved(0); @@ -556,8 +570,7 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(void)

barf: set_thread_wsaved(window + 1); - user_exit(); - do_exit(SIGILL); + force_sig(SIGSEGV, current); }

asmlinkage long sparc_do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/rtrap_64.S +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/rtrap_64.S @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ __handle_preemption: wrpr %g0, RTRAP_PSTATE_IRQOFF, %pstate

__handle_user_windows: + add %sp, PTREGS_OFF, %o0 call fault_in_user_windows 661: wrpr %g0, RTRAP_PSTATE, %pstate /* If userspace is using ADI, it could potentially pass --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c @@ -371,7 +371,11 @@ static int setup_frame32(struct ksignal get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sigframe_size); if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf, sigframe_size)) { - do_exit(SIGILL); + if (show_unhandled_signals) + pr_info("%s[%d] bad frame in setup_frame32: %08lx TPC %08lx O7 %08lx\n", + current->comm, current->pid, (unsigned long)sf, + regs->tpc, regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]); + force_sigsegv(ksig->sig, current); return -EINVAL; }

@@ -501,7 +505,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame32(struct ksign get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sigframe_size); if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf, sigframe_size)) { - do_exit(SIGILL); + if (show_unhandled_signals) + pr_info("%s[%d] bad frame in setup_rt_frame32: %08lx TPC %08lx O7 %08lx\n", + current->comm, current->pid, (unsigned long)sf, + regs->tpc, regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]); + force_sigsegv(ksig->sig, current); return -EINVAL; }

--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c @@ -370,7 +370,11 @@ setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, str get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sf_size);

if (invalid_frame_pointer (sf)) { - do_exit(SIGILL); /* won't return, actually */ + if (show_unhandled_signals) + pr_info("%s[%d] bad frame in setup_rt_frame: %016lx TPC %016lx O7 %016lx\n", + current->comm, current->pid, (unsigned long)sf, + regs->tpc, regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]); + force_sigsegv(ksig->sig, current); return -EINVAL; }

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com

commit 0fe5119e267f3e3d8ac206895f5922195ec55a8a upstream.

Recently a check was added which prevents marking of routers with zero source address, but for IPv6 that cannot happen as the relevant RFCs actually forbid such packets: RFC 2710 (MLDv1): "To be valid, the Query message MUST come from a link-local IPv6 Source Address, be at least 24 octets long, and have a correct MLD checksum."

Same goes for RFC 3810.

And also it can be seen as a requirement in ipv6_mc_check_mld_query() which is used by the bridge to validate the message before processing it. Thus any queries with :: source address won't be processed anyway. So just remove the check for zero IPv6 source address from the query processing function.

Fixes: 5a2de63fd1a5 ("bridge: do not add port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Cc: Hangbin Liu liuhangbin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -1426,8 +1426,7 @@ static void br_multicast_query_received( * is 0.0.0.0 should not be added to router port list. */ if ((saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IP) && saddr->u.ip4) || - (saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) && - !ipv6_addr_any(&saddr->u.ip6))) + saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) br_multicast_mark_router(br, port); }