April 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

Patch "netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 01:15:45 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream. recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that name is 0 terminated. This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/". Add helper for this and then use it for both. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 2 ++ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c | 16 ++++++++++------ net/netfilter/xt_recent.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h @@ -285,6 +285,8 @@ unsigned int *xt_alloc_entry_offsets(uns bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets, unsigned int target, unsigned int size); +int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size); + int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto); int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -423,6 +423,36 @@ textify_hooks(char *buf, size_t size, un return buf; } +/** + * xt_check_proc_name - check that name is suitable for /proc file creation + * + * @name: file name candidate + * @size: length of buffer + * + * some x_tables modules wish to create a file in /proc. + * This function makes sure that the name is suitable for this + * purpose, it checks that name is NUL terminated and isn't a 'special' + * name, like "..". + * + * returns negative number on error or 0 if name is useable. + */ +int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size) +{ + if (name[0] == '\0') + return -EINVAL; + + if (strnlen(name, size) == size) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + + if (strcmp(name, ".") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "..") == 0 || + strchr(name, '/')) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_proc_name); + int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto) { --- a/net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c @@ -915,8 +915,9 @@ static int hashlimit_mt_check_v1(const s struct hashlimit_cfg3 cfg = {}; int ret; - if (info->name[sizeof(info->name) - 1] != '\0') - return -EINVAL; + ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name)); + if (ret) + return ret; ret = cfg_copy(&cfg, (void *)&info->cfg, 1); @@ -933,8 +934,9 @@ static int hashlimit_mt_check_v2(const s struct hashlimit_cfg3 cfg = {}; int ret; - if (info->name[sizeof(info->name) - 1] != '\0') - return -EINVAL; + ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name)); + if (ret) + return ret; ret = cfg_copy(&cfg, (void *)&info->cfg, 2); @@ -948,9 +950,11 @@ static int hashlimit_mt_check_v2(const s static int hashlimit_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { struct xt_hashlimit_mtinfo3 *info = par->matchinfo; + int ret; - if (info->name[sizeof(info->name) - 1] != '\0') - return -EINVAL; + ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name)); + if (ret) + return ret; return hashlimit_mt_check_common(par, &info->hinfo, &info->cfg, info->name, 3); --- a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c @@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ static int recent_mt_check(const struct info->hit_count, XT_RECENT_MAX_NSTAMPS - 1); return -EINVAL; } - if (info->name[0] == '\0' || - strnlen(info->name, XT_RECENT_NAME_LEN) == XT_RECENT_NAME_LEN) - return -EINVAL; + ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name)); + if (ret) + return ret; if (ip_pkt_list_tot && info->hit_count < ip_pkt_list_tot) nstamp_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(ip_pkt_list_tot) - 1; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-4.14/netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch queue-4.14/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-x_tables-make-allocation-less-aggressive.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-drop-template-ct-when-conntrack-is-skipped.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "netfilter: drop template ct when conntrack is skipped." has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled netfilter: drop template ct when conntrack is skipped. to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: netfilter-drop-template-ct-when-conntrack-is-skipped.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From aebfa52a925d701114afd6af0def35bab16d4f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 11:08:50 +0100 Subject: netfilter: drop template ct when conntrack is skipped. From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> commit aebfa52a925d701114afd6af0def35bab16d4f47 upstream. The ipv4 nf_ct code currently skips the nf_conntrak_in() call for fragmented packets. As a results later matches/target can end up manipulating template ct entry instead of 'real' ones. Exploiting the above, syzbot found a way to trigger the following splat: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4242 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:55 xt_cluster_mt+0x6c1/0x840 net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:127 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 4242 Comm: syzkaller027971 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #243 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183 __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547 report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184 fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline] do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x58/0x80 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:957 RIP: 0010:xt_cluster_hash net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:55 [inline] RIP: 0010:xt_cluster_mt+0x6c1/0x840 net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:127 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d2f6f2d0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801af700540 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff84a2d1e1 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801d2f6f478 RDI: ffff8801cafd336a RBP: ffff8801d2f6f2e8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801b03b3d18 R13: ffff8801cafd3300 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801d2f6f478 ipt_do_table+0xa91/0x19b0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:296 iptable_filter_hook+0x65/0x80 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_filter.c:41 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:243 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline] raw_send_hdrinc.isra.17+0xf39/0x1880 net/ipv4/raw.c:432 raw_sendmsg+0x14cd/0x26b0 net/ipv4/raw.c:669 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:763 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:639 SYSC_sendto+0x361/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1748 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1716 do_syscall_64+0x280/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x441b49 RSP: 002b:00007ffff5ca8b18 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000441b49 RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: 0000000020ff7000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006cc018 R08: 000000002066354c R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 0000000000403470 R13: 0000000000403500 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. Instead of adding checks for template ct on every target/match manipulating skb->_nfct, simply drop the template ct when skipping nf_conntrack_in(). Fixes: 7b4fdf77a450ec ("netfilter: don't track fragmented packets") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+0346441ae0545cfcea3a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c @@ -159,8 +159,20 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_conntrack_local ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr)) return NF_ACCEPT; - if (ip_is_fragment(ip_hdr(skb))) /* IP_NODEFRAG setsockopt set */ + if (ip_is_fragment(ip_hdr(skb))) { /* IP_NODEFRAG setsockopt set */ + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct nf_conn *tmpl; + + tmpl = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); + if (tmpl && nf_ct_is_template(tmpl)) { + /* when skipping ct, clear templates to avoid fooling + * later targets/matches + */ + skb->_nfct = 0; + nf_ct_put(tmpl); + } return NF_ACCEPT; + } return nf_conntrack_in(state->net, PF_INET, state->hook, skb); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pabeni(a)redhat.com are queue-4.14/l2tp-fix-races-with-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-addresses.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-drop-template-ct-when-conntrack-is-skipped.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:27:31 +0100 Subject: netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 upstream. ebt_among is special, it has a dynamic match size and is exempt from the central size checks. commit c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks") added validation for pool size, but missed fact that the macros ebt_among_wh_src/dst can already return out-of-bound result because they do not check value of wh_src/dst_ofs (an offset) vs. the size of the match that userspace gave to us. v2: check that offset has correct alignment. Paolo Abeni points out that we should also check that src/dst wormhash arrays do not overlap, and src + length lines up with start of dst (or vice versa). v3: compact wormhash_sizes_valid() part NB: Fixes tag is intentionally wrong, this bug exists from day one when match was added for 2.6 kernel. Tag is there so stable maintainers will notice this one too. Tested with same rules from the earlier patch. Fixes: c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks") Reported-by: <syzbot+bdabab6f1983a03fc009(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+) --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c @@ -177,6 +177,28 @@ static bool poolsize_invalid(const struc return w && w->poolsize >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_mac_wormhash_tuple)); } +static bool wormhash_offset_invalid(int off, unsigned int len) +{ + if (off == 0) /* not present */ + return false; + + if (off < (int)sizeof(struct ebt_among_info) || + off % __alignof__(struct ebt_mac_wormhash)) + return true; + + off += sizeof(struct ebt_mac_wormhash); + + return off > len; +} + +static bool wormhash_sizes_valid(const struct ebt_mac_wormhash *wh, int a, int b) +{ + if (a == 0) + a = sizeof(struct ebt_among_info); + + return ebt_mac_wormhash_size(wh) + a == b; +} + static int ebt_among_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { const struct ebt_among_info *info = par->matchinfo; @@ -189,6 +211,10 @@ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const stru if (expected_length > em->match_size) return -EINVAL; + if (wormhash_offset_invalid(info->wh_dst_ofs, em->match_size) || + wormhash_offset_invalid(info->wh_src_ofs, em->match_size)) + return -EINVAL; + wh_dst = ebt_among_wh_dst(info); if (poolsize_invalid(wh_dst)) return -EINVAL; @@ -201,6 +227,14 @@ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const stru if (poolsize_invalid(wh_src)) return -EINVAL; + if (info->wh_src_ofs < info->wh_dst_ofs) { + if (!wormhash_sizes_valid(wh_src, info->wh_src_ofs, info->wh_dst_ofs)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (!wormhash_sizes_valid(wh_dst, info->wh_dst_ofs, info->wh_src_ofs)) + return -EINVAL; + } + expected_length += ebt_mac_wormhash_size(wh_src); if (em->match_size != EBT_ALIGN(expected_length)) { Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-4.14/netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch queue-4.14/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-x_tables-make-allocation-less-aggressive.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-drop-template-ct-when-conntrack-is-skipped.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms()" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms() to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-xfrm-use-preempt-safe-this_cpu_read-in-ipcomp_alloc_tfms.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 14:42:53 -0800 Subject: net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms() From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann(a)google.com> commit 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 upstream. f7c83bcbfaf5 ("net: xfrm: use __this_cpu_read per-cpu helper") added a __this_cpu_read() call inside ipcomp_alloc_tfms(). At the time, __this_cpu_read() required the caller to either not care about races or to handle preemption/interrupt issues. 3.15 tightened the rules around some per-cpu operations, and now __this_cpu_read() should never be used in a preemptible context. On 3.15 and later, we need to use this_cpu_read() instead. syzkaller reported this leading to the following kernel BUG while fuzzing sendmsg: BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: repro/3101 caller is ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990 CPU: 3 PID: 3101 Comm: repro Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4-00123-g86f84779d8e9 #154 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xb9/0x115 check_preemption_disabled+0x1cb/0x1f0 ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990 ? __xfrm_init_state+0x876/0xc20 ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0 ipcomp4_init_state+0xaa/0x7c0 __xfrm_init_state+0x3eb/0xc20 xfrm_init_state+0x19/0x60 pfkey_add+0x20df/0x36f0 ? pfkey_broadcast+0x3dd/0x600 ? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340 ? pfkey_seq_stop+0x80/0x80 ? __skb_clone+0x236/0x750 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f6/0x260 ? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340 ? pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0 pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0 ? pfkey_send_new_mapping+0x11c0/0x11c0 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1390/0x1390 pfkey_sendmsg+0x383/0x750 ? dump_sp+0x430/0x430 sock_sendmsg+0xc0/0x100 ___sys_sendmsg+0x6c8/0x8b0 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x3b0/0x3b0 ? pagevec_lru_move_fn+0x144/0x1f0 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x1c0 ? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0xc43/0x11e0 ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0 ? get_kernel_page+0xb0/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 ? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x400/0x11e0 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x553/0x2460 ? __fget_light+0x163/0x1f0 ? __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170 __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170 ? SyS_shutdown+0x1a0/0x1a0 ? __do_page_fault+0x5a0/0xca0 ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0 SyS_sendmsg+0x27/0x40 ? __sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x19f/0x640 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7f0ee73dfb79 RSP: 002b:00007ffe14fc15a8 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0ee73dfb79 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000208befc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe14fc15b0 R08: 00007ffe14fc15c0 R09: 00007ffe14fc15c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: 0000000000400440 R13: 00007ffe14fc16b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static struct crypto_comp * __percpu *ip struct crypto_comp *tfm; /* This can be any valid CPU ID so we don't need locking. */ - tfm = __this_cpu_read(*pos->tfms); + tfm = this_cpu_read(*pos->tfms); if (!strcmp(crypto_comp_name(tfm), alg_name)) { pos->users++; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ghackmann(a)google.com are queue-4.14/net-xfrm-use-preempt-safe-this_cpu_read-in-ipcomp_alloc_tfms.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: l2tp-fix-races-with-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-addresses.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b954f94023dcc61388c8384f0f14eb8e42c863c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 14:54:24 +0100 Subject: l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> commit b954f94023dcc61388c8384f0f14eb8e42c863c5 upstream. The l2tp_tunnel_create() function checks for v4mapped ipv6 sockets and cache that flag, so that l2tp core code can reusing it at xmit time. If the socket is provided by the userspace, the connection status of the tunnel sockets can change between the tunnel creation and the xmit call, so that syzbot is able to trigger the following splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bd949318 by task syz-executor4/23448 CPU: 0 PID: 23448 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #65 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x23c/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 l2tp_xmit_core net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1053 [inline] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x105f/0x1410 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1148 pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x470/0x670 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:341 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:640 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2080 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2091 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453e69 RSP: 002b:00007f819593cc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f819593d6d4 RCX: 0000000000453e69 RDX: 0000000000000081 RSI: 000000002037ffc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004c3 R14: 00000000006f72e8 R15: 0000000000000000 This change addresses the issues: * explicitly checking for TCP_ESTABLISHED for user space provided sockets * dropping the v4mapped flag usage - it can become outdated - and explicitly invoking ipv6_addr_v4mapped() instead The issue is apparently there since ancient times. v1 -> v2: (many thanks to Guillaume) - with csum issue introduced in v1 - replace pr_err with pr_debug - fix build issue with IPV6 disabled - move l2tp_sk_is_v4mapped in l2tp_core.c v2 -> v3: - don't update inet_daddr for v4mapped address, unneeded - drop rendundant check at creation time Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+92fa328176eb07e4ac1a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h | 3 --- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -113,6 +113,13 @@ struct l2tp_net { spinlock_t l2tp_session_hlist_lock; }; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) +static bool l2tp_sk_is_v6(struct sock *sk) +{ + return sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 && + !ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr); +} +#endif static inline struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel(struct sock *sk) { @@ -1130,7 +1137,7 @@ static int l2tp_xmit_core(struct l2tp_se /* Queue the packet to IP for output */ skb->ignore_df = 1; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - if (tunnel->sock->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped) + if (l2tp_sk_is_v6(tunnel->sock)) error = inet6_csk_xmit(tunnel->sock, skb, NULL); else #endif @@ -1193,6 +1200,15 @@ int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *s goto out_unlock; } + /* The user-space may change the connection status for the user-space + * provided socket at run time: we must check it under the socket lock + */ + if (tunnel->fd >= 0 && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) { + kfree_skb(skb); + ret = NET_XMIT_DROP; + goto out_unlock; + } + /* Get routing info from the tunnel socket */ skb_dst_drop(skb); skb_dst_set(skb, dst_clone(__sk_dst_check(sk, 0))); @@ -1212,7 +1228,7 @@ int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *s /* Calculate UDP checksum if configured to do so */ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped) + if (l2tp_sk_is_v6(sk)) udp6_set_csum(udp_get_no_check6_tx(sk), skb, &inet6_sk(sk)->saddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr, udp_len); @@ -1616,24 +1632,6 @@ int l2tp_tunnel_create(struct net *net, if (cfg != NULL) tunnel->debug = cfg->debug; -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) { - struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); - - if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&np->saddr) && - ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) { - struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); - - tunnel->v4mapped = true; - inet->inet_saddr = np->saddr.s6_addr32[3]; - inet->inet_rcv_saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr.s6_addr32[3]; - inet->inet_daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr.s6_addr32[3]; - } else { - tunnel->v4mapped = false; - } - } -#endif - /* Mark socket as an encapsulation socket. See net/ipv4/udp.c */ tunnel->encap = encap; if (encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP) { --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h @@ -195,9 +195,6 @@ struct l2tp_tunnel { struct sock *sock; /* Parent socket */ int fd; /* Parent fd, if tunnel socket * was created by userspace */ -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) - bool v4mapped; -#endif struct work_struct del_work; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from pabeni(a)redhat.com are queue-4.14/l2tp-fix-races-with-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-addresses.patch queue-4.14/netfilter-drop-template-ct-when-conntrack-is-skipped.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "Bluetooth: Fix missing encryption refresh on Security Request" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Bluetooth: Fix missing encryption refresh on Security Request to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: bluetooth-fix-missing-encryption-refresh-on-security-request.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 64e759f58f128730b97a3c3a26d283c075ad7c86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 15:41:53 +0100 Subject: Bluetooth: Fix missing encryption refresh on Security Request From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> commit 64e759f58f128730b97a3c3a26d283c075ad7c86 upstream. If Security Request is received on connection that is already encrypted with sufficient security master should perform encryption key refresh procedure instead of just ignoring Slave Security Request (Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3 Part H 2.4.6). > ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 6 SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1 Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09) < HCI Command: LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) plen 28 Handle: 3585 Random number: 0x0000000000000000 Encrypted diversifier: 0x0000 Long term key: 44264272a5c426a9e868f034cf0e69f3 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: Encryption Key Refresh Complete (0x30) plen 3 Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 3585 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -2287,8 +2287,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2 else sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); - if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) + if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) { + /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we + * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3, + * Part H 2.4.6 + */ + smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level); return 0; + } if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level) hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl are queue-4.14/bluetooth-fix-missing-encryption-refresh-on-security-request.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "xfrm: Refuse to insert 32 bit userspace socket policies on 64 bit systems" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled xfrm: Refuse to insert 32 bit userspace socket policies on 64 bit systems to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: xfrm-refuse-to-insert-32-bit-userspace-socket-policies-on-64-bit-systems.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 19d7df69fdb2636856dc8919de72fc1bf8f79598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 08:49:23 +0100 Subject: xfrm: Refuse to insert 32 bit userspace socket policies on 64 bit systems From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> commit 19d7df69fdb2636856dc8919de72fc1bf8f79598 upstream. We don't have a compat layer for xfrm, so userspace and kernel structures have different sizes in this case. This results in a broken configuration, so refuse to configure socket policies when trying to insert from 32 bit userspace as we do it already with policies inserted via netlink. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e1a1577ca8bcb47b769a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> [use is_compat_task() - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1845,6 +1845,11 @@ int xfrm_user_policy(struct sock *sk, in struct xfrm_mgr *km; struct xfrm_policy *pol = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + if (is_compat_task()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif + if (!optval && !optlen) { xfrm_sk_policy_insert(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, NULL); xfrm_sk_policy_insert(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, NULL); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com are queue-3.18/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch queue-3.18/xfrm-refuse-to-insert-32-bit-userspace-socket-policies-on-64-bit-systems.patch queue-3.18/net-xfrm-use-preempt-safe-this_cpu_read-in-ipcomp_alloc_tfms.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:27:31 +0100 Subject: netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 upstream. ebt_among is special, it has a dynamic match size and is exempt from the central size checks. commit c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks") added validation for pool size, but missed fact that the macros ebt_among_wh_src/dst can already return out-of-bound result because they do not check value of wh_src/dst_ofs (an offset) vs. the size of the match that userspace gave to us. v2: check that offset has correct alignment. Paolo Abeni points out that we should also check that src/dst wormhash arrays do not overlap, and src + length lines up with start of dst (or vice versa). v3: compact wormhash_sizes_valid() part NB: Fixes tag is intentionally wrong, this bug exists from day one when match was added for 2.6 kernel. Tag is there so stable maintainers will notice this one too. Tested with same rules from the earlier patch. Fixes: c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks") Reported-by: <syzbot+bdabab6f1983a03fc009(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+) --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c @@ -177,6 +177,28 @@ static bool poolsize_invalid(const struc return w && w->poolsize >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_mac_wormhash_tuple)); } +static bool wormhash_offset_invalid(int off, unsigned int len) +{ + if (off == 0) /* not present */ + return false; + + if (off < (int)sizeof(struct ebt_among_info) || + off % __alignof__(struct ebt_mac_wormhash)) + return true; + + off += sizeof(struct ebt_mac_wormhash); + + return off > len; +} + +static bool wormhash_sizes_valid(const struct ebt_mac_wormhash *wh, int a, int b) +{ + if (a == 0) + a = sizeof(struct ebt_among_info); + + return ebt_mac_wormhash_size(wh) + a == b; +} + static int ebt_among_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { const struct ebt_among_info *info = par->matchinfo; @@ -189,6 +211,10 @@ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const stru if (expected_length > em->match_size) return -EINVAL; + if (wormhash_offset_invalid(info->wh_dst_ofs, em->match_size) || + wormhash_offset_invalid(info->wh_src_ofs, em->match_size)) + return -EINVAL; + wh_dst = ebt_among_wh_dst(info); if (poolsize_invalid(wh_dst)) return -EINVAL; @@ -201,6 +227,14 @@ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const stru if (poolsize_invalid(wh_src)) return -EINVAL; + if (info->wh_src_ofs < info->wh_dst_ofs) { + if (!wormhash_sizes_valid(wh_src, info->wh_src_ofs, info->wh_dst_ofs)) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (!wormhash_sizes_valid(wh_dst, info->wh_dst_ofs, info->wh_src_ofs)) + return -EINVAL; + } + expected_length += ebt_mac_wormhash_size(wh_src); if (em->match_size != EBT_ALIGN(expected_length)) { Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch queue-3.18/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch queue-3.18/netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 01:15:45 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream. recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that name is 0 terminated. This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/". Add helper for this and then use it for both. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 2 ++ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c | 5 +++-- net/netfilter/xt_recent.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h @@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ unsigned int *xt_alloc_entry_offsets(uns bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets, unsigned int target, unsigned int size); +int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size); + int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto); int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -367,6 +367,36 @@ textify_hooks(char *buf, size_t size, un return buf; } +/** + * xt_check_proc_name - check that name is suitable for /proc file creation + * + * @name: file name candidate + * @size: length of buffer + * + * some x_tables modules wish to create a file in /proc. + * This function makes sure that the name is suitable for this + * purpose, it checks that name is NUL terminated and isn't a 'special' + * name, like "..". + * + * returns negative number on error or 0 if name is useable. + */ +int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size) +{ + if (name[0] == '\0') + return -EINVAL; + + if (strnlen(name, size) == size) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + + if (strcmp(name, ".") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "..") == 0 || + strchr(name, '/')) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_proc_name); + int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto) { --- a/net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c @@ -668,8 +668,9 @@ static int hashlimit_mt_check(const stru if (info->cfg.gc_interval == 0 || info->cfg.expire == 0) return -EINVAL; - if (info->name[sizeof(info->name)-1] != '\0') - return -EINVAL; + ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name)); + if (ret) + return ret; if (par->family == NFPROTO_IPV4) { if (info->cfg.srcmask > 32 || info->cfg.dstmask > 32) return -EINVAL; --- a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c @@ -355,9 +355,9 @@ static int recent_mt_check(const struct info->hit_count, ip_pkt_list_tot); return -EINVAL; } - if (info->name[0] == '\0' || - strnlen(info->name, XT_RECENT_NAME_LEN) == XT_RECENT_NAME_LEN) - return -EINVAL; + ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name)); + if (ret) + return ret; mutex_lock(&recent_mutex); t = recent_table_lookup(recent_net, info->name); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-3.18/netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch queue-3.18/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch queue-3.18/netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms()" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms() to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: net-xfrm-use-preempt-safe-this_cpu_read-in-ipcomp_alloc_tfms.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 14:42:53 -0800 Subject: net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms() From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann(a)google.com> commit 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 upstream. f7c83bcbfaf5 ("net: xfrm: use __this_cpu_read per-cpu helper") added a __this_cpu_read() call inside ipcomp_alloc_tfms(). At the time, __this_cpu_read() required the caller to either not care about races or to handle preemption/interrupt issues. 3.15 tightened the rules around some per-cpu operations, and now __this_cpu_read() should never be used in a preemptible context. On 3.15 and later, we need to use this_cpu_read() instead. syzkaller reported this leading to the following kernel BUG while fuzzing sendmsg: BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: repro/3101 caller is ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990 CPU: 3 PID: 3101 Comm: repro Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4-00123-g86f84779d8e9 #154 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xb9/0x115 check_preemption_disabled+0x1cb/0x1f0 ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990 ? __xfrm_init_state+0x876/0xc20 ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0 ipcomp4_init_state+0xaa/0x7c0 __xfrm_init_state+0x3eb/0xc20 xfrm_init_state+0x19/0x60 pfkey_add+0x20df/0x36f0 ? pfkey_broadcast+0x3dd/0x600 ? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340 ? pfkey_seq_stop+0x80/0x80 ? __skb_clone+0x236/0x750 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f6/0x260 ? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340 ? pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0 pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0 ? pfkey_send_new_mapping+0x11c0/0x11c0 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1390/0x1390 pfkey_sendmsg+0x383/0x750 ? dump_sp+0x430/0x430 sock_sendmsg+0xc0/0x100 ___sys_sendmsg+0x6c8/0x8b0 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x3b0/0x3b0 ? pagevec_lru_move_fn+0x144/0x1f0 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x1c0 ? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0xc43/0x11e0 ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0 ? get_kernel_page+0xb0/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 ? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x400/0x11e0 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x553/0x2460 ? __fget_light+0x163/0x1f0 ? __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170 __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170 ? SyS_shutdown+0x1a0/0x1a0 ? __do_page_fault+0x5a0/0xca0 ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0 SyS_sendmsg+0x27/0x40 ? __sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x19f/0x640 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7f0ee73dfb79 RSP: 002b:00007ffe14fc15a8 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0ee73dfb79 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000208befc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe14fc15b0 R08: 00007ffe14fc15c0 R09: 00007ffe14fc15c0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: 0000000000400440 R13: 00007ffe14fc16b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static struct crypto_comp * __percpu *ip struct crypto_comp *tfm; /* This can be any valid CPU ID so we don't need locking. */ - tfm = __this_cpu_read(*pos->tfms); + tfm = this_cpu_read(*pos->tfms); if (!strcmp(crypto_comp_name(tfm), alg_name)) { pos->users++; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ghackmann(a)google.com are queue-3.18/net-xfrm-use-preempt-safe-this_cpu_read-in-ipcomp_alloc_tfms.patch

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Linux-stable-mirror April 2018