April 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

Patch "netfilter: ctnetlink: Make some parameters integer to avoid enum mismatch" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled netfilter: ctnetlink: Make some parameters integer to avoid enum mismatch to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: netfilter-ctnetlink-make-some-parameters-integer-to-avoid-enum-mismatch.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From a2b7cbdd2559aff06cebc28a7150f81c307a90d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 11:39:20 -0700 Subject: netfilter: ctnetlink: Make some parameters integer to avoid enum mismatch From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> commit a2b7cbdd2559aff06cebc28a7150f81c307a90d3 upstream. Not all parameters passed to ctnetlink_parse_tuple() and ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple() match the enum type in the signatures of these functions. Since this is intended change the argument type of to be an unsigned integer value. Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> [natechancellor: ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple is still inline] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -999,9 +999,8 @@ static const struct nla_policy tuple_nla static int ctnetlink_parse_tuple(const struct nlattr * const cda[], - struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, - enum ctattr_type type, u_int8_t l3num, - struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone) + struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, u32 type, + u_int8_t l3num, struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone) { struct nlattr *tb[CTA_TUPLE_MAX+1]; int err; @@ -2416,7 +2415,7 @@ static struct nfnl_ct_hook ctnetlink_glu static inline int ctnetlink_exp_dump_tuple(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, - enum ctattr_expect type) + u32 type) { struct nlattr *nest_parms; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from mka(a)chromium.org are queue-4.4/dm-ioctl-remove-double-parentheses.patch queue-4.4/arm64-avoid-overflow-in-va_start-and-page_offset.patch queue-4.4/genirq-use-cpumask_available-for-check-of-cpumask-variable.patch queue-4.4/selinux-remove-redundant-check-for-unknown-labeling-behavior.patch queue-4.4/fs-compat-remove-warning-from-compatible_ioctl.patch queue-4.4/jiffies.h-declare-jiffies-and-jiffies_64-with-____cacheline_aligned_in_smp.patch queue-4.4/selinux-remove-unnecessary-check-of-array-base-in-selinux_set_mapping.patch queue-4.4/pci-make-pci_rom_address_mask-a-32-bit-constant.patch queue-4.4/frv-declare-jiffies-to-be-located-in-the-.data-section.patch queue-4.4/netfilter-ctnetlink-make-some-parameters-integer-to-avoid-enum-mismatch.patch queue-4.4/cpumask-add-helper-cpumask_available.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "audit: add tty field to LOGIN event" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled audit: add tty field to LOGIN event to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: audit-add-tty-field-to-login-event.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From db0a6fb5d97afe01fd9c47d37c6daa82d4d4001d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 14:14:01 -0400 Subject: audit: add tty field to LOGIN event From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> commit db0a6fb5d97afe01fd9c47d37c6daa82d4d4001d upstream. The tty field was missing from AUDIT_LOGIN events. Refactor code to create a new function audit_get_tty(), using it to replace the call in audit_log_task_info() and to add it to audit_log_set_loginuid(). Lock and bump the kref to protect it, adding audit_put_tty() alias to decrement it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/audit.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 18 +++++------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++++-- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/tty.h> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1) #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1) @@ -239,6 +240,23 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_ses return tsk->sessionid; } +static inline struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + struct tty_struct *tty = NULL; + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags); + if (tsk->signal) + tty = tty_kref_get(tsk->signal->tty); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tsk->sighand->siglock, flags); + return tty; +} + +static inline void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty) +{ + tty_kref_put(tty); +} + extern void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp); extern void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode); extern void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm); @@ -410,6 +428,12 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_ses { return -1; } +static inline struct tty_struct *audit_get_tty(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + return NULL; +} +static inline void audit_put_tty(struct tty_struct *tty) +{ } static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { } static inline void audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #endif #include <linux/freezer.h> -#include <linux/tty.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <net/netns/generic.h> @@ -1876,21 +1875,14 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_bu { const struct cred *cred; char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)]; - char *tty; + struct tty_struct *tty; if (!ab) return; /* tsk == current */ cred = current_cred(); - - spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); - if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name) - tty = tsk->signal->tty->name; - else - tty = "(none)"; - spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); - + tty = audit_get_tty(tsk); audit_log_format(ab, " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" @@ -1906,11 +1898,11 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_bu from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid), - tty, audit_get_sessionid(tsk)); - + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", + audit_get_sessionid(tsk)); + audit_put_tty(tty); audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, tsk)); - audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, tsk->mm); audit_log_task_context(ab); } --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1976,6 +1976,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_ { struct audit_buffer *ab; uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; + struct tty_struct *tty; if (!audit_enabled) return; @@ -1983,14 +1984,17 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_ uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), + tty = audit_get_tty(current); ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); if (!ab) return; audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid); audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", - oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); + audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", + oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", + oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); + audit_put_tty(tty); audit_log_end(ab); } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from rgb(a)redhat.com are queue-4.4/audit-add-tty-field-to-login-event.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "arm64: avoid overflow in VA_START and PAGE_OFFSET" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled arm64: avoid overflow in VA_START and PAGE_OFFSET to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: arm64-avoid-overflow-in-va_start-and-page_offset.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 82cd588052815eb4146f9f7c5347ca5e32c56360 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 11:03:58 -0700 Subject: arm64: avoid overflow in VA_START and PAGE_OFFSET From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> commit 82cd588052815eb4146f9f7c5347ca5e32c56360 upstream. The bitmask used to define these values produces overflow, as seen by this compiler warning: arch/arm64/kernel/head.S:47:8: warning: integer overflow in preprocessor expression #elif (PAGE_OFFSET & 0x1fffff) != 0 ^~~~~~~~~~~ arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h:52:46: note: expanded from macro 'PAGE_OFFSET' #define PAGE_OFFSET (UL(0xffffffffffffffff) << (VA_BITS - 1)) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ It would be preferrable to use GENMASK_ULL() instead, but it's not set up to be used from assembly (the UL() macro token pastes UL suffixes when not included in assembly sources). Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel(a)linaro.org> Suggested-by: Yury Norov <ynorov(a)caviumnetworks.com> Suggested-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> [natechancellor: KIMAGE_VADDR doesn't exist] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h @@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ * and PAGE_OFFSET - it must be within 128MB of the kernel text. */ #define VA_BITS (CONFIG_ARM64_VA_BITS) -#define VA_START (UL(0xffffffffffffffff) << VA_BITS) -#define PAGE_OFFSET (UL(0xffffffffffffffff) << (VA_BITS - 1)) +#define VA_START (UL(0xffffffffffffffff) - \ + (UL(1) << VA_BITS) + 1) +#define PAGE_OFFSET (UL(0xffffffffffffffff) - \ + (UL(1) << (VA_BITS - 1)) + 1) #define MODULES_END (PAGE_OFFSET) #define MODULES_VADDR (MODULES_END - SZ_64M) #define PCI_IO_END (MODULES_VADDR - SZ_2M) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ndesaulniers(a)google.com are queue-4.4/arm64-avoid-overflow-in-va_start-and-page_offset.patch queue-4.4/netfilter-nf_nat_h323-fix-logical-not-parentheses-warning.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 14:42:01 +0100 Subject: xfrm_user: uncoditionally validate esn replay attribute struct From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> commit d97ca5d714a5334aecadadf696875da40f1fbf3e upstream. The sanity test added in ecd7918745234 can be bypassed, validation only occurs if XFRM_STATE_ESN flag is set, but rest of code doesn't care and just checks if the attribute itself is present. So always validate. Alternative is to reject if we have the attribute without the flag but that would change abi. Reported-by: syzbot+0ab777c27d2bb7588f73(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)googlemail.com> Fixes: ecd7918745234 ("xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid") Fixes: d8647b79c3b7e ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 21 ++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -121,22 +121,17 @@ static inline int verify_replay(struct x struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL]; struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *rs; - if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) { - if (!rt) - return -EINVAL; - - rs = nla_data(rt); + if (!rt) + return (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) ? -EINVAL : 0; - if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8) - return -EINVAL; + rs = nla_data(rt); - if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) && - nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs)) - return -EINVAL; - } + if (rs->bmp_len > XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_MAX / sizeof(rs->bmp[0]) / 8) + return -EINVAL; - if (!rt) - return 0; + if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(rs) && + nla_len(rt) != sizeof(*rs)) + return -EINVAL; /* As only ESP and AH support ESN feature. */ if ((p->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP) && (p->id.proto != IPPROTO_AH)) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from fw(a)strlen.de are queue-4.14/xfrm_user-uncoditionally-validate-esn-replay-attribute-struct.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 84652aefb347297aa08e91e283adf7b18f77c2d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 11:27:22 -0700 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Introduce safer rdma_addr_size() variants From: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> commit 84652aefb347297aa08e91e283adf7b18f77c2d5 upstream. There are several places in the ucma ABI where userspace can pass in a sockaddr but set the address family to AF_IB. When that happens, rdma_addr_size() will return a size bigger than sizeof struct sockaddr_in6, and the ucma kernel code might end up copying past the end of a buffer not sized for a struct sockaddr_ib. Fix this by introducing new variants int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr); int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr); that are type-safe for the types used in the ucma ABI and return 0 if the size computed is bigger than the size of the type passed in. We can use these new variants to check what size userspace has passed in before copying any addresses. Reported-by: <syzbot+6800425d54ed3ed8135d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland(a)purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- include/rdma/ib_addr.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c @@ -207,6 +207,22 @@ int rdma_addr_size(struct sockaddr *addr } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size); +int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr) +{ + int ret = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) addr); + + return ret <= sizeof(*addr) ? ret : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size_in6); + +int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr) +{ + int ret = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) addr); + + return ret <= sizeof(*addr) ? ret : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(rdma_addr_size_kss); + static struct rdma_addr_client self; void rdma_addr_register_client(struct rdma_addr_client *client) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -632,6 +632,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_ if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; + if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr)) + return -EINVAL; + ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); @@ -645,22 +648,21 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind(struct ucma_fil int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_bind cmd; - struct sockaddr *addr; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr; - if (cmd.reserved || !cmd.addr_size || (cmd.addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))) + if (cmd.reserved || !cmd.addr_size || + cmd.addr_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr)) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, addr); + ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -670,23 +672,22 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct uc int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_ip cmd; - struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; - dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; - if (!rdma_addr_size(src) || !rdma_addr_size(dst)) + if (!rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.src_addr) || + !rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.dst_addr)) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, + (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -696,24 +697,23 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_addr(struct int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_addr cmd; - struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; - dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; - if (cmd.reserved || (cmd.src_size && (cmd.src_size != rdma_addr_size(src))) || - !cmd.dst_size || (cmd.dst_size != rdma_addr_size(dst))) + if (cmd.reserved || + (cmd.src_size && (cmd.src_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.src_addr))) || + !cmd.dst_size || (cmd.dst_size != rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.dst_addr))) return -EINVAL; ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, + (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1432,7 +1432,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_join_ip_multicast(st join_cmd.response = cmd.response; join_cmd.uid = cmd.uid; join_cmd.id = cmd.id; - join_cmd.addr_size = rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + join_cmd.addr_size = rdma_addr_size_in6(&cmd.addr); if (!join_cmd.addr_size) return -EINVAL; @@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_join_multicast(struc if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; - if (!rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *)&cmd.addr)) + if (!rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr)) return -EINVAL; return ucma_process_join(file, &cmd, out_len); --- a/include/rdma/ib_addr.h +++ b/include/rdma/ib_addr.h @@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ int rdma_copy_addr(struct rdma_dev_addr const unsigned char *dst_dev_addr); int rdma_addr_size(struct sockaddr *addr); +int rdma_addr_size_in6(struct sockaddr_in6 *addr); +int rdma_addr_size_kss(struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage *addr); int rdma_addr_find_smac_by_sgid(union ib_gid *sgid, u8 *smac, u16 *vlan_id); int rdma_addr_find_l2_eth_by_grh(const union ib_gid *sgid, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from roland(a)purestorage.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free access in ucma_close" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free access in ucma_close to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ed65a4dc22083e73bac599ded6a262318cad7baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 14:20:15 +0200 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free access in ucma_close From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit ed65a4dc22083e73bac599ded6a262318cad7baf upstream. The error in ucma_create_id() left ctx in the list of contexts belong to ucma file descriptor. The attempt to close this file descriptor causes to use-after-free accesses while iterating over such list. Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Reported-by: <syzbot+dcfd344365a56fbebd0f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -497,6 +497,9 @@ err1: mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); mutex_unlock(&mut); + mutex_lock(&file->mut); + list_del(&ctx->list); + mutex_unlock(&file->mut); kfree(ctx); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Ensure that CM_ID exists prior to access it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Ensure that CM_ID exists prior to access it to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From e8980d67d6017c8eee8f9c35f782c4bd68e004c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 17:05:13 +0200 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Ensure that CM_ID exists prior to access it From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit e8980d67d6017c8eee8f9c35f782c4bd68e004c9 upstream. Prior to access UCMA commands, the context should be initialized and connected to CM_ID with ucma_create_id(). In case user skips this step, he can provide non-valid ctx without CM_ID and cause to multiple NULL dereferences. Also there are situations where the create_id can be raced with other user access, ensure that the context is only shared to other threads once it is fully initialized to avoid the races. [ 109.088108] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 [ 109.090315] IP: ucma_connect+0x138/0x1d0 [ 109.092595] PGD 80000001dc02d067 P4D 80000001dc02d067 PUD 1da9ef067 PMD 0 [ 109.095384] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 109.097834] CPU: 0 PID: 663 Comm: uclose Tainted: G B 4.16.0-rc1-00062-g2975d5de6428 #45 [ 109.100816] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 109.105943] RIP: 0010:ucma_connect+0x138/0x1d0 [ 109.108850] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c8567a80 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 109.111484] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff100390acf50 RCX: ffffffff9d7812e2 [ 109.114496] RDX: 1ffffffff3f507a5 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297 [ 109.117490] RBP: ffff8801daa15600 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed00390aceeb [ 109.120429] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed00390aceea R12: 0000000000000000 [ 109.123318] R13: 0000000000000120 R14: ffff8801de6459c0 R15: 0000000000000118 [ 109.126221] FS: 00007fabb68d6700(0000) GS:ffff8801e5c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 109.129468] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 109.132523] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000001d45d8003 CR4: 00000000003606b0 [ 109.135573] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 109.138716] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 109.142057] Call Trace: [ 109.144160] ? ucma_listen+0x110/0x110 [ 109.146386] ? wake_up_q+0x59/0x90 [ 109.148853] ? futex_wake+0x10b/0x2a0 [ 109.151297] ? save_stack+0x89/0xb0 [ 109.153489] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 109.155500] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 109.157933] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0 [ 109.160389] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1d/0x80 [ 109.162706] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 109.164911] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 109.167121] ? path_openat+0x1b10/0x1b10 [ 109.169355] ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0 [ 109.171567] ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170 [ 109.174145] ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0 [ 109.177110] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 109.179532] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 109.181885] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 109.184482] ? compat_start_thread+0x60/0x60 [ 109.187124] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 109.189548] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 109.192178] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 109.194725] RIP: 0033:0x7fabb61ebe99 [ 109.197040] RSP: 002b:00007fabb68d5e98 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 109.200294] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fabb61ebe99 [ 109.203399] RDX: 0000000000000120 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 109.206548] RBP: 00007fabb68d5ec0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 109.209902] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fabb68d5fc0 [ 109.213327] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff40ab2430 R15: 00007fabb68d69c0 [ 109.216613] Code: 88 44 24 2c 0f b6 84 24 6e 01 00 00 88 44 24 2d 0f b6 84 24 69 01 00 00 88 44 24 2e 8b 44 24 60 89 44 24 30 e8 da f6 06 ff 31 c0 <66> 41 83 7c 24 20 1b 75 04 8b 44 24 64 48 8d 74 24 20 4c 89 e7 [ 109.223602] RIP: ucma_connect+0x138/0x1d0 RSP: ffff8801c8567a80 [ 109.226256] CR2: 0000000000000020 Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Reported-by: <syzbot+36712f50b0552615bf59(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma ctx = idr_find(&ctx_idr, id); if (!ctx) ctx = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); - else if (ctx->file != file) + else if (ctx->file != file || !ctx->cm_id) ctx = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return ctx; } @@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucm struct rdma_ucm_create_id cmd; struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp; struct ucma_context *ctx; + struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; enum ib_qp_type qp_type; int ret; @@ -476,10 +477,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucm return -ENOMEM; ctx->uid = cmd.uid; - ctx->cm_id = rdma_create_id(current->nsproxy->net_ns, - ucma_event_handler, ctx, cmd.ps, qp_type); - if (IS_ERR(ctx->cm_id)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(ctx->cm_id); + cm_id = rdma_create_id(current->nsproxy->net_ns, + ucma_event_handler, ctx, cmd.ps, qp_type); + if (IS_ERR(cm_id)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(cm_id); goto err1; } @@ -489,10 +490,12 @@ static ssize_t ucma_create_id(struct ucm ret = -EFAULT; goto err2; } + + ctx->cm_id = cm_id; return 0; err2: - rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id); + rdma_destroy_id(cm_id); err1: mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Check that device is connected prior to access it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Check that device is connected prior to access it to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 4b658d1bbc16605330694bb3ef2570c465ef383d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2018 11:23:55 +0300 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Check that device is connected prior to access it From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit 4b658d1bbc16605330694bb3ef2570c465ef383d upstream. Add missing check that device is connected prior to access it. [ 55.358652] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rdma_init_qp_attr+0x4a/0x2c0 [ 55.359389] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000000000b0 by task qp/618 [ 55.360255] [ 55.360432] CPU: 1 PID: 618 Comm: qp Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00071-gcaf61b1b8b88 #91 [ 55.361693] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 55.363264] Call Trace: [ 55.363833] dump_stack+0x5c/0x77 [ 55.364215] kasan_report+0x163/0x380 [ 55.364610] ? rdma_init_qp_attr+0x4a/0x2c0 [ 55.365238] rdma_init_qp_attr+0x4a/0x2c0 [ 55.366410] ucma_init_qp_attr+0x111/0x200 [ 55.366846] ? ucma_notify+0xf0/0xf0 [ 55.367405] ? _get_random_bytes+0xea/0x1b0 [ 55.367846] ? urandom_read+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 55.368436] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xd2/0x1e0 [ 55.369104] ? refcount_inc_not_zero+0x9/0x60 [ 55.369583] ? refcount_inc+0x5/0x30 [ 55.370155] ? rdma_create_id+0x215/0x240 [ 55.370937] ? _copy_to_user+0x4f/0x60 [ 55.371620] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x1f5/0x290 [ 55.372127] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 55.372720] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 55.373090] ? ucma_close_id+0x40/0x40 [ 55.373805] ? __lru_cache_add+0xa8/0xd0 [ 55.374403] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 55.374774] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 55.375173] ? fsnotify+0x899/0x8f0 [ 55.375544] ? fsnotify_unmount_inodes+0x170/0x170 [ 55.376689] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x30/0x30 [ 55.377522] ? handle_mm_fault+0x174/0x320 [ 55.378169] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 55.378864] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 55.379270] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 55.379643] ? mm_fault_error+0x180/0x180 [ 55.380071] ? task_work_run+0x7d/0xd0 [ 55.380910] ? __task_pid_nr_ns+0x120/0x140 [ 55.381366] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 55.381739] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 55.382143] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 55.382841] RIP: 0033:0x7fc2ef803e99 [ 55.383227] RSP: 002b:00007fffcc5f3be8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 55.384173] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc2ef803e99 [ 55.386145] RDX: 0000000000000057 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 55.388418] RBP: 00007fffcc5f3c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 55.390542] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400480 [ 55.392916] R13: 00007fffcc5f3cf0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 55.521088] Code: e5 4d 1e ff 48 89 df 44 0f b6 b3 b8 01 00 00 e8 65 50 1e ff 4c 8b 2b 49 8d bd b0 00 00 00 e8 56 50 1e ff 41 0f b6 c6 48 c1 e0 04 <49> 03 85 b0 00 00 00 48 8d 78 08 48 89 04 24 e8 3a 4f 1e ff 48 [ 55.525980] RIP: rdma_init_qp_attr+0x52/0x2c0 RSP: ffff8801e2c2f9d8 [ 55.532648] CR2: 00000000000000b0 [ 55.534396] ---[ end trace 70cee64090251c0b ]--- Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Fixes: d541e45500bd ("IB/core: Convert ah_attr from OPA to IB when copying to user") Reported-by: <syzbot+7b62c837c2516f8f38c8(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -1165,6 +1165,11 @@ static ssize_t ucma_init_qp_attr(struct if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + if (!ctx->cm_id->device) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + resp.qp_attr_mask = 0; memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr); qp_attr.qp_state = cmd.qp_state; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Check that device exists prior to accessing it" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Check that device exists prior to accessing it to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From c8d3bcbfc5eab3f01cf373d039af725f3b488813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2018 11:39:05 +0300 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Check that device exists prior to accessing it From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit c8d3bcbfc5eab3f01cf373d039af725f3b488813 upstream. Ensure that device exists prior to accessing its properties. Reported-by: <syzbot+71655d44855ac3e76366(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_notify(struct ucma_f { struct rdma_ucm_notify cmd; struct ucma_context *ctx; - int ret; + int ret = -EINVAL; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; @@ -1344,7 +1344,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_notify(struct ucma_f if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type) cmd.event); + if (ctx->cm_id->device) + ret = rdma_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type)cmd.event); + ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

6 years, 2 months

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Patch "RDMA/ucma: Check AF family prior resolving address" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled RDMA/ucma: Check AF family prior resolving address to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 2975d5de6428ff6d9317e9948f0968f7d42e5d74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2018 15:33:02 +0200 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Check AF family prior resolving address From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> commit 2975d5de6428ff6d9317e9948f0968f7d42e5d74 upstream. Garbage supplied by user will cause to UCMA module provide zero memory size for memcpy(), because it wasn't checked, it will produce unpredictable results in rdma_resolve_addr(). [ 42.873814] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.874816] Write of size 28 at addr 00000000000000a0 by task resaddr/1044 [ 42.876765] [ 42.876960] CPU: 1 PID: 1044 Comm: resaddr Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00057-gaa56a5293d7e #34 [ 42.877840] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 42.879691] Call Trace: [ 42.880236] dump_stack+0x5c/0x77 [ 42.880664] kasan_report+0x163/0x380 [ 42.881354] ? rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.881864] memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 42.882692] rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.883366] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 42.883856] ? vsnprintf+0x31a/0x770 [ 42.884686] ? rdma_bind_addr+0xc40/0xc40 [ 42.885327] ? num_to_str+0x130/0x130 [ 42.885773] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 42.886217] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.6+0x10/0x10 [ 42.887698] ? unwind_get_return_address_ptr+0x50/0x50 [ 42.888302] ? replace_slot+0x147/0x170 [ 42.889176] ? delete_node+0x12c/0x340 [ 42.890223] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0xa9/0x160 [ 42.891196] ? ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 42.891917] ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 42.893003] ? ucma_resolve_addr+0x190/0x190 [ 42.893531] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 42.894204] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 42.895162] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0 [ 42.896309] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x67e/0xd90 [ 42.897192] ? put_prev_entity+0x7d/0x170 [ 42.897870] ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20 [ 42.898439] ? tracing_record_taskinfo_skip+0x20/0x50 [ 42.899686] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 42.900142] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 42.900602] ? firmware_map_remove+0xdf/0xdf [ 42.901135] ? do_task_dead+0x5d/0x60 [ 42.901598] ? do_exit+0xcc6/0x1220 [ 42.902789] ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0 [ 42.903190] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 42.903600] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 42.904206] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 42.905710] ? compat_start_thread+0x60/0x60 [ 42.906423] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 42.908716] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 42.910760] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 42.912735] RIP: 0033:0x7f138b0afe99 [ 42.914734] RSP: 002b:00007f138b799e98 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 42.917134] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f138b0afe99 [ 42.919487] RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020000c40 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 42.922393] RBP: 00007f138b799ec0 R08: 00007f138b79a700 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 42.925266] R10: 00007f138b79a700 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007f138b799fc0 [ 42.927570] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdbae757c0 R15: 00007f138b79a9c0 [ 42.930047] [ 42.932681] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 42.934795] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0 [ 42.936939] IP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 42.938864] PGD 80000001bea92067 P4D 80000001bea92067 PUD 1bea96067 PMD 0 [ 42.941576] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 42.943952] CPU: 1 PID: 1044 Comm: resaddr Tainted: G B 4.16.0-rc1-00057-gaa56a5293d7e #34 [ 42.946964] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.0-0-g63451fca13-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 42.952336] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 42.954707] RSP: 0018:ffff8801c8b479c8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 42.957227] RAX: 00000000000000a0 RBX: ffff8801c8b47ba0 RCX: 000000000000001c [ 42.960543] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: ffff8801c8b47bbc RDI: 00000000000000a0 [ 42.963867] RBP: ffff8801c8b47b60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed0039168ed1 [ 42.967303] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039168ed0 R12: ffff8801c8b47bbc [ 42.970685] R13: 00000000000000a0 R14: 1ffff10039168f4a R15: 0000000000000000 [ 42.973631] FS: 00007f138b79a700(0000) GS:ffff8801e5d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 42.976831] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 42.979239] CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 00000001be908002 CR4: 00000000003606a0 [ 42.982060] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 42.984877] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 42.988033] Call Trace: [ 42.990487] rdma_resolve_addr+0xc8/0xfb0 [ 42.993202] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 42.996055] ? vsnprintf+0x31a/0x770 [ 42.998707] ? rdma_bind_addr+0xc40/0xc40 [ 43.000985] ? num_to_str+0x130/0x130 [ 43.003410] ? deref_stack_reg+0x88/0xd0 [ 43.006302] ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.6+0x10/0x10 [ 43.008780] ? unwind_get_return_address_ptr+0x50/0x50 [ 43.011178] ? replace_slot+0x147/0x170 [ 43.013517] ? delete_node+0x12c/0x340 [ 43.016019] ? __radix_tree_lookup+0xa9/0x160 [ 43.018755] ? ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 43.021270] ucma_resolve_ip+0xb7/0x110 [ 43.023968] ? ucma_resolve_addr+0x190/0x190 [ 43.026312] ? _copy_from_user+0x5e/0x90 [ 43.029384] ucma_write+0x174/0x1f0 [ 43.031861] ? ucma_resolve_route+0xf0/0xf0 [ 43.034782] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x67e/0xd90 [ 43.037483] ? put_prev_entity+0x7d/0x170 [ 43.040215] ? ring_buffer_record_is_on+0xd/0x20 [ 43.042990] ? tracing_record_taskinfo_skip+0x20/0x50 [ 43.045595] __vfs_write+0xc4/0x350 [ 43.048624] ? kernel_read+0xa0/0xa0 [ 43.051604] ? firmware_map_remove+0xdf/0xdf [ 43.055379] ? do_task_dead+0x5d/0x60 [ 43.058000] ? do_exit+0xcc6/0x1220 [ 43.060783] ? __fget+0xa8/0xf0 [ 43.063133] vfs_write+0xf7/0x280 [ 43.065677] SyS_write+0xa1/0x120 [ 43.068647] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 43.071179] ? compat_start_thread+0x60/0x60 [ 43.074025] ? SyS_read+0x120/0x120 [ 43.076705] do_syscall_64+0xeb/0x250 [ 43.079006] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86 [ 43.081606] RIP: 0033:0x7f138b0afe99 [ 43.083679] RSP: 002b:00007f138b799e98 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 43.086802] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f138b0afe99 [ 43.089989] RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020000c40 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 43.092866] RBP: 00007f138b799ec0 R08: 00007f138b79a700 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 43.096233] R10: 00007f138b79a700 R11: 0000000000000287 R12: 00007f138b799fc0 [ 43.098913] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffdbae757c0 R15: 00007f138b79a9c0 [ 43.101809] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20 72 7e 40 38 [ 43.107950] RIP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 RSP: ffff8801c8b479c8 Reported-by: <syzbot+1d8c43206853b369d00c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Sean Hefty <sean.hefty(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -664,19 +664,23 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct uc int in_len, int out_len) { struct rdma_ucm_resolve_ip cmd; + struct sockaddr *src, *dst; struct ucma_context *ctx; int ret; if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd))) return -EFAULT; + src = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr; + dst = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr; + if (!rdma_addr_size(src) || !rdma_addr_size(dst)) + return -EINVAL; + ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id); if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); - ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, - (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, - cmd.timeout_ms); + ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, src, dst, cmd.timeout_ms); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from leonro(a)mellanox.com are queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-af-family-prior-resolving-address.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-is-connected-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-fix-use-after-free-access-in-ucma_close.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-ensure-that-cm_id-exists-prior-to-access-it.patch queue-4.14/rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch

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Linux-stable-mirror April 2018