October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] clk: actions: prevent overflow in owl_pll_recalc_rate

by Anastasia Belova

In case of OWL S900 SoC clock driver there are cases where bfreq = 24000000, shift = 0. If value read from CMU_COREPLL or CMU_DDRPLL to val is big enough, an overflow may occur. Add explicit casting to prevent it. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 2792c37e94c8 ("clk: actions: Add pll clock support") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Anastasia Belova <abelova(a)astralinux.ru> --- drivers/clk/actions/owl-pll.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/actions/owl-pll.c b/drivers/clk/actions/owl-pll.c index 155f313986b4..fa17567665ec 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/actions/owl-pll.c +++ b/drivers/clk/actions/owl-pll.c @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static unsigned long owl_pll_recalc_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, val = val >> pll_hw->shift; val &= mul_mask(pll_hw); - return pll_hw->bfreq * val; + return (unsigned long)pll_hw->bfreq * val; } static int owl_pll_is_enabled(struct clk_hw *hw) -- 2.30.2

8 months, 3 weeks

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[to-be-updated] mm-enforce-a-minimal-stack-gap-even-against-inaccessible-vmas.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: mm: enforce a minimal stack gap even against inaccessible VMAs has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was mm-enforce-a-minimal-stack-gap-even-against-inaccessible-vmas.patch This patch was dropped because an updated version will be issued ------------------------------------------------------ From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Subject: mm: enforce a minimal stack gap even against inaccessible VMAs Date: Tue, 08 Oct 2024 00:55:39 +0200 As explained in the comment block this change adds, we can't tell what userspace's intent is when the stack grows towards an inaccessible VMA. I have a (highly contrived) C testcase for 32-bit x86 userspace with glibc that mixes malloc(), pthread creation, and recursion in just the right way such that the main stack overflows into malloc() arena memory. I don't know of any specific scenario where this is actually exploitable, but it seems like it could be a security problem for sufficiently unlucky userspace. I believe we should ensure that, as long as code is compiled with something like -fstack-check, a stack overflow in it can never cause the main stack to overflow into adjacent heap memory. My fix effectively reverts the behavior for !vma_is_accessible() VMAs to the behavior before commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas"), so I think it should be a fairly safe change even in case A. [akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: s/prev/next/ in !CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP section, per Lorenzo] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410090632.brLG8w0b-lkp@intel.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241008-stack-gap-inaccessible-v1-1-848d4d891f21… Fixes: 561b5e0709e4 ("mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in the stack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben(a)decadent.org.uk> Cc: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)redhat.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/mmap.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-enforce-a-minimal-stack-gap-even-against-inaccessible-vmas +++ a/mm/mmap.c @@ -1064,10 +1064,12 @@ static int expand_upwards(struct vm_area gap_addr = TASK_SIZE; next = find_vma_intersection(mm, vma->vm_end, gap_addr); - if (next && vma_is_accessible(next)) { - if (!(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)) + if (next && !(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)) { + /* see comments in expand_downwards() */ + if (vma_is_accessible(next)) + return -ENOMEM; + if (address == next->vm_start) return -ENOMEM; - /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */ } if (next) @@ -1155,10 +1157,47 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_stru /* Enforce stack_guard_gap */ prev = vma_prev(&vmi); /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */ - if (prev) { - if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) && - vma_is_accessible(prev) && - (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)) + if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) && + (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)) { + /* + * If the previous VMA is accessible, this is the normal case + * where the main stack is growing down towards some unrelated + * VMA. Enforce the full stack guard gap. + */ + if (vma_is_accessible(prev)) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * If the previous VMA is not accessible, we have a problem: + * We can't tell what userspace's intent is. + * + * Case A: + * Maybe userspace wants to use the previous VMA as a + * "guard region" at the bottom of the main stack, in which case + * userspace wants us to grow the stack until it is adjacent to + * the guard region. Apparently some Java runtime environments + * and Rust do that? + * That is kind of ugly, and in that case userspace really ought + * to ensure that the stack is fully expanded immediately, but + * we have to handle this case. + * + * Case B: + * But maybe the previous VMA is entirely unrelated to the stack + * and is only *temporarily* PROT_NONE. For example, glibc + * malloc arenas create a big PROT_NONE region and then + * progressively mark parts of it as writable. + * In that case, we must not let the stack become adjacent to + * the previous VMA. Otherwise, after the region later becomes + * writable, a stack overflow will cause the stack to grow into + * the previous VMA, and we won't have any stack gap to protect + * against this. + * + * As an ugly tradeoff, enforce a single-page gap. + * A single page will hopefully be small enough to not be + * noticed in case A, while providing the same level of + * protection in case B that normal userspace threads get. + */ + if (address == prev->vm_end) return -ENOMEM; } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from jannh(a)google.com are mm-mremap-fix-move_normal_pmd-retract_page_tables-race.patch

8 months, 3 weeks

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+ mm-damon-fix-memory-leak-in-damon_sysfs_test_add_targets.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/damon/tests/sysfs-kunit.h: fix memory leak in damon_sysfs_test_add_targets() has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-damon-fix-memory-leak-in-damon_sysfs_test_add_targets.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> Subject: mm/damon/tests/sysfs-kunit.h: fix memory leak in damon_sysfs_test_add_targets() Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 20:53:23 +0800 The sysfs_target->regions allocated in damon_sysfs_regions_alloc() is not freed in damon_sysfs_test_add_targets(), which cause the following memory leak, free it to fix it. unreferenced object 0xffffff80c2a8db80 (size 96): comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 187, jiffies 4294894363 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc 0): [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 [<000000008e6835c1>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x26c/0x2f4 [<000000001286d9f8>] damon_sysfs_test_add_targets+0x1cc/0x738 [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374 [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241010125323.3127187-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com Fixes: b8ee5575f763 ("mm/damon/sysfs-test: add a unit test for damon_sysfs_set_targets()") Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/damon/tests/sysfs-kunit.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) --- a/mm/damon/tests/sysfs-kunit.h~mm-damon-fix-memory-leak-in-damon_sysfs_test_add_targets +++ a/mm/damon/tests/sysfs-kunit.h @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static void damon_sysfs_test_add_targets damon_destroy_ctx(ctx); kfree(sysfs_targets->targets_arr); kfree(sysfs_targets); + kfree(sysfs_target->regions); kfree(sysfs_target); } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com are mm-damon-fix-memory-leak-in-damon_sysfs_test_add_targets.patch

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH 6.1] ASoC: Intel: sof_realtek_common: set ret = 0 as initial value

by Vitaliy Shevtsov

From: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao(a)linux.intel.com> commit 47d2b66fec133cb27da3a551334686e465d19469 upstream. 'ret' will not be initialized if dai_fmt is not DSP_A or DSP_B. Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206212507.359993-4-pierre-louis.bossart@linu… Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Vitaliy Shevtsov <v.shevtsov(a)maxima.ru> --- sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_realtek_common.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_realtek_common.c b/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_realtek_common.c index ff2851fc8930..6c12ca92f371 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_realtek_common.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_realtek_common.c @@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ static int rt1015_hw_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd = asoc_substream_to_rtd(substream); struct snd_soc_dai_link *dai_link = rtd->dai_link; struct snd_soc_dai *codec_dai; - int i, clk_freq, ret; + int i, clk_freq; + int ret = 0; clk_freq = sof_dai_get_bclk(rtd); -- 2.46.2

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH] drm/vmwgfx: Handle surface check failure correctly

by Nikolay Kuratov

Currently if condition (!bo and !vmw_kms_srf_ok()) was met we go to err_out with ret == 0. err_out dereferences vfb if ret == 0, but in our case vfb is still NULL. Fix this by assigning sensible error to ret. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE Signed-off-by: Nikolay Kuratov <kniv(a)yandex-team.ru> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 810b3e1683d0 ("drm/vmwgfx: Support topology greater than texture size") --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c index 288ed0bb75cb..752510a11e1b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c @@ -1539,6 +1539,7 @@ static struct drm_framebuffer *vmw_kms_fb_create(struct drm_device *dev, DRM_ERROR("Surface size cannot exceed %dx%d\n", dev_priv->texture_max_width, dev_priv->texture_max_height); + ret = -EINVAL; goto err_out; } -- 2.34.1

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH V2 1/3] perf/x86/intel: Fix ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF

by kan.liang＠linux.intel.com

From: Kan Liang <kan.liang(a)linux.intel.com> The EAX of the CPUID Leaf 023H enumerates the mask of valid sub-leaves. To tell the availability of the sub-leaf 1 (enumerate the counter mask), perf should check the bit 1 (0x2) of EAS, rather than bit 0 (0x1). The error is not user-visible on bare metal. Because the sub-leaf 0 and the sub-leaf 1 are always available. However, it may bring issues in a virtualization environment when a VMM only enumerates the sub-leaf 0. Fixes: eb467aaac21e ("perf/x86/intel: Support Architectural PerfMon Extension leaf") Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 7ca40002a19b..2f3bf3bbbd77 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -4886,8 +4886,8 @@ static void update_pmu_cap(struct x86_hybrid_pmu *pmu) if (ebx & ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_EQ) pmu->config_mask |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_EQ; - if (sub_bitmaps & ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF_BIT) { - cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF, + if (sub_bitmaps & ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF) { + cpuid_count(ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_LEAF, ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF_BIT, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); pmu->cntr_mask64 = eax; pmu->fixed_cntr_mask64 = ebx; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h index 91b73571412f..41ace8431e01 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ union cpuid10_edx { #define ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_UMASK2 0x1 #define ARCH_PERFMON_EXT_EQ 0x2 #define ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF_BIT 0x1 -#define ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF 0x1 +#define ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF BIT(ARCH_PERFMON_NUM_COUNTER_LEAF_BIT) /* * Intel Architectural LBR CPUID detection/enumeration details: -- 2.38.1

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH] vt: prevent kernel-infoleak in con_font_get()

by Jeongjun Park

font.data may not initialize all memory spaces depending on the implementation of vc->vc_sw->con_font_get. This may cause info-leak, so to prevent this, it is safest to modify it to initialize the allocated memory space to 0, and it generally does not affect the overall performance of the system. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+955da2d57931604ee691(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 05e2600cb0a4 ("VT: Bump font size limitation to 64x128 pixels") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/tty/vt/vt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c index cd87e3d1291e..96842ce817af 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c +++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c @@ -4726,7 +4726,7 @@ static int con_font_get(struct vc_data *vc, struct console_font_op *op) return -EINVAL; if (op->data) { - font.data = kvmalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL); + font.data = kvzalloc(max_font_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!font.data) return -ENOMEM; } else --

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH] mm: Enforce a minimal stack gap even against inaccessible VMAs

by Jann Horn

As explained in the comment block this change adds, we can't tell what userspace's intent is when the stack grows towards an inaccessible VMA. I have a (highly contrived) C testcase for 32-bit x86 userspace with glibc that mixes malloc(), pthread creation, and recursion in just the right way such that the main stack overflows into malloc() arena memory. (Let me know if you want me to share that.) I don't know of any specific scenario where this is actually exploitable, but it seems like it could be a security problem for sufficiently unlucky userspace. I believe we should ensure that, as long as code is compiled with something like -fstack-check, a stack overflow in it can never cause the main stack to overflow into adjacent heap memory. My fix effectively reverts the behavior for !vma_is_accessible() VMAs to the behavior before commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas"), so I think it should be a fairly safe change even in case A. Fixes: 561b5e0709e4 ("mm/mmap.c: do not blow on PROT_NONE MAP_FIXED holes in the stack") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> --- I have tested that Libreoffice still launches after this change, though I don't know if that means anything. Note that I haven't tested the growsup code. --- mm/mmap.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index dd4b35a25aeb..971bfd6c1cea 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1064,10 +1064,12 @@ static int expand_upwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address) gap_addr = TASK_SIZE; next = find_vma_intersection(mm, vma->vm_end, gap_addr); - if (next && vma_is_accessible(next)) { - if (!(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)) + if (next && !(next->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)) { + /* see comments in expand_downwards() */ + if (vma_is_accessible(prev)) + return -ENOMEM; + if (address == next->vm_start) return -ENOMEM; - /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */ } if (next) @@ -1155,10 +1157,47 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address) /* Enforce stack_guard_gap */ prev = vma_prev(&vmi); /* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */ - if (prev) { - if (!(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) && - vma_is_accessible(prev) && - (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)) + if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) && + (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)) { + /* + * If the previous VMA is accessible, this is the normal case + * where the main stack is growing down towards some unrelated + * VMA. Enforce the full stack guard gap. + */ + if (vma_is_accessible(prev)) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * If the previous VMA is not accessible, we have a problem: + * We can't tell what userspace's intent is. + * + * Case A: + * Maybe userspace wants to use the previous VMA as a + * "guard region" at the bottom of the main stack, in which case + * userspace wants us to grow the stack until it is adjacent to + * the guard region. Apparently some Java runtime environments + * and Rust do that? + * That is kind of ugly, and in that case userspace really ought + * to ensure that the stack is fully expanded immediately, but + * we have to handle this case. + * + * Case B: + * But maybe the previous VMA is entirely unrelated to the stack + * and is only *temporarily* PROT_NONE. For example, glibc + * malloc arenas create a big PROT_NONE region and then + * progressively mark parts of it as writable. + * In that case, we must not let the stack become adjacent to + * the previous VMA. Otherwise, after the region later becomes + * writable, a stack overflow will cause the stack to grow into + * the previous VMA, and we won't have any stack gap to protect + * against this. + * + * As an ugly tradeoff, enforce a single-page gap. + * A single page will hopefully be small enough to not be + * noticed in case A, while providing the same level of + * protection in case B that normal userspace threads get. + */ + if (address == prev->vm_end) return -ENOMEM; } --- base-commit: 8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b change-id: 20241008-stack-gap-inaccessible-c7319f7d4b1b -- Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>

8 months, 3 weeks

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[PATCH v2 0/3] Fix bugs in qla2xxx driver

by Anastasia Kovaleva

This series of patches contains 3 separate changes that fix some bugs in the qla2xxx driver. --- v2: - Change a spinlock wrap to a WRITE_ONCE() in patch 1 - Add Reviewed-by tags on patches 2 and 3 --- Anastasia Kovaleva (3): scsi: qla2xxx: Drop starvation counter on success scsi: qla2xxx: Make target send correct LOGO scsi: qla2xxx: Remove incorrect trap drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_iocb.c | 11 +++++++++++ drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c | 4 ++++ drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c | 16 +++++++--------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.40.1

8 months, 3 weeks

3
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[PATCH v2] spi: stm32: fix missing device mode capability in stm32mp25

by Alain Volmat

The STM32MP25 SOC has capability to behave in device mode however missing .has_device_mode within its stm32mp25_spi_cfg structure leads to not being able to enable the device mode. Fixes: f6cd66231aa5 ("spi: stm32: add st,stm32mp25-spi compatible supporting STM32MP25 soc") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alain Volmat <alain.volmat(a)foss.st.com> --- Changes in v2: - correct Fixes commit sha1 - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009-spi-mp25-device-fix-v1-1-8e5ca7db7838@fo… --- drivers/spi/spi-stm32.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-stm32.c b/drivers/spi/spi-stm32.c index f2dd8ab12df831d54758d21ec1a68ffc40e2f0a6..da3517d7102dce5f830cdf0dbdee3e19184f69c5 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-stm32.c @@ -2044,6 +2044,7 @@ static const struct stm32_spi_cfg stm32mp25_spi_cfg = { .baud_rate_div_max = STM32H7_SPI_MBR_DIV_MAX, .has_fifo = true, .prevent_dma_burst = true, + .has_device_mode = true, }; static const struct of_device_id stm32_spi_of_match[] = { --- base-commit: c2a59c892f20379a3e48124a83491a12374cd7e0 change-id: 20241009-spi-mp25-device-fix-e03406280c02 Best regards, -- Alain Volmat <alain.volmat(a)foss.st.com>

8 months, 3 weeks

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2024