March 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 5.15.y 0/6] vfio: Interrupt eventfd hardening for 5.15.y

by Alex Williamson

Largely the same as the 6.1.y backports, minor context conflict still using externs in header file and still using GFP_KERNEL rather than GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. Also picking up 810cd4bb5345 ("vfio/pci: Lock external INTx masking ops") which was previously included in Sasha's 6.1.y backports but here the prototype of vfio_pci_intx_mask() is different. Thanks, Alex Alex Williamson (6): vfio/pci: Disable auto-enable of exclusive INTx IRQ vfio/pci: Lock external INTx masking ops vfio: Introduce interface to flush virqfd inject workqueue vfio/pci: Create persistent INTx handler vfio/platform: Create persistent IRQ handlers vfio/fsl-mc: Block calling interrupt handler without trigger drivers/vfio/fsl-mc/vfio_fsl_mc_intr.c | 7 +- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 176 +++++++++++++--------- drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_irq.c | 101 +++++++++---- drivers/vfio/virqfd.c | 21 +++ include/linux/vfio.h | 2 + 5 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-) -- 2.44.0

11 months, 1 week

1
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[PATCH 1/2] security: Handle dentries without inode in security_path_post_mknod()

by Roberto Sassu

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Commit 08abce60d63fi ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook") introduced security_path_post_mknod(), to replace the IMA-specific call to ima_post_path_mknod(). For symmetry with security_path_mknod(), security_path_post_mknod() is called after a successful mknod operation, for any file type, rather than only for regular files at the time there was the IMA call. However, as reported by VFS maintainers, successful mknod operation does not mean that the dentry always has an inode attached to it (for example, not for FIFOs on a SAMBA mount). If that condition happens, the kernel crashes when security_path_post_mknod() attempts to verify if the inode associated to the dentry is private. Add an extra check to first verify if there is an inode attached to the dentry, before checking if the inode is private. Also add the same check to the current users of the path_post_mknod hook, ima_post_path_mknod() and evm_post_path_mknod(). Finally, use the proper helper, d_backing_inode(), to retrieve the inode from the dentry in ima_post_path_mknod(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.8.x Reported-by: Steve French <smfrench(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/CAH2r5msAVzxCUHHG8VKrMPUKQHmBpE6K9_vjh… Fixes: 08abce60d63fi ("security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 81dbade5b9b3..ec1659273fcf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -1037,11 +1037,13 @@ static void evm_file_release(struct file *file) static void evm_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct evm_iint_cache *iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); + struct evm_iint_cache *iint; - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + /* path_post_mknod hook might pass dentries without attached inode. */ + if (!inode || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; + iint = evm_iint_inode(inode); if (iint) iint->flags |= EVM_NEW_FILE; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index c84e8c55333d..afc883e60cf3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -719,10 +719,11 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; - struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); int must_appraise; - if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + /* path_post_mknod hook might pass dentries without attached inode. */ + if (!ima_policy_flag || !inode || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return; must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(idmap, inode, MAY_ACCESS, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7e118858b545..455f0749e1b0 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1801,7 +1801,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); */ void security_path_post_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + /* Not all dentries have an inode attached after mknod. */ + if (d_backing_inode(dentry) && + unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(path_post_mknod, idmap, dentry); } -- 2.34.1

11 months, 1 week

3
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FAILED: Patch "x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code" failed to apply to 6.8-stable tree

by Sasha Levin

The patch below does not apply to the 6.8-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. Thanks, Sasha ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1c811d403afd73f04bde82b83b24c754011bd0e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2024 13:53:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code The early startup code executes from a 1:1 mapping of memory, which differs from the mapping that the code was linked and/or relocated to run at. The latter mapping is not active yet at this point, and so symbol references that rely on it will fault. Given that the core kernel is built without -fPIC, symbol references are typically emitted as absolute, and so any such references occuring in the early startup code will therefore crash the kernel. While an attempt was made to work around this for the early SEV/SME startup code, by forcing RIP-relative addressing for certain global SEV/SME variables via inline assembly (see snp_cpuid_get_table() for example), RIP-relative addressing must be pervasively enforced for SEV/SME global variables when accessed prior to page table fixups. __startup_64() already handles this issue for select non-SEV/SME global variables using fixup_pointer(), which adjusts the pointer relative to a `physaddr` argument. To avoid having to pass around this `physaddr` argument across all functions needing to apply pointer fixups, introduce a macro RIP_RELATIVE_REF() which generates a RIP-relative reference to a given global variable. It is used where necessary to force RIP-relative accesses to global variables. For backporting purposes, this patch makes no attempt at cleaning up other occurrences of this pattern, involving either inline asm or fixup_pointer(). Those will be addressed later. [ bp: Call it "rip_rel_ref" everywhere like other code shortens "rIP-relative reference" and make the asm wrapper __always_inline. ] Co-developed-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: <stable(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240130220845.1978329-1-kevinloughlin@google.c… --- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 7 +------ arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 15 +++++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 12 ++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------------- 7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c index eeec9986570ed..d07be9d05cd03 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include <asm/processor.h> enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init = CC_VENDOR_NONE; -static u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init; +u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init; static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) { @@ -148,8 +148,3 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val) } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_mkdec); - -__init void cc_set_mask(u64 mask) -{ - cc_mask = mask; -} diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h index fbcfec4dc4ccd..ca8eed1d496ab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h @@ -113,6 +113,20 @@ #endif +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#ifndef __pic__ +static __always_inline __pure void *rip_rel_ptr(void *p) +{ + asm("leaq %c1(%%rip), %0" : "=r"(p) : "i"(p)); + + return p; +} +#define RIP_REL_REF(var) (*(typeof(&(var)))rip_rel_ptr(&(var))) +#else +#define RIP_REL_REF(var) (var) +#endif +#endif + /* * Macros to generate condition code outputs from inline assembly, * The output operand must be type "bool". diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h index 6ae2d16a7613b..21940ef8d2904 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_COCO_H #define _ASM_X86_COCO_H +#include <asm/asm.h> #include <asm/types.h> enum cc_vendor { @@ -11,9 +12,14 @@ enum cc_vendor { }; extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor; +extern u64 cc_mask; #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM -void cc_set_mask(u64 mask); +static inline void cc_set_mask(u64 mask) +{ + RIP_REL_REF(cc_mask) = mask; +} + u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val); u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val); #else diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h index 359ada486fa92..b31eb9fd59544 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/cc_platform.h> -#include <asm/bootparam.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +struct boot_params; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); @@ -58,6 +59,11 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); +static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void) +{ + return RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask); +} + #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted") #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -89,6 +95,8 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool en static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { } +static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void) { return 0; } + #define __bss_decrypted #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ @@ -106,11 +114,6 @@ void add_encrypt_protection_map(void); extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypted_unused[]; -static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void) -{ - return sme_me_mask; -} - #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c index 5db24d0fc557c..ae79f9505298d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c @@ -560,9 +560,9 @@ static int snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_le leaf->eax = leaf->ebx = leaf->ecx = leaf->edx = 0; /* Skip post-processing for out-of-range zero leafs. */ - if (!(leaf->fn <= cpuid_std_range_max || - (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_hyp_range_max) || - (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= cpuid_ext_range_max))) + if (!(leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) || + (leaf->fn >= 0x40000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max)) || + (leaf->fn >= 0x80000000 && leaf->fn <= RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max)))) return 0; } @@ -1072,11 +1072,11 @@ static void __init setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) const struct snp_cpuid_fn *fn = &cpuid_table->fn[i]; if (fn->eax_in == 0x0) - cpuid_std_range_max = fn->eax; + RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_std_range_max) = fn->eax; else if (fn->eax_in == 0x40000000) - cpuid_hyp_range_max = fn->eax; + RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_hyp_range_max) = fn->eax; else if (fn->eax_in == 0x80000000) - cpuid_ext_range_max = fn->eax; + RIP_REL_REF(cpuid_ext_range_max) = fn->eax; } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index 002af6c30601b..1ef7ae806a01b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data * in the cc_platform_has() function. */ - if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + if (!(RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) return; /* @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data * in the cc_platform_has() function. */ - if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + if (!(RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) return; /* Ask hypervisor to mark the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index efe9f217fcf99..0166ab1780ccb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) * instrumentation or checking boot_cpu_data in the cc_platform_has() * function. */ - if (!sme_get_me_mask() || sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) + if (!sme_get_me_mask() || + RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) return; /* @@ -541,11 +542,11 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f); /* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */ - sev_status = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV); - feature_mask = (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT; + RIP_REL_REF(sev_status) = msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV); + feature_mask = (msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT; /* The SEV-SNP CC blob should never be present unless SEV-SNP is enabled. */ - if (snp && !(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) + if (snp && !(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED)) snp_abort(); /* Check if memory encryption is enabled */ @@ -571,7 +572,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) return; } else { /* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */ - sme_me_mask = me_mask; goto out; } @@ -590,16 +590,13 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32)); - if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0) - goto out; - - if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) - sme_me_mask = me_mask; + if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0 || + strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) + return; out: - if (sme_me_mask) { - physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask; - cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD; - cc_set_mask(sme_me_mask); - } + RIP_REL_REF(sme_me_mask) = me_mask; + physical_mask &= ~me_mask; + cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD; + cc_set_mask(me_mask); } -- 2.43.0

11 months, 1 week

3
4
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v6.7+ stable backport request for drm/i915

by Ville Syrjälä

Hi stable team, Please backport the following the commits to 6.7/6.8 to fix some i915 type-c/thunderbolt PLL issues: commit 92b47c3b8b24 ("drm/i915: Replace a memset() with zero initialization") commit ba407525f824 ("drm/i915: Try to preserve the current shared_dpll for fastset on type-c ports") commit d283ee5662c6 ("drm/i915: Include the PLL name in the debug messages") commit 33c7760226c7 ("drm/i915: Suppress old PLL pipe_mask checks for MG/TC/TBT PLLs") 6.7 will need two additional dependencies: commit f215038f4133 ("drm/i915: Use named initializers for DPLL info") commit 58046e6cf811 ("drm/i915: Stop printing pipe name as hex") Thanks. -- Ville Syrjälä Intel

11 months, 1 week

2
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: diag: return KSFT_FAIL not test_cnt" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 45bcc0346561daa3f59e19a753cc7f3e08e8dff1 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024032708-vagrancy-backlash-61dd@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 45bcc0346561 ("selftests: mptcp: diag: return KSFT_FAIL not test_cnt") ce9902573652 ("selftests: mptcp: diag: format subtests results in TAP") dc97251bf0b7 ("selftests: mptcp: diag: skip listen tests if not supported") e04a30f78809 ("selftest: mptcp: add test for mptcp socket in use") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 45bcc0346561daa3f59e19a753cc7f3e08e8dff1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang(a)kylinos.cn> Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 18:11:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: diag: return KSFT_FAIL not test_cnt The test counter 'test_cnt' should not be returned in diag.sh, e.g. what if only the 4th test fail? Will do 'exit 4' which is 'exit ${KSFT_SKIP}', the whole test will be marked as skipped instead of 'failed'! So we should do ret=${KSFT_FAIL} instead. Fixes: df62f2ec3df6 ("selftests/mptcp: add diag interface tests") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 42fb6cddec3b ("selftests: mptcp: more stable diag tests") Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <tanggeliang(a)kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/diag.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/diag.sh index f300f4e1eb59..18d37d4695c1 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/diag.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/diag.sh @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ __chk_nr() else echo "[ fail ] expected $expected found $nr" mptcp_lib_result_fail "${msg}" - ret=$test_cnt + ret=${KSFT_FAIL} fi else echo "[ ok ]" @@ -124,11 +124,11 @@ wait_msk_nr() if [ $i -ge $timeout ]; then echo "[ fail ] timeout while expecting $expected max $max last $nr" mptcp_lib_result_fail "${msg} # timeout" - ret=$test_cnt + ret=${KSFT_FAIL} elif [ $nr != $expected ]; then echo "[ fail ] expected $expected found $nr" mptcp_lib_result_fail "${msg} # unexpected result" - ret=$test_cnt + ret=${KSFT_FAIL} else echo "[ ok ]" mptcp_lib_result_pass "${msg}"

11 months, 1 week

2
1
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[PATCH stable 6.6 and 6.7 1/2] perf top: Use evsel's cpus to replace user_requested_cpus

by kan.liang＠linux.intel.com

From: Kan Liang <kan.liang(a)linux.intel.com> [The patch set is to fix the perf top failure on all Intel hybrid machines. Without the patch, the default perf top command is broken. I have verified that the patches on both stable 6.6 and 6.7. They can be applied to stable 6.6 and 6.7 tree without any modification as well. Please consider to apply them to stable 6.6 and 6.7. Thanks] ------------------ From: Kan Liang <kan.liang(a)linux.intel.com> [ Upstream commit 5fa695e7da4975e8d21ce49f3718d6cf00ecb75e ] perf top errors out on a hybrid machine $perf top Error: The cycles:P event is not supported. The perf top expects that the "cycles" is collected on all CPUs in the system. But for hybrid there is no single "cycles" event which can cover all CPUs. Perf has to split it into two cycles events, e.g., cpu_core/cycles/ and cpu_atom/cycles/. Each event has its own CPU mask. If a event is opened on the unsupported CPU. The open fails. That's the reason of the above error out. Perf should only open the cycles event on the corresponding CPU. The commit ef91871c960e ("perf evlist: Propagate user CPU maps intersecting core PMU maps") intersect the requested CPU map with the CPU map of the PMU. Use the evsel's cpus to replace user_requested_cpus. The evlist's threads are also propagated to the evsel's threads in __perf_evlist__propagate_maps(). For a system-wide event, perf appends a dummy event and assign it to the evsel's threads. For a per-thread event, the evlist's thread_map is assigned to the evsel's threads. The same as the other tools, e.g., perf record, using the evsel's threads when opening an event. Reported-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang(a)linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme(a)redhat.com> Cc: Hector Martin <marcan(a)marcan.st> Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung(a)kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/ZXNnDrGKXbEELMXV@kernel.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231214144612.1092028-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme(a)redhat.com> --- tools/perf/builtin-top.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/builtin-top.c b/tools/perf/builtin-top.c index ea8c7eca5eee..cce9350177e2 100644 --- a/tools/perf/builtin-top.c +++ b/tools/perf/builtin-top.c @@ -1027,8 +1027,8 @@ static int perf_top__start_counters(struct perf_top *top) evlist__for_each_entry(evlist, counter) { try_again: - if (evsel__open(counter, top->evlist->core.user_requested_cpus, - top->evlist->core.threads) < 0) { + if (evsel__open(counter, counter->core.cpus, + counter->core.threads) < 0) { /* * Specially handle overwrite fall back. -- 2.34.1

11 months, 1 week

3
4
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FAILED: Patch "powerpc: xor_vmx: Add '-mhard-float' to CFLAGS" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by Sasha Levin

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. Thanks, Sasha ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 35f20786c481d5ced9283ff42de5c69b65e5ed13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2024 11:07:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] powerpc: xor_vmx: Add '-mhard-float' to CFLAGS arch/powerpc/lib/xor_vmx.o is built with '-msoft-float' (from the main powerpc Makefile) and '-maltivec' (from its CFLAGS), which causes an error when building with clang after a recent change in main: error: option '-msoft-float' cannot be specified with '-maltivec' make[6]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:243: arch/powerpc/lib/xor_vmx.o] Error 1 Explicitly add '-mhard-float' before '-maltivec' in xor_vmx.o's CFLAGS to override the previous inclusion of '-msoft-float' (as the last option wins), which matches how other areas of the kernel use '-maltivec', such as AMDGPU. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1986 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/4792f912b232141ecba4cbae538873b… Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240127-ppc-xor_vmx-drop-msoft-float-v1-1-f24140e81376@… --- arch/powerpc/lib/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/lib/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/lib/Makefile index 6eac63e79a899..0ab65eeb93ee3 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/Makefile @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_LIB_RHEAP) += rheap.o obj-$(CONFIG_FTR_FIXUP_SELFTEST) += feature-fixups-test.o obj-$(CONFIG_ALTIVEC) += xor_vmx.o xor_vmx_glue.o -CFLAGS_xor_vmx.o += -maltivec $(call cc-option,-mabi=altivec) +CFLAGS_xor_vmx.o += -mhard-float -maltivec $(call cc-option,-mabi=altivec) # Enable <altivec.h> CFLAGS_xor_vmx.o += -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include) -- 2.43.0

11 months, 1 week

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FAILED: Patch "block: Fix page refcounts for unaligned buffers in __bio_release_pages()" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by Sasha Levin

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. Thanks, Sasha ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 38b43539d64b2fa020b3b9a752a986769f87f7a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Battersby <tonyb(a)cybernetics.com> Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 13:08:09 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] block: Fix page refcounts for unaligned buffers in __bio_release_pages() Fix an incorrect number of pages being released for buffers that do not start at the beginning of a page. Fixes: 1b151e2435fc ("block: Remove special-casing of compound pages") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb(a)cybernetics.com> Tested-by: Greg Edwards <gedwards(a)ddn.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/86e592a9-98d4-4cff-a646-0c0084328356@cybernetics.… Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> --- block/bio.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bio.c b/block/bio.c index 496867b51609f..a8b6919400270 100644 --- a/block/bio.c +++ b/block/bio.c @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ void __bio_release_pages(struct bio *bio, bool mark_dirty) bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) { struct page *page; - size_t done = 0; + size_t nr_pages; if (mark_dirty) { folio_lock(fi.folio); @@ -1161,10 +1161,11 @@ void __bio_release_pages(struct bio *bio, bool mark_dirty) folio_unlock(fi.folio); } page = folio_page(fi.folio, fi.offset / PAGE_SIZE); + nr_pages = (fi.offset + fi.length - 1) / PAGE_SIZE - + fi.offset / PAGE_SIZE + 1; do { bio_release_page(bio, page++); - done += PAGE_SIZE; - } while (done < fi.length); + } while (--nr_pages != 0); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__bio_release_pages); -- 2.43.0

11 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] blk-mq: release scheduler resource when request completes

by Bart Van Assche

From: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> commit e5c0ca13659e9d18f53368d651ed7e6e433ec1cf upstream. Chuck reported [1] an IO hang problem on NFS exports that reside on SATA devices and bisected to commit 615939a2ae73 ("blk-mq: defer to the normal submission path for post-flush requests"). We analysed the IO hang problem, found there are two postflush requests waiting for each other. The first postflush request completed the REQ_FSEQ_DATA sequence, so go to the REQ_FSEQ_POSTFLUSH sequence and added in the flush pending list, but failed to blk_kick_flush() because of the second postflush request which is inflight waiting in scheduler queue. The second postflush waiting in scheduler queue can't be dispatched because the first postflush hasn't released scheduler resource even though it has completed by itself. Fix it by releasing scheduler resource when the first postflush request completed, so the second postflush can be dispatched and completed, then make blk_kick_flush() succeed. While at it, remove the check for e->ops.finish_request, as all schedulers set that. Reaffirm this requirement by adding a WARN_ON_ONCE() at scheduler registration time, just like we do for insert_requests and dispatch_request. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/7A57C7AE-A51A-4254-888B-FE15CA21F9E9@oracle.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20230819031206.2744005-1-chengming.zhou… Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202308172100.8ce4b853-oliver.sang@intel.com Fixes: 615939a2ae73 ("blk-mq: defer to the normal submission path for post-flush requests") Reported-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> Tested-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230813152325.3017343-1-chengming.zhou@linux.dev [axboe: folded in incremental fix and added tags] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> [bvanassche: changed RQF_USE_SCHED into RQF_ELVPRIV; restored the finish_request pointer check before calling finish_request and removed the new warning from the elevator code. This patch fixes an I/O hang when submitting a REQ_FUA request to a request queue for a zoned block device for which FUA has been disabled (QUEUE_FLAG_FUA is not set).] Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> --- block/blk-mq.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index 7ed6b9469f97..07610505c177 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -675,6 +675,22 @@ struct request *blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx(struct request_queue *q, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx); +static void blk_mq_finish_request(struct request *rq) +{ + struct request_queue *q = rq->q; + + if ((rq->rq_flags & RQF_ELVPRIV) && + q->elevator->type->ops.finish_request) { + q->elevator->type->ops.finish_request(rq); + /* + * For postflush request that may need to be + * completed twice, we should clear this flag + * to avoid double finish_request() on the rq. + */ + rq->rq_flags &= ~RQF_ELVPRIV; + } +} + static void __blk_mq_free_request(struct request *rq) { struct request_queue *q = rq->q; @@ -701,9 +717,7 @@ void blk_mq_free_request(struct request *rq) { struct request_queue *q = rq->q; - if ((rq->rq_flags & RQF_ELVPRIV) && - q->elevator->type->ops.finish_request) - q->elevator->type->ops.finish_request(rq); + blk_mq_finish_request(rq); if (unlikely(laptop_mode && !blk_rq_is_passthrough(rq))) laptop_io_completion(q->disk->bdi); @@ -1025,6 +1039,8 @@ inline void __blk_mq_end_request(struct request *rq, blk_status_t error) if (blk_mq_need_time_stamp(rq)) __blk_mq_end_request_acct(rq, ktime_get_ns()); + blk_mq_finish_request(rq); + if (rq->end_io) { rq_qos_done(rq->q, rq); if (rq->end_io(rq, error) == RQ_END_IO_FREE) @@ -1079,6 +1095,8 @@ void blk_mq_end_request_batch(struct io_comp_batch *iob) if (iob->need_ts) __blk_mq_end_request_acct(rq, now); + blk_mq_finish_request(rq); + rq_qos_done(rq->q, rq); /*

11 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.15-] efivars: Request at most 512 bytes for variable names

by Tim Schumacher

commit f45812cc23fb74bef62d4eb8a69fe7218f4b9f2a upstream. Work around a quirk in a few old (2011-ish) UEFI implementations, where a call to `GetNextVariableName` with a buffer size larger than 512 bytes will always return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER. There is some lore around EFI variable names being up to 1024 bytes in size, but this has no basis in the UEFI specification, and the upper bounds are typically platform specific, and apply to the entire variable (name plus payload). Given that Linux does not permit creating files with names longer than NAME_MAX (255) bytes, 512 bytes (== 256 UTF-16 characters) is a reasonable limit. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> [timschumi(a)gmx.de: adjusted diff for changed context and code move] Signed-off-by: Tim Schumacher <timschumi(a)gmx.de> --- Please apply this patch to stable kernel 5.15, 5.10, 5.4, and 4.19 respectively. Kernel 6.1 and upwards were already handled via CC, 5.15 and below required a separate patch due to a slight refactor of surrounding code in bbc6d2c6ef22 ("efi: vars: Switch to new wrapper layer") and a subsequent code move in 2d82e6227ea1 ("efi: vars: Move efivar caching layer into efivarfs"). Please note that the upper Signed-off-by tags are remnants from the original patch, I documented my modifications below them and added another sign-off. As far as I was able to gather, this is the expected format for diverged stable patches. I'm not sure on the specifics of manual stable backports, so let me know in case anything doesn't follow the process. The linux-efi team and list are on CC both for documentation/review purposes and in case a new sign-off/ack of theirs is required. --- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c index cae590bd08f2..eaed1ddcc803 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int efivar_init(int (*func)(efi_char16_t *, efi_guid_t, unsigned long, void *), void *data, bool duplicates, struct list_head *head) { const struct efivar_operations *ops; - unsigned long variable_name_size = 1024; + unsigned long variable_name_size = 512; efi_char16_t *variable_name; efi_status_t status; efi_guid_t vendor_guid; @@ -438,12 +438,13 @@ int efivar_init(int (*func)(efi_char16_t *, efi_guid_t, unsigned long, void *), } /* - * Per EFI spec, the maximum storage allocated for both - * the variable name and variable data is 1024 bytes. + * A small set of old UEFI implementations reject sizes + * above a certain threshold, the lowest seen in the wild + * is 512. */ do { - variable_name_size = 1024; + variable_name_size = 512; status = ops->get_next_variable(&variable_name_size, variable_name, @@ -491,9 +492,13 @@ int efivar_init(int (*func)(efi_char16_t *, efi_guid_t, unsigned long, void *), break; case EFI_NOT_FOUND: break; + case EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + pr_warn("efivars: Variable name size exceeds maximum (%lu > 512)\n", + variable_name_size); + status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; + break; default: - printk(KERN_WARNING "efivars: get_next_variable: status=%lx\n", - status); + pr_warn("efivars: get_next_variable: status=%lx\n", status); status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; break; } -- 2.44.0

11 months, 1 week

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