June 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] i2c: ocores: set IACK bit after core is enabled" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 5a72477273066b5b357801ab2d315ef14949d402 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062412-mobster-doable-acc6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 5a72477273066b5b357801ab2d315ef14949d402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Grygorii Tertychnyi <grembeter(a)gmail.com> Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 17:39:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] i2c: ocores: set IACK bit after core is enabled Setting IACK bit when core is disabled does not clear the "Interrupt Flag" bit in the status register, and the interrupt remains pending. Sometimes it causes failure for the very first message transfer, that is usually a device probe. Hence, set IACK bit after core is enabled to clear pending interrupt. Fixes: 18f98b1e3147 ("[PATCH] i2c: New bus driver for the OpenCores I2C controller") Signed-off-by: Grygorii Tertychnyi <grygorii.tertychnyi(a)leica-geosystems.com> Acked-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter(a)korsgaard.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ocores.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ocores.c index 56a4dabf5a38..4ad670a80a63 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ocores.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ocores.c @@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ static int ocores_init(struct device *dev, struct ocores_i2c *i2c) oc_setreg(i2c, OCI2C_PREHIGH, prescale >> 8); /* Init the device */ - oc_setreg(i2c, OCI2C_CMD, OCI2C_CMD_IACK); oc_setreg(i2c, OCI2C_CONTROL, ctrl | OCI2C_CTRL_EN); + oc_setreg(i2c, OCI2C_CMD, OCI2C_CMD_IACK); return 0; }

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062459-ebay-electable-e94e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If period_ns is small, prd might well become 0. Catch that case because otherwise with regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, prd - 1); a few lines down quite a big period is configured. Fixes: 7edf7369205b ("pwm: Add driver for STM32 plaftorm") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b86f62f099983646f97eeb6bfc0117bb2d0c340d.17189791… Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <ukleinek(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c index a2f231d13a9f..3e7b2a8e34e7 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c @@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ static int stm32_pwm_config(struct stm32_pwm *priv, unsigned int ch, prd = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(period_ns, clk_get_rate(priv->clk), (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC * (prescaler + 1)); + if (!prd) + return -EINVAL; /* * All channels share the same prescaler and counter so when two

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062458-try-bouncing-bb82@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If period_ns is small, prd might well become 0. Catch that case because otherwise with regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, prd - 1); a few lines down quite a big period is configured. Fixes: 7edf7369205b ("pwm: Add driver for STM32 plaftorm") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b86f62f099983646f97eeb6bfc0117bb2d0c340d.17189791… Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <ukleinek(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c index a2f231d13a9f..3e7b2a8e34e7 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c @@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ static int stm32_pwm_config(struct stm32_pwm *priv, unsigned int ch, prd = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(period_ns, clk_get_rate(priv->clk), (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC * (prescaler + 1)); + if (!prd) + return -EINVAL; /* * All channels share the same prescaler and counter so when two

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062457-reversal-unkind-166b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If period_ns is small, prd might well become 0. Catch that case because otherwise with regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, prd - 1); a few lines down quite a big period is configured. Fixes: 7edf7369205b ("pwm: Add driver for STM32 plaftorm") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b86f62f099983646f97eeb6bfc0117bb2d0c340d.17189791… Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <ukleinek(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c index a2f231d13a9f..3e7b2a8e34e7 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c @@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ static int stm32_pwm_config(struct stm32_pwm *priv, unsigned int ch, prd = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(period_ns, clk_get_rate(priv->clk), (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC * (prescaler + 1)); + if (!prd) + return -EINVAL; /* * All channels share the same prescaler and counter so when two

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062457-irritant-squatter-ff51@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If period_ns is small, prd might well become 0. Catch that case because otherwise with regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, prd - 1); a few lines down quite a big period is configured. Fixes: 7edf7369205b ("pwm: Add driver for STM32 plaftorm") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b86f62f099983646f97eeb6bfc0117bb2d0c340d.17189791… Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <ukleinek(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c index a2f231d13a9f..3e7b2a8e34e7 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c @@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ static int stm32_pwm_config(struct stm32_pwm *priv, unsigned int ch, prd = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(period_ns, clk_get_rate(priv->clk), (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC * (prescaler + 1)); + if (!prd) + return -EINVAL; /* * All channels share the same prescaler and counter so when two

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062456-unvocal-anyone-3135@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If period_ns is small, prd might well become 0. Catch that case because otherwise with regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, prd - 1); a few lines down quite a big period is configured. Fixes: 7edf7369205b ("pwm: Add driver for STM32 plaftorm") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b86f62f099983646f97eeb6bfc0117bb2d0c340d.17189791… Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <ukleinek(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c index a2f231d13a9f..3e7b2a8e34e7 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c @@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ static int stm32_pwm_config(struct stm32_pwm *priv, unsigned int ch, prd = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(period_ns, clk_get_rate(priv->clk), (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC * (prescaler + 1)); + if (!prd) + return -EINVAL; /* * All channels share the same prescaler and counter so when two

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062455-magnetism-backing-fbef@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c45fcf46ca2368dafe7e5c513a711a6f0f974308 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Uwe=20Kleine-K=C3=B6nig?= <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] pwm: stm32: Refuse too small period requests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit If period_ns is small, prd might well become 0. Catch that case because otherwise with regmap_write(priv->regmap, TIM_ARR, prd - 1); a few lines down quite a big period is configured. Fixes: 7edf7369205b ("pwm: Add driver for STM32 plaftorm") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Trevor Gamblin <tgamblin(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig(a)baylibre.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b86f62f099983646f97eeb6bfc0117bb2d0c340d.17189791… Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <ukleinek(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c index a2f231d13a9f..3e7b2a8e34e7 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/pwm-stm32.c @@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ static int stm32_pwm_config(struct stm32_pwm *priv, unsigned int ch, prd = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(period_ns, clk_get_rate(priv->clk), (u64)NSEC_PER_SEC * (prescaler + 1)); + if (!prd) + return -EINVAL; /* * All channels share the same prescaler and counter so when two

3 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062445-fastness-juniper-7dfe@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 9a95c5bfbf02 ("ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section") 260017f31a8c ("lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()") 923831117611 ("evm: Move to LSM infrastructure") 84594c9ecdca ("ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure") cd3cec0a02c7 ("ima: Move to LSM infrastructure") 06cca5110774 ("integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA") b8d997032a46 ("security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook") 2d705d802414 ("security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook") 8b9d0b825c65 ("security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook") a7811e34d100 ("security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook") f09068b5a114 ("security: Introduce file_release hook") 8f46ff5767b0 ("security: Introduce file_post_open hook") dae52cbf5887 ("security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook") 77fa6f314f03 ("security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook") 314a8dc728d0 ("security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM") 779cb1947e27 ("evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") 2b6a4054f8c2 ("evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") 784111d0093e ("evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") fec5f85e468d ("ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructure") 526864dd2f60 ("ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 01:25:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index f804b76cde44..44488b1ab9a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 21cf70346b33..de3af33e6ff5 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); @@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index e5da848c50b9..e5ca08789f74 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5332,15 +5332,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, * @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f20e1968b7f7..e33e55384b75 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3507,7 +3507,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 70ba2841e181..f5cbec1e6a92 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4693,11 +4693,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule;

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062443-rocket-emptiness-09d2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 9a95c5bfbf02 ("ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section") 260017f31a8c ("lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()") 923831117611 ("evm: Move to LSM infrastructure") 84594c9ecdca ("ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure") cd3cec0a02c7 ("ima: Move to LSM infrastructure") 06cca5110774 ("integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA") b8d997032a46 ("security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook") 2d705d802414 ("security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook") 8b9d0b825c65 ("security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook") a7811e34d100 ("security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook") f09068b5a114 ("security: Introduce file_release hook") 8f46ff5767b0 ("security: Introduce file_post_open hook") dae52cbf5887 ("security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook") 77fa6f314f03 ("security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook") 314a8dc728d0 ("security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM") 779cb1947e27 ("evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") 2b6a4054f8c2 ("evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") 784111d0093e ("evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") fec5f85e468d ("ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructure") 526864dd2f60 ("ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 01:25:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index f804b76cde44..44488b1ab9a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 21cf70346b33..de3af33e6ff5 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); @@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index e5da848c50b9..e5ca08789f74 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5332,15 +5332,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, * @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f20e1968b7f7..e33e55384b75 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3507,7 +3507,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 70ba2841e181..f5cbec1e6a92 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4693,11 +4693,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule;

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024062441-botanical-utensil-bb06@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 9a95c5bfbf02 ("ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section") 260017f31a8c ("lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()") 923831117611 ("evm: Move to LSM infrastructure") 84594c9ecdca ("ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure") cd3cec0a02c7 ("ima: Move to LSM infrastructure") 06cca5110774 ("integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA") b8d997032a46 ("security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook") 2d705d802414 ("security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook") 8b9d0b825c65 ("security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook") a7811e34d100 ("security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook") f09068b5a114 ("security: Introduce file_release hook") 8f46ff5767b0 ("security: Introduce file_post_open hook") dae52cbf5887 ("security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook") 77fa6f314f03 ("security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook") 314a8dc728d0 ("security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM") 779cb1947e27 ("evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") 2b6a4054f8c2 ("evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") 784111d0093e ("evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") fec5f85e468d ("ima: Align ima_post_read_file() definition with LSM infrastructure") 526864dd2f60 ("ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() definition with LSM infrastructure") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 01:25:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index f804b76cde44..44488b1ab9a9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 21cf70346b33..de3af33e6ff5 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -2048,7 +2048,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp); int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule); void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); @@ -2056,7 +2057,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); #else static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index be8c680121e4..d6ef4f4f9cba 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -529,7 +529,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f_val; f->lsm_str = str; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule, + GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -799,7 +800,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + (void **)&df->lsm_rule, GFP_KERNEL); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index e5da848c50b9..e5ca08789f74 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -5332,15 +5332,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, * @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f20e1968b7f7..e33e55384b75 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3507,7 +3507,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 70ba2841e181..f5cbec1e6a92 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4693,11 +4693,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule;

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Linux-stable-mirror June 2024