July 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[tip: timers/core] timers/migration: Move hierarchy setup into cpuhotplug prepare callback

by tip-bot2 for Anna-Maria Behnsen

The following commit has been merged into the timers/core branch of tip: Commit-ID: 8cdb61838ee5c63556773ea2eed24deab6b15257 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8cdb61838ee5c63556773ea2eed24deab6b15257 Author: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria(a)linutronix.de> AuthorDate: Wed, 03 Jul 2024 22:28:39 +02:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CommitterDate: Thu, 04 Jul 2024 20:22:22 +02:00 timers/migration: Move hierarchy setup into cpuhotplug prepare callback When a CPU comes online the first time, it is possible that a new top level group will be created. In general all propagation is done from the bottom to top. This minimizes complexity and prevents possible races. But when a new top level group is created, the formely top level group needs to be connected to the new level. This is the only time, when the direction to propagate changes is changed: the changes are propagated from top (new top level group) to bottom (formerly top level group). This introduces two races (see (A) and (B)) as reported by Frederic: (A) This race happens, when marking the formely top level group as active, but the last active CPU of the formerly top level group goes idle. Then it's likely that formerly group is no longer active, but marked nevertheless as active in new top level group: [GRP0:0] migrator = 0 active = 0 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ 0 1 .. 7 active idle 0) Hierarchy has for now only 8 CPUs and CPU 0 is the only active CPU. [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = 0 migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0 active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 active idle !online 1) CPU 8 is booting and creates a new group in first level GRP0:1 and therefore also a new top group GRP1:0. For now the setup code proceeded only until the connected between GRP0:1 to the new top group. The connection between CPU8 and GRP0:1 is not yet established and CPU 8 is still !online. [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = 0 migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0 active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 active idle !online 2) Setup code now connects GRP0:0 to GRP1:0 and observes while in tmigr_connect_child_parent() that GRP0:0 is not TMIGR_NONE. So it prepares to call tmigr_active_up() on it. It hasn't done it yet. [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = TMIGR_NONE migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = NONE active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 idle idle !online 3) CPU 0 goes idle. Since GRP0:0->parent has been updated by CPU 8 with GRP0:0->lock held, CPU 0 observes GRP1:0 after calling tmigr_update_events() and it propagates the change to the top (no change there and no wakeup programmed since there is no timer). [GRP1:0] migrator = GRP0:0 active = GRP0:0 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = TMIGR_NONE migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = NONE active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 idle idle !online 4) Now the setup code finally calls tmigr_active_up() to and sets GRP0:0 active in GRP1:0 [GRP1:0] migrator = GRP0:0 active = GRP0:0, GRP0:1 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = TMIGR_NONE migrator = 8 active = NONE active = 8 nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ | 0 1 .. 7 8 idle idle active 5) Now CPU 8 is connected with GRP0:1 and CPU 8 calls tmigr_active_up() out of tmigr_cpu_online(). [GRP1:0] migrator = GRP0:0 active = GRP0:0 nextevt = T8 / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = TMIGR_NONE migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = NONE active = NONE nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = T8 / \ | 0 1 .. 7 8 idle idle idle 5) CPU 8 goes idle with a timer T8 and relies on GRP0:0 as the migrator. But it's not really active, so T8 gets ignored. --> The update which is done in third step is not noticed by setup code. So a wrong migrator is set to top level group and a timer could get ignored. (B) Reading group->parent and group->childmask when an hierarchy update is ongoing and reaches the formerly top level group is racy as those values could be inconsistent. (The notation of migrator and active now slightly changes in contrast to the above example, as now the childmasks are used.) [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = TMIGR_NONE migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x00 active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX childmask= 0 childmask= 1 parent = NULL parent = GRP1:0 / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 idle idle !online childmask=1 1) Hierarchy has 8 CPUs. CPU 8 is at the moment in the process of onlining but did not yet connect GRP0:0 to GRP1:0. [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = TMIGR_NONE migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x00 active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX childmask= 0 childmask= 1 parent = GRP1:0 parent = GRP1:0 / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 idle idle !online childmask=1 2) Setup code (running on CPU 8) now connects GRP0:0 to GRP1:0, updates parent pointer of GRP0:0 and ... [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = 0x01 migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x01 active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX childmask= 0 childmask= 1 parent = GRP1:0 parent = GRP1:0 / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 active idle !online childmask=1 tmigr_walk.childmask = 0 3) ... CPU 0 comes active in the same time. As migrator in GRP0:0 was TMIGR_NONE, childmask of GRP0:0 is stored in update propagation data structure tmigr_walk (as update of childmask is not yet visible/updated). And now ... [GRP1:0] migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = 0x01 migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x01 active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX childmask= 2 childmask= 1 parent = GRP1:0 parent = GRP1:0 / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 active idle !online childmask=1 tmigr_walk.childmask = 0 4) ... childmask of GRP0:0 is updated by CPU 8 (still part of setup code). [GRP1:0] migrator = 0x00 active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX / \ [GRP0:0] [GRP0:1] migrator = 0x01 migrator = TMIGR_NONE active = 0x01 active = 0x00 nextevt = KTIME_MAX nextevt = KTIME_MAX childmask= 2 childmask= 1 parent = GRP1:0 parent = GRP1:0 / \ 0 1 .. 7 8 active idle !online childmask=1 tmigr_walk.childmask = 0 5) CPU 0 sees the connection to GRP1:0 and now propagates active state to GRP1:0 but with childmask = 0 as stored in propagation data structure. --> Now GRP1:0 always has a migrator as 0x00 != TMIGR_NONE and for all CPUs it looks like GRP1:0 is always active. To prevent those races, the setup of the hierarchy is moved into the cpuhotplug prepare callback. The prepare callback is not executed by the CPU which will come online, it is executed by the CPU which prepares onlining of the other CPU. This CPU is active while it is connecting the formerly top level to the new one. This prevents from (A) to happen and it also prevents from any further walk above the formerly top level until that active CPU becomes inactive, releasing the new ->parent and ->childmask updates to be visible by any subsequent walk up above the formerly top level hierarchy. This prevents from (B) to happen. The direction for the updates is now forced to look like "from bottom to top". However if the active CPU prevents from tmigr_cpu_(in)active() to walk up with the update not-or-half visible, nothing prevents walking up to the new top with a 0 childmask in tmigr_handle_remote_up() or tmigr_requires_handle_remote_up() if the active CPU doing the prepare is not the migrator. But then it looks fine because: * tmigr_check_migrator() should just return false * The migrator is active and should eventually observe the new childmask at some point in a future tick. Split setup functionality of online callback into the cpuhotplug prepare callback and setup hotplug state. Reorder the code, that all prepare related functions are close to each other and online and offline callbacks are also close together. Fixes: 7ee988770326 ("timers: Implement the hierarchical pull model") Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240703202839.8921-1-anna-maria@linutronix.de --- include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 1 +- kernel/time/timer_migration.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h index 7a5785f..df59666 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h +++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state { CPUHP_KVM_PPC_BOOK3S_PREPARE, CPUHP_ZCOMP_PREPARE, CPUHP_TIMERS_PREPARE, + CPUHP_TMIGR_PREPARE, CPUHP_MIPS_SOC_PREPARE, CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN_END = CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN + 20, diff --git a/kernel/time/timer_migration.c b/kernel/time/timer_migration.c index d91efe1..9b86efd 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timer_migration.c +++ b/kernel/time/timer_migration.c @@ -1438,6 +1438,66 @@ u64 tmigr_quick_check(u64 nextevt) return KTIME_MAX; } +/* + * tmigr_trigger_active() - trigger a CPU to become active again + * + * This function is executed on a CPU which is part of cpu_online_mask, when the + * last active CPU in the hierarchy is offlining. With this, it is ensured that + * the other CPU is active and takes over the migrator duty. + */ +static long tmigr_trigger_active(void *unused) +{ + struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = this_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu); + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!tmc->online || tmc->idle); + + return 0; +} + +static int tmigr_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu) +{ + struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = this_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu); + int migrator; + u64 firstexp; + + raw_spin_lock_irq(&tmc->lock); + tmc->online = false; + WRITE_ONCE(tmc->wakeup, KTIME_MAX); + + /* + * CPU has to handle the local events on his own, when on the way to + * offline; Therefore nextevt value is set to KTIME_MAX + */ + firstexp = __tmigr_cpu_deactivate(tmc, KTIME_MAX); + trace_tmigr_cpu_offline(tmc); + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tmc->lock); + + if (firstexp != KTIME_MAX) { + migrator = cpumask_any_but(cpu_online_mask, cpu); + work_on_cpu(migrator, tmigr_trigger_active, NULL); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int tmigr_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu) +{ + struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = this_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu); + + /* Check whether CPU data was successfully initialized */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tmc->tmgroup)) + return -EINVAL; + + raw_spin_lock_irq(&tmc->lock); + trace_tmigr_cpu_online(tmc); + tmc->idle = timer_base_is_idle(); + if (!tmc->idle) + __tmigr_cpu_activate(tmc); + tmc->online = true; + raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tmc->lock); + return 0; +} + static void tmigr_init_group(struct tmigr_group *group, unsigned int lvl, int node) { @@ -1512,7 +1572,7 @@ static struct tmigr_group *tmigr_get_group(unsigned int cpu, int node, static void tmigr_connect_child_parent(struct tmigr_group *child, struct tmigr_group *parent) { - union tmigr_state childstate; + struct tmigr_walk data; raw_spin_lock_irq(&child->lock); raw_spin_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); @@ -1540,22 +1600,24 @@ static void tmigr_connect_child_parent(struct tmigr_group *child, * child to the new parent. So tmigr_connect_child_parent() is * executed with the formerly top level group (child) and the newly * created group (parent). + * + * * It is ensured that the child is active, as this setup path is + * executed in hotplug prepare callback. This is exectued by an + * already connected and !idle CPU. Even if all other CPUs go idle, + * the CPU executing the setup will be responsible up to current top + * level group. And the next time it goes inactive, it will release + * the new childmask and parent to subsequent walkers through this + * @child. Therefore propagate active state unconditionally. */ - childstate.state = atomic_read(&child->migr_state); - if (childstate.migrator != TMIGR_NONE) { - struct tmigr_walk data; - - data.childmask = child->childmask; + data.childmask = child->childmask; - /* - * There is only one new level per time (which is protected by - * tmigr_mutex). When connecting the child and the parent and - * set the child active when the parent is inactive, the parent - * needs to be the uppermost level. Otherwise there went - * something wrong! - */ - WARN_ON(!tmigr_active_up(parent, child, &data) && parent->parent); - } + /* + * There is only one new level per time (which is protected by + * tmigr_mutex). When connecting the child and the parent and set the + * child active when the parent is inactive, the parent needs to be the + * uppermost level. Otherwise there went something wrong! + */ + WARN_ON(!tmigr_active_up(parent, child, &data) && parent->parent); } static int tmigr_setup_groups(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int node) @@ -1661,80 +1723,32 @@ static int tmigr_add_cpu(unsigned int cpu) return ret; } -static int tmigr_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu) +static int tmigr_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu) { - struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = this_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu); - int ret; - - /* First online attempt? Initialize CPU data */ - if (!tmc->tmgroup) { - raw_spin_lock_init(&tmc->lock); - - ret = tmigr_add_cpu(cpu); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - if (tmc->childmask == 0) - return -EINVAL; + struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = per_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu, cpu); + int ret = 0; - timerqueue_init(&tmc->cpuevt.nextevt); - tmc->cpuevt.nextevt.expires = KTIME_MAX; - tmc->cpuevt.ignore = true; - tmc->cpuevt.cpu = cpu; - - tmc->remote = false; - WRITE_ONCE(tmc->wakeup, KTIME_MAX); - } - raw_spin_lock_irq(&tmc->lock); - trace_tmigr_cpu_online(tmc); - tmc->idle = timer_base_is_idle(); - if (!tmc->idle) - __tmigr_cpu_activate(tmc); - tmc->online = true; - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tmc->lock); - return 0; -} - -/* - * tmigr_trigger_active() - trigger a CPU to become active again - * - * This function is executed on a CPU which is part of cpu_online_mask, when the - * last active CPU in the hierarchy is offlining. With this, it is ensured that - * the other CPU is active and takes over the migrator duty. - */ -static long tmigr_trigger_active(void *unused) -{ - struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = this_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu); + /* Not first online attempt? */ + if (tmc->tmgroup) + return ret; - WARN_ON_ONCE(!tmc->online || tmc->idle); + raw_spin_lock_init(&tmc->lock); - return 0; -} + ret = tmigr_add_cpu(cpu); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; -static int tmigr_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu) -{ - struct tmigr_cpu *tmc = this_cpu_ptr(&tmigr_cpu); - int migrator; - u64 firstexp; + if (tmc->childmask == 0) + return -EINVAL; - raw_spin_lock_irq(&tmc->lock); - tmc->online = false; + timerqueue_init(&tmc->cpuevt.nextevt); + tmc->cpuevt.nextevt.expires = KTIME_MAX; + tmc->cpuevt.ignore = true; + tmc->cpuevt.cpu = cpu; + tmc->remote = false; WRITE_ONCE(tmc->wakeup, KTIME_MAX); - /* - * CPU has to handle the local events on his own, when on the way to - * offline; Therefore nextevt value is set to KTIME_MAX - */ - firstexp = __tmigr_cpu_deactivate(tmc, KTIME_MAX); - trace_tmigr_cpu_offline(tmc); - raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tmc->lock); - - if (firstexp != KTIME_MAX) { - migrator = cpumask_any_but(cpu_online_mask, cpu); - work_on_cpu(migrator, tmigr_trigger_active, NULL); - } - - return 0; + return ret; } static int __init tmigr_init(void) @@ -1793,6 +1807,11 @@ static int __init tmigr_init(void) tmigr_hierarchy_levels, TMIGR_CHILDREN_PER_GROUP, tmigr_crossnode_level); + ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_TMIGR_ONLINE, "tmigr:prepare", + tmigr_cpu_prepare, NULL); + if (ret) + goto err; + ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_TMIGR_ONLINE, "tmigr:online", tmigr_cpu_online, tmigr_cpu_offline); if (ret)

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 205 ++++++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 +-- 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 4c695b0388f3..9bb142c75243 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o -tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 2f1d96a5a5a7..06d0f10a2301 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -163,6 +163,112 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) return size_map[alg] + 2; } +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int slot; + + if (!chip->auth) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ + buf->handles++; + return; + } + + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key @@ -567,104 +673,6 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) - return -EINVAL; - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @handle: The handle to be appended - * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) - * - * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the - * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply - * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name - * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV - * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name - * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to - * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these - * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is - * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called - * on the handle to obtain the name. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int slot; - - slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; - if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; - } - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - auth->session += 4; - - if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); - } - - auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name); - /** * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -1311,3 +1319,4 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 21a67dc9efe8..2844fea4a12a 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NAME_SIZE]; u8 null_ec_key_x[EC_PT_SZ]; u8 null_ec_key_y[EC_PT_SZ]; - struct tpm2_auth *auth; #endif + struct tpm2_auth *auth; }; #define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 @@ -490,11 +490,13 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -521,14 +523,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ - buf->handles++; -} static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, -- 2.45.2

11 months, 2 weeks

3
5
0 0

[PATCH net 4/4] wireguard: send: annotate intentional data race in checking empty queue

by Jason A. Donenfeld

KCSAN reports a race in wg_packet_send_keepalive, which is intentional: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_send_keepalive / wg_packet_send_staged_packets write to 0xffff88814cd91280 of 8 bytes by task 3194 on cpu 0: __skb_queue_head_init include/linux/skbuff.h:2162 [inline] skb_queue_splice_init include/linux/skbuff.h:2248 [inline] wg_packet_send_staged_packets+0xe5/0xad0 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:351 wg_xmit+0x5b8/0x660 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:218 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11b/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0xeff/0x1d80 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x231/0x2a0 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xa66/0xce0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x1a5/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0xeb/0x220 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0x4a2/0x670 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:509 ndisc_send_rs+0x3ab/0x3e0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:719 addrconf_dad_completed+0x640/0x8e0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4295 addrconf_dad_work+0x891/0xbc0 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 read to 0xffff88814cd91280 of 8 bytes by task 3202 on cpu 1: skb_queue_empty include/linux/skbuff.h:1798 [inline] wg_packet_send_keepalive+0x20/0x100 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:225 wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:186 [inline] wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x445/0x5e0 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:213 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 value changed: 0xffff888148fef200 -> 0xffff88814cd91280 Mark this race as intentional by using the skb_queue_empty_lockless() function rather than skb_queue_empty(), which uses READ_ONCE() internally to annotate the race. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/send.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c index 0d48e0f4a1ba..26e09c30d596 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/send.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ void wg_packet_send_keepalive(struct wg_peer *peer) { struct sk_buff *skb; - if (skb_queue_empty(&peer->staged_packet_queue)) { + if (skb_queue_empty_lockless(&peer->staged_packet_queue)) { skb = alloc_skb(DATA_PACKET_HEAD_ROOM + MESSAGE_MINIMUM_LENGTH, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!skb)) -- 2.45.2

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH net 3/4] wireguard: queueing: annotate intentional data race in cpu round robin

by Jason A. Donenfeld

KCSAN reports a race in the CPU round robin function, which, as the comment points out, is intentional: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_send_staged_packets / wg_packet_send_staged_packets read to 0xffff88811254eb28 of 4 bytes by task 3160 on cpu 1: wg_cpumask_next_online drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h:127 [inline] wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h:173 [inline] wg_packet_create_data drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:320 [inline] wg_packet_send_staged_packets+0x60e/0xac0 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:388 wg_packet_send_keepalive+0xe2/0x100 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:239 wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:186 [inline] wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x449/0x5f0 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:213 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3248 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x483/0x9a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3329 worker_thread+0x526/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 kthread+0x1d1/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 write to 0xffff88811254eb28 of 4 bytes by task 3158 on cpu 0: wg_cpumask_next_online drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h:130 [inline] wg_queue_enqueue_per_device_and_peer drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h:173 [inline] wg_packet_create_data drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:320 [inline] wg_packet_send_staged_packets+0x6e5/0xac0 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:388 wg_packet_send_keepalive+0xe2/0x100 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:239 wg_receive_handshake_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:186 [inline] wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker+0x449/0x5f0 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:213 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3248 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x483/0x9a0 kernel/workqueue.c:3329 worker_thread+0x526/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 kthread+0x1d1/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 value changed: 0xffffffff -> 0x00000000 Mark this race as intentional by using READ/WRITE_ONCE(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h index 1ea4f874e367..7eb76724b3ed 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h @@ -124,10 +124,10 @@ static inline int wg_cpumask_choose_online(int *stored_cpu, unsigned int id) */ static inline int wg_cpumask_next_online(int *last_cpu) { - int cpu = cpumask_next(*last_cpu, cpu_online_mask); + int cpu = cpumask_next(READ_ONCE(*last_cpu), cpu_online_mask); if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids) cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask); - *last_cpu = cpu; + WRITE_ONCE(*last_cpu, cpu); return cpu; } -- 2.45.2

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH net 2/4] wireguard: allowedips: avoid unaligned 64-bit memory accesses

by Jason A. Donenfeld

From: Helge Deller <deller(a)kernel.org> On the parisc platform, the kernel issues kernel warnings because swap_endian() tries to load a 128-bit IPv6 address from an unaligned memory location: Kernel: unaligned access to 0x55f4688c in wg_allowedips_insert_v6+0x2c/0x80 [wireguard] (iir 0xf3010df) Kernel: unaligned access to 0x55f46884 in wg_allowedips_insert_v6+0x38/0x80 [wireguard] (iir 0xf2010dc) Avoid such unaligned memory accesses by instead using the get_unaligned_be64() helper macro. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> [Jason: replace src[8] in original patch with src+8] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: e7096c131e51 ("net: WireGuard secure network tunnel") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c index 0ba714ca5185..4b8528206cc8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/allowedips.c @@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ static void swap_endian(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, u8 bits) if (bits == 32) { *(u32 *)dst = be32_to_cpu(*(const __be32 *)src); } else if (bits == 128) { - ((u64 *)dst)[0] = be64_to_cpu(((const __be64 *)src)[0]); - ((u64 *)dst)[1] = be64_to_cpu(((const __be64 *)src)[1]); + ((u64 *)dst)[0] = get_unaligned_be64(src); + ((u64 *)dst)[1] = get_unaligned_be64(src + 8); } } -- 2.45.2

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH net 1/4] wireguard: selftests: use acpi=off instead of -no-acpi for recent QEMU

by Jason A. Donenfeld

QEMU 9.0 removed -no-acpi, in favor of machine properties, so update the Makefile to use the correct QEMU invocation. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: b83fdcd9fb8a ("wireguard: selftests: use microvm on x86") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile index e95bd56b332f..35856b11c143 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/Makefile @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ KERNEL_ARCH := x86_64 KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage QEMU_VPORT_RESULT := virtio-serial-device ifeq ($(HOST_ARCH),$(ARCH)) -QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine microvm,accel=kvm,pit=off,pic=off,rtc=off -no-acpi +QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine microvm,accel=kvm,pit=off,pic=off,rtc=off,acpi=off else -QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu max -machine microvm -no-acpi +QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu max -machine microvm,acpi=off endif else ifeq ($(ARCH),i686) CHOST := i686-linux-musl @@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ KERNEL_ARCH := x86 KERNEL_BZIMAGE := $(KERNEL_BUILD_PATH)/arch/x86/boot/bzImage QEMU_VPORT_RESULT := virtio-serial-device ifeq ($(subst x86_64,i686,$(HOST_ARCH)),$(ARCH)) -QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine microvm,accel=kvm,pit=off,pic=off,rtc=off -no-acpi +QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu host -machine microvm,accel=kvm,pit=off,pic=off,rtc=off,acpi=off else -QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine microvm -no-acpi +QEMU_MACHINE := -cpu coreduo -machine microvm,acpi=off endif else ifeq ($(ARCH),mips64) CHOST := mips64-linux-musl -- 2.45.2

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 8/8] arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845: Disable SS instance in Parkmode for USB

by Krishna Kurapati

For Gen-1 targets like SDM845, it is seen that stressing out the controller in host mode results in HC died error: xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host not responding to stop endpoint command xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead xhci-hcd.12.auto: HC died; cleaning up And at this instant only restarting the host mode fixes it. Disable SuperSpeed instance in park mode for SDM845 to mitigate this issue. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: ca4db2b538a1 ("arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845: Add USB-related nodes") Signed-off-by: Krishna Kurapati <quic_kriskura(a)quicinc.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845.dtsi | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845.dtsi index 23b101bb3842..54077549b9da 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845.dtsi @@ -4138,6 +4138,7 @@ usb_1_dwc3: usb@a600000 { iommus = <&apps_smmu 0x740 0>; snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk; snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk; + snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk; phys = <&usb_1_hsphy>, <&usb_1_qmpphy QMP_USB43DP_USB3_PHY>; phy-names = "usb2-phy", "usb3-phy"; @@ -4213,6 +4214,7 @@ usb_2_dwc3: usb@a800000 { iommus = <&apps_smmu 0x760 0>; snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk; snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk; + snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk; phys = <&usb_2_hsphy>, <&usb_2_qmpphy>; phy-names = "usb2-phy", "usb3-phy"; }; -- 2.34.1

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 7/8] arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Disable SS instance in Parkmode for USB

by Krishna Kurapati

For Gen-1 targets like MSM8996, it is seen that stressing out the controller in host mode results in HC died error: xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host not responding to stop endpoint command xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead xhci-hcd.12.auto: HC died; cleaning up And at this instant only restarting the host mode fixes it. Disable SuperSpeed instance in park mode for MSM8996 to mitigate this issue. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 1e39255ed29d ("arm64: dts: msm8996: Add device node for qcom,dwc3") Signed-off-by: Krishna Kurapati <quic_kriskura(a)quicinc.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996.dtsi index 2b20cedfe26c..0fd2b1b944a5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/msm8996.dtsi @@ -3101,6 +3101,7 @@ usb3_dwc3: usb@6a00000 { snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk; snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk; snps,is-utmi-l1-suspend; + snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk; tx-fifo-resize; }; }; -- 2.34.1

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 6/8] arm64: dts: qcom: sm6350: Disable SS instance in Parkmode for USB

by Krishna Kurapati

For Gen-1 targets like SM6350, it is seen that stressing out the controller in host mode results in HC died error: xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host not responding to stop endpoint command xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead xhci-hcd.12.auto: HC died; cleaning up And at this instant only restarting the host mode fixes it. Disable SuperSpeed instance in park mode for SM6350 to mitigate this issue. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 23737b9557fe ("arm64: dts: qcom: sm6350: Add USB1 nodes") Signed-off-by: Krishna Kurapati <quic_kriskura(a)quicinc.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6350.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6350.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6350.dtsi index 46e122c4421c..84009b74aee7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6350.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6350.dtsi @@ -1921,6 +1921,7 @@ usb_1_dwc3: usb@a600000 { snps,dis_enblslpm_quirk; snps,has-lpm-erratum; snps,hird-threshold = /bits/ 8 <0x10>; + snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk; phys = <&usb_1_hsphy>, <&usb_1_qmpphy QMP_USB43DP_USB3_PHY>; phy-names = "usb2-phy", "usb3-phy"; usb-role-switch; -- 2.34.1

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 5/8] arm64: dts: qcom: sm6115: Disable SS instance in Parkmode for USB

by Krishna Kurapati

For Gen-1 targets like SM6115, it is seen that stressing out the controller in host mode results in HC died error: xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host not responding to stop endpoint command xhci-hcd.12.auto: xHCI host controller not responding, assume dead xhci-hcd.12.auto: HC died; cleaning up And at this instant only restarting the host mode fixes it. Disable SuperSpeed instance in park mode for SM6115 to mitigate this issue. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 97e563bf5ba1 ("arm64: dts: qcom: sm6115: Add basic soc dtsi") Signed-off-by: Krishna Kurapati <quic_kriskura(a)quicinc.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6115.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6115.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6115.dtsi index 48ccd6fa8a11..e374733f3b85 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6115.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm6115.dtsi @@ -1660,6 +1660,7 @@ usb_dwc3: usb@4e00000 { snps,has-lpm-erratum; snps,hird-threshold = /bits/ 8 <0x10>; snps,usb3_lpm_capable; + snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk; usb-role-switch; -- 2.34.1

11 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror July 2024