Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li…
Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
---
v3:
* Address:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/922603265d61011dbb23f18a04525ae973b…
v2:
* Use auth in place of chip->auth.
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 68 ++++--------
2 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 179bcaac06ce..e0be22b8ae70 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -270,6 +270,108 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ * @buf: The buffer to be appended
+ * @attributes: The session attributes
+ * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none)
+ * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none)
+ *
+ * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except
+ * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is
+ * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes,
+ * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the
+ * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(),
+ * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be
+ * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the
+ * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing,
+ * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM).
+ *
+ * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling
+ * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect
+ * and the TPM will reject the command.
+ *
+ * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
+ * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
+ * kernel message.
+ */
+void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+ u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
+ int passphrase_len)
+{
+ u8 __maybe_unused nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct tpm2_auth __maybe_unused *auth;
+ u32 __maybe_unused len;
+
+ if (!__and(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC), chip->auth)) {
+ /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
+ int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
+
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
+ /* not the first session so update the existing length */
+ len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
+ put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
+ } else {
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
+ }
+ /* auth handle */
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
+ /* nonce */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
+ /* attributes */
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
+ /* passphrase */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len);
+ return;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+ /*
+ * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
+ * before computing the HMAC
+ */
+ while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0')
+ passphrase_len--;
+
+ auth = chip->auth;
+ auth->attrs = attributes;
+ auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len;
+ if (passphrase_len)
+ memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len);
+
+ if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+ /* we're not the first session */
+ len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]);
+ if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+ WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* add our new session */
+ len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]);
+ } else {
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ /* random number for our nonce */
+ get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle);
+ /* our new nonce */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs);
+ /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
@@ -455,82 +557,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
}
-/**
- * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element
- * @chip: the TPM chip structure
- * @buf: The buffer to be appended
- * @attributes: The session attributes
- * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none)
- * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none)
- *
- * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except
- * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is
- * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes,
- * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the
- * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(),
- * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be
- * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the
- * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing,
- * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM).
- *
- * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling
- * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect
- * and the TPM will reject the command.
- *
- * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
- * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
- * kernel message.
- */
-void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
- int passphrase_len)
-{
- u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
- u32 len;
- struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
-
- /*
- * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
- * before computing the HMAC
- */
- while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0
- && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0')
- passphrase_len--;
-
- auth->attrs = attributes;
- auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len;
- if (passphrase_len)
- memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len);
-
- if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
- /* we're not the first session */
- len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]);
- if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
- WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append");
- return;
- }
-
- /* add our new session */
- len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
- put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]);
- } else {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
- }
-
- /* random number for our nonce */
- get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle);
- /* our new nonce */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs);
- /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session);
-
/**
* tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC
* @chip: the TPM chip structure
@@ -561,6 +587,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct sha256_state sctx;
+ if (!auth)
+ return;
+
/* save the command code in BE format */
auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
@@ -719,6 +748,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal);
int parm_len, len, i, handles;
+ if (!auth)
+ return rc;
+
if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index d9a6991b247d..e47f5d65935e 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -493,10 +493,6 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u32 handle, u8 *name);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
-
-int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
int passphraselen);
@@ -506,9 +502,27 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u8 *passphrase,
int passphraselen)
{
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase,
- passphraselen);
+ struct tpm_header *head;
+ int offset;
+
+ if (__and(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC), chip->auth)) {
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, passphraselen);
+ } else {
+ offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+
+ /*
+ * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to
+ * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS.
+ */
+ if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
+ head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
+ }
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+
+int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf);
int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
int rc);
@@ -523,48 +537,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
}
-static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip,
- struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
- int passphraselen)
-{
- /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
- int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- u32 len = 9 + passphraselen;
-
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
- /* not the first session so update the existing length */
- len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
- put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
- } else {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
- }
- /* auth handle */
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
- /* nonce */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
- /* attributes */
- tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
- /* passphrase */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphraselen);
- tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphraselen);
-}
-static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
- struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u8 attributes,
- u8 *passphrase,
- int passphraselen)
-{
- int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *) buf->data;
-
- /*
- * if the only sessions are optional, the command tag
- * must change to TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS
- */
- if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
-}
static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct tpm_buf *buf)
{
--
2.45.2
Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li…
Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
---
v3:
* Address:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/922603265d61011dbb23f18a04525ae973b…
v2:
* N/A
---
drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 217 +++++++++++++++++--------------
include/linux/tpm.h | 14 +-
3 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
index 4c695b0388f3..9bb142c75243 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/common.o
tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o
tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o
tpm-y += tpm-buf.o
+tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o
-tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o
tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 2f1d96a5a5a7..179bcaac06ce 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -83,9 +83,6 @@
#define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128
#define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8)
-static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
- u32 *handle, u8 *name);
-
/*
* This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like
* session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is
@@ -148,6 +145,7 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
/*
* Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255)
*/
@@ -163,6 +161,120 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name)
return size_map[alg] + 2;
}
+static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
+{
+ struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
+ off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
+ u32 val;
+
+ /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
+ tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+ /* skip public */
+ val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ if (val > tot_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ offset += val;
+ /* name */
+ val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
+ /* forget the rest */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
+{
+ struct tpm_buf buf;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
+ if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
+ rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
+
+ tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
+
+/**
+ * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
+ * @chip: the TPM chip structure
+ * @buf: The buffer to be appended
+ * @handle: The handle to be appended
+ * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
+ *
+ * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
+ * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply
+ * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
+ * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
+ * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
+ * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
+ * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these
+ * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is
+ * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
+ * on the handle to obtain the name.
+ *
+ * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
+ * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
+ * kernel message.
+ */
+void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
+ u32 handle, u8 *name)
+{
+ enum tpm2_mso_type __maybe_unused mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
+ struct tpm2_auth __maybe_unused *auth;
+ int __maybe_unused slot;
+
+ if (!__and(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC), chip->auth)) {
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
+ /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */
+ buf->handles++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+ slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4;
+ if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ auth = chip->auth;
+ WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
+ "name added in wrong place\n");
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
+ auth->session += 4;
+
+ if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
+ mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
+ mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
+ if (!name)
+ tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
+ } else {
+ if (name)
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
+ }
+
+ auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
+ if (name)
+ memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
+#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+
+static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
+ u32 *handle, u8 *name);
+
/*
* It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume
* because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key
@@ -567,104 +679,6 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session);
-static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf)
-{
- struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
- off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
- u32 val;
-
- /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
- tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-
- /* skip public */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
- if (val > tot_len)
- return -EINVAL;
- offset += val;
- /* name */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
- if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset]))
- return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val);
- /* forget the rest */
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name)
-{
- struct tpm_buf buf;
- int rc;
-
- rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public");
- if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
- rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf);
-
- tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer
- * @chip: the TPM chip structure
- * @buf: The buffer to be appended
- * @handle: The handle to be appended
- * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL)
- *
- * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the
- * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply
- * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name
- * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV
- * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name
- * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to
- * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these
- * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is
- * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called
- * on the handle to obtain the name.
- *
- * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
- * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
- * kernel message.
- */
-void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name)
-{
- enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle);
- struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
- int slot;
-
- slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4;
- if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n");
- return;
- }
- WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf),
- "name added in wrong place\n");
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
- auth->session += 4;
-
- if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE ||
- mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
- if (!name)
- tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]);
- } else {
- if (name)
- dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n");
- }
-
- auth->name_h[slot] = handle;
- if (name)
- memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name);
-
/**
* tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness
* @chip: the TPM chip structure
@@ -1311,3 +1325,4 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip)
return rc;
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 21a67dc9efe8..d9a6991b247d 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -490,11 +490,13 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
{
}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
-int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u32 handle, u8 *name);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
+
+int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
int passphraselen);
@@ -521,14 +523,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
}
-static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip,
- struct tpm_buf *buf,
- u32 handle, u8 *name)
-{
- tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
- /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */
- buf->handles++;
-}
static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct tpm_buf *buf,
u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
--
2.45.2
The caching mode for buffer objects with VRAM as a possible
placement was forced to write-combined, regardless of placement.
However, write-combined system memory is expensive to allocate and
even though it is pooled, the pool is expensive to shrink, since
it involves global CPU TLB flushes.
Moreover write-combined system memory from TTM is only reliably
available on x86 and DGFX doesn't have an x86 restriction.
So regardless of the cpu caching mode selected for a bo,
internally use write-back caching mode for system memory on DGFX.
Coherency is maintained, but user-space clients may perceive a
difference in cpu access speeds.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 622f709ca629 ("drm/xe/uapi: Add support for CPU caching mode")
Cc: Pallavi Mishra <pallavi.mishra(a)intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com>
Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Effie Yu <effie.yu(a)intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jose Souza <jose.souza(a)intel.com>
Cc: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h | 3 +-
include/uapi/drm/xe_drm.h | 8 +++++-
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c
index 65c696966e96..31192d983d9e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static struct ttm_tt *xe_ttm_tt_create(struct ttm_buffer_object *ttm_bo,
struct xe_device *xe = xe_bo_device(bo);
struct xe_ttm_tt *tt;
unsigned long extra_pages;
- enum ttm_caching caching;
+ enum ttm_caching caching = ttm_cached;
int err;
tt = kzalloc(sizeof(*tt), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -357,26 +357,35 @@ static struct ttm_tt *xe_ttm_tt_create(struct ttm_buffer_object *ttm_bo,
extra_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(xe_device_ccs_bytes(xe, bo->size),
PAGE_SIZE);
- switch (bo->cpu_caching) {
- case DRM_XE_GEM_CPU_CACHING_WC:
- caching = ttm_write_combined;
- break;
- default:
- caching = ttm_cached;
- break;
- }
-
- WARN_ON((bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_USER) && !bo->cpu_caching);
-
/*
- * Display scanout is always non-coherent with the CPU cache.
- *
- * For Xe_LPG and beyond, PPGTT PTE lookups are also non-coherent and
- * require a CPU:WC mapping.
+ * DGFX system memory is always WB / ttm_cached, since
+ * other caching modes are only supported on x86. DGFX
+ * GPU system memory accesses are always coherent with the
+ * CPU.
*/
- if ((!bo->cpu_caching && bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_SCANOUT) ||
- (xe->info.graphics_verx100 >= 1270 && bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_PAGETABLE))
- caching = ttm_write_combined;
+ if (!IS_DGFX(xe)) {
+ switch (bo->cpu_caching) {
+ case DRM_XE_GEM_CPU_CACHING_WC:
+ caching = ttm_write_combined;
+ break;
+ default:
+ caching = ttm_cached;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON((bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_USER) && !bo->cpu_caching);
+
+ /*
+ * Display scanout is always non-coherent with the CPU cache.
+ *
+ * For Xe_LPG and beyond, PPGTT PTE lookups are also
+ * non-coherent and require a CPU:WC mapping.
+ */
+ if ((!bo->cpu_caching && bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_SCANOUT) ||
+ (xe->info.graphics_verx100 >= 1270 &&
+ bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_PAGETABLE))
+ caching = ttm_write_combined;
+ }
if (bo->flags & XE_BO_FLAG_NEEDS_UC) {
/*
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h
index 86422e113d39..10450f1fbbde 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h
@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ struct xe_bo {
/**
* @cpu_caching: CPU caching mode. Currently only used for userspace
- * objects.
+ * objects. Exceptions are system memory on DGFX, which is always
+ * WB.
*/
u16 cpu_caching;
diff --git a/include/uapi/drm/xe_drm.h b/include/uapi/drm/xe_drm.h
index 93e00be44b2d..1189b3044723 100644
--- a/include/uapi/drm/xe_drm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/drm/xe_drm.h
@@ -783,7 +783,13 @@ struct drm_xe_gem_create {
#define DRM_XE_GEM_CPU_CACHING_WC 2
/**
* @cpu_caching: The CPU caching mode to select for this object. If
- * mmaping the object the mode selected here will also be used.
+ * mmaping the object the mode selected here will also be used. The
+ * exception is when mapping system memory (including evicted
+ * system memory) on discrete GPUs. The caching mode selected will
+ * then be overridden to DRM_XE_GEM_CPU_CACHING_WB, and coherency
+ * between GPU- and CPU is guaranteed. The caching mode of
+ * existing CPU-mappings will be updated transparently to
+ * user-space clients.
*/
__u16 cpu_caching;
/** @pad: MBZ */
--
2.44.0
The quilt patch titled
Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug on rename operation of broken directory
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-on-rename-operation-of-broken-directory.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-hotfixes-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com>
Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug on rename operation of broken directory
Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2024 01:51:07 +0900
Syzbot reported that in rename directory operation on broken directory on
nilfs2, __block_write_begin_int() called to prepare block write may fail
BUG_ON check for access exceeding the folio/page size.
This is because nilfs_dotdot(), which gets parent directory reference
entry ("..") of the directory to be moved or renamed, does not check
consistency enough, and may return location exceeding folio/page size for
broken directories.
Fix this issue by checking required directory entries ("." and "..") in
the first chunk of the directory in nilfs_dotdot().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240628165107.9006-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+d3abed1ad3d367fa2627(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d3abed1ad3d367fa2627
Fixes: 2ba466d74ed7 ("nilfs2: directory entry operations")
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/nilfs2/dir.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/nilfs2/dir.c~nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-on-rename-operation-of-broken-directory
+++ a/fs/nilfs2/dir.c
@@ -383,11 +383,39 @@ found:
struct nilfs_dir_entry *nilfs_dotdot(struct inode *dir, struct folio **foliop)
{
- struct nilfs_dir_entry *de = nilfs_get_folio(dir, 0, foliop);
+ struct folio *folio;
+ struct nilfs_dir_entry *de, *next_de;
+ size_t limit;
+ char *msg;
+ de = nilfs_get_folio(dir, 0, &folio);
if (IS_ERR(de))
return NULL;
- return nilfs_next_entry(de);
+
+ limit = nilfs_last_byte(dir, 0); /* is a multiple of chunk size */
+ if (unlikely(!limit || le64_to_cpu(de->inode) != dir->i_ino ||
+ !nilfs_match(1, ".", de))) {
+ msg = "missing '.'";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ next_de = nilfs_next_entry(de);
+ /*
+ * If "next_de" has not reached the end of the chunk, there is
+ * at least one more record. Check whether it matches "..".
+ */
+ if (unlikely((char *)next_de == (char *)de + nilfs_chunk_size(dir) ||
+ !nilfs_match(2, "..", next_de))) {
+ msg = "missing '..'";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ *foliop = folio;
+ return next_de;
+
+fail:
+ nilfs_error(dir->i_sb, "directory #%lu %s", dir->i_ino, msg);
+ folio_release_kmap(folio, de);
+ return NULL;
}
ino_t nilfs_inode_by_name(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from konishi.ryusuke(a)gmail.com are
nilfs2-avoid-undefined-behavior-in-nilfs_cnt32_ge-macro.patch