August 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mptcp: mib: count MPJ with backup flag" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 4dde0d72ccec500c60c798e036b852e013d6e124 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024080722-survive-jacket-b862@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 4dde0d72ccec ("mptcp: mib: count MPJ with backup flag") b3ea6b272d79 ("mptcp: consolidate initial ack seq generation") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 4dde0d72ccec500c60c798e036b852e013d6e124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Sat, 27 Jul 2024 12:01:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] mptcp: mib: count MPJ with backup flag Without such counters, it is difficult to easily debug issues with MPJ not having the backup flags on production servers. This is not strictly a fix, but it eases to validate the following patches without requiring to take packet traces, to query ongoing connections with Netlink with admin permissions, or to guess by looking at the behaviour of the packet scheduler. Also, the modification is self contained, isolated, well controlled, and the increments are done just after others, there from the beginning. It looks then safe, and helpful to backport this. Fixes: 4596a2c1b7f5 ("mptcp: allow creating non-backup subflows") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/net/mptcp/mib.c b/net/mptcp/mib.c index c30405e76833..7884217f33eb 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/mib.c +++ b/net/mptcp/mib.c @@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ static const struct snmp_mib mptcp_snmp_list[] = { SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPTCPRetrans", MPTCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinNoTokenFound", MPTCP_MIB_JOINNOTOKEN), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinSynRx", MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNRX), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinSynBackupRx", MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNBACKUPRX), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinSynAckRx", MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKRX), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinSynAckBackupRx", MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKBACKUPRX), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinSynAckHMacFailure", MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKMAC), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinAckRx", MPTCP_MIB_JOINACKRX), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("MPJoinAckHMacFailure", MPTCP_MIB_JOINACKMAC), diff --git a/net/mptcp/mib.h b/net/mptcp/mib.h index 2704afd0dfe4..66aa67f49d03 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/mib.h +++ b/net/mptcp/mib.h @@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ enum linux_mptcp_mib_field { MPTCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS, /* Segments retransmitted at the MPTCP-level */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINNOTOKEN, /* Received MP_JOIN but the token was not found */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNRX, /* Received a SYN + MP_JOIN */ + MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNBACKUPRX, /* Received a SYN + MP_JOIN + backup flag */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKRX, /* Received a SYN/ACK + MP_JOIN */ + MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKBACKUPRX, /* Received a SYN/ACK + MP_JOIN + backup flag */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKMAC, /* HMAC was wrong on SYN/ACK + MP_JOIN */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINACKRX, /* Received an ACK + MP_JOIN */ MPTCP_MIB_JOINACKMAC, /* HMAC was wrong on ACK + MP_JOIN */ diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c index a3778aee4e77..be406197b1c4 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c @@ -168,6 +168,9 @@ static int subflow_check_req(struct request_sock *req, return 0; } else if (opt_mp_join) { SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNRX); + + if (mp_opt.backup) + SUBFLOW_REQ_INC_STATS(req, MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNBACKUPRX); } if (opt_mp_capable && listener->request_mptcp) { @@ -577,6 +580,9 @@ static void subflow_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) subflow->mp_join = 1; MPTCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKRX); + if (subflow->backup) + MPTCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), MPTCP_MIB_JOINSYNACKBACKUPRX); + if (subflow_use_different_dport(msk, sk)) { pr_debug("synack inet_dport=%d %d", ntohs(inet_sk(sk)->inet_dport),

1 year, 4 months

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[tip: x86/urgent] x86/mtrr: Check if fixed MTRRs exist before saving them

by tip-bot2 for Andi Kleen

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: 919f18f961c03d6694aa726c514184f2311a4614 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/919f18f961c03d6694aa726c514184f2311a4614 Author: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Wed, 07 Aug 2024 17:02:44 -07:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CommitterDate: Thu, 08 Aug 2024 17:03:12 +02:00 x86/mtrr: Check if fixed MTRRs exist before saving them MTRRs have an obsolete fixed variant for fine grained caching control of the 640K-1MB region that uses separate MSRs. This fixed variant has a separate capability bit in the MTRR capability MSR. So far all x86 CPUs which support MTRR have this separate bit set, so it went unnoticed that mtrr_save_state() does not check the capability bit before accessing the fixed MTRR MSRs. Though on a CPU that does not support the fixed MTRR capability this results in a #GP. The #GP itself is harmless because the RDMSR fault is handled gracefully, but results in a WARN_ON(). Add the missing capability check to prevent this. Fixes: 2b1f6278d77c ("[PATCH] x86: Save the MTRRs of the BSP before booting an AP") Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240808000244.946864-1-ak@linux.intel.com --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c index 767bf1c..2a2fc14 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ void mtrr_save_state(void) { int first_cpu; - if (!mtrr_enabled()) + if (!mtrr_enabled() || !mtrr_state.have_fixed) return; first_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);

1 year, 4 months

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[GIT PULL 1/2] KVM: s390: fix validity interception issue when gisa is switched off

by Janosch Frank

From: Michael Mueller <mimu(a)linux.ibm.com> We might run into a SIE validity if gisa has been disabled either via using kernel parameter "kvm.use_gisa=0" or by setting the related sysfs attribute to N (echo N >/sys/module/kvm/parameters/use_gisa). The validity is caused by an invalid value in the SIE control block's gisa designation. That happens because we pass the uninitialized gisa origin to virt_to_phys() before writing it to the gisa designation. To fix this we return 0 in kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc() if the origin is 0. kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc() is used to determine which gisa designation to set in the SIE control block. A value of 0 in the gisa designation disables gisa usage. The issue surfaces in the host kernel with the following kernel message as soon a new kvm guest start is attemted. kvm: unhandled validity intercept 0x1011 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 781237 at arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c:101 kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x42e/0x4d0 [kvm] Modules linked in: vhost_net tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp nft_compat x_tables nf_nat_tftp nf_conntrack_tftp vfio_pci_core irqbypass vhost_vsock vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock vhost vhost_iotlb kvm nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables sunrpc mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core uvdevice s390_trng eadm_sch vfio_ccw zcrypt_cex4 mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio sch_fq_codel drm i2c_core loop drm_panel_orientation_quirks configfs nfnetlink lcs ctcm fsm dm_service_time ghash_s390 prng chacha_s390 libchacha aes_s390 des_s390 libdes sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 sha512_s390 sha256_s390 sha1_s390 sha_common dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log zfcp scsi_transport_fc scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua pkey zcrypt dm_multipath rng_core autofs4 [last unloaded: vfio_pci] CPU: 0 PID: 781237 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.10.0-08682-gcad9f11498ea #6 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 701 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 000003d93deb0122 (kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x432/0x4d0 [kvm]) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000003d900000027 000003d900000023 0000000000000028 000002cd00000000 000002d063a00900 00000359c6daf708 00000000000bebb5 0000000000001eff 000002cfd82e9000 000002cfd80bc000 0000000000001011 000003d93deda412 000003ff8962df98 000003d93de77ce0 000003d93deb011e 00000359c6daf960 Krnl Code: 000003d93deb0112: c020fffe7259 larl %r2,000003d93de7e5c4 000003d93deb0118: c0e53fa8beac brasl %r14,000003d9bd3c7e70 #000003d93deb011e: af000000 mc 0,0 >000003d93deb0122: a728ffea lhi %r2,-22 000003d93deb0126: a7f4fe24 brc 15,000003d93deafd6e 000003d93deb012a: 9101f0b0 tm 176(%r15),1 000003d93deb012e: a774fe48 brc 7,000003d93deafdbe 000003d93deb0132: 40a0f0ae sth %r10,174(%r15) Call Trace: [<000003d93deb0122>] kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x432/0x4d0 [kvm] ([<000003d93deb011e>] kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x42e/0x4d0 [kvm]) [<000003d93deacc10>] vcpu_post_run+0x1d0/0x3b0 [kvm] [<000003d93deaceda>] __vcpu_run+0xea/0x2d0 [kvm] [<000003d93dead9da>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16a/0x430 [kvm] [<000003d93de93ee0>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x190/0x7c0 [kvm] [<000003d9bd728b4e>] vfs_ioctl+0x2e/0x70 [<000003d9bd72a092>] __s390x_sys_ioctl+0xc2/0xd0 [<000003d9be0e9222>] __do_syscall+0x1f2/0x2e0 [<000003d9be0f9a90>] system_call+0x70/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000003d9bd3c7f58>] __warn_printk+0xe8/0xf0 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Fixes: fe0ef0030463 ("KVM: s390: sort out physical vs virtual pointers usage") Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <mimu(a)linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240801123109.2782155-1-mimu@linux.ibm.com Message-ID: <20240801123109.2782155-1-mimu(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> --- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h index bf8534218af3..e680c6bf0c9d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.h @@ -267,7 +267,12 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_s390_get_gfn_end(struct kvm_memslots *slots) static inline u32 kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc(struct kvm *kvm) { - u32 gd = virt_to_phys(kvm->arch.gisa_int.origin); + u32 gd; + + if (!kvm->arch.gisa_int.origin) + return 0; + + gd = virt_to_phys(kvm->arch.gisa_int.origin); if (gd && sclp.has_gisaf) gd |= GISA_FORMAT1; -- 2.46.0

1 year, 4 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 9/9] tracefs: Use generic inode RCU for synchronizing freeing

by Steven Rostedt

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> With structure layout randomization enabled for 'struct inode' we need to avoid overlapping any of the RCU-used / initialized-only-once members, e.g. i_lru or i_sb_list to not corrupt related list traversals when making use of the rcu_head. For an unlucky structure layout of 'struct inode' we may end up with the following splat when running the ftrace selftests: [<...>] list_del corruption, ffff888103ee2cb0->next (tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object]) is NULL (prev is tracefs_inode_cache+0x78/0x4e0 [slab object]) [<...>] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [<...>] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:54! [<...>] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN [<...>] CPU: 3 PID: 2550 Comm: mount Tainted: G N 6.8.12-grsec+ #122 ed2f536ca62f28b087b90e3cc906a8d25b3ddc65 [<...>] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [<...>] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84656018>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x138/0x3e0 [<...>] Code: 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff e9 03 5c d9 fc cc 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff e9 33 5a d9 fc cc 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff <0f> 0b 4c 89 e9 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60 8f dd 89 31 c0 e8 2f [<...>] RSP: 0018:fffffe80416afaf0 EFLAGS: 00010283 [<...>] RAX: 0000000000000098 RBX: ffff888103ee2cb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [<...>] RDX: ffffffff84655fe8 RSI: ffffffff89dd8b60 RDI: 0000000000000001 [<...>] RBP: ffff888103ee2cb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd0082d5f25 [<...>] R10: fffffe80416af92f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: fdf99c16731d9b6d [<...>] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88819ad4b8b8 R15: 0000000000000000 [<...>] RBX: tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x108/0x3e0 [<...>] RSI: __func__.47+0x4340/0x4400 [<...>] RBP: tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] RSP: process kstack fffffe80416afaf0+0x7af0/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe80416af928+0x7928/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R10: process kstack fffffe80416af92f+0x792f/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R14: tracefs_inode_cache+0x78/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] FS: 00006dcb380c1840(0000) GS:ffff8881e0600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [<...>] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [<...>] CR2: 000076ab72b30e84 CR3: 000000000b088004 CR4: 0000000000360ef0 shadow CR4: 0000000000360ef0 [<...>] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [<...>] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [<...>] ASID: 0003 [<...>] Stack: [<...>] ffffffff818a2315 00000000f5c856ee ffffffff896f1840 ffff888103ee2cb0 [<...>] ffff88812b6b9750 0000000079d714b6 fffffbfff1e9280b ffffffff8f49405f [<...>] 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff888104457280 ffffffff8248b392 [<...>] Call Trace: [<...>] <TASK> [<...>] [<ffffffff818a2315>] ? lock_release+0x175/0x380 fffffe80416afaf0 [<...>] [<ffffffff8248b392>] list_lru_del+0x152/0x740 fffffe80416afb48 [<...>] [<ffffffff8248ba93>] list_lru_del_obj+0x113/0x280 fffffe80416afb88 [<...>] [<ffffffff8940fd19>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x119/0x200 fffffe80416afb90 [<...>] [<ffffffff8295b244>] iput_final+0x1c4/0x9a0 fffffe80416afbb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8293a52b>] dentry_unlink_inode+0x44b/0xaa0 fffffe80416afbf8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8293fefc>] __dentry_kill+0x23c/0xf00 fffffe80416afc40 [<...>] [<ffffffff8953a85f>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x1f/0xa0 fffffe80416afc48 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949ce5>] ? shrink_dentry_list+0x1c5/0x760 fffffe80416afc70 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949b71>] ? shrink_dentry_list+0x51/0x760 fffffe80416afc78 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949da8>] shrink_dentry_list+0x288/0x760 fffffe80416afc80 [<...>] [<ffffffff8294ae75>] shrink_dcache_sb+0x155/0x420 fffffe80416afcc8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8953a7c3>] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x23/0xa0 fffffe80416afce0 [<...>] [<ffffffff8294ad20>] ? do_one_tree+0x140/0x140 fffffe80416afcf8 [<...>] [<ffffffff82997349>] ? do_remount+0x329/0xa00 fffffe80416afd18 [<...>] [<ffffffff83ebf7a1>] ? security_sb_remount+0x81/0x1c0 fffffe80416afd38 [<...>] [<ffffffff82892096>] reconfigure_super+0x856/0x14e0 fffffe80416afd70 [<...>] [<ffffffff815d1327>] ? ns_capable_common+0xe7/0x2a0 fffffe80416afd90 [<...>] [<ffffffff82997436>] do_remount+0x416/0xa00 fffffe80416afdd0 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ba4>] path_mount+0x5c4/0x900 fffffe80416afe28 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b25e0>] ? finish_automount+0x13a0/0x13a0 fffffe80416afe60 [<...>] [<ffffffff82903812>] ? user_path_at_empty+0xb2/0x140 fffffe80416afe88 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ff5>] do_mount+0x115/0x1c0 fffffe80416afeb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ee0>] ? path_mount+0x900/0x900 fffffe80416afed8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8272461c>] ? __kasan_check_write+0x1c/0xa0 fffffe80416afee0 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b31cf>] __do_sys_mount+0x12f/0x280 fffffe80416aff30 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b36cd>] __x64_sys_mount+0xcd/0x2e0 fffffe80416aff70 [<...>] [<ffffffff819f8818>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x218/0x380 fffffe80416aff88 [<...>] [<ffffffff8111655e>] x64_sys_call+0x5d5e/0x6720 fffffe80416affa8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8952756d>] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x3c0 fffffe80416affb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8100119b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack+0x4c/0x87 fffffe80416affe8 [<...>] </TASK> [<...>] <PTREGS> [<...>] RIP: 0033:[<00006dcb382ff66a>] vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38225000-6dcb3837e000 22 55(read|exec|mayread|mayexec)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] Code: 48 8b 0d 29 18 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f6 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [<...>] RSP: 002b:0000763d68192558 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [<...>] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00006dcb38433264 RCX: 00006dcb382ff66a [<...>] RDX: 000017c3e0d11210 RSI: 000017c3e0d1a5a0 RDI: 000017c3e0d1ae70 [<...>] RBP: 000017c3e0d10fb0 R08: 000017c3e0d11260 R09: 00006dcb383d1be0 [<...>] R10: 000000000020002e R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [<...>] R13: 000017c3e0d1ae70 R14: 000017c3e0d11210 R15: 000017c3e0d10fb0 [<...>] RBX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38433000-6dcb38434000 5b 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RCX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38225000-6dcb3837e000 22 55(read|exec|mayread|mayexec)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RDX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RSI: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RDI: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RBP: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RSP: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 763d68173000-763d68195000 7ffffffdd 100133(read|write|mayread|maywrite|growsdown|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R08: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R09: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb383d1000-6dcb383d3000 1cd 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R13: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R14: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R15: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] </PTREGS> [<...>] Modules linked in: [<...>] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The list debug message as well as RBX's symbolic value point out that the object in question was allocated from 'tracefs_inode_cache' and that the list's '->next' member is at offset 0. Dumping the layout of the relevant parts of 'struct tracefs_inode' gives the following: struct tracefs_inode { union { struct inode { struct list_head { struct list_head * next; /* 0 8 */ struct list_head * prev; /* 8 8 */ } i_lru; [...] } vfs_inode; struct callback_head { void (*func)(struct callback_head *); /* 0 8 */ struct callback_head * next; /* 8 8 */ } rcu; }; [...] }; Above shows that 'vfs_inode.i_lru' overlaps with 'rcu' which will destroy the 'i_lru' list as soon as the 'rcu' member gets used, e.g. in call_rcu() or later when calling the RCU callback. This will disturb concurrent list traversals as well as object reuse which assumes these list heads will keep their integrity. For reproduction, the following diff manually overlays 'i_lru' with 'rcu' as, otherwise, one would require some good portion of luck for gambling an unlucky RANDSTRUCT seed: --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ struct inode { umode_t i_mode; unsigned short i_opflags; kuid_t i_uid; + struct list_head i_lru; /* inode LRU list */ kgid_t i_gid; unsigned int i_flags; @@ -690,7 +691,6 @@ struct inode { u16 i_wb_frn_avg_time; u16 i_wb_frn_history; #endif - struct list_head i_lru; /* inode LRU list */ struct list_head i_sb_list; struct list_head i_wb_list; /* backing dev writeback list */ union { The tracefs inode does not need to supply its own RCU delayed destruction of its inode. The inode code itself offers both a "destroy_inode()" callback that gets called when the last reference of the inode is released, and the "free_inode()" which is called after a RCU synchronization period from the "destroy_inode()". The tracefs code can unlink the inode from its list in the destroy_inode() callback, and the simply free it from the free_inode() callback. This should provide the same protection. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240807115143.45927-3-minipli@grsecurity.net/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Ilkka =?utf-8?b?TmF1bGFww6TDpA==?= <digirigawa(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240807185402.61410544@gandalf.local.home Fixes: baa23a8d4360 ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options") Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender(a)grsecurity.net> Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 10 ++++------ fs/tracefs/internal.h | 5 +---- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index 21a7e51fc3c1..1748dff58c3b 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -53,15 +53,14 @@ static struct inode *tracefs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) return &ti->vfs_inode; } -static void tracefs_free_inode_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) +static void tracefs_free_inode(struct inode *inode) { - struct tracefs_inode *ti; + struct tracefs_inode *ti = get_tracefs(inode); - ti = container_of(rcu, struct tracefs_inode, rcu); kmem_cache_free(tracefs_inode_cachep, ti); } -static void tracefs_free_inode(struct inode *inode) +static void tracefs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode) { struct tracefs_inode *ti = get_tracefs(inode); unsigned long flags; @@ -69,8 +68,6 @@ static void tracefs_free_inode(struct inode *inode) spin_lock_irqsave(&tracefs_inode_lock, flags); list_del_rcu(&ti->list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tracefs_inode_lock, flags); - - call_rcu(&ti->rcu, tracefs_free_inode_rcu); } static ssize_t default_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, @@ -437,6 +434,7 @@ static int tracefs_drop_inode(struct inode *inode) static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = { .alloc_inode = tracefs_alloc_inode, .free_inode = tracefs_free_inode, + .destroy_inode = tracefs_destroy_inode, .drop_inode = tracefs_drop_inode, .statfs = simple_statfs, .show_options = tracefs_show_options, diff --git a/fs/tracefs/internal.h b/fs/tracefs/internal.h index f704d8348357..d83c2a25f288 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/internal.h +++ b/fs/tracefs/internal.h @@ -10,10 +10,7 @@ enum { }; struct tracefs_inode { - union { - struct inode vfs_inode; - struct rcu_head rcu; - }; + struct inode vfs_inode; /* The below gets initialized with memset_after(ti, 0, vfs_inode) */ struct list_head list; unsigned long flags; -- 2.43.0

1 year, 4 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 7/9] tracing: Fix overflow in get_free_elt()

by Steven Rostedt

From: Tze-nan Wu <Tze-nan.Wu(a)mediatek.com> "tracing_map->next_elt" in get_free_elt() is at risk of overflowing. Once it overflows, new elements can still be inserted into the tracing_map even though the maximum number of elements (`max_elts`) has been reached. Continuing to insert elements after the overflow could result in the tracing_map containing "tracing_map->max_size" elements, leaving no empty entries. If any attempt is made to insert an element into a full tracing_map using `__tracing_map_insert()`, it will cause an infinite loop with preemption disabled, leading to a CPU hang problem. Fix this by preventing any further increments to "tracing_map->next_elt" once it reaches "tracing_map->max_elt". Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 08d43a5fa063e ("tracing: Add lock-free tracing_map") Co-developed-by: Cheng-Jui Wang <cheng-jui.wang(a)mediatek.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240805055922.6277-1-Tze-nan.Wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Cheng-Jui Wang <cheng-jui.wang(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Tze-nan Wu <Tze-nan.Wu(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- kernel/trace/tracing_map.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c b/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c index a4dcf0f24352..3a56e7c8aa4f 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c +++ b/kernel/trace/tracing_map.c @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static struct tracing_map_elt *get_free_elt(struct tracing_map *map) struct tracing_map_elt *elt = NULL; int idx; - idx = atomic_inc_return(&map->next_elt); + idx = atomic_fetch_add_unless(&map->next_elt, 1, map->max_elts); if (idx < map->max_elts) { elt = *(TRACING_MAP_ELT(map->elts, idx)); if (map->ops && map->ops->elt_init) @@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ void tracing_map_clear(struct tracing_map *map) { unsigned int i; - atomic_set(&map->next_elt, -1); + atomic_set(&map->next_elt, 0); atomic64_set(&map->hits, 0); atomic64_set(&map->drops, 0); @@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ struct tracing_map *tracing_map_create(unsigned int map_bits, map->map_bits = map_bits; map->max_elts = (1 << map_bits); - atomic_set(&map->next_elt, -1); + atomic_set(&map->next_elt, 0); map->map_size = (1 << (map_bits + 1)); map->ops = ops; -- 2.43.0

1 year, 4 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 6/9] function_graph: Fix the ret_stack used by ftrace_graph_ret_addr()

by Steven Rostedt

From: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu(a)suse.com> When ftrace_graph_ret_addr() is invoked to convert a found stack return address to its original value, the function can end up producing the following crash: [ 95.442712] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 [ 95.442720] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 95.442724] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 95.442727] PGD 0 P4D 0- [ 95.442731] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 95.442736] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2214 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE K 6.11.0-rc1-default #1 67c62a3b3720562f7e7db5f11c1fdb40b7a2857c [ 95.442747] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE, [K]=LIVEPATCH [ 95.442750] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 95.442754] RIP: 0010:ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x42/0xc0 [ 95.442766] Code: [...] [ 95.442773] RSP: 0018:ffff979b80ff7718 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 95.442776] RAX: ffffffff8ca99b10 RBX: ffff979b80ff7760 RCX: ffff979b80167dc0 [ 95.442780] RDX: ffffffff8ca99b10 RSI: ffff979b80ff7790 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 95.442783] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 95.442786] R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8e9491e0 [ 95.442790] R13: ffffffff8d6f70f0 R14: ffff979b80167da8 R15: ffff979b80167dc8 [ 95.442793] FS: 00007fbf83895740(0000) GS:ffff8a0afdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 95.442797] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 95.442800] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000005070002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 95.442806] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 95.442809] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 95.442816] Call Trace: [ 95.442823] <TASK> [ 95.442896] unwind_next_frame+0x20d/0x830 [ 95.442905] arch_stack_walk_reliable+0x94/0xe0 [ 95.442917] stack_trace_save_tsk_reliable+0x7d/0xe0 [ 95.442922] klp_check_and_switch_task+0x55/0x1a0 [ 95.442931] task_call_func+0xd3/0xe0 [ 95.442938] klp_try_switch_task.part.5+0x37/0x150 [ 95.442942] klp_try_complete_transition+0x79/0x2d0 [ 95.442947] klp_enable_patch+0x4db/0x890 [ 95.442960] do_one_initcall+0x41/0x2e0 [ 95.442968] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 95.442975] load_module+0x1ebf/0x1fb0 [ 95.443004] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xc0 [ 95.443010] idempotent_init_module+0x190/0x240 [ 95.443015] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5b/0xc0 [ 95.443019] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x160 [ 95.443232] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 95.443236] RIP: 0033:0x7fbf82f2c709 [ 95.443241] Code: [...] [ 95.443247] RSP: 002b:00007fffd5ea3b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 95.443253] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056359c48e750 RCX: 00007fbf82f2c709 [ 95.443257] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000056356ed4efc5 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 95.443260] RBP: 000056356ed4efc5 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fffd5ea3c10 [ 95.443263] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 95.443267] R13: 000056359c48e6f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 95.443272] </TASK> [ 95.443274] Modules linked in: [...] [ 95.443385] Unloaded tainted modules: intel_uncore_frequency(E):1 isst_if_common(E):1 skx_edac(E):1 [ 95.443414] CR2: 0000000000000028 The bug can be reproduced with kselftests: cd linux/tools/testing/selftests make TARGETS='ftrace livepatch' (cd ftrace; ./ftracetest test.d/ftrace/fgraph-filter.tc) (cd livepatch; ./test-livepatch.sh) The problem is that ftrace_graph_ret_addr() is supposed to operate on the ret_stack of a selected task but wrongly accesses the ret_stack of the current task. Specifically, the above NULL dereference occurs when task->curr_ret_stack is non-zero, but current->ret_stack is NULL. Correct ftrace_graph_ret_addr() to work with the right ret_stack. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Reported-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes(a)suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240803131211.17255-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com Fixes: 7aa1eaef9f42 ("function_graph: Allow multiple users to attach to function graph") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- kernel/trace/fgraph.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c index fc205ad167a9..d1d5ea2d0a1b 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/fgraph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/fgraph.c @@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ unsigned long ftrace_graph_ret_addr(struct task_struct *task, int *idx, i = *idx ? : task->curr_ret_stack; while (i > 0) { - ret_stack = get_ret_stack(current, i, &i); + ret_stack = get_ret_stack(task, i, &i); if (!ret_stack) break; /* -- 2.43.0

1 year, 4 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 5/9] eventfs: Use SRCU for freeing eventfs_inodes

by Steven Rostedt

From: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> To mirror the SRCU lock held in eventfs_iterate() when iterating over eventfs inodes, use call_srcu() to free them too. This was accidentally(?) degraded to RCU in commit 43aa6f97c2d0 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts"). Cc: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240723210755.8970-1-minipli@grsecurity.net Fixes: 43aa6f97c2d0 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts") Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c index a9c28a1d5dc8..01e99e98457d 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void release_ei(struct kref *ref) entry->release(entry->name, ei->data); } - call_rcu(&ei->rcu, free_ei_rcu); + call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, &ei->rcu, free_ei_rcu); } static inline void put_ei(struct eventfs_inode *ei) -- 2.43.0

1 year, 4 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 4/9] eventfs: Dont return NULL in eventfs_create_dir()

by Steven Rostedt

From: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Commit 77a06c33a22d ("eventfs: Test for ei->is_freed when accessing ei->dentry") added another check, testing if the parent was freed after we released the mutex. If so, the function returns NULL. However, all callers expect it to either return a valid pointer or an error pointer, at least since commit 5264a2f4bb3b ("tracing: Fix a NULL vs IS_ERR() bug in event_subsystem_dir()"). Returning NULL will therefore fail the error condition check in the caller. Fix this by substituting the NULL return value with a fitting error pointer. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 77a06c33a22d ("eventfs: Test for ei->is_freed when accessing ei->dentry") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240723122522.2724-1-minipli@grsecurity.net Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c index 5d88c184f0fc..a9c28a1d5dc8 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ struct eventfs_inode *eventfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct eventfs_inode /* Was the parent freed? */ if (list_empty(&ei->list)) { cleanup_ei(ei); - ei = NULL; + ei = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY); } return ei; } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 4 months

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[for-linus][PATCH 3/9] tracefs: Fix inode allocation

by Steven Rostedt

From: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> The leading comment above alloc_inode_sb() is pretty explicit about it: /* * This must be used for allocating filesystems specific inodes to set * up the inode reclaim context correctly. */ Switch tracefs over to alloc_inode_sb() to make sure inodes are properly linked. Cc: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240807115143.45927-2-minipli@grsecurity.net Fixes: ba37ff75e04b ("eventfs: Implement tracefs_inode_cache") Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index 1028ab6d9a74..21a7e51fc3c1 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static struct inode *tracefs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) struct tracefs_inode *ti; unsigned long flags; - ti = kmem_cache_alloc(tracefs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); + ti = alloc_inode_sb(sb, tracefs_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ti) return NULL; -- 2.43.0

1 year, 4 months

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[git:media_stage/master] media: uapi/linux/cec.h: cec_msg_set_reply_to: zero flags

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

This is an automatic generated email to let you know that the following patch were queued: Subject: media: uapi/linux/cec.h: cec_msg_set_reply_to: zero flags Author: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> Date: Wed Aug 7 09:22:10 2024 +0200 The cec_msg_set_reply_to() helper function never zeroed the struct cec_msg flags field, this can cause unexpected behavior if flags was uninitialized to begin with. Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> Fixes: 0dbacebede1e ("[media] cec: move the CEC framework out of staging and to media") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> include/uapi/linux/cec.h | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cec.h b/include/uapi/linux/cec.h index 894fffc66f2c..b2af1dddd4d7 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/cec.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cec.h @@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static inline void cec_msg_init(struct cec_msg *msg, * Set the msg destination to the orig initiator and the msg initiator to the * orig destination. Note that msg and orig may be the same pointer, in which * case the change is done in place. + * + * It also zeroes the reply, timeout and flags fields. */ static inline void cec_msg_set_reply_to(struct cec_msg *msg, struct cec_msg *orig) @@ -139,7 +141,9 @@ static inline void cec_msg_set_reply_to(struct cec_msg *msg, /* The destination becomes the initiator and vice versa */ msg->msg[0] = (cec_msg_destination(orig) << 4) | cec_msg_initiator(orig); - msg->reply = msg->timeout = 0; + msg->reply = 0; + msg->timeout = 0; + msg->flags = 0; } /**

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Linux-stable-mirror August 2024