August 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[RESEND PATCH v1] mm/vmalloc: fix page mapping if vm_area_alloc_pages() with high order fallback to order 0

by Hailong Liu

The __vmap_pages_range_noflush() assumes its argument pages** contains pages with the same page shift. However, since commit e9c3cda4d86e (mm, vmalloc: fix high order __GFP_NOFAIL allocations), if gfp_flags includes __GFP_NOFAIL with high order in vm_area_alloc_pages() and page allocation failed for high order, the pages** may contain two different page shifts (high order and order-0). This could lead __vmap_pages_range_noflush() to perform incorrect mappings, potentially resulting in memory corruption. Users might encounter this as follows (vmap_allow_huge = true, 2M is for PMD_SIZE): kvmalloc(2M, __GFP_NOFAIL|GFP_X) __vmalloc_node_range_noprof(vm_flags=VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP) vm_area_alloc_pages(order=9) ---> order-9 allocation failed and fallback to order-0 vmap_pages_range() vmap_pages_range_noflush() __vmap_pages_range_noflush(page_shift = 21) ----> wrong mapping happens We can remove the fallback code because if a high-order allocation fails, __vmalloc_node_range_noprof() will retry with order-0. Therefore, it is unnecessary to fallback to order-0 here. Therefore, fix this by removing the fallback code. Fixes: e9c3cda4d86e ("mm, vmalloc: fix high order __GFP_NOFAIL allocations") Signed-off-by: Hailong Liu <hailong.liu(a)oppo.com> Reported-by: Tangquan.Zheng <zhengtangquan(a)oppo.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> CC: Barry Song <21cnbao(a)gmail.com> CC: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> --- mm/vmalloc.c | 11 ++--------- mm/vmalloc.c.rej | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 mm/vmalloc.c.rej diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index 6b783baf12a1..af2de36549d6 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -3584,15 +3584,8 @@ vm_area_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp, int nid, page = alloc_pages_noprof(alloc_gfp, order); else page = alloc_pages_node_noprof(nid, alloc_gfp, order); - if (unlikely(!page)) { - if (!nofail) - break; - - /* fall back to the zero order allocations */ - alloc_gfp |= __GFP_NOFAIL; - order = 0; - continue; - } + if (unlikely(!page)) + break; /* * Higher order allocations must be able to be treated as --- sorry for fat fingers. with .rej file. resend this. Baoquan suggests set page_shift to 0 if fallback in (2 and concern about performance of retry with order-0. But IMO with retry, - Save memory usage if high order allocation failed. - Keep consistancy with align and page-shift. - make use of bulk allocator with order-0 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240725035318.471-1-hailong.liu@oppo.com/ -- 2.34.1

10 months

1
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[PATCH] drm: omapdrm: Add missing check for alloc_ordered_workqueue

by Ma Ke

As it may return NULL pointer and cause NULL pointer dereference. Add check for the return value of alloc_ordered_workqueue. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2f95bc6d324a ("drm: omapdrm: Perform initialization/cleanup at probe/remove time") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/omap_drv.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/omap_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/omap_drv.c index 6598c9c08ba1..94a57f0d1c08 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/omap_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/omap_drv.c @@ -695,6 +695,10 @@ static int omapdrm_init(struct omap_drm_private *priv, struct device *dev) soc = soc_device_match(omapdrm_soc_devices); priv->omaprev = soc ? (uintptr_t)soc->data : 0; priv->wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("omapdrm", 0); + if (!priv->wq) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_alloc_workqueue; + } mutex_init(&priv->list_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->obj_list); @@ -753,6 +757,7 @@ static int omapdrm_init(struct omap_drm_private *priv, struct device *dev) drm_mode_config_cleanup(ddev); omap_gem_deinit(ddev); destroy_workqueue(priv->wq); +err_alloc_workqueue: omap_disconnect_pipelines(ddev); drm_dev_put(ddev); return ret; -- 2.25.1

10 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH v4 RESEND] lockdep: fix deadlock issue between lockdep and rcu

by Carlos Llamas

From: Zhiguo Niu <zhiguo.niu(a)unisoc.com> There is a deadlock scenario between lockdep and rcu when rcu nocb feature is enabled, just as following call stack: rcuop/x -000|queued_spin_lock_slowpath(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80, val = ?) -001|queued_spin_lock(inline) // try to hold nocb_gp_lock -001|do_raw_spin_lock(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80) -002|__raw_spin_lock_irqsave(inline) -002|_raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80) -003|wake_nocb_gp_defer(inline) -003|__call_rcu_nocb_wake(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F30B680) -004|__call_rcu_common(inline) -004|call_rcu(head = 0xFFFFFFC082EECC28, func = ?) -005|call_rcu_zapped(inline) -005|free_zapped_rcu(ch = ?)// hold graph lock -006|rcu_do_batch(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F245680) -007|nocb_cb_wait(inline) -007|rcu_nocb_cb_kthread(arg = 0xFFFFFF817F245680) -008|kthread(_create = 0xFFFFFF80803122C0) -009|ret_from_fork(asm) rcuop/y -000|queued_spin_lock_slowpath(lock = 0xFFFFFFC08291BBC8, val = 0) -001|queued_spin_lock() -001|lockdep_lock() -001|graph_lock() // try to hold graph lock -002|lookup_chain_cache_add() -002|validate_chain() -003|lock_acquire -004|_raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F211D80) -005|lock_timer_base(inline) -006|mod_timer(inline) -006|wake_nocb_gp_defer(inline)// hold nocb_gp_lock -006|__call_rcu_nocb_wake(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8680) -007|__call_rcu_common(inline) -007|call_rcu(head = 0xFFFFFFC0822E0B58, func = ?) -008|call_rcu_hurry(inline) -008|rcu_sync_call(inline) -008|rcu_sync_func(rhp = 0xFFFFFFC0822E0B58) -009|rcu_do_batch(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F266680) -010|nocb_cb_wait(inline) -010|rcu_nocb_cb_kthread(arg = 0xFFFFFF817F266680) -011|kthread(_create = 0xFFFFFF8080363740) -012|ret_from_fork(asm) rcuop/x and rcuop/y are rcu nocb threads with the same nocb gp thread. This patch release the graph lock before lockdep call_rcu. Fixes: a0b0fd53e1e6 ("locking/lockdep: Free lock classes that are no longer in use") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng(a)gmail.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Cc: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Signed-off-by: Zhiguo Niu <zhiguo.niu(a)unisoc.com> Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan(a)unisoc.com> Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> --- kernel/locking/lockdep.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c index 151bd3de5936..3468d8230e5f 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c +++ b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c @@ -6184,25 +6184,27 @@ static struct pending_free *get_pending_free(void) static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *cb); /* - * Schedule an RCU callback if no RCU callback is pending. Must be called with - * the graph lock held. - */ -static void call_rcu_zapped(struct pending_free *pf) +* See if we need to queue an RCU callback, must called with +* the lockdep lock held, returns false if either we don't have +* any pending free or the callback is already scheduled. +* Otherwise, a call_rcu() must follow this function call. +*/ +static bool prepare_call_rcu_zapped(struct pending_free *pf) { WARN_ON_ONCE(inside_selftest()); if (list_empty(&pf->zapped)) - return; + return false; if (delayed_free.scheduled) - return; + return false; delayed_free.scheduled = true; WARN_ON_ONCE(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index != pf); delayed_free.index ^= 1; - call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu); + return true; } /* The caller must hold the graph lock. May be called from RCU context. */ @@ -6228,6 +6230,7 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch) { struct pending_free *pf; unsigned long flags; + bool need_callback; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ch != &delayed_free.rcu_head)) return; @@ -6239,14 +6242,18 @@ static void free_zapped_rcu(struct rcu_head *ch) pf = delayed_free.pf + (delayed_free.index ^ 1); __free_zapped_classes(pf); delayed_free.scheduled = false; + need_callback = + prepare_call_rcu_zapped(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index); + lockdep_unlock(); + raw_local_irq_restore(flags); /* - * If there's anything on the open list, close and start a new callback. - */ - call_rcu_zapped(delayed_free.pf + delayed_free.index); + * If there's pending free and its callback has not been scheduled, + * queue an RCU callback. + */ + if (need_callback) + call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu); - lockdep_unlock(); - raw_local_irq_restore(flags); } /* @@ -6286,6 +6293,7 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_reg(void *start, unsigned long size) { struct pending_free *pf; unsigned long flags; + bool need_callback; init_data_structures_once(); @@ -6293,10 +6301,11 @@ static void lockdep_free_key_range_reg(void *start, unsigned long size) lockdep_lock(); pf = get_pending_free(); __lockdep_free_key_range(pf, start, size); - call_rcu_zapped(pf); + need_callback = prepare_call_rcu_zapped(pf); lockdep_unlock(); raw_local_irq_restore(flags); - + if (need_callback) + call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu); /* * Wait for any possible iterators from look_up_lock_class() to pass * before continuing to free the memory they refer to. @@ -6390,6 +6399,7 @@ static void lockdep_reset_lock_reg(struct lockdep_map *lock) struct pending_free *pf; unsigned long flags; int locked; + bool need_callback = false; raw_local_irq_save(flags); locked = graph_lock(); @@ -6398,11 +6408,13 @@ static void lockdep_reset_lock_reg(struct lockdep_map *lock) pf = get_pending_free(); __lockdep_reset_lock(pf, lock); - call_rcu_zapped(pf); + need_callback = prepare_call_rcu_zapped(pf); graph_unlock(); out_irq: raw_local_irq_restore(flags); + if (need_callback) + call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu); } /* @@ -6446,6 +6458,7 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key) struct pending_free *pf; unsigned long flags; bool found = false; + bool need_callback = false; might_sleep(); @@ -6466,11 +6479,14 @@ void lockdep_unregister_key(struct lock_class_key *key) if (found) { pf = get_pending_free(); __lockdep_free_key_range(pf, key, 1); - call_rcu_zapped(pf); + need_callback = prepare_call_rcu_zapped(pf); } lockdep_unlock(); raw_local_irq_restore(flags); + if (need_callback) + call_rcu(&delayed_free.rcu_head, free_zapped_rcu); + /* Wait until is_dynamic_key() has finished accessing k->hash_entry. */ synchronize_rcu(); } -- 2.45.0.rc1.225.g2a3ae87e7f-goog

10 months

5
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0 0

[PATCH for 6.6 stable] btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write

by fdmanana＠kernel.org

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> commit 939b656bc8ab203fdbde26ccac22bcb7f0985be5 upstream. During an append (O_APPEND write flag) direct IO write if the input buffer was not previously faulted in, we can corrupt the file in a way that the final size is unexpected and it includes an unexpected hole. The problem happens like this: 1) We have an empty file, with size 0, for example; 2) We do an O_APPEND direct IO with a length of 4096 bytes and the input buffer is not currently faulted in; 3) We enter btrfs_direct_write(), lock the inode and call generic_write_checks(), which calls generic_write_checks_count(), and that function sets the iocb position to 0 with the following code: if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND) iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read(inode); 4) We call btrfs_dio_write() and enter into iomap, which will end up calling btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() and that calls btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), where we update the i_size of the inode to 4096 bytes; 5) After btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() returns, iomap will attempt to access the page of the write input buffer (at iomap_dio_bio_iter(), with a call to bio_iov_iter_get_pages()) and fail with -EFAULT, which gets returned to btrfs at btrfs_direct_write() via btrfs_dio_write(); 6) At btrfs_direct_write() we get the -EFAULT error, unlock the inode, fault in the write buffer and then goto to the label 'relock'; 7) We lock again the inode, do all the necessary checks again and call again generic_write_checks(), which calls generic_write_checks_count() again, and there we set the iocb's position to 4K, which is the current i_size of the inode, with the following code pointed above: if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND) iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read(inode); 8) Then we go again to btrfs_dio_write() and enter iomap and the write succeeds, but it wrote to the file range [4K, 8K[, leaving a hole in the [0, 4K[ range and an i_size of 8K, which goes against the expections of having the data written to the range [0, 4K[ and get an i_size of 4K. Fix this by not unlocking the inode before faulting in the input buffer, in case we get -EFAULT or an incomplete write, and not jumping to the 'relock' label after faulting in the buffer - instead jump to a location immediately before calling iomap, skipping all the write checks and relocking. This solves this problem and it's fine even in case the input buffer is memory mapped to the same file range, since only holding the range locked in the inode's io tree can cause a deadlock, it's safe to keep the inode lock (VFS lock), as was fixed and described in commit 51bd9563b678 ("btrfs: fix deadlock due to page faults during direct IO reads and writes"). A sample reproducer provided by a reporter is the following: $ cat test.c #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <test file>\n", argv[0]); return 1; } int fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT | O_APPEND, 0644); if (fd < 0) { perror("creating test file"); return 1; } char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); ssize_t ret = write(fd, buf, 4096); if (ret < 0) { perror("pwritev2"); return 1; } struct stat stbuf; ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf); if (ret < 0) { perror("stat"); return 1; } printf("size: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)stbuf.st_size); return stbuf.st_size == 4096 ? 0 : 1; } A test case for fstests will be sent soon. Reported-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/0b841d46-12fe-4e64-9abb-871d8d0de271@re… Fixes: 8184620ae212 ("btrfs: fix lost file sync on direct IO write with nowait and dsync iocb") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> --- fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 1 + fs/btrfs/file.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 06333a74d6c4..86c7f8ce1715 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ struct btrfs_file_private { void *filldir_buf; u64 last_index; struct extent_state *llseek_cached_state; + bool fsync_skip_inode_lock; }; static inline u32 BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(const struct btrfs_fs_info *info) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file.c b/fs/btrfs/file.c index c997b790568f..a47a7bbf9b7e 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/file.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/file.c @@ -1535,21 +1535,37 @@ static ssize_t btrfs_direct_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) * So here we disable page faults in the iov_iter and then retry if we * got -EFAULT, faulting in the pages before the retry. */ +again: from->nofault = true; dio = btrfs_dio_write(iocb, from, written); from->nofault = false; - /* - * iomap_dio_complete() will call btrfs_sync_file() if we have a dsync - * iocb, and that needs to lock the inode. So unlock it before calling - * iomap_dio_complete() to avoid a deadlock. - */ - btrfs_inode_unlock(BTRFS_I(inode), ilock_flags); - - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dio)) + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dio)) { err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dio); - else + } else { + struct btrfs_file_private stack_private = { 0 }; + struct btrfs_file_private *private; + const bool have_private = (file->private_data != NULL); + + if (!have_private) + file->private_data = &stack_private; + + /* + * If we have a synchoronous write, we must make sure the fsync + * triggered by the iomap_dio_complete() call below doesn't + * deadlock on the inode lock - we are already holding it and we + * can't call it after unlocking because we may need to complete + * partial writes due to the input buffer (or parts of it) not + * being already faulted in. + */ + private = file->private_data; + private->fsync_skip_inode_lock = true; err = iomap_dio_complete(dio); + private->fsync_skip_inode_lock = false; + + if (!have_private) + file->private_data = NULL; + } /* No increment (+=) because iomap returns a cumulative value. */ if (err > 0) @@ -1576,10 +1592,12 @@ static ssize_t btrfs_direct_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) } else { fault_in_iov_iter_readable(from, left); prev_left = left; - goto relock; + goto again; } } + btrfs_inode_unlock(BTRFS_I(inode), ilock_flags); + /* * If 'err' is -ENOTBLK or we have not written all data, then it means * we must fallback to buffered IO. @@ -1778,6 +1796,7 @@ static inline bool skip_inode_logging(const struct btrfs_log_ctx *ctx) */ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) { + struct btrfs_file_private *private = file->private_data; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = btrfs_sb(inode->i_sb); @@ -1787,6 +1806,7 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) int ret = 0, err; u64 len; bool full_sync; + const bool skip_ilock = (private ? private->fsync_skip_inode_lock : false); trace_btrfs_sync_file(file, datasync); @@ -1814,7 +1834,10 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) if (ret) goto out; - btrfs_inode_lock(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_ILOCK_MMAP); + if (skip_ilock) + down_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); + else + btrfs_inode_lock(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_ILOCK_MMAP); atomic_inc(&root->log_batch); @@ -1838,7 +1861,10 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) */ ret = start_ordered_ops(inode, start, end); if (ret) { - btrfs_inode_unlock(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_ILOCK_MMAP); + if (skip_ilock) + up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); + else + btrfs_inode_unlock(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_ILOCK_MMAP); goto out; } @@ -1941,7 +1967,10 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) * file again, but that will end up using the synchronization * inside btrfs_sync_log to keep things safe. */ - btrfs_inode_unlock(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_ILOCK_MMAP); + if (skip_ilock) + up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->i_mmap_lock); + else + btrfs_inode_unlock(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_ILOCK_MMAP); if (ret == BTRFS_NO_LOG_SYNC) { ret = btrfs_end_transaction(trans); -- 2.43.0

10 months

3
2
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[PATCH v2 0/7] Add USB clocks to Exynos7885

by David Virag

This set of patches adds the clocks necessary for USB on the Exynos7885 SoC. While at it, also fix some issues with the existing driver/bindings. This set was split from a previous set containing clk, phy, and usb patches [1]. Changes in v2: - Split from full patchset. - Added Cc-stable tags and fixes tag to update CLKS_NR_FSYS patch - Blank line fixes Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-samsung-soc/20240804215458.404085-1-virag.dav… David Virag (7): dt-bindings: clock: exynos7885: Fix duplicated binding dt-bindings: clock: exynos7885: Add CMU_TOP PLL MUX indices dt-bindings: clock: exynos7885: Add indices for USB clocks clk: samsung: exynos7885: Update CLKS_NR_FSYS after bindings fix clk: samsung: exynos7885: Add missing MUX clocks from PLLs in CMU_TOP clk: samsung: clk-pll: Add support for pll_1418x clk: samsung: exynos7885: Add USB related clocks to CMU_FSYS drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos7885.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++------ drivers/clk/samsung/clk-pll.c | 20 ++++-- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-pll.h | 1 + include/dt-bindings/clock/exynos7885.h | 32 ++++++--- 4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.46.0

10 months

2
4
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[PATCH 03/13] serial: don't use uninitialized value in uart_poll_init()

by Jiri Slaby (SUSE)

Coverity reports (as CID 1536978) that uart_poll_init() passes uninitialized pm_state to uart_change_pm(). It is in case the first 'if' takes the true branch (does "goto out;"). Fix this and simplify the function by simple guard(mutex). The code needs no labels after this at all. And it is pretty clear that the code has not fiddled with pm_state at that point. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <jirislaby(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 5e227ef2aa38 (serial: uart_poll_init() should power on the UART) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c index 3afe77f05abf..d63e9b636e02 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c @@ -2690,14 +2690,13 @@ static int uart_poll_init(struct tty_driver *driver, int line, char *options) int ret = 0; tport = &state->port; - mutex_lock(&tport->mutex); + + guard(mutex)(&tport->mutex); port = uart_port_check(state); if (!port || port->type == PORT_UNKNOWN || - !(port->ops->poll_get_char && port->ops->poll_put_char)) { - ret = -1; - goto out; - } + !(port->ops->poll_get_char && port->ops->poll_put_char)) + return -1; pm_state = state->pm_state; uart_change_pm(state, UART_PM_STATE_ON); @@ -2717,10 +2716,10 @@ static int uart_poll_init(struct tty_driver *driver, int line, char *options) ret = uart_set_options(port, NULL, baud, parity, bits, flow); console_list_unlock(); } -out: + if (ret) uart_change_pm(state, pm_state); - mutex_unlock(&tport->mutex); + return ret; } -- 2.46.0

10 months

5
6
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[PATCH net] eventpoll: Annotate data-race of busy_poll_usecs

by Joe Damato

From: Martin Karsten <mkarsten(a)uwaterloo.ca> A struct eventpoll's busy_poll_usecs field can be modified via a user ioctl at any time. All reads of this field should be annotated with READ_ONCE. Fixes: 85455c795c07 ("eventpoll: support busy poll per epoll instance") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin Karsten <mkarsten(a)uwaterloo.ca> Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <jdamato(a)fastly.com> --- fs/eventpoll.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c index f53ca4f7fced..6d0e2f547ae7 100644 --- a/fs/eventpoll.c +++ b/fs/eventpoll.c @@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static bool busy_loop_ep_timeout(unsigned long start_time, static bool ep_busy_loop_on(struct eventpoll *ep) { - return !!ep->busy_poll_usecs || net_busy_loop_on(); + return !!READ_ONCE(ep->busy_poll_usecs) || net_busy_loop_on(); } static bool ep_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time) -- 2.25.1

10 months

3
2
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[PATCH 3/3] io_uring/net: don't pick multiple buffers for non-bundle send

by Jens Axboe

If a send is issued marked with IOSQE_BUFFER_SELECT for selecting a buffer, unless it's a bundle, it should not select multiple buffers. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a05d1f625c7a ("io_uring/net: support bundles for send") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> --- io_uring/net.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/io_uring/net.c b/io_uring/net.c index 050bea5e7256..d08abcca89cc 100644 --- a/io_uring/net.c +++ b/io_uring/net.c @@ -601,17 +601,18 @@ int io_send(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) .iovs = &kmsg->fast_iov, .max_len = INT_MAX, .nr_iovs = 1, - .mode = KBUF_MODE_EXPAND, }; if (kmsg->free_iov) { arg.nr_iovs = kmsg->free_iov_nr; arg.iovs = kmsg->free_iov; - arg.mode |= KBUF_MODE_FREE; + arg.mode = KBUF_MODE_FREE; } if (!(sr->flags & IORING_RECVSEND_BUNDLE)) arg.nr_iovs = 1; + else + arg.mode |= KBUF_MODE_EXPAND; ret = io_buffers_select(req, &arg, issue_flags); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) -- 2.43.0

10 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 2/3] io_uring/net: ensure expanded bundle send gets marked for cleanup

by Jens Axboe

If the iovec inside the kmsg isn't already allocated AND one gets expanded beyond the fixed size, then the request may not already have been marked for cleanup. Ensure that it is. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a05d1f625c7a ("io_uring/net: support bundles for send") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> --- io_uring/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/io_uring/net.c b/io_uring/net.c index 97a48408cec3..050bea5e7256 100644 --- a/io_uring/net.c +++ b/io_uring/net.c @@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ int io_send(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) if (arg.iovs != &kmsg->fast_iov && arg.iovs != kmsg->free_iov) { kmsg->free_iov_nr = ret; kmsg->free_iov = arg.iovs; + req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; } } -- 2.43.0

10 months

1
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[PATCH 1/3] io_uring/net: ensure expanded bundle recv gets marked for cleanup

by Jens Axboe

If the iovec inside the kmsg isn't already allocated AND one gets expanded beyond the fixed size, then the request may not already have been marked for cleanup. Ensure that it is. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2f9c9515bdfd ("io_uring/net: support bundles for recv") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> --- io_uring/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/io_uring/net.c b/io_uring/net.c index 594490a1389b..97a48408cec3 100644 --- a/io_uring/net.c +++ b/io_uring/net.c @@ -1094,6 +1094,7 @@ static int io_recv_buf_select(struct io_kiocb *req, struct io_async_msghdr *kmsg if (arg.iovs != &kmsg->fast_iov && arg.iovs != kmsg->free_iov) { kmsg->free_iov_nr = ret; kmsg->free_iov = arg.iovs; + req->flags |= REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP; } } else { void __user *buf; -- 2.43.0

10 months

1
0
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Linux-stable-mirror August 2024