August 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] spi: rockchip: Resolve unbalanced runtime PM / system PM handling

by Brian Norris

Commit e882575efc77 ("spi: rockchip: Suspend and resume the bus during NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM ops") stopped respecting runtime PM status and simply disabled clocks unconditionally when suspending the system. This causes problems when the device is already runtime suspended when we go to sleep -- in which case we double-disable clocks and produce a WARNing. Switch back to pm_runtime_force_{suspend,resume}(), because that still seems like the right thing to do, and the aforementioned commit makes no explanation why it stopped using it. Also, refactor some of the resume() error handling, because it's not actually a good idea to re-disable clocks on failure. Fixes: e882575efc77 ("spi: rockchip: Suspend and resume the bus during NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM ops") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: "Ondřej Jirman" <megi(a)xff.cz> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220621154218.sau54jeij4bunf56@core/ Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris(a)chromium.org> --- drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c b/drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c index e1ecd96c7858..f30af4316b8b 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-rockchip.c @@ -951,8 +951,11 @@ static int rockchip_spi_suspend(struct device *dev) if (ret < 0) return ret; - clk_disable_unprepare(rs->spiclk); - clk_disable_unprepare(rs->apb_pclk); + ret = pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev); + if (ret < 0) { + spi_controller_resume(ctlr); + return ret; + } pinctrl_pm_select_sleep_state(dev); @@ -967,21 +970,11 @@ static int rockchip_spi_resume(struct device *dev) pinctrl_pm_select_default_state(dev); - ret = clk_prepare_enable(rs->apb_pclk); + ret = pm_runtime_force_resume(dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; - ret = clk_prepare_enable(rs->spiclk); - if (ret < 0) - clk_disable_unprepare(rs->apb_pclk); - - ret = spi_controller_resume(ctlr); - if (ret < 0) { - clk_disable_unprepare(rs->spiclk); - clk_disable_unprepare(rs->apb_pclk); - } - - return 0; + return spi_controller_resume(ctlr); } #endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */ -- 2.46.0.295.g3b9ea8a38a-goog

1 year, 3 months

2
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[PATCH] drm/vmwgfx: Cleanup kms setup without 3d

by Zack Rusin

Do not validate format equality for the non 3d cases to allow xrgb to argb copies and make sure the dx binding flags are only used on dx compatible surfaces. Fixes basic 2d kms setup on configurations without 3d. There's little practical benefit to it because kms framebuffer coherence is disabled on configurations without 3d but with those changes the code actually makes sense. Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> Fixes: d6667f0ddf46 ("drm/vmwgfx: Fix handling of dumb buffers") Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list <bcm-kernel-feedback-list(a)broadcom.com> Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.9+ Cc: Maaz Mombasawala <maaz.mombasawala(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Martin Krastev <martin.krastev(a)broadcom.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c | 9 --------- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c index 288ed0bb75cb..b5fc5a9e123a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c @@ -1339,15 +1339,6 @@ static int vmw_kms_new_framebuffer_surface(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, return -EINVAL; } - /* - * For DX, surface format validation is done when surface->scanout - * is set. - */ - if (!has_sm4_context(dev_priv) && format != surface->metadata.format) { - DRM_ERROR("Invalid surface format for requested mode.\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - vfbs = kzalloc(sizeof(*vfbs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!vfbs) { ret = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c index 1625b30d9970..5721c74da3e0 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c @@ -2276,9 +2276,12 @@ int vmw_dumb_create(struct drm_file *file_priv, const struct SVGA3dSurfaceDesc *desc = vmw_surface_get_desc(format); SVGA3dSurfaceAllFlags flags = SVGA3D_SURFACE_HINT_TEXTURE | SVGA3D_SURFACE_HINT_RENDERTARGET | - SVGA3D_SURFACE_SCREENTARGET | - SVGA3D_SURFACE_BIND_SHADER_RESOURCE | - SVGA3D_SURFACE_BIND_RENDER_TARGET; + SVGA3D_SURFACE_SCREENTARGET; + + if (vmw_surface_is_dx_screen_target_format(format)) { + flags |= SVGA3D_SURFACE_BIND_SHADER_RESOURCE | + SVGA3D_SURFACE_BIND_RENDER_TARGET; + } /* * Without mob support we're just going to use raw memory buffer -- 2.43.0

1 year, 3 months

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[PATCH] cpuidle: haltpoll: Fix guest_halt_poll_ns failed to take effect

by Yanhao Dong

From: ysay <ysaydong(a)gmail.com> When guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink=N,setting guest_halt_poll_ns from a large value to 0 does not reset the CPU polling time, despite guest_halt_poll_ns being intended as a mandatory maximum time limit. The problem was situated in the adjust_poll_limit() within drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c:79. Specifically, when guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink was set to N, resetting guest_halt_poll_ns to zero did not lead to executing any section of code that adjusts dev->poll_limit_ns. The issue has been resolved by relocating the check and assignment for dev->poll_limit_ns outside of the conditional block. This ensures that every modification to guest_halt_poll_ns properly influences the CPU polling time. Signed-off-by: ysay <ysaydong(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 2cffe9f6b96f ("cpuidle: add haltpoll governor") --- drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c b/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c index 663b7f164..99c6260d7 100644 --- a/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c +++ b/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c @@ -78,26 +78,22 @@ static int haltpoll_select(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, static void adjust_poll_limit(struct cpuidle_device *dev, u64 block_ns) { - unsigned int val; + unsigned int val = dev->poll_limit_ns; /* Grow cpu_halt_poll_us if * cpu_halt_poll_us < block_ns < guest_halt_poll_us */ if (block_ns > dev->poll_limit_ns && block_ns <= guest_halt_poll_ns) { - val = dev->poll_limit_ns * guest_halt_poll_grow; + val *= guest_halt_poll_grow; if (val < guest_halt_poll_grow_start) val = guest_halt_poll_grow_start; - if (val > guest_halt_poll_ns) - val = guest_halt_poll_ns; trace_guest_halt_poll_ns_grow(val, dev->poll_limit_ns); - dev->poll_limit_ns = val; } else if (block_ns > guest_halt_poll_ns && guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink) { unsigned int shrink = guest_halt_poll_shrink; - val = dev->poll_limit_ns; if (shrink == 0) { val = 0; } else { @@ -108,8 +104,12 @@ static void adjust_poll_limit(struct cpuidle_device *dev, u64 block_ns) } trace_guest_halt_poll_ns_shrink(val, dev->poll_limit_ns); - dev->poll_limit_ns = val; } + + if (val > guest_halt_poll_ns) + val = guest_halt_poll_ns; + + dev->poll_limit_ns = val; } /** -- 2.43.5

1 year, 3 months

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[PATCH 2/2] mmc : fix for check cqe halt.

by Seunghwan Baek

To check if mmc cqe is in halt state, need to check set/clear of CQHCI_HALT bit. At this time, we need to check with &, not &&. Therefore, code to check whether cqe is in halt state is modified to cqhci_halted, which has already been implemented. Fixes: 0653300224a6 ("mmc: cqhci: rename cqhci.c to cqhci-core.c") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Seunghwan Baek <sh8267.baek(a)samsung.com> --- drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c b/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c index c14d7251d0bb..3d5bcb92c78e 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/cqhci-core.c @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static void __cqhci_enable(struct cqhci_host *cq_host) cqhci_writel(cq_host, cqcfg, CQHCI_CFG); - if (cqhci_readl(cq_host, CQHCI_CTL) & CQHCI_HALT) + if (cqhci_halted(cq_host)) cqhci_writel(cq_host, 0, CQHCI_CTL); mmc->cqe_on = true; @@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ static int cqhci_request(struct mmc_host *mmc, struct mmc_request *mrq) cqhci_writel(cq_host, 0, CQHCI_CTL); mmc->cqe_on = true; pr_debug("%s: cqhci: CQE on\n", mmc_hostname(mmc)); - if (cqhci_readl(cq_host, CQHCI_CTL) && CQHCI_HALT) { + if (cqhci_halted(cq_host)) { pr_err("%s: cqhci: CQE failed to exit halt state\n", mmc_hostname(mmc)); } -- 2.17.1

1 year, 3 months

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[PATCH] binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix AUXV size calculation when ELF_HWCAP2 is defined

by Max Filippov

create_elf_fdpic_tables() does not correctly account the space for the AUX vector when an architecture has ELF_HWCAP2 defined. Prior to the commit 10e29251be0e ("binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix /proc/<pid>/auxv") it resulted in the last entry of the AUX vector being set to zero, but with that change it results in a kernel BUG. Fix that by adding one to the number of AUXV entries (nitems) when ELF_HWCAP2 is defined. Fixes: 10e29251be0e ("binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix /proc/<pid>/auxv") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Greg Ungerer <gregungerer(a)westnet.com.au> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5b51975f-6d0b-413c-8b38-39a6a45e8821@westnet.c… Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc(a)gmail.com> --- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index c11289e1301b..a5cb45cb30c8 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c @@ -594,6 +594,9 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, if (bprm->have_execfd) nitems++; +#ifdef ELF_HWCAP2 + nitems++; +#endif csp = sp; sp -= nitems * 2 * sizeof(unsigned long); -- 2.39.2

1 year, 3 months

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[tip: x86/urgent] x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read()

by tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: b6fb565a2d15277896583d471b21bc14a0c99661 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/b6fb565a2d15277896583d471b21bc14a0c99661 Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 15:53:04 +03:00 Committer: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> CommitterDate: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 12:45:19 -07:00 x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read() The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an address from the VMM. Sean noticed that mmio_read() unintentionally exposes the value of an initialized variable (val) on the stack to the VMM. This variable is only needed as an output value. It did not need to be passed to the VMM in the first place. Do not send the original value of *val to the VMM. [ dhansen: clarify what 'val' is used for. ] Fixes: 31d58c4e557d ("x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO") Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240826125304.1566719-1-kirill.shutemov%40linu… --- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index 078e2ba..da8b66d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ static bool mmio_read(int size, unsigned long addr, unsigned long *val) .r12 = size, .r13 = EPT_READ, .r14 = addr, - .r15 = *val, }; if (__tdx_hypercall(&args))

1 year, 3 months

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[PATCH] x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read()

by Kirill A. Shutemov

The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an address from the VMM. Sean noticed that mmio_read() unintentionally exposes the value of an initialized variable on the stack to the VMM. Do not send the original value of *val to the VMM. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Fixes: 31d58c4e557d ("x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.19+ --- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index 078e2bac2553..da8b66dce0da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ static bool mmio_read(int size, unsigned long addr, unsigned long *val) .r12 = size, .r13 = EPT_READ, .r14 = addr, - .r15 = *val, }; if (__tdx_hypercall(&args)) -- 2.43.0

1 year, 3 months

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[PATCH] codetag: debug: mark codetags for pages which transitioned from being poison to unpoison as empty

by Hao Ge

From: Hao Ge <gehao(a)kylinos.cn> The PG_hwpoison page will be caught and isolated on the entrance to the free buddy page pool. so,when we clear this flag and return it to the buddy system,mark codetags for pages as empty. It was detected by [1] and the following WARN occurred: [ 113.930443][ T3282] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 113.931105][ T3282] alloc_tag was not set [ 113.931576][ T3282] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3282 at ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:130 pgalloc_tag_sub.part.66+0x154/0x164 [ 113.932866][ T3282] Modules linked in: hwpoison_inject fuse ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute ip6table_nat ip6table_man4 [ 113.941638][ T3282] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3282 Comm: madvise11 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc4-dirty #18 [ 113.943003][ T3282] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 113.943453][ T3282] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [ 113.944378][ T3282] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 113.945319][ T3282] pc : pgalloc_tag_sub.part.66+0x154/0x164 [ 113.946016][ T3282] lr : pgalloc_tag_sub.part.66+0x154/0x164 [ 113.946706][ T3282] sp : ffff800087093a10 [ 113.947197][ T3282] x29: ffff800087093a10 x28: ffff0000d7a9d400 x27: ffff80008249f0a0 [ 113.948165][ T3282] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff80008249f2b0 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 113.949134][ T3282] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 113.950597][ T3282] x20: ffff0000c08fcad8 x19: ffff80008251e000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 113.952207][ T3282] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff800081746210 [ 113.953161][ T3282] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d323832335420 x12: 5b5d353031313339 [ 113.954120][ T3282] x11: ffff800087093500 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 [ 113.955078][ T3282] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : ffff80008236ba90 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff [ 113.956036][ T3282] x5 : ffff000b34bf4dc8 x4 : ffff8000820aba90 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 113.956994][ T3282] x2 : ffff800ab320f000 x1 : 841d1e35ac932e00 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 113.957962][ T3282] Call trace: [ 113.958350][ T3282] pgalloc_tag_sub.part.66+0x154/0x164 [ 113.959000][ T3282] pgalloc_tag_sub+0x14/0x1c [ 113.959539][ T3282] free_unref_page+0xf4/0x4b8 [ 113.960096][ T3282] __folio_put+0xd4/0x120 [ 113.960614][ T3282] folio_put+0x24/0x50 [ 113.961103][ T3282] unpoison_memory+0x4f0/0x5b0 [ 113.961678][ T3282] hwpoison_unpoison+0x30/0x48 [hwpoison_inject] [ 113.962436][ T3282] simple_attr_write_xsigned.isra.34+0xec/0x1cc [ 113.963183][ T3282] simple_attr_write+0x38/0x48 [ 113.963750][ T3282] debugfs_attr_write+0x54/0x80 [ 113.964330][ T3282] full_proxy_write+0x68/0x98 [ 113.964880][ T3282] vfs_write+0xdc/0x4d0 [ 113.965372][ T3282] ksys_write+0x78/0x100 [ 113.965875][ T3282] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 [ 113.966440][ T3282] invoke_syscall+0x7c/0x104 [ 113.966984][ T3282] el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x88/0x104 [ 113.967652][ T3282] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x38 [ 113.968893][ T3282] el0_svc+0x3c/0x1b8 [ 113.969379][ T3282] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xbc [ 113.969980][ T3282] el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 [ 113.970511][ T3282] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link [1]: https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/sysc… Fixes: a8fc28dad6d5 ("alloc_tag: introduce clear_page_tag_ref() helper function") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10 Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <gehao(a)kylinos.cn> --- mm/memory-failure.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 7066fc84f351..570388c41532 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2623,6 +2623,12 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) folio_put(folio); if (TestClearPageHWPoison(p)) { + /* the PG_hwpoison page will be caught and isolated + * on the entrance to the free buddy page pool. + * so,when we clear this flag and return it to the buddy system, + * clear it's codetag + */ + clear_page_tag_ref(p); folio_put(folio); ret = 0; } -- 2.25.1

1 year, 3 months

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[PATCH] Fixes: 496d0a648509 ("cpuidle: Fix guest_halt_poll_ns failed to take effect when setting guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink=N")

by Yanhao Dong

From: ysay <ysaydong(a)gmail.com> When guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink=N,setting guest_halt_poll_ns from a large value to 0 does not reset the CPU polling time, despite guest_halt_poll_ns being intended as a mandatory maximum time limit. The problem was situated in the adjust_poll_limit() within drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c:79. Specifically, when guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink was set to N, resetting guest_halt_poll_ns to zero did not lead to executing any section of code that adjusts dev->poll_limit_ns. The issue has been resolved by relocating the check and assignment for dev->poll_limit_ns outside of the conditional block. This ensures that every modification to guest_halt_poll_ns properly influences the CPU polling time. Signed-off-by: ysay <ysaydong(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c b/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c index 663b7f164..99c6260d7 100644 --- a/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c +++ b/drivers/cpuidle/governors/haltpoll.c @@ -78,26 +78,22 @@ static int haltpoll_select(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, static void adjust_poll_limit(struct cpuidle_device *dev, u64 block_ns) { - unsigned int val; + unsigned int val = dev->poll_limit_ns; /* Grow cpu_halt_poll_us if * cpu_halt_poll_us < block_ns < guest_halt_poll_us */ if (block_ns > dev->poll_limit_ns && block_ns <= guest_halt_poll_ns) { - val = dev->poll_limit_ns * guest_halt_poll_grow; + val *= guest_halt_poll_grow; if (val < guest_halt_poll_grow_start) val = guest_halt_poll_grow_start; - if (val > guest_halt_poll_ns) - val = guest_halt_poll_ns; trace_guest_halt_poll_ns_grow(val, dev->poll_limit_ns); - dev->poll_limit_ns = val; } else if (block_ns > guest_halt_poll_ns && guest_halt_poll_allow_shrink) { unsigned int shrink = guest_halt_poll_shrink; - val = dev->poll_limit_ns; if (shrink == 0) { val = 0; } else { @@ -108,8 +104,12 @@ static void adjust_poll_limit(struct cpuidle_device *dev, u64 block_ns) } trace_guest_halt_poll_ns_shrink(val, dev->poll_limit_ns); - dev->poll_limit_ns = val; } + + if (val > guest_halt_poll_ns) + val = guest_halt_poll_ns; + + dev->poll_limit_ns = val; } /** -- 2.43.5

1 year, 3 months

3
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[tip: x86/urgent] x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read()

by tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: eb786ee1390b8fbba633c01a971709c6906fd8bf Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/eb786ee1390b8fbba633c01a971709c6906fd8bf Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> AuthorDate: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 15:53:04 +03:00 Committer: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> CommitterDate: Mon, 26 Aug 2024 07:04:09 -07:00 x86/tdx: Fix data leak in mmio_read() The mmio_read() function makes a TDVMCALL to retrieve MMIO data for an address from the VMM. Sean noticed that mmio_read() unintentionally exposes the value of an initialized variable on the stack to the VMM. Do not send the original value of *val to the VMM. Fixes: 31d58c4e557d ("x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO") Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240826125304.1566719-1-kirill.shutemov%40linu… --- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index 078e2ba..da8b66d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ static bool mmio_read(int size, unsigned long addr, unsigned long *val) .r12 = size, .r13 = EPT_READ, .r14 = addr, - .r15 = *val, }; if (__tdx_hypercall(&args))

1 year, 3 months

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