February 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2] ufs: core: bsg: Fix memory crash in case arpmb command failed

by Arthur Simchaev

In case the device doesn't support arpmb, the kernel get memory crash due to copy user data in bsg_transport_sg_io_fn level. So in case ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req returned error, do not set the job's reply_len. Memory crash backtrace: 3,1290,531166405,-;ufshcd 0000:00:12.5: ARPMB OP failed: error code -22 4,1308,531166555,-;Call Trace: 4,1309,531166559,-; <TASK> 4,1310,531166565,-; ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 4,1311,531166575,-; ? die+0x37/0xa0 4,1312,531166583,-; ? do_trap+0xd4/0xf0 4,1313,531166593,-; ? do_error_trap+0x71/0xb0 4,1314,531166601,-; ? usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 4,1315,531166610,-; ? exc_invalid_op+0x52/0x80 4,1316,531166622,-; ? usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 4,1317,531166630,-; ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 4,1318,531166643,-; ? usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 4,1319,531166652,-; __check_heap_object+0xe3/0x120 4,1320,531166661,-; check_heap_object+0x185/0x1d0 4,1321,531166670,-; __check_object_size.part.0+0x72/0x150 4,1322,531166679,-; __check_object_size+0x23/0x30 4,1323,531166688,-; bsg_transport_sg_io_fn+0x314/0x3b0 Fixes: 6ff265fc5ef6 ("scsi: ufs: core: bsg: Add advanced RPMB support in ufs_bsg") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arthur Simchaev <arthur.simchaev(a)sandisk.com> --- Changes in v2: - Add Fixes tag - Elaborate commit log Signed-off-by: Arthur Simchaev <arthur.simchaev(a)sandisk.com> --- drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c b/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c index 8d4ad0a3f2cf..a8ed9bc6e4f1 100644 --- a/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +++ b/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c @@ -194,10 +194,12 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job) ufshcd_rpm_put_sync(hba); kfree(buff); bsg_reply->result = ret; - job->reply_len = !rpmb ? sizeof(struct ufs_bsg_reply) : sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply); /* complete the job here only if no error */ - if (ret == 0) + if (ret == 0) { + job->reply_len = !rpmb ? sizeof(struct ufs_bsg_reply) : + sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply); bsg_job_done(job, ret, bsg_reply->reply_payload_rcv_len); + } return ret; } -- 2.34.1

6 months, 1 week

4
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[PATCH 5.10/5.15] smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption

by Anastasia Belova

From: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya(a)suse.de> commit b0abcd65ec545701b8793e12bc27dc98042b151a upstream. Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API. Reproducer: # mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt # dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null ... [ 194.196391] ================================================================== [ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899 [ 194.197707] [ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43 [ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs] [ 194.200032] Call Trace: [ 194.200191] <TASK> [ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0 [ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210 [ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0 [ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 [ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340 [ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140 [ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs] [ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs] [ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs] This is because TFM is being used in parallel. Fix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep the existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done in smb3_calc_signature()). Also remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and crypto_wait_req() since it's always going to be a synchronous operation. Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Anastasia Belova <abelova(a)astralinux.ru> [ Anastasia: ] --- Backport fix for CVE-2024-50047 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c index 68f93de2b152..8cfce01cf699 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -4291,7 +4291,7 @@ smb2_get_enc_key(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id, int enc, u8 *key) */ static int crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, - struct smb_rqst *rqst, int enc) + struct smb_rqst *rqst, int enc, struct crypto_aead *tfm) { struct smb2_transform_hdr *tr_hdr = (struct smb2_transform_hdr *)rqst[0].rq_iov[0].iov_base; @@ -4302,8 +4302,6 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE]; struct aead_request *req; u8 *iv; - DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); - struct crypto_aead *tfm; unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize); void *creq; @@ -4314,15 +4312,6 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, return rc; } - rc = smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(server); - if (rc) { - cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: crypto alloc failed\n", __func__); - return rc; - } - - tfm = enc ? server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt : - server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt; - if ((server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_CCM) || (server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)) rc = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, SMB3_GCM256_CRYPTKEY_SIZE); @@ -4361,11 +4350,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv); aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len); - aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, - crypto_req_done, &wait); - - rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) - : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait); + rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req); if (!rc && enc) memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE); @@ -4454,7 +4439,7 @@ smb3_init_transform_rq(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, /* fill the 1st iov with a transform header */ fill_transform_hdr(tr_hdr, orig_len, old_rq, server->cipher_type); - rc = crypt_message(server, num_rqst, new_rq, 1); + rc = crypt_message(server, num_rqst, new_rq, 1, server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt); cifs_dbg(FYI, "Encrypt message returned %d\n", rc); if (rc) goto err_free; @@ -4480,8 +4465,9 @@ decrypt_raw_data(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *buf, unsigned int npages, unsigned int page_data_size, bool is_offloaded) { - struct kvec iov[2]; + struct crypto_aead *tfm; struct smb_rqst rqst = {NULL}; + struct kvec iov[2]; int rc; iov[0].iov_base = buf; @@ -4496,9 +4482,31 @@ decrypt_raw_data(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *buf, rqst.rq_pagesz = PAGE_SIZE; rqst.rq_tailsz = (page_data_size % PAGE_SIZE) ? : PAGE_SIZE; - rc = crypt_message(server, 1, &rqst, 0); + if (is_offloaded) { + if ((server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM) || + (server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)) + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0); + else + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(tfm); + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed alloc decrypt TFM, rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + + return rc; + } + } else { + if (unlikely(!server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt)) + return -EIO; + + tfm = server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt; + } + + rc = crypt_message(server, 1, &rqst, 0, tfm); cifs_dbg(FYI, "Decrypt message returned %d\n", rc); + if (is_offloaded) + crypto_free_aead(tfm); + if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 03651cc6b7a5..245e2dd5a194 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -998,6 +998,12 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses) else cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "Missing expected negotiate contexts\n"); } + + if (server->cipher_type && !rc) { + rc = smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(server); + if (rc) + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: crypto alloc failed, rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + } neg_exit: free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp); return rc; -- 2.43.0

6 months, 1 week

1
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[PATCH] drm/radeon: Add error handlings for r420 CP errata initialization

by Wentao Liang

In r420_cp_errata_init(), the RESYNC information is stored even when the Scratch register is not correctly allocated. Change the return type of r420_cp_errata_init() from void to int to propagate errors to the caller. Add error checking after radeon_scratch_get() to ensure RESYNC information is stored to an allocated address. Log an error message and return the error code immediately when radeon_scratch_get() fails. Additionally, handle the return value of r420_cp_errata_init() in r420_startup() to log an appropriate error message and propagate the error if initialization fails. Fixes: 62cdc0c20663 ("drm/radeon/kms: Workaround RV410/R420 CP errata (V3)") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+ Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r420.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r420.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r420.c index 9a31cdec6415..67c55153cba8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r420.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/r420.c @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void r420_clock_resume(struct radeon_device *rdev) WREG32_PLL(R_00000D_SCLK_CNTL, sclk_cntl); } -static void r420_cp_errata_init(struct radeon_device *rdev) +static int r420_cp_errata_init(struct radeon_device *rdev) { int r; struct radeon_ring *ring = &rdev->ring[RADEON_RING_TYPE_GFX_INDEX]; @@ -215,7 +215,11 @@ static void r420_cp_errata_init(struct radeon_device *rdev) * The proper workaround is to queue a RESYNC at the beginning * of the CP init, apparently. */ - radeon_scratch_get(rdev, &rdev->config.r300.resync_scratch); + r = radeon_scratch_get(rdev, &rdev->config.r300.resync_scratch); + if (r) { + DRM_ERROR("failed to get scratch reg (%d).\n", r); + return r; + } r = radeon_ring_lock(rdev, ring, 8); WARN_ON(r); radeon_ring_write(ring, PACKET0(R300_CP_RESYNC_ADDR, 1)); @@ -290,8 +294,11 @@ static int r420_startup(struct radeon_device *rdev) dev_err(rdev->dev, "failed initializing CP (%d).\n", r); return r; } - r420_cp_errata_init(rdev); - + r = r420_cp_errata_init(rdev); + if (r) { + dev_err(rdev->dev, "failed initializing CP errata workaround (%d).\n", r); + return r; + } r = radeon_ib_pool_init(rdev); if (r) { dev_err(rdev->dev, "IB initialization failed (%d).\n", r); -- 2.42.0.windows.2

6 months, 1 week

2
1
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[PATCH 4/4] char: misc: deallocate static minor in error path

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

When creating sysfs files fail, the allocated minor must be freed such that it can be later reused. That is specially harmful for static minor numbers, since those would always fail to register later on. Fixes: 6d04d2b554b1 ("misc: misc_minor_alloc to use ida for all dynamic/misc dynamic minors") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- drivers/char/misc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/misc.c b/drivers/char/misc.c index 7a768775e558..7843a1a34d64 100644 --- a/drivers/char/misc.c +++ b/drivers/char/misc.c @@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ int misc_register(struct miscdevice *misc) device_create_with_groups(&misc_class, misc->parent, dev, misc, misc->groups, "%s", misc->name); if (IS_ERR(misc->this_device)) { + misc_minor_free(misc->minor); if (is_dynamic) { - misc_minor_free(misc->minor); misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR; } err = PTR_ERR(misc->this_device); -- 2.34.1

6 months, 1 week

2
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Re: [PATCH 6.13 000/258] 6.13.4-rc2 review

by Ronald Warsow

Hi Greg no regressions here on x86_64 (RKL, Intel 11th Gen. CPU) Thanks Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow(a)gmx.de>

6 months, 1 week

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Re: [PATCH 6.13 000/274] 6.13.4-rc1 review

by Ronald Warsow

Hi Greg no regressions here on x86_64 (RKL, Intel 11th Gen. CPU) Thanks Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow(a)gmx.de>

6 months, 1 week

1
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Recall: [PATCH] fpga: bridge: incorrect set to clear freeze_illegal_request register

by Kathpalia, Tanmay

Kathpalia, Tanmay would like to recall the message, "[PATCH] fpga: bridge: incorrect set to clear freeze_illegal_request register".

6 months, 1 week

1
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[PATCH] usb: core: Add error handling in usb_reset_device for autoresume failure

by Wentao Liang

In usb_reset_device(), the function continues execution and calls usb_autosuspend_device() after usb_autosuspend_device fails. To fix this, add error handling for usb_autoresume_device() and return the error code immediately. This ensures that usb_autosuspend_device() is not called when usb_autoresume_device() fails, maintaining device state consistency. Fixes: 94fcda1f8ab5 ("usbcore: remove unused argument in autosuspend") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 2.6.20+ Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c index 21ac9b464696..f2efdbdd1533 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c @@ -6292,7 +6292,9 @@ int usb_reset_device(struct usb_device *udev) noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save(); /* Prevent autosuspend during the reset */ - usb_autoresume_device(udev); + ret = usb_autoresume_device(udev); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_autoresume; if (config) { for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; ++i) { @@ -6341,6 +6343,7 @@ int usb_reset_device(struct usb_device *udev) } usb_autosuspend_device(udev); +error_autoresume: memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag); udev->reset_in_progress = 0; return ret; -- 2.42.0.windows.2

6 months, 1 week

3
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[PATCH] fpga: bridge: incorrect set to clear freeze_illegal_request register

by Kathpalia, Tanmay

From: Tanmay Kathpalia <tanmay.kathpalia(a)altera.com> A Partial Region Controller can be connected to one or more Freeze Bridge. Each Freeze Bridge has an illegal_request bit represented in the freeze_illegal_request register. Thus, instead of just set to clear the illegal_request bit for first Freeze Bridge, we need to ensure the set to clear action is applied to which ever Freeze Bridge that has occurrence of illegal request. Fixes: ca24a648f535 ("fpga: add altera freeze bridge support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chiau Ee Chew <chiau.ee.chew(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tanmay Kathpalia <tanmay.kathpalia(a)altera.com> --- drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c b/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c index 594693ff786e..23e8b2b54355 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/altera-freeze-bridge.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int altera_freeze_br_req_ack(struct altera_freeze_br_data *priv, if (illegal) { dev_err(dev, "illegal request detected 0x%x", illegal); - writel(1, csr_illegal_req_addr); + writel(illegal, csr_illegal_req_addr); illegal = readl(csr_illegal_req_addr); if (illegal) -- 2.35.3

6 months, 1 week

1
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[PATCH] scsi: mpi3mr: fix invalid 64-bit phy bitmask calculation

by Fedor Pchelkin

ffs() operates on arguments of type 'int', not generally considered to be 64-bit values. Shifts like (1 << i) can also only be helpful for calculations that are expected to have a range equal to the width of type 'int'. When the left operand is of type 'int', valid values of the shift argument should not exceed the width of this type (almost always 32 bits), otherwise it is considered as undefined behavior. Since there is a need for manipulating the phy mask bits higher than that, perform the calculations directly in 64 bits. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: cb5b60894602 ("scsi: mpi3mr: Increase maximum number of PHYs to 64 from 32") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> --- drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_transport.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_transport.c b/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_transport.c index 0ba9e6a6a13c..f0da8c0dc55d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_transport.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_transport.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ * */ +#include <linux/bits.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "mpi3mr.h" @@ -608,10 +609,12 @@ static void mpi3mr_delete_sas_phy(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc, mr_sas_port->num_phys--; if (host_node) { - mr_sas_port->phy_mask &= ~(1 << mr_sas_phy->phy_id); + mr_sas_port->phy_mask &= ~BIT_ULL(mr_sas_phy->phy_id); - if (mr_sas_port->lowest_phy == mr_sas_phy->phy_id) - mr_sas_port->lowest_phy = ffs(mr_sas_port->phy_mask) - 1; + if (mr_sas_port->lowest_phy == mr_sas_phy->phy_id && + mr_sas_port->phy_mask) + mr_sas_port->lowest_phy = + __ffs64(mr_sas_port->phy_mask) - 1; } sas_port_delete_phy(mr_sas_port->port, mr_sas_phy->phy); mr_sas_phy->phy_belongs_to_port = 0; @@ -639,10 +642,11 @@ static void mpi3mr_add_sas_phy(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc, list_add_tail(&mr_sas_phy->port_siblings, &mr_sas_port->phy_list); mr_sas_port->num_phys++; if (host_node) { - mr_sas_port->phy_mask |= (1 << mr_sas_phy->phy_id); + mr_sas_port->phy_mask |= BIT_ULL(mr_sas_phy->phy_id); if (mr_sas_phy->phy_id < mr_sas_port->lowest_phy) - mr_sas_port->lowest_phy = ffs(mr_sas_port->phy_mask) - 1; + mr_sas_port->lowest_phy = + __ffs64(mr_sas_port->phy_mask) - 1; } sas_port_add_phy(mr_sas_port->port, mr_sas_phy->phy); mr_sas_phy->phy_belongs_to_port = 1; @@ -1396,7 +1400,7 @@ static struct mpi3mr_sas_port *mpi3mr_sas_port_add(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc, &mr_sas_port->phy_list); mr_sas_port->num_phys++; if (mr_sas_node->host_node) - mr_sas_port->phy_mask |= (1 << i); + mr_sas_port->phy_mask |= BIT_ULL(i); } if (!mr_sas_port->num_phys) { @@ -1406,7 +1410,7 @@ static struct mpi3mr_sas_port *mpi3mr_sas_port_add(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc, } if (mr_sas_node->host_node) - mr_sas_port->lowest_phy = ffs(mr_sas_port->phy_mask) - 1; + mr_sas_port->lowest_phy = __ffs64(mr_sas_port->phy_mask) - 1; if (mr_sas_port->remote_identify.device_type == SAS_END_DEVICE) { tgtdev = mpi3mr_get_tgtdev_by_addr(mrioc, @@ -1738,7 +1742,7 @@ mpi3mr_refresh_sas_ports(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc) found = 0; for (j = 0; j < host_port_count; j++) { if (h_port[j].handle == attached_handle) { - h_port[j].phy_mask |= (1 << i); + h_port[j].phy_mask |= BIT_ULL(i); found = 1; break; } @@ -1765,7 +1769,7 @@ mpi3mr_refresh_sas_ports(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc) port_idx = host_port_count; h_port[port_idx].sas_address = le64_to_cpu(sasinf->sas_address); h_port[port_idx].handle = attached_handle; - h_port[port_idx].phy_mask = (1 << i); + h_port[port_idx].phy_mask = BIT_ULL(i); h_port[port_idx].iounit_port_id = sas_io_unit_pg0->phy_data[i].io_unit_port; h_port[port_idx].lowest_phy = sasinf->phy_num; h_port[port_idx].used = 0; -- 2.48.1

6 months, 1 week

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Linux-stable-mirror February 2025