August 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ima: limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a414016218ca97140171aa3bb926b02e1f68c2cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025041739-props-huff-8deb@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a414016218ca97140171aa3bb926b02e1f68c2cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 10:45:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] ima: limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations Each time a file in policy, that is already opened for read, is opened for write, a Time-of-Measure-Time-of-Use (ToMToU) integrity violation audit message is emitted and a violation record is added to the IMA measurement list. This occurs even if a ToMToU violation has already been recorded. Limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations per file open for read. Note: The IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU atomic flag must be set from the reader side based on policy. This may result in a per file open for read ToMToU violation. Since IMA_MUST_MEASURE is only used for violations, rename the atomic IMA_MUST_MEASURE flag to IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # applies cleanly up to linux-6.6 Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel(a)suse.cz> Tested-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3423b3088de5..e0489c6f7f59 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { #define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1 #define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 #define IMA_DIGSIG 3 -#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 +#define IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU 4 #define IMA_EMITTED_OPENWRITERS 5 /* IMA integrity metadata associated with an inode */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 95118c1887cb..f3e7ac513db3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -129,14 +129,15 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { if (!iint) iint = ima_iint_find(inode); + /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ - if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, - &iint->atomic_flags)) + if (iint && test_and_clear_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, + &iint->atomic_flags)) send_tomtou = true; } } else { if (must_measure) - set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags); + set_bit(IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU, &iint->atomic_flags); /* Limit number of open_writers violations */ if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure) {

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ASoC: q6apm-dai: schedule all available frames to avoid dsp" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 3d4a4411aa8bbc3653ff22a1ff0432eb93d22ae0 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025041708-persevere-tripod-4354@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 3d4a4411aa8bbc3653ff22a1ff0432eb93d22ae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org> Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 17:47:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] ASoC: q6apm-dai: schedule all available frames to avoid dsp under-runs With the existing code, we are only setting up one period at a time, in a ping-pong buffer style. This triggers lot of underruns in the dsp leading to jitter noise during audio playback. Fix this by scheduling all available periods, this will ensure that the dsp has enough buffer feed and ultimatley fixing the underruns and audio distortion. Fixes: 9b4fe0f1cd79 ("ASoC: qdsp6: audioreach: add q6apm-dai support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250314174800.10142-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.… Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c index c9404b5934c7..9d8e8e37c6de 100644 --- a/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c +++ b/sound/soc/qcom/qdsp6/q6apm-dai.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct q6apm_dai_rtd { unsigned int bytes_received; unsigned int copied_total; uint16_t bits_per_sample; + snd_pcm_uframes_t queue_ptr; bool next_track; enum stream_state state; struct q6apm_graph *graph; @@ -134,8 +135,6 @@ static void event_handler(uint32_t opcode, uint32_t token, void *payload, void * prtd->pos += prtd->pcm_count; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&prtd->lock, flags); snd_pcm_period_elapsed(substream); - if (prtd->state == Q6APM_STREAM_RUNNING) - q6apm_write_async(prtd->graph, prtd->pcm_count, 0, 0, 0); break; case APM_CLIENT_EVENT_DATA_READ_DONE: @@ -294,6 +293,27 @@ static int q6apm_dai_prepare(struct snd_soc_component *component, return 0; } +static int q6apm_dai_ack(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) +{ + struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; + struct q6apm_dai_rtd *prtd = runtime->private_data; + int i, ret = 0, avail_periods; + + if (substream->stream == SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK) { + avail_periods = (runtime->control->appl_ptr - prtd->queue_ptr)/runtime->period_size; + for (i = 0; i < avail_periods; i++) { + ret = q6apm_write_async(prtd->graph, prtd->pcm_count, 0, 0, NO_TIMESTAMP); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(component->dev, "Error queuing playback buffer %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + prtd->queue_ptr += runtime->period_size; + } + } + + return ret; +} + static int q6apm_dai_trigger(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd) { @@ -305,9 +325,6 @@ static int q6apm_dai_trigger(struct snd_soc_component *component, case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START: case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME: case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_RELEASE: - /* start writing buffers for playback only as we already queued capture buffers */ - if (substream->stream == SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK) - ret = q6apm_write_async(prtd->graph, prtd->pcm_count, 0, 0, 0); break; case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP: /* TODO support be handled via SoftPause Module */ @@ -836,6 +853,7 @@ static const struct snd_soc_component_driver q6apm_fe_dai_component = { .hw_params = q6apm_dai_hw_params, .pointer = q6apm_dai_pointer, .trigger = q6apm_dai_trigger, + .ack = q6apm_dai_ack, .compress_ops = &q6apm_dai_compress_ops, .use_dai_pcm_id = true, };

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[PATCH] media: uvcvideo: Fix race condition for meta buffer list

by Ricardo Ribalda

queue->irqueue contains a list of the buffers owned by the driver. The list is protected by queue->irqlock. uvc_queue_get_current_buffer() returns a pointer to the current buffer in that list, but does not remove the buffer from it. This can lead to race conditions. Inspecting the code, it seems that the candidate for such race is uvc_queue_return_buffers(). For the capture queue, that function is called with the device streamoff, so no race can occur. On the other hand, the metadata queue, could trigger a race condition, because stop_streaming can be called with the device in any streaming state. We can solve this issue modifying the way the metadata buffer lifetime works. We can keep the queue->irqlock while the use the current metadata buffer. The core of this change is uvc_video_decode_meta(), it now obtains the buffer and holds the spinlock instead of getting the buffer as an argument. Reported-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20250630141707.GG20333@pendragon.ideaso… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 088ead255245 ("media: uvcvideo: Add a metadata device node") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> --- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_isight.c | 3 +- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_queue.c | 4 +- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h | 8 ++-- 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_isight.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_isight.c index 43cda5e760a345af56186603e2f0594b814cdbcb..f0e71744d25cab98184335b46569b31ba1346e12 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_isight.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_isight.c @@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ static int isight_decode(struct uvc_video_queue *queue, struct uvc_buffer *buf, return 0; } -void uvc_video_decode_isight(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, struct uvc_buffer *buf, - struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf) +void uvc_video_decode_isight(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, struct uvc_buffer *buf) { struct urb *urb = uvc_urb->urb; struct uvc_streaming *stream = uvc_urb->stream; diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_queue.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_queue.c index 790184c9843d211d34fa7d66801631d5a07450bd..e184e3ae0f59f142a683263168724bca64509628 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_queue.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_queue.c @@ -310,9 +310,11 @@ void uvc_queue_cancel(struct uvc_video_queue *queue, int disconnect) * Buffers may span multiple packets, and even URBs, therefore the active buffer * remains on the queue until the EOF marker. */ -static struct uvc_buffer * +struct uvc_buffer * __uvc_queue_get_current_buffer(struct uvc_video_queue *queue) { + lockdep_assert_held(&queue->irqlock); + if (list_empty(&queue->irqqueue)) return NULL; diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c index 2e377e7b9e81599aca19b800a171cc16a09c1e8a..d6777090d0f892ffe93696c915acd4ec171ca798 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c @@ -1428,9 +1428,11 @@ static int uvc_video_encode_data(struct uvc_streaming *stream, * previous header. */ static void uvc_video_decode_meta(struct uvc_streaming *stream, - struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf, const u8 *mem, unsigned int length) { + struct vb2_queue *vb2_qmeta = stream->meta.vdev.queue; + struct uvc_video_queue *qmeta = &stream->meta.queue; + struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf; struct uvc_meta_buf *meta; size_t len_std = 2; bool has_pts, has_scr; @@ -1439,7 +1441,13 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_meta(struct uvc_streaming *stream, ktime_t time; const u8 *scr; - if (!meta_buf || length == 2) + if (!vb2_qmeta || length <= 2) + return; + + guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&qmeta->irqlock); + + meta_buf = __uvc_queue_get_current_buffer(qmeta); + if (!meta_buf) return; has_pts = mem[1] & UVC_STREAM_PTS; @@ -1512,30 +1520,48 @@ static void uvc_video_validate_buffer(const struct uvc_streaming *stream, * Completion handler for video URBs. */ -static void uvc_video_next_buffers(struct uvc_streaming *stream, - struct uvc_buffer **video_buf, struct uvc_buffer **meta_buf) +static void uvc_video_next_meta(struct uvc_streaming *stream, + struct uvc_buffer *video_buf) { - uvc_video_validate_buffer(stream, *video_buf); + struct vb2_queue *vb2_qmeta = stream->meta.vdev.queue; + struct uvc_video_queue *qmeta = &stream->meta.queue; + struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf; + struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb2_meta; + const struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb2_video; - if (*meta_buf) { - struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb2_meta = &(*meta_buf)->buf; - const struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vb2_video = &(*video_buf)->buf; + if (!vb2_qmeta) + return; - vb2_meta->sequence = vb2_video->sequence; - vb2_meta->field = vb2_video->field; - vb2_meta->vb2_buf.timestamp = vb2_video->vb2_buf.timestamp; + guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&qmeta->irqlock); - (*meta_buf)->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY; - if (!(*meta_buf)->error) - (*meta_buf)->error = (*video_buf)->error; - *meta_buf = uvc_queue_next_buffer(&stream->meta.queue, - *meta_buf); - } - *video_buf = uvc_queue_next_buffer(&stream->queue, *video_buf); + meta_buf = __uvc_queue_get_current_buffer(qmeta); + if (!meta_buf) + return; + list_del(&meta_buf->queue); + + vb2_meta = &meta_buf->buf; + vb2_video = &video_buf->buf; + + vb2_meta->sequence = vb2_video->sequence; + vb2_meta->field = vb2_video->field; + vb2_meta->vb2_buf.timestamp = vb2_video->vb2_buf.timestamp; + meta_buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY; + if (!meta_buf->error) + meta_buf->error = video_buf->error; + + uvc_queue_buffer_release(meta_buf); +} + +static struct uvc_buffer *uvc_video_next_buffer(struct uvc_streaming *stream, + struct uvc_buffer *video_buf) +{ + uvc_video_validate_buffer(stream, video_buf); + uvc_video_next_meta(stream, video_buf); + return uvc_queue_next_buffer(&stream->queue, video_buf); } static void uvc_video_decode_isoc(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, - struct uvc_buffer *buf, struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf) + struct uvc_buffer *buf) { struct urb *urb = uvc_urb->urb; struct uvc_streaming *stream = uvc_urb->stream; @@ -1559,13 +1585,13 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_isoc(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, ret = uvc_video_decode_start(stream, buf, mem, urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length); if (ret == -EAGAIN) - uvc_video_next_buffers(stream, &buf, &meta_buf); + buf = uvc_video_next_buffer(stream, buf); } while (ret == -EAGAIN); if (ret < 0) continue; - uvc_video_decode_meta(stream, meta_buf, mem, ret); + uvc_video_decode_meta(stream, mem, ret); /* Decode the payload data. */ uvc_video_decode_data(uvc_urb, buf, mem + ret, @@ -1576,12 +1602,12 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_isoc(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, urb->iso_frame_desc[i].actual_length); if (buf->state == UVC_BUF_STATE_READY) - uvc_video_next_buffers(stream, &buf, &meta_buf); + buf = uvc_video_next_buffer(stream, buf); } } static void uvc_video_decode_bulk(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, - struct uvc_buffer *buf, struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf) + struct uvc_buffer *buf) { struct urb *urb = uvc_urb->urb; struct uvc_streaming *stream = uvc_urb->stream; @@ -1607,7 +1633,7 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_bulk(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, do { ret = uvc_video_decode_start(stream, buf, mem, len); if (ret == -EAGAIN) - uvc_video_next_buffers(stream, &buf, &meta_buf); + buf = uvc_video_next_buffer(stream, buf); } while (ret == -EAGAIN); /* If an error occurred skip the rest of the payload. */ @@ -1617,7 +1643,7 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_bulk(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, memcpy(stream->bulk.header, mem, ret); stream->bulk.header_size = ret; - uvc_video_decode_meta(stream, meta_buf, mem, ret); + uvc_video_decode_meta(stream, mem, ret); mem += ret; len -= ret; @@ -1644,7 +1670,7 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_bulk(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, uvc_video_decode_end(stream, buf, stream->bulk.header, stream->bulk.payload_size); if (buf->state == UVC_BUF_STATE_READY) - uvc_video_next_buffers(stream, &buf, &meta_buf); + buf = uvc_video_next_buffer(stream, buf); } stream->bulk.header_size = 0; @@ -1654,7 +1680,7 @@ static void uvc_video_decode_bulk(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, } static void uvc_video_encode_bulk(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, - struct uvc_buffer *buf, struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf) + struct uvc_buffer *buf) { struct urb *urb = uvc_urb->urb; struct uvc_streaming *stream = uvc_urb->stream; @@ -1707,8 +1733,6 @@ static void uvc_video_complete(struct urb *urb) struct uvc_video_queue *qmeta = &stream->meta.queue; struct vb2_queue *vb2_qmeta = stream->meta.vdev.queue; struct uvc_buffer *buf = NULL; - struct uvc_buffer *buf_meta = NULL; - unsigned long flags; int ret; switch (urb->status) { @@ -1734,14 +1758,6 @@ static void uvc_video_complete(struct urb *urb) buf = uvc_queue_get_current_buffer(queue); - if (vb2_qmeta) { - spin_lock_irqsave(&qmeta->irqlock, flags); - if (!list_empty(&qmeta->irqqueue)) - buf_meta = list_first_entry(&qmeta->irqqueue, - struct uvc_buffer, queue); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&qmeta->irqlock, flags); - } - /* Re-initialise the URB async work. */ uvc_urb->async_operations = 0; @@ -1755,7 +1771,7 @@ static void uvc_video_complete(struct urb *urb) * Process the URB headers, and optionally queue expensive memcpy tasks * to be deferred to a work queue. */ - stream->decode(uvc_urb, buf, buf_meta); + stream->decode(uvc_urb, buf); /* If no async work is needed, resubmit the URB immediately. */ if (!uvc_urb->async_operations) { diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h index 757254fc4fe930ae61c9d0425f04d4cd074a617e..bb41477ce4ff5cdbf27bc9d830b63a60645e3fa1 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h @@ -479,8 +479,7 @@ struct uvc_streaming { unsigned int frozen : 1; struct uvc_video_queue queue; struct workqueue_struct *async_wq; - void (*decode)(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, struct uvc_buffer *buf, - struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf); + void (*decode)(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, struct uvc_buffer *buf); struct { struct video_device vdev; @@ -694,6 +693,8 @@ int uvc_queue_init(struct uvc_video_queue *queue, enum v4l2_buf_type type); void uvc_queue_cancel(struct uvc_video_queue *queue, int disconnect); struct uvc_buffer *uvc_queue_next_buffer(struct uvc_video_queue *queue, struct uvc_buffer *buf); +struct uvc_buffer * +__uvc_queue_get_current_buffer(struct uvc_video_queue *queue); struct uvc_buffer *uvc_queue_get_current_buffer(struct uvc_video_queue *queue); void uvc_queue_buffer_release(struct uvc_buffer *buf); static inline int uvc_queue_streaming(struct uvc_video_queue *queue) @@ -802,8 +803,7 @@ u16 uvc_endpoint_max_bpi(struct usb_device *dev, struct usb_host_endpoint *ep); /* Quirks support */ void uvc_video_decode_isight(struct uvc_urb *uvc_urb, - struct uvc_buffer *buf, - struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf); + struct uvc_buffer *buf); /* debugfs and statistics */ void uvc_debugfs_init(void); --- base-commit: d968e50b5c26642754492dea23cbd3592bde62d8 change-id: 20250714-uvc-racemeta-fee2e69bbfcd Best regards, -- Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org>

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[PATCH] media: uvcvideo: Mark invalid entities with id UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID

by Ricardo Ribalda

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Per UVC 1.1+ specification 3.7.2, units and terminals must have a non-zero unique ID. ``` Each Unit and Terminal within the video function is assigned a unique identification number, the Unit ID (UID) or Terminal ID (TID), contained in the bUnitID or bTerminalID field of the descriptor. The value 0x00 is reserved for undefined ID, ``` If we add a new entity with id 0 or a duplicated ID, it will be marked as UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID. In a previous attempt commit 3dd075fe8ebb ("media: uvcvideo: Require entities to have a non-zero unique ID"), we ignored all the invalid units, this broke a lot of non-compatible cameras. Hopefully we are more lucky this time. This also prevents some syzkaller reproducers from triggering warnings due to a chain of entities referring to themselves. In one particular case, an Output Unit is connected to an Input Unit, both with the same ID of 1. But when looking up for the source ID of the Output Unit, that same entity is found instead of the input entity, which leads to such warnings. In another case, a backward chain was considered finished as the source ID was 0. Later on, that entity was found, but its pads were not valid. Here is a sample stack trace for one of those cases. [ 20.650953] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd [ 20.830206] usb 1-1: Using ep0 maxpacket: 8 [ 20.833501] usb 1-1: config 0 descriptor?? [ 21.038518] usb 1-1: string descriptor 0 read error: -71 [ 21.038893] usb 1-1: Found UVC 0.00 device <unnamed> (2833:0201) [ 21.039299] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Output 1 was not initialized! [ 21.041583] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Input 1 was not initialized! [ 21.042218] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 21.042536] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:1147 media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.043195] Modules linked in: [ 21.043535] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-00030-g3480e43aeccf #444 [ 21.044101] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 21.044639] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [ 21.045100] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.045508] Code: fe e8 20 01 00 00 b8 f4 ff ff ff 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b eb e9 0f 0b eb 0a 0f 0b eb 06 <0f> 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 [ 21.046801] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004b318 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 21.047227] RAX: ffff888004e5d458 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff818fccf1 [ 21.047719] RDX: 000000000000007b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888004313290 [ 21.048241] RBP: ffff888004313290 R08: 0001ffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 21.048701] R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0001888004313290 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 21.049138] R13: ffff888004313080 R14: ffff888004313080 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 21.049648] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 21.050271] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 21.050688] CR2: 0000592cc27635b0 CR3: 000000000431c000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 21.051136] PKRU: 55555554 [ 21.051331] Call Trace: [ 21.051480] <TASK> [ 21.051611] ? __warn+0xc4/0x210 [ 21.051861] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.052252] ? report_bug+0x11b/0x1a0 [ 21.052540] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x31/0x40 [ 21.052901] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 21.053197] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 [ 21.053511] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 21.053924] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.054364] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.054834] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.055131] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1e/0x40 [ 21.055441] ? __v4l2_device_register_subdev+0x202/0x210 [ 21.055837] uvc_mc_register_entities+0x358/0x400 [ 21.056144] uvc_register_chains+0x1fd/0x290 [ 21.056413] uvc_probe+0x380e/0x3dc0 [ 21.056676] ? __lock_acquire+0x5aa/0x26e0 [ 21.056946] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.057196] ? kernfs_activate+0x70/0x80 [ 21.057533] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x1b/0x70 [ 21.057811] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.058047] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x55/0x70 [ 21.058330] ? lock_release+0x124/0x260 [ 21.058657] ? usb_match_one_id_intf+0xa2/0x100 [ 21.058997] usb_probe_interface+0x1ba/0x330 [ 21.059399] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.059662] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.059944] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.060170] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.060427] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.060872] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.061312] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.061812] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.062229] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.062590] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.062912] usb_set_configuration+0x7b6/0xaf0 [ 21.063403] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x36/0x80 [ 21.063714] usb_probe_device+0x7b/0x130 [ 21.063936] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.064111] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.064577] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.065019] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.065403] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.065820] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.066094] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.066535] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.066992] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.067250] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.067501] usb_new_device+0x347/0x610 [ 21.067817] hub_event+0x156b/0x1e30 [ 21.068060] ? process_scheduled_works+0x48b/0xaf0 [ 21.068337] process_scheduled_works+0x5a3/0xaf0 [ 21.068668] worker_thread+0x3cf/0x560 [ 21.068932] ? kthread+0x109/0x1b0 [ 21.069133] kthread+0x197/0x1b0 [ 21.069343] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069598] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069908] ret_from_fork+0x32/0x40 [ 21.070169] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.070424] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 21.070737] </TASK> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+0584f746fde3d52b4675(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0584f746fde3d52b4675 Reported-by: syzbot+dd320d114deb3f5bb79b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dd320d114deb3f5bb79b Fixes: a3fbc2e6bb05 ("media: mc-entity.c: use WARN_ON, validate link pads") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Co-developed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> --- This is a new attempt to land a Thadeu's patch, but being a bit more benevolent on the non-compliant cameras. I have kept most of Thadeu's code, but instead of returning an error when trying to allocate an invalid entity, I replace its id with a special ID. Thadeu can you validate this new version? Tomasz can you also check this patch with your non compliant camera? Thanks! --- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c index 775bede0d93d9b3e5391914aa395326d3de6a3b1..46923cd85f0b6790f01ae6b393571ca7660900f7 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c @@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ struct uvc_entity *uvc_entity_by_id(struct uvc_device *dev, int id) { struct uvc_entity *entity; + if (id == UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID) + return NULL; + list_for_each_entry(entity, &dev->entities, list) { if (entity->id == id) return entity; @@ -795,14 +798,27 @@ static const u8 uvc_media_transport_input_guid[16] = UVC_GUID_UVC_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_INPUT; static const u8 uvc_processing_guid[16] = UVC_GUID_UVC_PROCESSING; -static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_entity(u16 type, u16 id, - unsigned int num_pads, unsigned int extra_size) +static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_new_entity(struct uvc_device *dev, u16 type, + u16 id, unsigned int num_pads, + unsigned int extra_size) { struct uvc_entity *entity; unsigned int num_inputs; unsigned int size; unsigned int i; + /* Per UVC 1.1+ spec 3.7.2, the ID should be non-zero. */ + if (id == 0) { + dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "Found Unit with invalid ID 0.\n"); + id = UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID; + } + + /* Per UVC 1.1+ spec 3.7.2, the ID is unique. */ + if (uvc_entity_by_id(dev, id)) { + dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "Found multiple Units with ID %u\n", id); + id = UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID; + } + extra_size = roundup(extra_size, sizeof(*entity->pads)); if (num_pads) num_inputs = type & UVC_TERM_OUTPUT ? num_pads : num_pads - 1; @@ -812,7 +828,7 @@ static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_entity(u16 type, u16 id, + num_inputs; entity = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (entity == NULL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); entity->id = id; entity->type = type; @@ -924,10 +940,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_vendor_control(struct uvc_device *dev, break; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT, buffer[3], - p + 1, 2*n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT, + buffer[3], p + 1, 2 * n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->guid, &buffer[4], 16); unit->extension.bNumControls = buffer[20]; @@ -1036,10 +1052,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - term = uvc_alloc_entity(type | UVC_TERM_INPUT, buffer[3], - 1, n + p); - if (term == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + term = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, type | UVC_TERM_INPUT, + buffer[3], 1, n + p); + if (IS_ERR(term)) + return PTR_ERR(term); if (UVC_ENTITY_TYPE(term) == UVC_ITT_CAMERA) { term->camera.bControlSize = n; @@ -1095,10 +1111,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return 0; } - term = uvc_alloc_entity(type | UVC_TERM_OUTPUT, buffer[3], - 1, 0); - if (term == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + term = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, type | UVC_TERM_OUTPUT, + buffer[3], 1, 0); + if (IS_ERR(term)) + return PTR_ERR(term); memcpy(term->baSourceID, &buffer[7], 1); @@ -1117,9 +1133,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], p + 1, 0); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], + p + 1, 0); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->baSourceID, &buffer[5], p); @@ -1139,9 +1156,9 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], 2, n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], 2, n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->baSourceID, &buffer[4], 1); unit->processing.wMaxMultiplier = @@ -1168,9 +1185,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], p + 1, n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], + p + 1, n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->guid, &buffer[4], 16); unit->extension.bNumControls = buffer[20]; @@ -1315,9 +1333,10 @@ static int uvc_gpio_parse(struct uvc_device *dev) return dev_err_probe(&dev->intf->dev, irq, "No IRQ for privacy GPIO\n"); - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT, UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID, 0, 1); - if (!unit) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT, + UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID, 0, 1); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); unit->gpio.gpio_privacy = gpio_privacy; unit->gpio.irq = irq; diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h index 70dc80e2b213dff333665022b3410b175d072793..881bfa0caab22714c26a3260cc843bda8e2706a4 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ #define UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT 0x7ffe #define UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID 0x100 +#define UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID 0xffff + /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Driver specific constants. */ --- base-commit: a75b8d198c55e9eb5feb6f6e155496305caba2dc change-id: 20250820-uvc-thadeu2-25723a961bd8 Best regards, -- Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org>

3 weeks

4
5
0 0

[PATCH] fs/ceph/addr: fix crash after fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks() error

by Max Kellermann

The function move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() was created by commit ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method") by moving code from ceph_writepages_start() to this function. This new function is supposed to return an error code which is checked by the caller (now ceph_process_folio_batch()), and on error, the caller invokes redirty_page_for_writepage() and then breaks from the loop. However, the refactoring commit has gone wrong, and it by accident, it always returns 0 (= success) because it first NULLs the pointer and then returns PTR_ERR(NULL) which is always 0. This means errors are silently ignored, leaving NULL entries in the page array, which may later crash the kernel. The simple solution is to call PTR_ERR() before clearing the pointer. Fixes: ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ceph-devel/aK4v548CId5GIKG1@swift.blarg.de/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 8b202d789e93..e3e0d477f3f7 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -1264,7 +1264,9 @@ static inline int move_dirty_folio_in_page_array(struct address_space *mapping, 0, gfp_flags); if (IS_ERR(pages[index])) { - if (PTR_ERR(pages[index]) == -EINVAL) { + int err = PTR_ERR(pages[index]); + + if (err == -EINVAL) { pr_err_client(cl, "inode->i_blkbits=%hhu\n", inode->i_blkbits); } @@ -1273,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline int move_dirty_folio_in_page_array(struct address_space *mapping, BUG_ON(ceph_wbc->locked_pages == 0); pages[index] = NULL; - return PTR_ERR(pages[index]); + return err; } } else { pages[index] = &folio->page; -- 2.47.2

3 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] firmware: arm_scmi: quirk: fix write to string constant

by Johan Hovold

The quirk version range is typically a string constant and must not be modified (e.g. as it may be stored in read-only memory): Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffffc036d998a947 Fix the range parsing so that it operates on a copy of the version range string, and mark all the quirk strings as const to reduce the risk of introducing similar future issues. Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220437 Fixes: 487c407d57d6 ("firmware: arm_scmi: Add common framework to handle firmware quirks") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.16 Cc: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/quirks.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/quirks.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/quirks.c index 03960aca3610..e70823754b0b 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/quirks.c @@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ struct scmi_quirk { bool enabled; const char *name; - char *vendor; - char *sub_vendor_id; - char *impl_ver_range; + const char *vendor; + const char *sub_vendor_id; + const char *impl_ver_range; u32 start_range; u32 end_range; struct static_key_false *key; @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static unsigned int scmi_quirk_signature(const char *vend, const char *sub_vend) static int scmi_quirk_range_parse(struct scmi_quirk *quirk) { - const char *last, *first = quirk->impl_ver_range; + const char *last, *first; size_t len; char *sep; int ret; @@ -228,8 +228,12 @@ static int scmi_quirk_range_parse(struct scmi_quirk *quirk) if (!len) return 0; + first = kmemdup(quirk->impl_ver_range, len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!first) + return -ENOMEM; + last = first + len - 1; - sep = strchr(quirk->impl_ver_range, '-'); + sep = strchr(first, '-'); if (sep) *sep = '\0'; @@ -238,7 +242,7 @@ static int scmi_quirk_range_parse(struct scmi_quirk *quirk) else /* X OR X- OR X-y */ ret = kstrtouint(first, 0, &quirk->start_range); if (ret) - return ret; + goto out_free; if (!sep) quirk->end_range = quirk->start_range; @@ -246,7 +250,9 @@ static int scmi_quirk_range_parse(struct scmi_quirk *quirk) ret = kstrtouint(sep + 1, 0, &quirk->end_range); if (quirk->start_range > quirk->end_range) - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; +out_free: + kfree(first); return ret; } -- 2.49.1

3 weeks

3
7
0 0

[PATCH v3] PCI: j721e: Fix programming sequence of "strap" settings

by Siddharth Vadapalli

The Cadence PCIe Controller integrated in the TI K3 SoCs supports both Root-Complex and Endpoint modes of operation. The Glue Layer allows "strapping" the Mode of operation of the Controller, the Link Speed and the Link Width. This is enabled by programming the "PCIEn_CTRL" register (n corresponds to the PCIe instance) within the CTRL_MMR memory-mapped register space. The "reset-values" of the registers are also different depending on the mode of operation. Since the PCIe Controller latches onto the "reset-values" immediately after being powered on, if the Glue Layer configuration is not done while the PCIe Controller is off, it will result in the PCIe Controller latching onto the wrong "reset-values". In practice, this will show up as a wrong representation of the PCIe Controller's capability structures in the PCIe Configuration Space. Some such capabilities which are supported by the PCIe Controller in the Root-Complex mode but are incorrectly latched onto as being unsupported are: - Link Bandwidth Notification - Alternate Routing ID (ARI) Forwarding Support - Next capability offset within Advanced Error Reporting (AER) capability Fix this by powering off the PCIe Controller before programming the "strap" settings and powering it on after that. Fixes: f3e25911a430 ("PCI: j721e: Add TI J721E PCIe driver") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Siddharth Vadapalli <s-vadapalli(a)ti.com> --- Hello, This patch is based on commit 07d9df80082b Merge tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-08-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools of Mainline Linux. v2 of this patch is at: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250819101336.292013-1-s-vadapalli@ti.com/ Changes since v2: - Based on Bjorn's feedback at: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250819221748.GA598958@bhelgaas/ 1) Commit message has been rephrased to summarize the issue and the fix without elaborating too much on the details. 2) Description of the issue's symptoms noticeable by a user has been added to the commit message. 3) Comment has been wrapped to fit within 80 columns. 4) The implementation has been simplified by moving the Controller Power OFF and Power ON sequence into j721e_pcie_ctrl_init() as a result of which the code reordering as well as function parameter changes are no longer required. - Based on offline feedback from Vignesh, Runtime PM APIs are used instead of PM DOMAIN APIs to power off and power on the PCIe Controller. - Rebased patch on latest Mainline Linux. Test Logs on J7200 EVM without the current patch applied show that the ARI Forwarding Capability incorrectly shows up as not being supported: https://gist.github.com/Siddharth-Vadapalli-at-TI/768bca36025ed630c4e69bcc3… Test Logs on J7200 EVM with the current patch applied show that the ARI Forwarding Capability correctly shows up as being supported: https://gist.github.com/Siddharth-Vadapalli-at-TI/fc1752d17140646c8fa57209e… As explained in the commit message, this discrepancy is solely due to the PCIe Controller latching onto the incorrect reset-values which occurs when the strap settings are programmed after the PCIe Controller is powered on, at which point, the reset-values don't toggle anymore. Regards, Siddharth. drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c b/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c index 6c93f39d0288..c178b117215a 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c @@ -284,6 +284,22 @@ static int j721e_pcie_ctrl_init(struct j721e_pcie *pcie) if (!ret) offset = args.args[0]; + /* + * The PCIe Controller's registers have different "reset-values" + * depending on the "strap" settings programmed into the PCIEn_CTRL + * register within the CTRL_MMR memory-mapped register space. + * The registers latch onto a "reset-value" based on the "strap" + * settings sampled after the PCIe Controller is powered on. + * To ensure that the "reset-values" are sampled accurately, power + * off the PCIe Controller before programming the "strap" settings + * and power it on after that. + */ + ret = pm_runtime_put_sync(dev); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to power off PCIe Controller\n"); + return ret; + } + ret = j721e_pcie_set_mode(pcie, syscon, offset); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Failed to set pci mode\n"); @@ -302,6 +318,12 @@ static int j721e_pcie_ctrl_init(struct j721e_pcie *pcie) return ret; } + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to power on PCIe Controller\n"); + return ret; + } + /* Enable ACSPCIE refclk output if the optional property exists */ syscon = syscon_regmap_lookup_by_phandle_optional(node, "ti,syscon-acspcie-proxy-ctrl"); -- 2.43.0

3 weeks

2
12
0 0

[PATCH v3] drm/bridge: cdns-dsi: Replace deprecated UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS()

by Vitor Soares

From: Vitor Soares <vitor.soares(a)toradex.com> The deprecated UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() macro uses the provided callbacks for both runtime PM and system sleep. This causes the DSI clocks to be disabled twice: once during runtime suspend and again during system suspend, resulting in a WARN message from the clock framework when attempting to disable already-disabled clocks. [ 84.384540] clk:231:5 already disabled [ 84.388314] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 531 at /drivers/clk/clk.c:1181 clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xac ... [ 84.579183] Call trace: [ 84.581624] clk_core_disable+0xa4/0xac [ 84.585457] clk_disable+0x30/0x4c [ 84.588857] cdns_dsi_suspend+0x20/0x58 [cdns_dsi] [ 84.593651] pm_generic_suspend+0x2c/0x44 [ 84.597661] ti_sci_pd_suspend+0xbc/0x15c [ 84.601670] dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x14c [ 84.605588] __device_suspend+0x1a0/0x56c [ 84.609594] dpm_suspend+0x17c/0x21c [ 84.613165] dpm_suspend_start+0xa0/0xa8 [ 84.617083] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x12c/0x634 [ 84.621872] pm_suspend+0x1fc/0x368 To address this issue, replace UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS() with SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(), enabling suspend/resume handling through the _enable()/_disable() hooks managed by the DRM framework for both runtime and system-wide PM. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1.x Fixes: e19233955d9e ("drm/bridge: Add Cadence DSI driver") Signed-off-by: Vitor Soares <vitor.soares(a)toradex.com> --- v2 -> v3 - Fix warning: 'cdns_dsi_suspend' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] - Fix warning: 'cdns_dsi_resume' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] v1 -> v2 - Rely only on SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS() for the PM. drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/cadence/cdns-dsi-core.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/cadence/cdns-dsi-core.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/cadence/cdns-dsi-core.c index b022dd6e6b6e..6429d541889c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/cadence/cdns-dsi-core.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/cadence/cdns-dsi-core.c @@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ static const struct mipi_dsi_host_ops cdns_dsi_ops = { .transfer = cdns_dsi_transfer, }; -static int __maybe_unused cdns_dsi_resume(struct device *dev) +static int cdns_dsi_resume(struct device *dev) { struct cdns_dsi *dsi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused cdns_dsi_resume(struct device *dev) return 0; } -static int __maybe_unused cdns_dsi_suspend(struct device *dev) +static int cdns_dsi_suspend(struct device *dev) { struct cdns_dsi *dsi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); @@ -1279,8 +1279,9 @@ static int __maybe_unused cdns_dsi_suspend(struct device *dev) return 0; } -static UNIVERSAL_DEV_PM_OPS(cdns_dsi_pm_ops, cdns_dsi_suspend, cdns_dsi_resume, - NULL); +static const struct dev_pm_ops cdns_dsi_pm_ops = { + RUNTIME_PM_OPS(cdns_dsi_suspend, cdns_dsi_resume, NULL) +}; static int cdns_dsi_drm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { @@ -1427,7 +1428,7 @@ static struct platform_driver cdns_dsi_platform_driver = { .driver = { .name = "cdns-dsi", .of_match_table = cdns_dsi_of_match, - .pm = &cdns_dsi_pm_ops, + .pm = pm_ptr(&cdns_dsi_pm_ops), }, }; module_platform_driver(cdns_dsi_platform_driver); -- 2.34.1

3 weeks

3
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[PATCH 1/2] drm/mediatek: fix potential OF node use-after-free

by Johan Hovold

The for_each_child_of_node() helper drops the reference it takes to each node as it iterates over children and an explicit of_node_put() is only needed when exiting the loop early. Drop the recently introduced bogus additional reference count decrement at each iteration that could potentially lead to a use-after-free. Fixes: 1f403699c40f ("drm/mediatek: Fix device/node reference count leaks in mtk_drm_get_all_drm_priv") Cc: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c index 34131ae2c207..3b02ed0a16da 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c @@ -388,11 +388,11 @@ static bool mtk_drm_get_all_drm_priv(struct device *dev) of_id = of_match_node(mtk_drm_of_ids, node); if (!of_id) - goto next_put_node; + continue; pdev = of_find_device_by_node(node); if (!pdev) - goto next_put_node; + continue; drm_dev = device_find_child(&pdev->dev, NULL, mtk_drm_match); if (!drm_dev) @@ -418,11 +418,10 @@ static bool mtk_drm_get_all_drm_priv(struct device *dev) next_put_device_pdev_dev: put_device(&pdev->dev); -next_put_node: - of_node_put(node); - - if (cnt == MAX_CRTC) + if (cnt == MAX_CRTC) { + of_node_put(node); break; + } } if (drm_priv->data->mmsys_dev_num == cnt) { -- 2.49.1

3 weeks

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[PATCH RESEND] locking/spinlock/debug: Fix data-race in do_raw_write_lock

by A. Sverdlin

From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> KCSAN reports: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_raw_write_lock / do_raw_write_lock write (marked) to 0xffff800009cf504c of 4 bytes by task 1102 on cpu 1: do_raw_write_lock+0x120/0x204 _raw_write_lock_irq do_exit call_usermodehelper_exec_async ret_from_fork read to 0xffff800009cf504c of 4 bytes by task 1103 on cpu 0: do_raw_write_lock+0x88/0x204 _raw_write_lock_irq do_exit call_usermodehelper_exec_async ret_from_fork value changed: 0xffffffff -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 1103 Comm: kworker/u4:1 6.1.111 Commit 1a365e822372 ("locking/spinlock/debug: Fix various data races") has adressed most of these races, but seems to be not consistent/not complete. From do_raw_write_lock() only debug_write_lock_after() part has been converted to WRITE_ONCE(), but not debug_write_lock_before() part. Do it now. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1a365e822372 ("locking/spinlock/debug: Fix various data races") Reported-by: Adrian Freihofer <adrian.freihofer(a)siemens.com> Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> --- There are still some inconsistencies remaining IMO: - lock->magic is sometimes accessed with READ_ONCE() even though it's only being plain-written; - debug_spin_unlock() and debug_write_unlock() both do WRITE_ONCE() on lock->owner and lock->owner_cpu, but examine them with plain read accesses. kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c b/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c index 87b03d2e41dbb..2338b3adfb55f 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c +++ b/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c @@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ void do_raw_read_unlock(rwlock_t *lock) static inline void debug_write_lock_before(rwlock_t *lock) { RWLOCK_BUG_ON(lock->magic != RWLOCK_MAGIC, lock, "bad magic"); - RWLOCK_BUG_ON(lock->owner == current, lock, "recursion"); - RWLOCK_BUG_ON(lock->owner_cpu == raw_smp_processor_id(), + RWLOCK_BUG_ON(READ_ONCE(lock->owner) == current, lock, "recursion"); + RWLOCK_BUG_ON(READ_ONCE(lock->owner_cpu) == raw_smp_processor_id(), lock, "cpu recursion"); } -- 2.47.1

3 weeks

3
2
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